Opinion
C. A. 1:21-1549-JFA-SVH
04-08-2022
Sedrick Jamon Hayes, Plaintiff, v. Corporal S. Eli, Sergeant Karen Scott, and Captain Darren Yarborough, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge.
In this case, a pretrial detainee complains he was not provided with the appropriate religious diet. Sedrick Jamon Hayes (“Plaintiff”) filed this complaint for alleged violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three employees of the Florence County Detention Center (“FCDC”): Corporal S. Eli (“Eli”), Sergeant Karen Scott (“Scott”), and Captain Darren Yarborough (“Yarborough”) (collectively “Defendants”).
The case is before the court on Yarborough's motion for summary judgment and Eli and Scott's motion for summary judgment. [ECF Nos. 23, 49]. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Defendant's motion. [ECF Nos. 24, 50]. Having been fully briefed [ECF Nos. 54, 55], the motions are ripe for disposition.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the case has been referred to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. Having carefully considered the record, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motions for summary judgment.
I. Factual Background
At all relevant times, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at FCDC. When Plaintiff was booked into FCDC on September 9, 2018, he indicated on his medical questionnaire that he was not on any special diet. [ECF No. 23-2].
On September 17, 2018, Plaintiff submitted an inmate grievance stating he needed a “no meat diet, ” was informed that “this must be taken care of by the chaplain, ” and that “we are in transition at this time[, ] please be patient.” [ECF No. 23-4 at 1]. On October 4, 2018, Plaintiff submitted an inmate grievance identifying himself as “Moorish-American Moslem, ” stating he needed an Islamic diet, and stating that “this is a nonnegotiable promissory note that's activated can not void.” Id. at 2.
Two days later, Plaintiff submitted another similar inmate grievance and was informed by Eli that “you need to write Cpt. [Yarborough] about this matter” and “if you are Muslim you need to learn how to spell Muslim.” Id. at 3.
On October 9, 2018, Plaintiff submitted an inmate grievance addressed to Yarborough stating that, based on previous grievances submitted, an officer had “signed a non-negotiable promissory note.” Id. at 4. The next day, Plaintiff submitted an inmate grievance complaining about Eli, stating she was “trying to be sarcastic with my spelling of Moslem, ” and that she had signed a promissory note. Id. at 5; see also Id. at 6-10 (stating the same in additional inmate grievances).
Defendants have submitted evidence that none of them, or any other officer, has any responsibility for Plaintiff's diet and that his diet can only be changed by either the medical department or the chaplain. [ECF No. 23-2 ¶ 2, ECF No. 49-6 ¶ 2, ECF No. 49-7 ¶ 2]. Plaintiff argues, but has not provided evidence in support, that he contacted medical, was informed he need to speak with a chaplain, but that there was not a chaplain “at that time.” [ECF No. 54 at 2]. Plaintiff also has stated he has been offered a religious diet, but “will not accept their bags of no meat or trays at all because they violated my rights.” [ECF No. 10-1 at 8].
Plaintiff alleges he has been discriminated against, that he has been “unstabled” and “physically disabled [his] heart on my religious beliefs, ” and that “20 million dollars per person can help me stabilize my mind, body, and soul back.” [ECF No. 10 at 6].
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Summary Judgment
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A civil action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a means to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, but the statute is not, itself, a source of substantive rights. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). “Section 1983 imposes liability on any person who, under the color of state law, deprives another person ‘of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.'” Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish three elements to state a cause of action: (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or a federal statute; (2) by a person; (3) acting under color of state law.” Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997).
The Eleventh Amendment provides “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has long held the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends not only to suits against a state per se, but also to suits against agents and instrumentalities of the state. Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001).
A plaintiff “is not entitled to monetary damages under § 1983 against Defendants in their official capacities.” Moneyhan v. Keller, 563 Fed.Appx. 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars suits against non-consenting state, its agencies, and its officers acting in their official capacities)). However, suits for damages against state officials sued in their individual capacity are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier against suits to impose ‘individual and personal liability' on state officials under § 1983.”) (citation omitted).
To the extent Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacities, they are not subject to suit under § 1983, and the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motions for summary judgment regarding claims brought against them in their official capacities.
2. Claims Against Individual Defendants
The doctrine of supervisory liability is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of his employees, absent an official policy or custom that results in illegal action. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Fisher v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority, 690 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (4th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court explains that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-74 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding officials may be held liable for the acts of their subordinates, if the official is aware of a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm from a specified source and fails to take corrective action as a result of deliberate indifference or tacit authorization).
Additionally, under the qualified immunity defense, “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity ensures that “[o]fficials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.” Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992). Whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity is a question of law for the court and, when there are no relevant disputed material facts, a court should rule on the qualified immunity issue at the summary judgment stage. Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Ordinarily, the question of qualified immunity should be decided at the summary judgment stage.”).
To resolve a qualified immunity defense, the court must (1) determine whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). Courts may address the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis in whichever order is appropriate in light of the circumstances of the particular case at hand. Id.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence or argument that any of the individual Defendants violated his constitutional rights. While he asserts he requested an Islamic diet, he did not initially disclose it on his medical intake questionnaire. Further, when he filed his first request for a modified diet, officers directed him to the chaplain for approval. The record before the court is undisputed that Defendants do not have the authority to modify an inmate's diet.
Plaintiff complains that Eli was sarcastic in her response to him on paper; however, Plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of his constitutional rights based on the record before the court as to this issue, even assuming she was being sarcastic.
Further, Plaintiff has not demonstrated the pattern of widespread abuse necessary to establish supervisory action or inaction giving rise to § 1983 liability. See Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that “[g]enerally, a failure to supervise gives rise to § 1983 liability . . . only in those situations in which there is a history of widespread abuse”).
It does not appear that Plaintiff asserts any state-law claims. To the extent he does so, the undersigned recommends the district judge decline to retain jurisdiction over any such claims. Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir.1995) (holding district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motions for summary judgment. [ECF Nos. 23, 49].
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Co lins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).