Opinion
No. CV 09-5030876-S
May 5, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
FACTS
The plaintiff is a self-insured welfare benefit plan through Aetna Life Insurance Company and is sponsored by Hartford Hospital (the plan). The defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance (State Farm), is an insurance company providing automobile insurance coverage for motorists in the state of Connecticut. The plaintiff filed a summons, complaint and return of service on June 18, 2009, alleging the following facts. Aetna Life Insurance Company provides claims administration and claims payment services for the plan to employees and eligible dependents of Hartford Hospital. State Farm provides various types of automobile insurance coverage, including liability insurance coverage for insured motorists in the state of Connecticut.
Throughout this memo "the plan" refers to the welfare benefit plan provided by Aetna Life Insurance Company for employees and eligible dependents of Hartford Hospital.
Tiana Carrasquillo was injured in an automobile accident on February 22, 2008, which was the result of the negligence of Lilian Salinas. At all times relevant to the present case, Carrasquillo was covered by the plan, and Salinas was covered by an automobile liability insurance policy issued by the defendant State Farm. Carrasquillo was injured in the accident and incurred medical expenses, towards which the plan expended the sum of $10,760.85.
On July 10, 2008, the plan, through the Rawlings Company LLC (Rawlings), notified State Farm of the plan's claim. On October 24, 2008, the plan's representative, the Rawlings Company, mailed to State Farm a claim statement showing plan benefits paid in the amount of $10,760.85 and confirming the existence of the plan's claim. On July 23, 2008, a representative of State Farm mailed a letter to the Rawlings Company, acknowledging receipt of the letter, confirming State Farm's awareness of the plan's interest, and confirming that the plan's lien would be addressed at the time of the settlement of the claim. On December 30, 2008, State Farm confirmed that it had settled Carrasquillo's claim. State Farm issued payment to Carrasquillo and her attorney, rather than to Aetna, the Rawlings Company or the plan, "despite knowledge of the plan's claim to $10,760.85."
"By operation of law, and by operation of the terms of the plan, Aetna and the plan became the true owner of the amount of property, specifically money, it had paid for medical expenses and, at the time of settlement, had an immediate possessory interest in the funds reserved by State Farm for payment of Tiana Carrasquillo's damages . . . State Farm was aware of the possessory interest of the plan and interfered with and frustrated that interest without the consent of Aetna or the plan, thereby depriving the plan of its property without lawful justification. State Farm did not receive permission from the plan to distribute the plan's property without lawful justification . . . to Tiana Carrasquillo or her attorney, both of whom have continued to withhold the plan's property."
The only count brought in the complaint is conversion, for which the plaintiff argues that the defendant intentionally and unlawfully converted the plan's property (i.e., money) when it paid settlements to Carrasquillo and her attorney, rather than issuing payment to Aetna, the Rawlings Company or the plan.
The defendant filed a motion to strike (#101) and a supporting memorandum of law on July 30, 2009. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion (#104) on October 8, 2009. The defendant filed a reply memorandum to the plaintiff's memorandum in opposition (#105) on February 25, 2010. The current motion before the court is the defendant's motion to strike.
DISCUSSION
"Whenever any party wishes to contest (1) the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint, counterclaim or cross claim, or of any one or more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or (2) the legal sufficiency of any prayer for relief in any such complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or (3) the legal sufficiency of any such complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any count thereof, because of the absence of any necessary party or, pursuant to [§]17-56(b), the failure to join or give notice to any interested person, or (4) the joining of two or more causes of action which cannot properly be united in one complaint, whether the same be stated in one or more counts, or (5) the legal sufficiency of any answer to any complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any part of that answer including any special defense contained therein, that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." Practice Book § 10-39(a).
"[A] party may challenge the legal sufficiency of an adverse party's claim by filing a motion to strike." Vertex v. Waterbury, 278 Conn. 557, 564, 898 A.2d 178 (2006). The court must "construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) American Progressive Life Health Ins. Co. of New York v. Better Benefits, LLC, 292 Conn. 111, 120 (2009). In ruling on a motion to strike, "[t]he role of the trial court [is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [plaintiff has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).
"[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover . . . [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006).
In its complaint, the plaintiff argues that the defendant converted its property (i.e., money) when the defendant issued payment to Carrasquillo and her attorney, rather than to Aetna, the Rawlings Company or the plan, despite knowledge of the plan's claim to $10,760.85. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that "[the defendant] intentionally and unlawfully converted [the plaintiff's] property, specifically money due to the [plaintiff], when it paid the settlement proceeds to Tiana Carrasquillo and her attorney . . ."
I ERISA vs. Connecticut Anti-Subrogation Statute
The defendant first argues that the plaintiff's conversion claim is legally insufficient because it is premised on the subrogation provision of the health plan, which is barred by Connecticut's anti-subrogation statute, General Statutes § 52-225c. In response, the plaintiff argues that § 52-225c does not act as a bar to the plan's claims because the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., preempts Connecticut's anti-subrogation statute. The defendant further argues that the plaintiff's complaint does not allege that it is governed by ERISA, and has not alleged a legally recognized right to possession of the settlement funds that were once held by the defendant.
Connecticut's anti-subrogation statute, General Statutes § 52-225c, provides:
Unless otherwise provided by law, no insurer or any other person providing collateral source benefits as defined in [§]52-225b shall be entitled to recover the amount of any such benefits from the defendant or any other person or entity as a result of any claim or action for damages for personal injury or wrongful death regardless of whether such claim or action is resolved by settlement or judgment. The provisions of this section shall apply to insurance contracts issued, reissued or renewed on or after October 1, 1986.
Neither statutory law nor case law requires an employer-provided health benefit plan to state that the plan falls under ERISA in order to bring a cause of action under the statute. "The terms `employee welfare benefit plan' and `welfare plan' mean any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit described in section 186 (c)of this title (other than pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions)." (Emphasis added.) 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
The plain language of the statute and Connecticut Superior Court cases have found that an employer-provided health benefits plan is governed by ERISA, even when the plan has not explicitly stated that it is governed by ERISA. See, e.g., Bonsanti v. Newman, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 03 0401098 (February 3, 2006, Gilardi, J.) [ 40 Conn. L. Rptr. 700] ("The FlexPlus Plan is an employee benefit plan established and funded by TJX Companies, an employer engaged in commerce as required by 29 U.S.C. 1003(a). Therefore . . . ERISA applies to the FlexPlus Plan").
ERISA's "deemer clause" preempts state law and provides that employee benefit plans covered by ERISA are not "deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any state purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
"In FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 65, 111 S.Ct. 403, 112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990), the United State[s] Supreme Court held that Congress clearly intended `to exempt from direct state insurance regulation, ERISA employee benefit plans.' In fact, according to Holliday, `Congress intended by ERISA to establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern . . . Our interpretation of the deemer clause makes clear that, if a plan is insured, a state may regulate it indirectly through regulation of its insurer and its insurer's insurance contracts; if the plan is uninsured, the state may not regulate it . . . Our Supreme Court has recognized that `[t]he preemption provision of ERISA . . . preempts any state law that may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc., 238 Conn. 216, 233, 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103, 117 S.Ct. 1106, 137 L.Ed.2d 308 (1997). Several Connecticut trial court opinions have also recognized ERISA preemption." Gauntlett v. Webb, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 98 0352842 (August 13, 2003, Ballen, J.T.R.) ( 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 419, 421).
The defendant argues that "a subrogation provision in an insurance policy that conflicts with [§]52-225a is ineffective and unenforceable." However, this court finds that in the present case, the plan is an employee benefit plan established and funded by Hartford Hospital, an employer engaged in commerce, under 29 U.S.C. 1003(a). Therefore, this case shall be governed by ERISA, thus preempting the Connecticut anti-subrogation statute, § 52-225a.
II Enforceable Legal and Contractual Ownership Rights to Funds
The defendant further argues that even if the plan is governed by ERISA, the plaintiff has no contractual relationship with the defendant, there is no allegation that the defendant was party to the health plan, and, therefore, the defendant was not bound by the plan's terms. Further, the defendant argues that the plaintiff fails to allege any statutory or common-law lien that would create an obligation or duty on the part of the defendant to pay the settlement proceeds to the plaintiff. Consequently, the defendant argues that the plaintiff has no contractual ownership rights to the funds.
The defendant cites to Central States Health and Welfare Fund v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 17 F.3d 1081 (7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case that addresses similar issues to the present dispute. In Central States, there were a number of instances in which the plaintiff benefit plan paid members for their medical expenses related to accident injuries, and then notified the defendant, State Farm, of their subrogation rights to the funds. State Farm paid the injured individuals for their expenses related to accident injuries, rather than paying the plaintiff trustee, despite State Farm's knowledge of the plaintiff's subrogation rights. The plaintiff sought an injunction requiring State Farm to settle the plaintiff trustee's subrogation rights, rather than paying the injured parties. State Farm refused to pay the plaintiff, claiming that because State Farm was not a party to the subrogation agreement between the plaintiff and covered individuals, it was not obligated to settle a claim with the plaintiff trustee. The district court held, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, that State Farm was correct in that it had no obligation to settle with the plaintiff because there was no language in either the plan or in ERISA imposing such an obligation on State Farm. Id., 1084.
More recently, the court's discussion in Gauntlett v. Webb, supra, 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 419, regarding the relationships between an insurance company, a plan beneficiary and a third-party payor is instructive in the present matter. In Gauntlett, the terms of the agreement between the plaintiff welfare fund and the plan beneficiary provided that, in the event that the fund paid the beneficiary for injuries and then the beneficiary subsequently received payment from a third-party insurer, the beneficiary would be obligated to reimburse the fund for its previous payment. Id., 420-21. Although in Gauntlett, the issue of repayment was not justiciable at the time that the case was brought, the court made clear that "the terms of the summary plan put the onus on the member . . . to repay the fund from her judgment or settlement; and any future action by [the fund] will lie against the member for her failure to repay . . ." (Emphasis added.) Id., 422.
In the present case, the plaintiff welfare benefit plan includes a subrogation provision and a reimbursement provision in its agreement with its members. These provisions require plan members to reimburse the plan's payment for funds expended on behalf of the plan beneficiary, in the event that the member receives payment from a third party for the same matter. In this case, the parties to the agreement are the plan and the plan's beneficiary, Carrasquillo. As Connecticut courts discussed in Central States and Gauntlett, the onus of reimbursement falls on the plan beneficiary rather than on a third-party payor because a plan beneficiary has a contractual fiduciary relationship with the benefit plan, whereas a third-party payor does not. In the present case, the defendant does not have a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, and therefore is not required to make payments directly to the plaintiff.
The subrogation provision of the employee benefit contract provides:
Immediately upon paying or providing any benefit under the plan, the plan shall be subrogted (to stand in the place of) all rights of recovery by a covered person against any responsible party with respect to any payment made by the responsible party to a covered person due to a covered person's injury, illness, or condition to the full extent of benefits provided or to be provided by the plan.
The reimbursement provision of the employee benefit contract provides: "[I]f a covered person receives any payment from any responsible party or insurance coverage as a result of an injury, illness, or condition, the plan has the right to recover from, and to be reimbursed by, the covered person for all amounts this plan has paid and will pay as a result of that injury, illness, or condition, up to and including the full amount the covered person receives from any responsible party."
III Equitable Subrogation
The plaintiff further argues that it is entitled to the settlement funds under a claim of equitable subrogation because the defendant was notified and acknowledged that the plan possessed a lien/claim for medical benefits paid on behalf of Carrasquillo. In response, the defendant contends that the terms of the plan did not give the plaintiff any enforceable ownership interest in the funds, and that the defendant has no fiduciary obligation to the plaintiff.The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that no fiduciary duty exists between an insurer and a third-party claimant. Macomber v. Travelers Property Casualty Corp., 261 Conn. 620, 641, 804 A.2d 180 (2002). However, equitable subrogation may provide a means for an ERISA employee welfare benefit plan to bring a cause of action against a third-party payor for funds that the plan has expended on behalf of the plan beneficiary. "Subrogation is a concept that has its roots in doctrines of equity, and it is applied by operation of law . . . In its simplest form, subrogation allows a party who has paid a debt to step into the shoes of another (usually the debtee) to assume his or her legal rights against a third party to prevent that party's unjust enrichment . . . The law has recognized two types of subrogation: conventional; and legal or equitable. Conventional subrogation can take effect only by agreement and has been said to be synonymous with assignment. It occurs where one having no interest or any relation to the matter pays the debt of another, and by agreement is entitled to the rights and securities of the creditor so paid . . . By contrast, [t]he right of [equitable] subrogation is not a matter of contract; it does not arise from any contractual relationship between the parties, but takes place as a matter of equity, with or without an agreement to that effect . . . The object of [equitable] subrogation is the prevention of injustice." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gauntlett v. Webb, supra, 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 420.
As the federal law ERISA dictates employee benefit contracts, Connecticut courts have looked to the U.S. Supreme Court's holdings to determine whether a welfare benefit plan has a cause of action against a third-party payor. Federal statutory law provides that a benefit plan may bring a civil action "(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions, of this subchapter or the terms of the plan." (Emphasis added.) 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). The Supreme Court has interpreted the term "other appropriate equitable relief" as pertaining only to "those categories of relief that were typically available in equity," rather than in law. See Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 255-56, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993). In Mertens, the Court found that the plaintiff's claim was unavailable under ERISA because the beneficiaries' claim was for monetary relief for all losses their plan sustained as a result of the alleged breach of fiduciary duties;" id., 255; and further noted that "money damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief." Id.
Subsequent case law handed down by the Supreme Court has affirmed that a plaintiff ERISA employee benefit plan may seek reimbursement for funds it has expended under a claim of equitable, but not legal, relief. In Great-West Life Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 122 S.Ct. 708, 151 L.Ed.2d 635 (2002), the plaintiff welfare benefit plan had paid the member's medical expenses and subsequently sought to collect reimbursement from a third-party payor. The court found that the plan's attempt to "impose personal liability on [the beneficiaries] for a contractual obligation to pay money"; id., 205; was a legal, rather than equitable, remedy and, therefore, the plaintiff did not have a cause of action against the third-party payor. The court explained its finding that the relief sought was legal, rather than equitable, as follows: "Almost invariably . . . suits seeking (whether by judgment, injunction, or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are suits for money damages,' as that phrase has traditionally been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss resulting from the defendant's breach of legal duty." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 210. The court further explained that equitable relief could be sought in the case "where money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant's possession." (Emphasis added.) Id., 213.
Conversely, in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 126 S.Ct. 1869, 164 L.Ed.2d 612 (2006), the Supreme Court held that the welfare benefit plan could bring a cause of action to collect reimbursement from a third-party payor because the plan's claim constituted an equitable, and not legal, remedy. In that case, following a tort action, the plan member obtained a settlement from the alleged tortfeasors, from which the plan sought reimbursement for funds that it had forwarded to the member. Id., 360. While the action regarding reimbursement was pending, the district court ordered the plan member to place the disputed funds in an investment account until the issue of reimbursement had been resolved. Id. The court found that because the settlement from the third-party payor had been set aside in a separate account comprised only of settlement funds, the plan sought an equitable remedy under ERISA. Id., 361. The court distinguished Sereboff from Great-West Life Annuity Ins. Co. because the benefit plan in Sereboff sought to recover "specifically identifiable" funds that were being held in trust pending the outcome of the litigation, whereas there were no "specifically identifiable" funds in Great-West Life Annuity Ins. Co., Id., 362-63.
The Supreme Court's analyses in Great-West Life Annuity Ins. Co. and Sereboff demonstrate that the court makes an important distinction between a equitable and legal relief. Essentially, the court finds that when an ERISA employee welfare benefit plan seeks reimbursement for fees that it had paid on behalf of a plan beneficiary, the plan may only bring a claim for equitable, and not legal, relief.
In Administrative Committee for the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Associates Health and Welfare Plan v. Horton, 513 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2008), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit followed a similar analysis. The court held that, because an action was equitable in nature, a benefit plan with a reimbursement provision in the insurance contract could sue the third party holding settlement proceeds which an insured had obtained through a tortfeasor. The court made such finding because "the most important consideration is not the identity of the defendant, but rather that the settlement proceeds [were] still intact, and thus constituted an identifiable res that [could] be restored to its rightful recipient." (Emphasis added.) Id., 1229.
Connecticut courts follow a similar analysis. For instance, in J.P. Morgan Chase Medical Benefits Plan v. Swiatowiec, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 06 5003605 (July 20, 2009, Aurigemma, J.) [ 48 Conn. L. Rptr. 273], the court addressed whether the plan brought a cause of action seeking equitable or legal relief. In that case, the defendant, a third-party insurance company, argued that the plan was barred by 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) for bringing a claim against the defendant for reimbursement for payment that it had made behalf of the plan's member. The court found that the benefit plan's claim was legal in nature because "in [that] case, there [had] been no prior suit by the plaintiff's insured and there [were] no specifically identifiable funds against which the plaintiff may assert an equitable lien. The plaintiff . . . [sought] legal relief, money damages, and not equitable relief, and, as such, [that] suit [was] not permitted under ERISA."
In the present case, the court finds that the plaintiff's complaint seeks legal, rather than equitable, relief. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant converted its "property" (i.e., money) when it issued payment to Carrasquillo, rather than to the plaintiff. Nevertheless, as the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "money damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief;" Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, supra, 508 U.S. 255-56; and are considered legal relief unless the funds are "specifically identifiable." Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., supra, 547 U.S. 356. As the plaintiff did not claim that Carrasquillo placed the funds in an account solely comprised of settlement funds, the monies that the defendant paid to Carrasquillo do not constitute "specifically identifiable" funds. Consequently, this court finds that the plaintiff seeks legal relief, which is barred by 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
IV Statutory or Contractual Basis for Award of Attorneys Fees
Finally, the defendant argues that the plaintiff has no statutory or contractual basis for award of attorney fees, and that the plaintiff's prayer for relief of attorneys fees is legally insufficient under the American rule. In response, the plaintiff argues that it is entitled to attorneys fees because "one of the basic tenets of ERISA is the preservation of plan assets." The plaintiff, therefore, argues that it is reasonable for the plan to be reimbursed for the sums it expended in legal fees in an effort to recover its assets from State Farm.
"The common law rule in Connecticut, also known as the American rule, is that attorneys fees and ordinary expenses and burdens of litigation are not allowed to the successful party absent a contractual or statutory exception." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 267 Conn. 524, 532, 839 A.2d 1250 (2004).
Absent contractual or statutory authorization, each party is responsible for its own attorneys fees. See, e.g., Matyas v. Minck, 37 Conn.App. 321, 336, 655 A.2d 1155 (1995). The American rule applies, with special exceptions, in both legal and equitable actions; Stoner v. Stoner, 163 Conn. 345, 355-56, 307 A.2d 146 (1972); whether the plaintiff or the defendant is the successful litigant, and even though the need to engage in the litigation was caused by the wrongful act of the opposing party. See Theodore D. Bross Line Construction Corp. v. Ryan Crane Service Corp., 32 Conn.Sup. 181, 345 A.2d 594 (1975). "[The Supreme Court] also has recognized a bad faith exception to the American rule, which permits a court to award attorneys fees to the prevailing party on the basis of bad faith conduct of the other party or the other party's attorney." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 178, 851 A.2d 1113 (2004).
Attorneys fees may be awarded as punitive damages in appropriate cases to compensate a party for litigation expenses, less taxable costs. Roman v. Johnson, 48 Conn.App. 498, 710 A.2d 186 (1998). Punitive damages may only "consist of a reasonable expense properly incurred in the litigation . . . less taxable costs." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Virgo v. Lyons, 209 Conn. 497, 503, 551 A.2d 1243 (1988). Reasonable expenses for an attorney may include reasonable necessary disbursements in addition to a reasonable attorneys fee. Markey v. Santangelo, 195 Conn. 76, 80, 485 A.2d 1305 (1985).
In the present case, there is no contractual foundation upon which the plaintiff may bring a claim against the defendant for attorneys fees. The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that no fiduciary duty exists between an insurer and a third-party claimant. See Macomber v. Travelers Property Casualty Corp., supra, 261 Conn. 641. Here, the plaintiff and the defendant have no fiduciary or contractual relationship with one another and, therefore, the plaintiff has no contractual foundation upon which to collect attorneys fees from the defendant.
Additionally, the plaintiff does not argue that ERISA provides a statutory basis for collecting attorneys fees in such a matter. While the plaintiff asserts that it is entitled to attorneys fees because "one of the basic tenets of ERISA is the preservation of plan assets," this court does not find the plaintiff's argument compelling. Consequently, this court finds that attorneys fees are not an available remedy.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike is granted.