Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-00232-JB-MU
08-20-2020
Cathleen Chislett HARNETT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ESTATE OF John William CHISLETT, deceased, Defendant.
Deena Renee Tyler, Joseph Michael Druhan, Jr., Druhan Tyler LLC, Megan Brooks Comer, MBC Law, LLC, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiffs.
Deena Renee Tyler, Joseph Michael Druhan, Jr., Druhan Tyler LLC, Megan Brooks Comer, MBC Law, LLC, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiffs.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JEFFREY U. BEAVERSTOCK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This Memorandum Opinion follows the Court's Order (Doc. 26) granting intervenor Defendant Sally M. Chislett's ("SMC") Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that it is without subject-matter jurisdiction based on the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction and on the separate ground that Plaintiffs lack standing.
I. BACKGROUND
This is an action pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. (Doc. 1 at 2). Plaintiffs ask the Court, inter alia , to declare divorce decrees invalid. Diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C § 1332, is the sole basis of federal jurisdiction. (Id. ).
A. The Underlying Probate Action
Plaintiffs bring this case in aid of a pending state court action. Specifically, this case "arises out of an underlying action filed in the Probate Court of Baldwin County, Alabama," styled Estate of John William Chislett, deceased , Baldwin County Probate Case Number 36164 ("Probate Action"). (See Complaint at ¶ 10 (Doc. 1)). SMC instituted the Probate Action and filed a Petition to Probate the "Last Will and Testament Annexed" of John William Chislett ("JW Chislett"). (Id. at 2 – 3). SMC alleges she was JW Chislett's third wife and is his surviving spouse. (Id. at 3 ). Plaintiffs in the instant action are children of JW Chislett and his first wife, Carol Ann Wagner ("Wagner"). They have appeared in the Probate Action and filed a petition contesting probate on grounds that SMC exercised undue influence. (Id. ). Plaintiffs also moved to dismiss the Probate Action on grounds that SMC lacks standing. (Id. ). The Baldwin County Probate Judge, however, is unwilling to proceed with the Probate Action until determinations are made concerning the validity of JW Chislett's "multiple marriages/divorces." (Id. ). The Probate Judge transferred the Probate Action to an administrative docket pending theses determinations. (Doc. 5 at 3).
The purported "multiple marriages/divorces" for which the Baldwin County Probate Judge requires determination include:
(i) JW Chislett's marriage to Wagner in New York in 1958, and a
divorce decree entered in the Dominican Republic in 1974;
(ii) JW Chislett's marriage to his second wife, Jane Yang Chislett ("JYC") in New Hampshire in 1977, and their Agreement of Divorce signed in Taiwan in 1982; and
(iii) JW Chislett's marriage to SMC in 1986.
(Doc. 1).
B. The Instant Action
The "Estate of John William Chislett, deceased," i.e. the Probate Action, is the only defendant Plaintiffs name in this action. (Doc. 1, ¶3). Plaintiffs name SMC, Wagner, and JYC as "Relief Part[ies]." (Id. at 2). SMC intervened as a party-defendant. (Doc. 15). Plaintiffs seek only declaratory relief and invoke diversity jurisdiction exclusively. Their challenges of the subject divorces or marriages are not based on any federal right, statute or constitutional provision.
Plaintiffs ask this Court to declare whether the subject marriages and divorces are valid or invalid, so that the Baldwin County Probate Court will proceed with the underlying Probate Action. Plaintiffs argue their parents’ divorce (Wagner and JW Chislett) in 1974 is invalid, and therefore that their marriage is "still valid." (Id. at 7 - 9). SMC responds that her 1986 marriage to JW Chislett is valid, and they remained married until his death in 2018. (Doc. 5). SMC also alleges she and JW Chislett had two children, both of whom are beneficiaries under JW Chislett's Will awaiting administration in the Probate Action. (Id. ). Plaintiffs are not named in the Will. The Complaint includes a count for a "Declaration of Marriage" between JW Chislett and Wagner, and an alternative count for a "Declaration of Marriage" between JW Chislett and JYC. (Doc. 1 at 7 - 10). The Complaint also asks this Court to declare the marriage of JW Chislett and SMC invalid. (Id. at 10).
Plaintiffs contend they stand to inherit from JW Chislett's estate in the Probate Action if either of JW Chislett's divorces (from Wagner or JYC) is declared invalid, "because then [JW Chislett's] purported marriage to [SMC] will be invalid." (Doc. 18 at 2). Plaintiffs note the unwillingness of the Baldwin County Probate Judge to proceed, but they offer no legal reason or argument why these declarations are necessary to or would affect their pending challenge to the probate of JW Chislett's Will in the Probate Action.
In her Motion to Dismiss the instant action, SMC argues that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge JW Chislett's previous divorces because Plaintiffs are not parties to the divorces and had no legally protected interest at the time of the divorces. (Doc. 5). Plaintiffs respond that JW Chislett's divorces are facially invalid, and their potential inheritance and rights in the Probate Action constitute "protected interests." (Doc. 18 at 2). Plaintiffs represent that if non-parties to a divorce have rights that would be affected if a divorce is declared invalid, courts "routinely" find those non-parties to "have a personal right and, thus, standing to collaterally attack the decree." (Id. ).
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Domestic Relation Exception
"Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is subject to a judicially created exemption for domestic relations and probate cases." Rash v. Rash , 173 F.3d 1376, 1380 (11th Cir. 1999). See also, Alliant Tax Credit 31 v. Murphy , 924 F.3d 1134, 1138 (11th Cir. 2019) ("The federal judiciary has traditionally abstained from deciding cases concerning domestic relations.") (quoting Ingram v. Hayes , 866 F.2d 368, 369 (11th Cir. 1988) ).
The Court recognizes that the "domestic relations exception" is not an "absolute rule," and is to be "narrowly confined." Rash , 173 F.3d at 1380. Courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction "only when hearing the claim would require the court to delve into the parties’ domestic affairs." Id. (citing Ingram , 866 F.2d at 370 ). The United States Supreme Court, in reaffirming the domestic relations exception in Ankenbrandt v. Richards , explained that the domestic relations exception does not apply to "cases arising from the domestic relations of persons unless they seek the granting or modification of a divorce or alimony decree. " 504 U.S. 689, 698, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992) (emphasis added). After Ankenbrandt , the Supreme Court "clarified that only ‘divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees’ remain outside federal jurisdictional bounds." Marshall v. Marshall , 547 U.S. 293, 308, 126 S.Ct. 1735, 164 L.Ed.2d 480 (2006) (quoting Ankenbrandt , 504 U.S. at 703–04, 112 S.Ct. 2206 ).
In analyzing the application of the domestic relations exception, courts should "sift through the claims of the complaint to determine the true character of the dispute to be adjudicated," while keeping the policies favoring abstention "in mind." Kirby v. Mellenger , 830 F.2d 176, 178 (11th Cir. 1987). The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that a claim requiring the review or modification of a divorce decree is subject to the domestic relations exception, "even when the plaintiff couches the claim in other terms." McCavey v. Barnett , 629 F.App'x 865, 867 (11th Cir. 2015). See also, Campbell v. Friend of the Court , 2016 WL 750215, at *2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23039, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2016) ("Where the relief that is sought is simply to consider the propriety of an element of the state court's divorce decree, federal courts must abstain." (citing Ingram , 866 F.2d at 370 )).
The true character of Plaintiffs’ claims is clear. Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare JW Chislett's divorce from Wagner, and alternatively his divorce from JYC, invalid. These declarations are in turn necessary to Plaintiffs’ claims for a declaration that the marriage between JW Chislett and SMC is invalid. Plaintiffs’ claims fit squarely within the letter of domestic relations exception. See Ankenbrandt , 504 U.S. at 698, 112 S.Ct. 2206.
This case is materially distinguishable from cases finding the domestic relations exception inapplicable when the true character of the subject claims was in tort or contract. For example, in Stone v. Wall , the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found the domestic relations exception inapplicable to claims for "damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees" incurred in connection with recovering a minor child. 135 F.3d 1438, 1440 (11th Cir. 1998). The defendants in Stone were "a grandmother, aunt, and their lawyer" who abducted plaintiff's child. Id. at 1441. There was no decree awarding custody to defendants. Id. The Court concluded that the case was "just a tort suit for money damages." Id.
The Court applied a similar analysis in Alliant Tax Credit 31 , in which plaintiffs claimed that a divorce settlement and related asset transfers "were ruses to evade" a debt owed to plaintiffs. 924 F.3d at 1138. The action in Alliant Tax Credit was brought under a state fraudulent transfer act to void the asset transfers made pursuant to the divorce settlement. Id. The Court affirmed the district court's refusal to apply the domestic relations exception, because plaintiffs’ claims "did nothing more than ‘charge[ ] Defendants with a tort.’ " Id. at 1146. See also Ankenbrandt , 504 U.S. at 704, 112 S.Ct. 2206 (finding the domestic relations exception inapplicable because the "lawsuit in no way [sought a divorce, alimony or child custody] decree; rather, it allege[d] that [defendants] committed torts.").
The Court further recognizes the domestic relations exception "does not - at least, ordinarily - include third parties in its scope." Stone , 135 F.3d at 1441. In Matusow v. Trans-County Title agency, LLC , though, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reasonably opined this "is so because suits against third parties do not generally involve the issuance or modification of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree." 545 F.3d 241, 247 (3rd Cir. 2008) (citing Stone , 135 F.3d at 1441 and Ankenbrandt , 504 U.S. at 704 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 2206 for the general rule that the domestic relations exception does not apply to third parties). In this case however, that is precisely what Plaintiffs’ suit involves. Plaintiffs, who are non-parties to the subject divorce decrees, seek nothing more than to invalidate them.
Finally, the Court notes that the domestic relations exception should not be applied in the absence of the following factors: "(1) there is a strong state interest in domestic relations; (2) the state courts can competently settle the family dispute; (3) the state continues to supervise the decrees; and (4) federal dockets are congested." Stone , 135 F.3d at 1441 (citing Ingram , 866 F.2d at 370 ). The Court finds that, on balance, these factors weigh in favor of the application of the domestic relations exception. Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief in the instant action are incidental to their and SMC's primary claims in the Probate Action. The parties’ primary claims were commenced in Probate Court of Baldwin County, Alabama, and that is where they will be resolved. Furthermore, the Probate Court of Baldwin County is not merely competent to settle the "family disputes" at issue. It will do so by the resolution of the pending Probate Action. While the decrees are not subject to continuing supervision, the Probate Court of Baldwin County, Alabama will dispose of all underlying claims and issues between the parties. Finally, whether alleged defects in foreign divorce decrees render them invalid, for purposes of the administration of an estate subject to probate in an Alabama probate court, are issues best left to the state courts of Alabama.
The Court concludes that the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction applies in this case.
B. Standing
Even assuming the domestic relations exception does not apply, the Court concludes it is without subject-matter jurisdiction because the Plaintiffs lack standing.
The doctrine of standing embodies the "case-or-controversy" requirement in Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which "confines the federal courts to a properly judicial role." Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt. , 964 F.3d 990, 996 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Spokeo v. Robins , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) ). The " ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of standing consists of three elements: the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, the defendant must have caused that injury, and a favorable decision must be likely to redress it." Id. (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 [ ] (1992) ).
Plaintiffs, as the parties invoking the Court's jurisdiction, bear the burden to establish these three elements of Article III standing. Id. (citing Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 ). The Court in Trichell explained, "at the motion-to-dismiss stage, [this burden requires] alleging facts that plausibly establish their standing." Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 677-684, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), and Salcedo v. Hanna , 936 F.3d 1162, 1168 (11th Cir. 2019) ).
Although the parties list these principles of Article III standing in their briefs, they rely exclusively on state law to support their respective arguments. Plaintiffs ignore altogether the question of what law controls the issue of standing in their diversity case brought under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. SMC does little more, citing only Nunnelee v. United States , 972 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1287 n. 7 (N.D. Ala. 2013) as "characterizing questions of standing and capacity to sue as ‘substantive’ and applying Alabama law." (Doc. 19 at 2).
"Standing to sue in any Article III court is, of course, a federal question which does not depend on the party's prior standing in state court." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts , 472 U.S. 797, 804, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985). Further, when "jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of citizenship, a plaintiff must have standing under both Article III of the Constitution and applicable state law in order to maintain a cause of action." Stinson v. Twin Pines Coal Co. , 2014 WL 4472605, at *4, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127193, at *10 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 11, 2014) (citing Mid-Hudson Catskill Rural Migrant Ministry, Inc. v. Fine Host Corp. , 418 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2005), and Avenue CLO Fund Ltd. v. Bank of Am., NA , 709 F.3d 1072, 1077 (11th Cir. 2013) ). See also, Nat'l Ass'n of Prof'l Allstate Agents v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 2002 WL 34940469, at *3, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28409, at *6 (M.D. Fla. April 22, 2002) ("In an action based on diversity, the plaintiff must have standing under both relevant state law and the "case or controversy" requirements of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.") (citing Wolfe v. Gilmour Mfg. Co. , 143 F.3d 1122, 1126 (8th Cir. 1998) ).
For purposes of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, "[f]ederal standards guide the inquiry as to the propriety of declaratory relief in federal courts, even when the case is under the court's diversity jurisdiction." White v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. , 913 F.2d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 1990). The Court in White noted that section 2201(a) of the Act authorizes a declaratory remedy in cases presenting an "actual controversy." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) ). The "actual controversy" requirement in section 2201 "is identical to the meaning of ‘case or controversy’ for the purposes of Article III." Bauer v. Texas , 341 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lawson v. Callahan , 111 F.3d 403, 405 (5th Cir. 1997) ). See also, Emory v. Peeler , 756 F.2d 1547, 1551-52 (11th Cir. 1985) (" 28 U.S.C. § 2201(1982), echoing the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of article III of the Constitution, provides that a declaratory judgment may only be issued in the case of an "actual controversy.").
It is problematic, for Plaintiffs and the Court, that Plaintiffs have failed to offer arguments based on federal law to satisfy their burden to prove the elements of Article III standing. Trichell , 964 F.3d 990, 996 ("at the motion-to-dismiss stage, [the burden to prove standing requires plaintiffs to allege] facts that plausibly establish their standing."). However, taking as true the facts of Plaintiffs’ Complaint and the factual representations in their opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, the Court understands Plaintiffs to be arguing that their inheritance under JW Chislett's Estate depends on or would somehow be affected by his divorces being declared invalid, "because then [his] purported marriage to [SMC] will be invalid." Plaintiffs, however, offer no legal explanation why that is the case. It appears undisputed that the children of JW Chislett and SMC are named beneficiaries under JW Chislett's Will, and that Plaintiffs are not. However, Plaintiffs have appeared and contested probate of the Will in the Probate Action. Plaintiffs offer no legal argument as to how their standing or ability to do so in the Probate Action is impaired without declarations that JW Chislett's divorces are invalid. Declarations by this Court that JW Chislett's divorces are invalid will in no manner affect Plaintiffs’ rights to the JW Chislett's Estate or Plaintiffs’ arguments which remain pending in the Probate Action.
Plaintiffs have simply failed to demonstrate they have suffered an "injury in fact," or that the Defendant in this case, which is the Probate Action , caused such an injury, or that declaring JW Chislett's divorces invalid would "be likely to redress it." Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The declarations Plaintiffs seek will not address any injury suffered. JW Chislett did not name Plaintiffs in his Will. Declarations that prior divorces are invalid will nether change that nor affect Plaintiffs’ rights and standing to assert claims in the Probate Action.
Plaintiffs additionally contend that SMC will not have priority to serve as personal representative of JW Chislett's Estate if her marriage to him is invalidated, and that they (the Plaintiffs) will then have statutory priority. Again, Plaintiffs provide no legal argument as to why this is the case. In fact, it appears that Plaintiffs are not permitted to serve as administrator in Alabama as they are non-residents and are not administrating the same estate in another jurisdiction. See Ala. Code 43-2-22 (1975) and Thames v. Thames , 183 So.3d 168, 171-72 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015).
The Court also finds that Plaintiffs lack standing under Alabama state law, particularly under Waite v. Waite , 959 So.2d 610 (Ala. 2006). In Waite , the Alabama Supreme Court interpreted earlier Alabama cases as denying standing to challenge a divorce decree where (1) the party seeking to challenge the decree was not a party to it, (2) the decree was not void on its face, and (3) the party seeking to challenge the decree did not allege any rights that were or could have been affected by the decree at the time it was rendered. Waite , 959 So.2d at n.9.
Plaintiffs state that JW Chislett's divorces are void on their face. Statements, however, are all Plaintiffs offer; they cite no legal authority and make no legal argument. The Court will not formulate legal arguments for a party. SMC, moreover, does offer legal authority and argument, which the Court finds persuasive on this point. (Doc. 19 at 5 – 9). The Court also finds that the cases from other state jurisdictions on which SMC relies are persuasive. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Nielsen , 13 Neb.App. 738, 700 N.W.2d 675 (2005) ; see also Caballero v. Vig , 600 S.W.3d 452 (Tex. App. 2020).
Plaintiffs are non-parties to the subject divorce decrees, have failed to demonstrate that the divorce decrees are void on their face, and do not allege that they had an interest in the divorces at the time they were rendered. On this record, Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge JW Chislett's divorce decrees.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court ORDERS that Intervenor Defendant Sally Chislett's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) is GRANTED. The Motions to Set Aside Default Judgment (Docs. 24 and 25) are GRANTED. DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of August, 2020.