Opinion
No. 15-35117
06-28-2017
JESSICA M. HARMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 6:13-cv-01585-AA MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon
Ann L. Aiken, District Judge, Presiding Before: NELSON, TROTT, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Jessica Harms appeals the district court's decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012), and we affirm.
An examining psychologist's and a reviewing psychologist's recommendations regarding a supportive work setting did not amount to concrete work-related limitations in function that the administrative law judge ("ALJ") was required to include in his finding of the claimant's residual functional capacity. See Valentine v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 691-92 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the ALJ properly excluded doctor's non-imperative recommendation from residual functional capacity).
The ALJ followed the required two-step analysis in finding that Harms's statements regarding her symptoms were "not entirely credible," and he provided a specific, clear and convincing reason by explaining that the claimant's testimony was contradicted in part by evidence of her activities of daily living. See Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence, including evidence of such activities as driving children to school and shopping, supports the ALJ's finding that Harms had the residual functional capacity to work in an environment with a limited amount of social interaction. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that, in reaching a credibility determination, an ALJ may weigh inconsistencies between the claimant's testimony and her daily activities).
Any error in the ALJ's evaluation of a lay witness's statements was harmless. The lay statements described many of the same limitations as Harms's own testimony, and the ALJ's reason for rejecting the claimant's testimony—inconsistency with evidence of her activities of daily living—applies with equal force to the lay testimony. See id. at 1122.
AFFIRMED.