Opinion
Case No. 2D18-4792
01-22-2020
HARDEMAN LANDSCAPE NURSERY, INC., Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Robert I. WATKINS, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Daniel L. Saxe of Saady & Saxe, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. J. Scott Taylor of J. Scott Taylor, Attorney at Law, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Daniel L. Saxe of Saady & Saxe, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
J. Scott Taylor of J. Scott Taylor, Attorney at Law, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
KHOUZAM, Chief Judge.
Robert I. Watkins entered into a contract with Hardeman Landscape Nursery, Inc., for landscaping work at his residence. When the project was almost complete, the parties reached an impasse on how to finish it. Watkins sued Hardeman and Hardeman counterclaimed, each party alleging that the other had breached the contract. Following a bench trial, the circuit court entered a corrected final judgment determining that Hardeman established an initial breach of the contract by Watkins but had failed to properly prove damages and therefore would recover nothing. The court also determined that Watkins had failed to prove a breach of contract and therefore would recover nothing. Hardeman moved for attorney's fees and costs as the prevailing party, and the court denied the motion, finding that there was no prevailing party in this case. Hardeman appeals, and Watkins cross-appeals. We reverse the court's determination as to fees but affirm in all other respects without further comment.
Because Hardeman prevailed both on Watkins' main claim and on its own counterclaim, the trial court abused its discretion by declining to award Hardeman prevailing party attorney's fees. See Erhm Orthopedics, Inc. v. Edwards, 260 So. 3d 559, 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) ("[G]enerally our review of a trial court's determination of the prevailing party is for an abuse of discretion."). "[T]he party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorney's fees." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tubbs v. Mechanik Nuccio Hearne & Wester, P.A., 125 So. 3d 1034, 1043 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ). In determining the prevailing party, the trial court must consider which party was successful "on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Id. (quoting Trytek v. Gale Indus., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1194, 1200 (Fla. 2009) ).
"Absent compelling circumstances, ‘we have maintained that "[i]n a breach of contract action, one party must prevail." ’ " Khodam v. Escondido Homeowner's Ass'n, 87 So. 3d 65, 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Animal Wrappers & Doggie Wrappers, Inc. v. Courtyard Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 73 So. 3d 354, 356 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) ). One example of such compelling circumstances is where a contract fails as a result of fault by both contracting parties; in that scenario an award of prevailing party fees would not be appropriate because it would "result in an unjust reward to a party whose conduct caused the failure of the contract." KCIN, Inc. v. Canpro Invs., Ltd., 675 So. 2d 222, 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Another example of compelling circumstances under which prevailing party fees may not be warranted is where neither party proves a breach of the contract. Lasco Enters., Inc. v. Kohlbrand, 819 So. 2d 821, 826 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). In contrast, a finding that one party breached the contract makes the opposing party the prevailing party on the litigation's significant issues even where no damages are awarded. See Khodam, 87 So. 3d at 66. Here, the court concluded that Watkins had initially breached the contract and that Hardeman was justified in not completing additional work. There was no indication of compelling circumstances that would make it unjust for Hardeman to recover fees. Therefore, the court abused its discretion in declining to award Hardeman fees as the prevailing party. Accordingly, we reverse the court's determination as to fees but affirm in all other respects.
We note that the court did reach the correct result as to costs because Hardeman did not recover judgment. See Hawks v. Libit, 251 So. 3d 321, 322-23 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) ("[T]he plain language of this section [57.041(1) ] requires that the ‘party recovering judgment’—as opposed to the ‘prevailing party’ (though oftentimes a party will be both)—is entitled to an award of costs."); see also Sherman v. Sherman, 279 So. 3d 188, 189 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (en banc) (reversing "[b]ecause the trial court incorrectly applied a ‘prevailing party’ standard to costs awarded under section 57.041(1), when the correct standard is the ‘party recovering judgment’ ").
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
SALARIO and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.