Opinion
Case Nos. 04 CV 2500 BEN (POR), 05 CV 2213 BEN (POR).
March 23, 2006
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff John Hale ("Plaintiff") is an individual who has filed two separate cases, 04CV2500 and 05CV213, arising from the same incident. These cases are filed against the San Diego Sheriff's Department ("Sheriff's Department"), the County of San Diego ("County"), Sheriff William Kolender ("Kolender"), Gabriel Gil ("Gil"), Joshua Weber ("Weber"), Roberto Cardenas ("Cardenas"), and Does 1-20 ("Does") (collectively, "Defendants") alleging the following: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) failure to screen and hire; (3) failure to train; (4) failure to supervise and discipline; (5) Monell liability for a pattern of brutality; (6) Monell liability for failure to properly investigate complaint; (7) assault and battery; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (9) violation of the UNRUH Act pursuant to California Civil Code § 52.1. Defendants move to dismiss the second lawsuit, 05CV2213, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) because the Plaintiff (1) improperly split his causes of action, and (2) the lawsuit is barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff opposes the motion and moves to amend his first complaint to include the named Defendants from the second lawsuit or, alternatively, to consolidate cases 04CV2500 and 05CV213. For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is granted; the motion to consolidate is denied; and the motion to amend is granted.
II. FACTS
Plaintiff was the passenger in a car that was stopped for speeding. (Compl. ¶ 14). During the stop, Hale confronted the sheriff and was arrested and taken to jail. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-17). While being taken to his cell, an altercation between Hale and several Sheriffs ensued. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-22). Hale was knocked unconscious and his injuries required medical care. (Compl. ¶¶ 22-23). Hale was treated for lacerations on his chin and forehead. (Compl. ¶ 23).
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Case 04CV2500
On December 15, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Sheriff's Department, Kolender, and Does 1-20 for (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) failure to screen and hire; (3) failure to train; (4) failure to supervise and discipline; (5) Monell liability for a pattern of brutality; (6) Monell liability for failure to properly investigate complaint; (7) assault and battery; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (9) violation of the UNRUH Act pursuant to California Civil Code § 52.1. On July 25, 2005, Plaintiff sent notice to Defendants and the court identifying Defendants, previously sued as Does 1-3, as Gabriel Gil, Joshua Weber, and Roberto Cardenas. On August 10, 2005, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application and a proposed order seeking leave to amend his first complaint to substitute the true names of the deputies in place of Doe designations 1-3. On February 7, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint or, alternatively, to consolidate cases 04cv2500 and 05cv2213.
B. Case 05CV2213
On December 2, 2005, Plaintiff filed a second complaint against Gabriel Gil, Joshua Weber, and Roberto Cardenas for (1) civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) assault and battery; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4) violation of civil code section 52.1. On January 10, 2006, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss/strike pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) claiming that (1) Plaintiff impermissibly split his causes of action against the deputies; and (2) the causes of action based on state law are barred by the statute of limitations.
IV. DISCUSSION
The issues before the court are (1) whether the court should consolidate the two cases, (2) whether the second case is barred by the statute of limitations, and (3) whether the first complaint may be amended to substitute the named deputies for the fictitious Doe Defendants.
A. Consolidation
Defendants contend that Plaintiff improperly split his causes of action and that the second case is barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff responded by moving to consolidate the two cases and thus cure any improper case splitting or any statutory bar. Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a). District courts are given a wide latitude in which to exercise their discretion to grant or deny consolidation under Rule 42(a), so as to manage their dockets efficiently by expediting trials and eliminating unnecessary repetition and confusion. See Investors Research Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 877 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1989). Rule 42(a) is uniformly held to place the question of consolidation of pending actions within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be reversed except for an abuse of discretion. Ellis v. Corey, 892 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 1989).
Here, there is no dispute that the two lawsuits involve common questions of law and fact or that consolidation would avoid unnecessary costs or delay. The same evidence will be presented in each case. The same right was allegedly infringed in both cases, relating to the same incident and the same injury. And the suits arise from the same nucleus of facts. Indeed, the only difference between the two cases is who Plaintiff named as defendants. However, Defendants assert that the second case is not properly before the court because it is barred by the statute of limitations, and thus cannot be consolidated.
Defendants correctly assert that consolidation does not merge the lawsuits into a single action and the two lawsuits retain their separate character. "[C]onsolidation is permitted as a matter of convenience and economy of administration, but does not merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties, or make those who are parties in one suit parties in another." Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933). Further, "an act of consolidation does not affect any of the substantive rights of the parties." J.G. Link Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 470 F.2d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 1972). Therefore, if the lawsuits were consolidated, the second lawsuit could still be barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, the relevant question is whether the second case is barred by the statute of limitations.
B. Statute of Limitations
Defendants contend the second case is barred by the statute of limitations. State law defines the statute of limitations for section 1983 actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985). The particular statutory period which is to be used is the one which applies to "tort actions for the recovery of damages for personal injuries." Garcia, 471 U.S. at 276. Any potential ambiguity over which limitations period should be applied is avoided by the corollary that in the event that the state has multiple statutes of limitations, "courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions." Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989).
In California, the general residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions is the one year period set forth in California Civil Procedure Code section 340(3). Silva v. Crane, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, the alleged injury occurred on April 10, 2004 and the case was not filed until December 2, 2005, which was past the one year deadline.
That statute of limitations for Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 claims are governed by Cal. Gov't Code 945.6, which requires that a suit brought against a public entity must be commenced no more than six months after the public entity rejects the claim. McMahon v. Albany Unified School Dist., 104 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1292. Here, the Plaintiff submitted his claim against the County in April and May 2004. It was rejected on June 15, 2004. Plaintiff did not file case 05CV2213 until December 2, 2005, well past the 6 month deadline. Therefore, the statute of limitations has run as to all claims brought by Plaintiff in the second case.
Plaintiff does not contest that the second case was filed after the statutory deadline. Rather, Plaintiff asserts that under California's relation back rules, the case is not barred by the statute of limitations. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1) states in relevant part: "[a]n amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when (1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations applicable to the action." Further, prior to the 1991 enactment of Rule 15(c)(1), the Ninth Circuit held that the relation back provisions of state law govern a federal cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Merritt v. County of L.A., 875 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1989). In Merritt, plaintiff sued the County of Los Angeles and Does I through X alleging violation of his civil rights under section 1983. Id. at 766. The plaintiff later learned the actual names of the officers through interrogatories and moved to amend his complaint under Rule 15(a) to substitute the officers' names for those of the fictitious Doe defendants. Id. The district court denied the motion and determined that naming of the individual defendants would not "relate back" to the filing of the original complaint, because there had been no showing that the individual defendants had received actual notice of the institution of the action within the prescribed limitations period as required by Rule 15(c). Id. at 767. On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held that "the relation back provisions of state law, rather than Rule 15(c), govern a federal cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 768. Therefore, the Court must look to California's relation back law, which provides in relevant part:
When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint . . . and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly. . . .
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 474. Here, Plaintiff asserted he was ignorant of the names of the deputies that beat him. He pled in his original complaint that he was ignorant of their names, but that they were agents of the San Diego Sheriff's Department and were acting within the course and scope of their employment. When Plaintiff first learned of the deputies names he attempted to add them to his original complaint. (Plaintiff's Ex Parte App. at 2-3.) Therefore, Plaintiff has met the first two California relation back requirements.
However, the California relation back rule permits the relation back for amending complaints, not for new complaints. The second complaint is a new case and therefore, as Defendant correctly states, "there is nothing to relate back to." There does not appear to be any authority, nor does Plaintiff provide any authority that permits a plaintiff to relate back a new case to a previously filed case, even if the two cases involve the same causes of action and the same facts. Plaintiff filed his complaint for his second case after the statutory deadline, and therefore, Plaintiff's second claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, consolidation would prove fruitless because the second case would still be barred by the statute of limitations. Rather dismissal of the second case is appropriate.
C. Amending Original Complaint (04CV2500)
The final question before the court is whether Plaintiff's original complaint filed in case 04CV2500 may be amended to substitute the named deputies for Does 1-3. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part:
A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or; if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) (emphasis added). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Leave to amend, although within the discretion of the trial court, "should be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15(a) . . . which was to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on technicalities or pleadings." James v. Pliler, 269 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2001). A district court may take into consideration such factors as "bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of the amendment, and whether the party has previously amended his pleadings." Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).
Here, amending the complaint would facilitate the decision on the merits, rather than on technicalities or pleadings. Defendants did not move to dismiss the case because it lacks merit, rather the motion to dismiss was based on filing requirements. Further, Plaintiff did not act in bad faith by excluding the actual names of the deputies in his first complaint. Plaintiff was ignorant of the names of the deputies when the complaint was filed, pled his ignorance in the complaint, and designated Does 1-20. Plaintiff obtained the names of the deputies through interrogatories, and immediately sought to add the names of the deputies by consent of the Defendants. (Plaintiff's Ex Parte App. at 2-3.) After the Defendants refused to consent, Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion with the court to amend his complaint to substitute the named deputies for Does 1-3. Plaintiff then brought this motion for leave to amend.
It appears Defendants only objection to the amendment is that the causes of actions against the named deputies are barred by the statute of limitations. As discussed supra, state relation back law applies to amending § 1983 actions, Merritt, 875 F.2d at 768, and under California Code of Civil Procedure § 474 the amended complaint relates back to the filing date of the original complaint.
Section 474 provides in relevant part:
When the Plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint . . . and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly. . . .
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 474. Here, Plaintiff asserted he was ignorant of the names of the deputies that beat him. He pled in his original complaint that he was ignorant of their names, but that they were agents of the San Diego Sheriff's Department and were acting within the course and scope of their employment. When Plaintiff first learned of the deputies names he attempted to add them to his original complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff has met the relation back requirements and he will be allowed to amend his first complaint to substitute the named deputies for Does 1-3.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's motion to Dismiss is granted, Plaintiff's motion to consolidate is denied, and Plaintiff's motion to amend is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.