Opinion
Civil No. 05cv1246-J (CAB).
April 6, 2006
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Shawn Guy filed this civil rights suit against Defendants County of San Diego, Jason Roland and Does 1-20 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is not incarcerated and is represented by counsel. Defendants have filed a motion seeking dismissal of the complaint on numerous grounds. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to the motion. The Court finds the issues appropriate for decision on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). After a thorough review of the motion, Plaintiff's complaint, and the applicable case law, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
Because this case comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and must also construe the complaint, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("FAC") filed on October 11, 2005:On September 17, 2004, Plaintiff was detained in the Descanso Detention Facility, operated by the County of San Diego. He was involved in an altercation with other inmates and suffered blows to his chest and his left side. (FAC ¶ 8.) The next day, September 18, 2004, Plaintiff was in great pain, had blood in his urine, felt very sick, and was very hot and dizzy. He requested medical treatment and was seen by a nurse that morning. Plaintiff was transferred to the downtown county jail for x-rays and further medical treatment. (FAC ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges that he was x-rayed on September 21, 2004 (FAC ¶ 11), but he did not receive any medical treatment, despite his numerous requests during the time period of September 19-23, 2004. (FAC ¶ 10.) During this time, Plaintiff's pain persisted, and his stomach became bloated and hard. (FAC ¶ 11.) Plaintiff's mother also repeatedly called jail personnel to inform them that her son was dying and that he needed medical attention. Defendant Jason Roland ignored her pleas and refused to give Plaintiff the medical treatment he needed. (FAC ¶ 12.) On September 23, 2004, Plaintiff was found unconscious and was taken to the hospital. It was determined that Plaintiff had a ruptured spleen and had been bleeding internally for days. Emergency surgery was performed, and Plaintiff's spleen was removed. (FAC ¶ 14.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges his health has been severely compromised. He must take medication daily. In addition, he has a large scar running from his chest to below his abdomen due to the emergency surgery, and future surgery may be necessary. (FAC ¶ 15.)
II. DISCUSSION
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A claim can be dismissed only if "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (citing Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he has properly stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint generally must satisfy only the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only that the complaint include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). "This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (citations omitted). Rule 8 contains a "powerful presumption against rejecting pleadings for failure to state a claim." Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1997)). Rule 8 does not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim, and the defendant only needs to be given fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) and Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
A. Deliberate Indifference Claim
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied him medical care and acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed, because Plaintiff failed to allege facts showing that Defendant Roland knowingly denied Plaintiff medical care. Defendants point out, Defendant Roland did not converse with Plaintiff about his need for medical care; rather, the FAC alleges that Defendant Roland spoke to Plaintiff's mother on the telephone but not to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges deliberate indifference in violation of his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. (FAC ¶ 17.) The cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment is applicable by its own terms only to prisoners. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) ("The Eighth Amendment . . . is specifically concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions. . . ."). Plaintiff alleges that he was a pretrial detainee at Descanso Detention Facility. (FAC ¶ 8.) Pretrial detainees and persons who have not been convicted may raise conditions of confinement claims similar to those made by convicted persons under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than under the Eighth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1440, n. 7 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ninth Circuit has held that the standard for analyzing the rights of pretrial detainees under the Due Process Clause is similar to that for convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment. See Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1461 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated, 490 U.S. 1087 (1989), reinstated, 886 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a pretrial detainee's right to be free from punishment is grounded in Due Process Clause, but courts borrow from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence when analyzing pretrial detainee's rights). Therefore, the distinction is not relevant at this initial stage.
A prison official exhibits deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment when he knows of and disregards a substantial risk of serious harm to inmate health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1970). The official must both know of "facts from which the inference could be drawn" that an excessive risk of harm exists, and he must actually draw that inference. Id. Evaluating a claim of deliberate indifference necessitates examining the seriousness of the prisoner's need and the nature of the defendant's response. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992). The indifference must be substantial, and the conduct must rise to a level of "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). "If a [prison official] should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk." Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Roland and Does 1-20 acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and that they "knew or should have known" that Plaintiff's condition necessitated medical treatment. (FAC ¶ 17.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants knew of his serious medical problems, ignored them, failed to obtain medical attention and treatment for him, and acted with deliberate indifference to his life threatening condition. (FAC ¶ 18.) Plaintiff also alleges that his mother informed Defendant Roland that Plaintiff was dying, and Defendant Roland ignored her pleas for medical treatment for her son. Allegedly, during this time, Plaintiff was bleeding internally due to a ruptured spleen. The symptoms alleged here are sufficient to support the inference that Plaintiff suffered from a substantial risk of serious harm. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that he pleaded with prison officials to get him medical care, but they ignored his requests (FAC ¶ 11), allegations sufficient to support the inference that Defendants knew of the risk of harm and were indifferent about the risk to Plaintiff.
Defendants argue that the FAC does not contain any factual allegations regarding Defendant Roland's culpable state of mind. However, the FAC alleges that Defendant Roland was informed by Plaintiff's mother that Plaintiff was dying and that Defendant Roland did nothing in response. (FAC ¶ 12.) These facts are sufficient to support the inference that Defendant Roland knew that Plaintiff suffered serious injuries and yet was indifferent to the risk. These allegations "at least minimally informed the parties and the court of" Plaintiff's claim. Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004). Under the notice pleading standard, Plaintiff was required to do no more. The Court finds Plaintiff's factual allegations are sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the deliberate indifference claim be DENIED.
B. Unlawful Policies, Customs or Habits Claim
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant County of San Diego, through its sheriff's department, has unlawful policies, customs, habits or practices, which result in delaying and denying medical care to its inmates, including Plaintiff. (FAC ¶ 23.) Defendants argue this claim should be dismissed, because there was no constitutional violation by the County's employees and therefore no claim stated against the County.
A local government may be held liable under § 1983 "when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury. . . ." Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Furthermore, if government employees' conduct was unconstitutional, and if it was based on a city's official policy, the local government can be held liable for violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id. Additionally, if a police officer is given qualified immunity on grounds that he acted unconstitutionally, but he reasonably believed he was not violating a clearly established right, the City can still be held liable for creating the policy that caused the officer's unconstitutional conduct. However, if a court finds that the government employee did not, in fact, violate plaintiff's constitutional rights, the plaintiff's claim against the local government fails because "[n]either a municipality nor a supervisor . . . can be held liable under § 1983 where no injury or constitutional violation has occurred." Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)). Therefore, if a court finds that the defendant police officers acted constitutionally, any § 1983 claims against a city based on the officers' conduct also fail.
Here, as discussed above, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a claim of deliberate indifference by Defendants Roland and Does 1-20. Further, Plaintiff alleges that the County has unlawful policies, customs, habits or practices of permitting, ignoring or condoning the unconstitutional violations committed by its employees, Defendants Roland and Does 1-20. The Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied Monell and has sufficiently alleged a claim of unlawful policies, customs or habits against Defendant County of San Diego. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with respect to this claim be DENIED.
C. Medical Negligence Claim
Defendants argue that the medical negligence claim against Defendants County of San Diego should be dismissed, because the county is a public entity that is immune to liability for medical malpractice. Defendants also argue that the medical negligence claim against Jason Roland should be dismissed, because he is not lawfully engaged in the practice of one of the healing arts. Plaintiff does not oppose dismissal of these two defendants from the medical negligence claim. Plaintiff, however, argues that the medical negligence claim is a viable claim against the Doe Defendants, who are unidentified health care professionals. Doe defendants are not favored in the Ninth Circuit. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Wiltsie v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 406 F.2d 515, 518 (9th Cir. 1968)). Where, however, the identity of the alleged defendants is not known prior to the filing of the complaint, "the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities. . . ." Gillispie, 629 F.2d at 642. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that the third cause of action for medical negligence be DISMISSED as to Defendants County of San Diego and Jason Roland. The Court further RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff be given 90 days to bring a motion to amend the complaint to name the Doe Defendants.
D. Failure to Summon Medical Care Claim
Plaintiff's claim for failure to summon medical care, based on Cal. Gov't Code § 845.6, alleges that Defendants failed to take reasonable action to summon medical care for Plaintiff when they knew or had reason to know that Plaintiff was in need of immediate medical care. (FAC ¶ 33.) Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed, because Plaintiff did eventually receive medical care.
Cal. Gov't Code § 845.6 states in part:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; but, except as otherwise provided by Sections 855.8 and 856, a public employee, and the public entity where the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.
A public employee's duty under § 845.6 is limited to summoning immediate medical care. It does not encompass a duty to provide reasonable or appropriate care. Watson v. California, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 262, 265 (Cal.Ct.App. 1993). Furthermore, "[t]he public employee must know or have reason to know of the need of immediate medical care and fail to summon such care." Lucas v. County of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 663 (Cal.Ct.App. 1996) (citing Watson, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265). Finally, police officers "do not have the medical training to know whether a prisoner's medical condition has been properly diagnosed and treated." Watson, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266.
Plaintiff alleges in the FAC that on September 18, 2004, the day after the altercation at Descansco Detention Facility, he requested medical treatment and was seen by a nurse. (FAC ¶ 9.) Because he did receive medical attention at this juncture, this factual allegation does not state a claim for failure to summon medical care. After the examination by the nurse, Plaintiff was transferred to a downtown facility so he could be x-rayed. (FAC ¶ 9.) He was placed in a holding tank and was later seen by a nurse, who told him to notify staff if the pain persisted. (FAC ¶ 10.) Plaintiff does not allege that he notified staff of his pain. Rather, he alleges that he requested x-rays (FAC ¶ 10), which would not necessarily indicate to staff that he was in immediate need of medical attention. This factual allegation also does not state a claim for failure to summon medical care.
Plaintiff further alleges that during the period of September 19-23, 2004, he put in numerous requests to see a doctor and obtain medical treatment. In addition, each time a deputy walked by his cell, he pleaded with the deputy to help him obtain medical care. (FAC ¶ 11.) Taking these alleged facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and resolving all doubts in Plaintiff's favor, if he had gotten "progressively worse" (FAC ¶ 11), was having difficulty breathing (FAC ¶ 13) and could barely walk during this time (FAC ¶ 13), it could be reasonably inferred that prison officials knew or should have known he was in need of immediate medical attention.
Defendants cite Lucas v. City of Long Beach, 60 Cal. App. 3d 341 (Cal.Ct.App. 1976) to support dismissal, but the facts of that case are inapplicable here. The court in Lucas noted that Cal. Gov't Code § 845.6 was "cast in the form of immunity which" is absolute "except for the situation of failure to provide medical care for a prisoner in obvious need for such care." Lucas, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 349. In Lucas, Plaintiff brought an action against the City of Long Beach and a member of the city's police department for the wrongful death of her 17-year-old son, Stephen. Id. at 344. Stephen was placed in a juvenile detention facility, because he had exhibited signs of intoxication. Id. at 345. Stephen ended up hanging himself and was found dead about three hours after being placed in detention. Id. During the time he was detained, Stephen manifested only symptoms of intoxication and concern that his arrest would upset his mother, symptoms that would not have alerted personnel that he was in immediate need of medical care. Id. at 350. The court found that "Stephen was not in fact in need of immediate medical care and clearly lack of medical care did not 'cause' the death." Id. The quote that Defendants cite from the case ("Government Code section 845.6 . . . in affixing liability for failure to summon 'immediate medical care' for a person in need thereof envisions liability for injury resulting from the failure to treat the physical condition requiring treatment. . . .") was the court pointing out the incongruity between Stephen's "symptoms" (intoxication and concern about his mother) and the ultimate cause of his death (suicide). Id. In such a case, there was no duty to summon medical care.
Here, as alleged in the FAC, Plaintiff exhibited symptoms that could have indicated he required immediate medical care. He was nauseous, hot, sweaty and very weak, and his stomach was hard and bloated. (FAC ¶ 11.) He had difficulty breathing, and he could barely walk. (FAC ¶ 14.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges he pleaded with any deputy who passed by his cell for help. (FAC ¶ 11.) Taking these allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it can be reasonably inferred that Defendants knew or should have known about his medical needs. While it is true that medical treatment was eventually given to Plaintiff, he alleges in the FAC that Defendants' failure to summon immediate medical care left his health severely compromised. (FAC ¶ 15.) Defendants argue that the FAC contains no allegation that Defendant Roland knew or should have known that Plaintiff was in need of "immediate medical care." However, Plaintiff alleges that his mother repeatedly called the jail and told Defendant Roland that Plaintiff was dying, allegations that are sufficient to support the inference that Defendant Roland knew or had reason to know that Plaintiff suffered serious injuries requiring immediate medical care. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the claim of failure to summon medical care be DENIED.
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, the Court recommends that:
1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) be GRANTED with respect to the medical negligence claim against Defendants County of San Diego and Roland but not against the Doe Defendants.
2) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) be DENIED with respect to the remaining claims in the FAC.
2) Defendants be directed to answer the FAC within 30 days of the Court issuing an order on the Motion to Dismiss.
3) Plaintiff be directed to request leave to amend the complaint to name the Doe Defendants within 90 days of the Court issuing an order on the Motion to Dismiss.
This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 28, 2006 any party to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation."
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than ten days after being served with the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).