Opinion
No. 04-03-00152-CV
Delivered and Filed: September 22, 2004.
Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1, Webb County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2000-Cvf-002090-C1, Honorable Alvino Morales, Judge Presiding.
Reversed and Rendered in Part; Affirmed in Part.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Catherine STONE, Justice, Paul W. GREEN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Kish and Manisha Manwani brought an action against their tenant, Anil Kumar Gupta, and his company, Laredo Perfume, Inc., seeking recovery for damage allegedly caused to the leased property. The trial court entered a judgment awarding damages and attorney's fees to the Manwanis, and Gupta and Laredo Perfume ("Gupta") appealed the decision. We remanded the cause to the trial court for entry of findings and conclusions, and after the trial court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, Gupta filed a supplemental brief raising three issues on appeal. The first issue asserts that Laredo Perfume, Inc. was not a party to the lease; the second issue disputes the award of attorney's fees to the Manwanis; and the third issue disputes the finding of damages in favor of the Manwanis. We reverse and render on the issue of Laredo Perfume, Inc. as a party, and we affirm the damages and attorney's fees awards authorized by the trial court.
Laredo Perfume, Inc.
In the first issue raised in his supplemental brief, Gupta asserts that the findings show that Laredo Perfume, Inc. was not a party to the lease agreement in question and thus the trial court should have entered a take nothing judgment against the Manwanis and in favor of Laredo Perfume, Inc. We must therefore determine whether there is an enforceable contract between Laredo Perfume, Inc. and the Manwanis. "In making this determination, we look to the parties' communications and the acts and circumstances surrounding those communications." Lyda Constructors, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 103 S.W.3d 632, 636 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.). Kish Manwani testified that although he believed Gupta and Laredo Perfume, Inc. to be "the same thing," he listed only Gupta's name on the contract because he was concerned that Laredo Perfume, Inc. was going to declare bankruptcy. However, to form an enforceable contract, there must be an offer, acceptance, meeting of the minds, and an expression of the terms with sufficient certainty so that there will be no doubts as to what the parties expected. Harris v. Balderas, 27 S.W.3d 71, 77 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied). Based on the testimony, there was no meeting of the minds. Gupta believed that he was the sole lessee because the lease agreement specifically did not include his company. In contrast, the Manwanis believed that Gupta and Laredo Perfume, Inc. were "the same thing." The conflicting testimony indicates that there was no meeting of the minds and thus no valid contract between the Manwanis and Laredo Perfumes, Inc. Evidence also supports this contention because "Anil Kumar Gupta" is the only name listed as the lessee in the lease contract in question. Finally, the trial court stated in his findings of fact and conclusions of law that Gupta is the sole defendant and sole entity who entered into the lease agreement with the Manwanis. We therefore hold that Laredo Perfume, Inc. was not a party to the lease and reverse the award of damages against the company.
Award of Damages
In his third issue, Gupta challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the award of damages. Specifically, Gupta claims the Manwanis failed to show the condition of their property before the alleged damages, and they failed to show that their costs of repair were reasonable. We review this claim under well-established standards of review for evidentiary challenges. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997) (legal sufficiency standard); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (factual sufficiency standard).
Gupta argues that proof of the condition of the premises prior to the alleged damages is an implicit prerequisite to a claim for damages, citing Moren v. Pruske, 570 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) and Planet Plows, Inc. v. Evans, 600 S.W.2d 874 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ). However, these cases do not require the plaintiff to present direct proof of the condition of his premises prior to the alleged damages. We agree that "the proper measure of damages where the injury to realty is repairable is the reasonable cost of repairs necessary to restore the property to its prior condition." Moren, 570 S.W.2d at 444. Additionally, there should be some evidence from which the jury could conclude the damages are for costs of repairs, not costs to improve the property beyond its original condition. Id. However, the court in Moren does not require the plaintiff to show explicitly the property's condition prior to the damage. Nor does the court otherwise indicate that such a direct showing is a prerequisite for a claim for damages. In any event, in the instant case, the condition of the premises at the time they were first leased to Gupta can be easily inferred from the evidence. Likewise, the evidence indicates the reasonable costs to repair the premises.
Several clauses in the contract between the Manwanis and Gupta contain stipulations regarding the condition of the leased premises. The first relevant clause states, "Le[s]see is authorized and empowered by lessor to remodel the leased premises in [order] to make suitable for jew[e]lry/perfumes store purpose and the sale of other merchandise." Under the heading "Maintenance of building structure, electrical and plumbing," the contract provides: "Le[s]see shall be responsible for maintaining the roof, electrical and plumbing in all common areas of the leased premises in good condition for the term of this (3) three years [sic] lease." Under the heading "Improvements," the following is written: "Any type of equipment such as tiles, carpet, shelves connected to the walls, airconditioning, light fixtur[e]s on roof, plumbing material, etc. will become property of the lesser [sic]."
When the costs of repairs are disputed, the reasonableness of the alleged costs of repair can be established by testimony from property owners, contractors, and others knowledgeable about the condition of the property in question before and after the alleged damage. See id. at 444-45; Dunlap v. Mars Plumbing Supply Co., 504 S.W.2d 917, 919 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1973, no writ.). Kish Manwani testified that after Gupta was evicted from the building, the Manwanis found that he had caused extensive and costly damage to their property prior to leaving the premises, costing them $17,529.85 in damages and lost rent during the time it took them to make repairs. The required repair work included tearing out of shelving, displays, electrical fixtures, and sections of walls and flooring. They also claim that Gupta left behind trash, left the premises dirty, and damaged the building beyond normal wear and tear.
At trial, Gupta testified that he removed about ten light fixtures, shelving, and displays, some of which left holes in the walls. Additionally, the bathroom and the wires in the air conditioning unit and in the ceiling were in disrepair at the time of Gupta's eviction. Based on his testimony, it appears that he violated the clauses of the lease that required the lessee to leave all attached improvements and maintain the wiring and plumbing.
Gupta relies on the testimony of Deputy Elizabeth Allen, a Webb County deputy sheriff. She testified that based on her observation of the premises, the damages alleged by the Manwanis amounted to normal wear and tear. She also testified that she saw a hole on the second floor but could not remember much else. However, it is important to note that Allen entered the building only when Gupta was occupying the store; her only purpose was to expedite his removal based on his eviction orders. Since Allen never entered the building after Gupta moved out, she was unable to testify about the damages that he might have created in the process of removing his belongings from the building.
Kish Manwani testified about the types of repairs that were needed, and presented receipts displaying the cost of the repair materials that they purchased. The Manwanis met with various contractors and determined what a reasonable cost would be to repair their building, specifically used a contractor to help them buy supplies, and enlisted the help of both the contractor and a handyman to complete repairs on the premises. While the Manwanis did not have the contractor or handyman testify at trial and Kish Manwani was the only witness who testified about the cost of supplies needed to repair his building, Manwani's testimony about his reliance on the contractor's advice is enough to establish that he was knowledgeable about the costs of repairs. See Coker v. Burghardt, 833 S.W.2d 306, 310-11 (Tex. App-Dallas 1992, writ denied) (holding that car owner could testify about costs of repair because he sufficiently familiarized himself with costs of repair by visiting various repair shops). We overrule Gupta's third issue.
Attorney's Fees
Gupta alleges in his second issue that the award of attorney's fees is without support in the record. Gupta claims the Manwanis "by their own admission" did not premise their case on a written or oral contract. We have reviewed the entire record, and to the contrary, it appears that the sole claim presented by the Manwanis is one for breach of the lease agreement. A person may recover reasonable attorney's fees from an individual or corporation if the claim is based upon an oral or written contract. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 38.001 (Vernon 1997); Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. 1996); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. 1967). The award of reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff who successfully presents a claim founded on a written or oral contract is mandatory. Jackson Law Office, P.C. v. Chappell, 37 S.W.3d 15, 23 (Tex. App-Tyler 2000, pet. denied). In the instant case, the court properly awarded attorney's fees since the Manwanis were successfully represented by counsel in their breach of contract claim.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court's judgment as to Laredo Perfume, Inc, and render a take-nothing judgment as to Laredo Perfume, Inc.; we affirm the trial court's judgment awarding damages and attorney's fees in favor of the Manwanis.