Opinion
Case No. 3:00 CV 7675.
July 6, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is Defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 50) as to which Plaintiff has filed an opposition (Doc. No. 53). Defendants have filed a reply (Doc. No. 56) as to which Plaintiff has filed a supplemental citation (Doc. No. 57). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion will be denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Gary K. Gunthorpe ("Gunthorpe") began working for Defendant DaimlerChrysler Corporation ("DaimlerChrysler") in 1995 as a tool engineer. Plaintiff then applied for and was offered the position of maintenance area supervisor at the Toledo assembly plant in 1998. Gunthorpe's supervisor was Defendant Carl Kraft ("Kraft"). Kraft observed that Plaintiff did not possess the requisite technical skills for the position, and Gunthorpe was transferred to the production department to be the first shift production supervisor under the supervision of Steven Czerniak ("Czerniak") in October 1999.
Beginning in January 2000, Plaintiff received a "Development Needed" performance appraisal from Czerniak who placed Gunthorpe on DaimlerChrysler's 30/60/90 day review process. Defendants contend that at the end of the 30/60/90 day review process Plaintiff had failed to show sufficient progress, and was terminated on April 14, 2000. Gunthorpe was fifty-two (52) years old. Cynthia Nowak ("Nowak"), the second shift production supervisor, who was thirty-two (32) years old, assumed Plaintiff's position. Gunthorpe filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County Ohio in October 2000 alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., along with state law claims of promissory estoppel, fraud and tortious interference with contract.
Defendants removed the matter to this Court, and moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims, which was granted. Gunthorpe v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 205 F. Supp.2d 820 (N.D. Ohio 2002). Gunthorpe appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court's grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff's state law claims, but reversed as to Plaintiff's age discrimination claim. Gunthorpe v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 90 Fed. Appx. 877 (6th Cir. Feb. 3, 2004). This Court then granted Defendants leave to file a renewed motion for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
A. SUMMARY JUDGEMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by demonstrating the absence of evidence supporting one or more essential elements of the non-movant's claim. Id. at 323-25. Once the movant meets this burden, the opposing party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ( quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)).
Once the burden of production has so shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not sufficient "simply [to] show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).Rather, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings" and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; see also Harris v. General Motors Corp., 201 F.3d 800, 802 (6th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
"In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Williams v. Belknap, 154 F. Supp.2d 1069, 1071 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (citing 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987)). However, "`at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter,'" Wiley v. U.S., 20 F.3d 222, 227 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249); therefore, "[t]he Court is not required or permitted . . . to judge the evidence or make findings of fact." Williams, 154 F. Supp.2d at 1071. The purpose of summary judgment "is not to resolve factual issues, but to determine if there are genuine issues of fact to be tried." Abercrombie Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 130 F. Supp.2d 928, 930 (S.D. Ohio 1999). Ultimately, this Court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52; see also Atchley v. RK Co., 224 F.3d 537, 539 (6th Cir. 2000).
B. DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
It shall be unlawful for an employer —
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). ADEA claims generally are analyzed pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm applied to claims alleged under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., "which requires a plaintiff first to establish a prima facie case of discrimination." Policastro v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 297 F.3d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 2002).
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff generally must show, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) membership in the protected class; (2) an adverse employment action; (3) that she was qualified for the position; and (4) that she "was replaced by someone outside the protected class or was treated differently from similarly situated members of the unprotected class." Warfield v. Lebanon Correctional Inst., 181 F.3d 723, 728-29 (6th Cir. 1999). However, the precise elements that a plaintiff must demonstrate to establish her prima facie case of discrimination will vary depending on the nature of the claim.
If a plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case of discrimination, then the defendant must produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (iterating the Court's "allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of proof in Title VII" discrimination cases). While a "defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons," Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981), it must nonetheless "clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection." Id. at 255.
If the defendant meets this burden of production, then the plaintiff "must persuade the court that the proffered reason for the employment action is pretext." Leigh, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 8525, at *15. Once the burden has shifted, the plaintiff is given "a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; see also St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 507-08. A plaintiff may demonstrate that the defendant's proffered explanation is pretext "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Three ways in which a plaintiff can establish that a defendant's reason is not credible is by showing that the reason "(1) has no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the defendant's challenged conduct, or (3) was insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct." Hopson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 306 F.3d 427, 434 (6th Cir. 2002). A court "may not, however, focus on the soundness of an employer's business judgment." Chappell v. GTE Prods. Corp., 803 F.2d 261, 266 (6th Cir. 1986).
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination pursuant to the ADEA, Plaintiff must establish:
(1) he was at least 40 years old at the time of the alleged discrimination; (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) he was otherwise qualified for the position; and (4) after he was rejected, a substantially younger applicant was selected.Burzynski v. Cohen, 264 F.3d 611, 622 (6th Cir. 2001).
Previously this Court found that Plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case because no reasonable person could conclude that Plaintiff was replaced by a younger employee. The Sixth Circuit, however, found that for purposes of summary judgment Plaintiff had established a prima facie case. Gunthorpe was fifty-two (52) years old when he was terminated, and was replaced by a substantially younger person, Nowak, who was thirty-two (32) years old. Gunthorpe, 90 Fed. Appx. at 880 (citing Bush v. Dictaphone, 161 F.3d 363, 368 (6th Cir. 1998)). The Sixth Circuit also concluded:
Because we must view the evidence and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to Gunthorpe, it is apparent that he has presented sufficient evidence that he was otherwise qualified. The record contains insufficient proof for us to conclude that he was unqualified. At the prima facie stage, we must focus on Gunthorpe's objective qualifications. Daimler Chrysler's subjective evaluations of Gunthorpe's poor performance are inconsistent with his performance records as first shift production supervisor. When Gunthorpe worked first shift and Nowak worked second shift he often outperformed her. There are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Gunthorpe was otherwise qualified for the position and as to whether DaimlerChrysler's proffered reason for his termination was pretextual.Id. (citations omitted).
Defendants purport to provide the evidence that the Sixth Circuit previously found lacking in the form of affidavit testimony offered by Czerniak in combination with attachments thereto. "[T]o be considered qualified for a position an employee must demonstrate that he or she was meeting the employer's legitimate expectations and was performing to the employer's satisfaction." Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1022 (6th Cir. 2000). Czerniak maintains:
I am aware that Gunthorpe has submitted raw production data to support his claim that he was outperforming Cynthia Nowak. However, for several reasons, including but not limited to those set forth below, raw production numbers are not indicative of a supervisor's performance:
a. Raw production numbers indicate nothing regarding quality. Gunthorpe had consistent quality issues and was simply unable to trouble shoot quality problems.
b. Raw production numbers do not take into account the employees that Gunthorpe and Nowak supervised. Gunthorpe was a fist shift supervisor. As such, he was fortunate to supervise a more experienced, higher seniority workforce. One would expect higher production numbers from Gunthorpe's workforce than from Nowak's. Similarly, because of his inabilities, I assigned Gunthorpe the strongest team leader, Dave Cook, and two of the strongest foremen.
c. Raw production numbers do not indicate whether either Gunthorpe or Nowak was "shipping service;" i.e. making parts to meet service requirements. Such parts are not reflected in the data submitted by Gunthorpe.
d. Raw production numbers do not indicate whether Gunthorpe left Nowak with a breakdown that lessened her shift's productivity. He often did exactly that.
e. Raw production numbers do not demonstrate the totality of the job of production supervisor. Besides being able to achieve production numbers, a supervisor must be able to get his employees to roll through the use of the P.F.S. crewsheet system, properly code absences so that his employees can be paid properly, adequately direct and discipline his employees, address and correct quality issues, and understand the build processes in his area of responsibility. Getting employees "to roll" is a term of art. The supervisor has one half hour at the beginning of the shift to determine how many employees have clocked in and place those employees in their positions. At the end of the half hour, the supervisor should know where all of his employees are, whether he needs additional employees, and whether he needs to transfer or send home excess employees. Gunthorpre was unable to accomplish these tasks. Indeed, he was so unable to manage the P.F.S. crewsheet system and to get his employees to roll, that I had to re-assign those tasks to Gunthorpe's team leader, Dave Cook. Nowak was able to perform these functions, so I did not have to assign them to her team leader.
(Doc. No. 50, Czerniak Aff., ¶¶ 6(a)-6(e)).
While Plaintiff had satisfied the improvement goal of reviewing the daily quality package provided at morning meetings during the 30/60/90 day review process, Defendants continued to find Gunthorpe's progress in determining and correcting operations impacting quality in Plaintiff's area to be unacceptable. Id. at attachments.
Gunthorpe's continued inability to properly operate the P.F.S. crewsheet system was also noted on each review during the 30/60/90 day review process. Id.
Plaintiff, however, provides testimony that is inapposite. Gunthorpe asserts that after assuming the position of production supervisor:
Gunthorpe received a Certificate of Recognition for five years of dedicated commitment to shared beliefs and values, signed by Robert Eaton, DaimlerChrysler's chairman, dated April 24, 2000, which was after his termination. (Doc. No. 53, Ex. G).
I worked for one week with the supervisor I was replacing and I was able to increase the production significantly with the exact same employees.
(Doc. No. 51, ¶ 5).
After the first week, I continued to improve the production with the exact same employees until I had increased production greater than 5% over the prior supervisor, who was transferred to another position within the plant and was still and employee when I was terminated.Id. at ¶ 6.
As a production supervisor, I never had production foremen working for me and Steven M. Czerniak never assigned any foremen to work under me.Id. at ¶ 8.
Production numbers took into account quality, as any production which failed to pass quality inspections were not credited to production.Id. at ¶ 9.
If quality problems occurred while the line was running, it required stopping the line and repairing the equipment causing the quality problem, which would cause a decrease in production.Id. at ¶ 10.
Since I never had to shut down the line for any reason, it was logically impossible for me to have had quality problems.Id. at ¶ 11.
The work force I supervised was not of higher seniority as many of the higher seniority employees preferred to work evening or night shift for the extra shift differential pay.Id. at ¶ 12.
I never left Nowak with a breakdown or any other problem which would lessen her shifts productivity, and further, any equipment problems would have been the responsibility of the maintenance department to correct during the break between shifts.Id. at ¶ 13.
The Court cannot help but observe that Czerniak's performance appraisal that allegedly triggered Plaintiff's 30/60/90 day review process is dated January 13, 2000, but Plaintiff's 30/60/90 day review process actually began January 4, 2000. (Doc. No. 50, Czerniak Aff., ¶¶ 4-5, attachments).
More importantly, Czerniak's purported explanations for the inconsistency between Plaintiff's and Nowak's production numbers, and Gunthorpe's poor performance evaluations, are not even properly considered at the prima facie stage.
At the prima facie stage, a court should focus on a plaintiff's objective qualifications to determine whether he or she is qualified for the relevant job. See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 332 U.S.App.D.C. 256, 16 F.3d 1284, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting that "courts traditionally treat explanations that rely heavily on subjective considerations with caution," and that "an employer's asserted strong reliance on subjective feelings about the candidates may mask discrimination"); MacDonald v. E. Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 941 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting "credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired") (emphasis added). The prima facie burden of showing that a plaintiff is qualified can therefore be met by presenting credible evidence that his or her qualifications are at least equivalent to the minimum objective criteria required for employment in the relevant field. Although the specific qualifications will vary depending on the job in question, the inquiry should focus on criteria such as the plaintiff's education, experience in the relevant industry, and demonstrated possession of the required general skills.Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Cline v. Catholic Diocese, 206 F.3d 651, 660-61 (6th Cir. 1999) (assessing whether a plaintiff has met her employer's legitimate expectations, and is therefore qualified, at the prima facie stage of a termination case requires a court to "examine plaintiff's evidence independent of the nondiscriminatory reason `produced' by the defense as its reason for terminating plaintiff").
In fact, in reversing this Court's award of summary judgment on Plaintiff's age discrimination claim, the Sixth Circuit stated:
DaimlerChrysler contends that its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Gunthorpe's termination is that he was not otherwise qualified for the position. This court, however, cannot consider such a reason at the prima facie stage. The only nondiscriminatory reason DaimlerChrysler offers is that Gunthorpe failed to meet the requirements to succeed in his position. Although poor work performance has been held to be a nondiscriminatory reason for termination, we must examine whether Gunthorpe was meeting DaimlerChrysler's legitimate expectations independent of its proffered nondiscriminatory reason.Gunthorpe, 90 Fed. Appx. at 880-81 (citations omitted).
The Court need look no further than Czerniak's own testimony to find that it is little more than another attempt to bootstrap Plaintiff's alleged poor work performance into the prima facie case:
Gunthorpe's termination was unrelated to his age. It was instead a product of his inability to perform the functions of his position. Even if raw production numbers were at times better than Nowak's, Gunthorpe remained the weaker supervisor because of his inability to manage his employees, his inability to discipline his employees, his inability to spot and correct quality issues, his inability to grasp the manufacture of the vehicle, and his inability to organize his employees.
(Doc. No. 50, Czerniak Aff., ¶ 7). See Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 280 F.3d 579, 587-88 (6th Cir. 2002) (asserting that evidence of poor performance should not be considered at the prima facie stage to demonstrate that an employee is unqualified). Accordingly, Defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 50) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.