Summary
stating that "the existence of valid and enforceable written contracts precludes recovery under the cause[] of action sounding in promissory estoppel . . . ."
Summary of this case from Tobin v. Rector of Trinity ChurchOpinion
2011-12-27
Israel GROSSMAN, et al., appellants, v. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, respondent(and a third-party action).
Jessica Sokol, New York, N.Y., for appellant Raphael Grossman, and Israel Grossman, Brooklyn, N.Y., pro se (one brief filed). Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, New York, N.Y. (E. Leo Milonas, Maria T. Galeno, and Andrew C. Smith of counsel), for respondent.
Jessica Sokol, New York, N.Y., for appellant Raphael Grossman, and Israel Grossman, Brooklyn, N.Y., pro se (one brief filed). Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, New York, N.Y. (E. Leo Milonas, Maria T. Galeno, and Andrew C. Smith of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, RANDALL T. ENG, and LEONARD B. AUSTIN, JJ.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiffs appeal (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Demarest, J.), dated January 26, 2010, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, (2), as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the same court dated June 16, 2010, as denied their motion for leave to renew and reargue their opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and (3) from an order of the same court dated July 6, 2010, which granted the defendant's application to impose a sanction upon the plaintiff Israel Grossman, and directed that plaintiff to pay the sum of $10,000 to the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection.
ORDERED that the order dated January 26, 2010, is affirmed; and it is further,
ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order dated June 16, 2010, as denied that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for leave to reargue is dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order denying reargument; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order dated June 16, 2010, is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,
ORDERED that on the Court's own motion, the notice of appeal from the order dated July 6, 2010, is treated as an application for leave to appeal from that order, and leave to appeal is granted ( see CPLR 5701); and it is further,
ORDERED that the order dated July 6, 2010, is affirmed; and it is further,
ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.
The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiff Israel Grossman (hereinafter Grossman) on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. “[U]nder the transactional approach adopted by New York in res judicata jurisprudence, ‘once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy’ ” ( Marinelli Assoc. v. Helmsley–Noyes Co., 265 A.D.2d 1, 5, 705 N.Y.S.2d 571, quoting O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687, 429 N.E.2d 1158). The defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law against Grossman by presenting evidence that the claims asserted by him in the instant action were barred by a prior final determination by an arbitration panel, which adjudicated claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the claims he asserts herein. In opposition, Grossman failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The Supreme Court also properly granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiff Raphael Grossman. The cause of action alleging a breach of an oral and implied contract is barred by the integration clauses in his written contracts with the defendant ( see Gebbia v. Toronto–Dominion Bank, 306 A.D.2d 37, 38, 762 N.Y.S.2d 38), and the existence of valid and enforceable written contracts precludes recovery under the causes of action sounding in promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment, which arise out of the same subject matter ( see Goldman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 5 N.Y.3d 561, 572, 807 N.Y.S.2d 583, 841 N.E.2d 742; Yenrab, Inc. v. 794 Linden Realty, LLC, 68 A.D.3d 755, 758–759, 892 N.Y.S.2d 105; Stark v. City of New York, 31 A.D.3d 530, 531, 818 N.Y.S.2d 281; Shah v. Micro Connections, 286 A.D.2d 433, 433–434, 729 N.Y.S.2d 497).
That branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for leave to renew their opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment was properly denied, since the new facts offered on the motion would not have changed the prior determination ( see CPLR 2221[e][2], [3] ).
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in imposing a sanction against Grossman ( see 22 NYCRR 130–1.1[a], [c] ).
We decline the defendant's request for the imposition of sanctions against the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs' request for the imposition of sanctions against the defendant, based upon allegedly frivolous conduct on this appeal ( see 22 NYCRR 130–1.1[a], [c]; Barns & Farms Realty, LLC v. Novelli, 82 A.D.3d 689, 691, 917 N.Y.S.2d 691).
The plaintiffs' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be addressed in light of our determination.