Opinion
C/A No. 0:19-642-CMC-PJG
05-10-2019
Monte Maurice Griffin, Petitioner, v. Bureau of Prisons, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner, Monte Maurice Griffin, a self-represented federal prisoner, brings this petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.). Having reviewed the Petition in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that it should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
I. Procedural Background
Petitioner is an inmate in the Federal Correctional Institution in Williamsburg, South Carolina. Petitioner files this petition for a writ of mandamus, asking the court to order the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") to implement a provision of the recently passed First Step Act of 2018 ("the Act"), Pub. L. 115-391. The Act, ratified in December 2018, amends 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) to increase the number of maximum allowable good time credits per year. The court need not detail the history leading to this change. See generally Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (2010); Yi v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining the underlying disagreement over how to interpret § 3624(b)(1), but ultimately deferring to BOP's interpretation). For the purpose of reviewing this the Petition, it suffices to know BOP interpreted the preceding version of the statute to only award credit if it determined that an inmate has demonstrated a full year of compliance with prison disciplinary regulations. But under the Act, the inmate will be credited based upon the length of the sentence imposed by the court. Therefore, an inmate would not be required to serve a full year before he can receive good time credit.
At issue here, Petitioner claims BOP has refused to comply with the Act's amendment to § 3624(b)(1). Specifically, Petitioner claims BOP still provides good time credit based on its interpretation of the preceding version of the statute because BOP claims the statute has a delayed effective date. (Pet., ECF No. 1 at 2-3.) Petitioner argues BOP has misinterpreted the Act to read a delayed effective date into the law that does not exist. (Id.) Petitioner asks the court to order BOP to immediately recalculate Petitioner's good time credit under the Act. (Id. at 4.)
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Petition pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), including 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Petition has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a pleading filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2009). Section 1915A requires, and § 1915 allows, a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a Respondent who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
This court is required to liberally construe pro se pleadings, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for "all civil actions").
B. Analysis
The court has jurisdiction to issue mandamus relief against federal officials. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the Petitioner."). But, a writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy only to be used in extraordinary situations. In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Kerr v. United States, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976)). The Fourth Circuit commands:
[T]o establish the conditions necessary for issuance of a writ of mandamus, the party seeking the writ must demonstrate that (1) he has a clear and indisputable right to the relief sought; (2) the responding party has a clear duty to do the specific act requested; (3) the act requested is an official act or duty; (4) there are no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires; and (5) the issuance of the writ will effect right and justice in the circumstances.U.S. ex rel. Rahman v. Ocncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 502, 511 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403).
Here, the court finds that Petitioner fails to allege facts that plausibly show extraordinary circumstances necessary for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Contrary to Petitioner's argument, the Act's amendment to § 3624(b)(1) does not take effect until the Attorney General completes a "risk and needs assessment system" "not later than 210 days after the date of enactment of this subchapter." 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a). Pub.L. 115-391, Title I, § 102(b)(1)(A), (2). In other words, while the Act has been ratified, the change to good time credit calculations is not yet in effect. Other courts that have recently considered this issue are in agreement. See Schmutzler v. Quintana, Civil Action No. 5:19-046-DCR, 2019 WL 727794, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 20, 2019); Brown v. Warden of FCI Williamsburg, Case No. 8:19-cv-00546-HMH-JDA, 2019 WL 1780747 at * 7 (D.S.C. Mar. 25, 2019) (collecting cases), Report and Recommendation adopted 2019 WL 1773382 (D.S.C. Apr. 23, 2019). Thus, BOP does not yet have a clear duty to perform the act requested in the Petition, nor does Petitioner have a clear and indisputable right to the relief requested. See U.S. ex rel. Rahman, 198 F.3d at 511. Consequently, Petitioner fails to state a claim upon which writ of mandamus can be granted.
Assuming the risk and needs assessment is timely completed, § 102(b)(1) of the Act will not take effect until approximately July 2019.
Petitioner has also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this matter that is nearly identical to the petition for a writ of mandamus. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed subsequent to the petition for a writ of mandamus, but it raises the same allegations and asks for the same relief—an order directing BOP to immediately recalculate Petitioner's good time credit under the Act. (ECF No. 6.) To the extent the petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks the same relief as the petition for a writ of mandamus, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed as duplicative. Cottle v. Bell, 229 F.3d 1142 (4th Cir. 2000) ("Because district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e).") (citing Aziz v. Burrows, 1158, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992)). To the extent Petitioner seeks actual habeas corpus relief, that is, immediate or speedier release from confinement, see Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005); he may file a new civil action. See generally Fed R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; see also Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011); Stewart v. U.S. I.N.S., 762 F.2d 193, 199 (2d. Cir. 1985).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process, and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be struck from the docket. May 10, 2019
Columbia, South Carolina
/s/_________
Paige J. Gossett
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
"Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation."
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).