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holding that Court possessed federal question jurisdiction over claim to enforce the Affidavit of Support
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Case No. 3:18-cv-2045-MJF
2019-09-10
Gernot GREINER, Plaintiff, v. Georgina DE CAPRI, Defendant.
Gernot Greiner, Fort Walton Beach, FL, pro se. William Lee Ketchersid, Ward & Ketchersid PA, Destin, FL, for Defendant.
Gernot Greiner, Fort Walton Beach, FL, pro se.
William Lee Ketchersid, Ward & Ketchersid PA, Destin, FL, for Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
Michael J. Frank, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Gernot Greiner—a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany—married Defendant Georgina De Capri, who is a citizen of the United States. In 2013, to obtain lawful permanent resident status for Greiner, De Capri executed a form promulgated by the U.S. government in which she promised to support Greiner financially. After their divorce in 2018, Greiner initiated this action to enforce De Capri's promise. De Capri moved to dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, her motion to dismiss must be denied.
After the parties consented, the district court referred this action to the undersigned magistrate judge to conduct all proceedings and enter final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.
I. Background
For purposes of a motion to dismiss this court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and it is in that light that the facts are set forth below. On February 19, 2010, De Capri and Greiner were married in Santa Rosa Beach, Florida. Shortly after their wedding, Greiner departed for his native Germany while De Capri remained in Florida. For approximately five years of their marriage, Greiner and De Capri lived apart and visited each other only briefly. In 2013, De Capri made efforts to obtain lawful permanent resident status for Greiner.
In addressing De Capri's motion to dismiss, this court has considered documents attached to the complaint and has taken judicial notice of documents filed by the parties in Florida courts. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. , 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) (noting that a court addressing a motion to dismiss can consider documents attached to the complaint and may take judicial notice of other documents); U.S. ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana Inc. , 776 F.3d 805, 812 n.4 (11th Cir. 2015) ("Courts may take judicial notice of publicly filed documents, such as those in state court litigation, at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.").
The Immigration and Nationality Act prohibits an alien who is likely to become a public charge from becoming a lawful permanent resident of the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) ("Any alien who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time of application for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible."). Aliens who would be inadmissible for this reason, however, may become admissible if a sponsor executes an affidavit promising to provide financial support to the intending immigrant. Erler v. Erler , 824 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2016). Thus, federal law requires that a person who sponsors certain aliens for admission into the United States "execute an affidavit of support." 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(a), (b) ; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii).
The required affidavit is a form promulgated by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, which is an agency of the Department of Homeland Security that awards immigration benefits. The affidavit of support is known as "USCIS Form I-864." Once executed, the affidavit "becomes a contract between the sponsor and the United States Government for the benefit of the sponsored immigrant ...." Erler , 824 F.3d at 1175 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(d) ).
On January 18, 2013, in an effort to obtain lawful permanent resident status for Greiner, De Capri executed a USCIS Form I-864. In this Form—pursuant to the requirements of federal law—De Capri was informed of her obligations and agreed that:
• she was sponsoring Greiner for an immigration benefit;
• she would "assume certain specific obligations under the Immigration and Nationality Act and other Federal Laws;"
• she would provide Greiner "any support necessary to maintain him" "at an income that is at least 125 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines for his" household size;
• if she did "not provide sufficient support" for Greiner he "may sue" her for the support; and
• divorce would "not terminate" her support obligations.
(Doc. 7-2). In 2013, the United States government granted Greiner lawful permanent resident status.
From November 2015 to January 2017, Greiner and De Capri resided together in Florida, but in January 2017, De Capri filed for divorce in a Florida court. On March 7, 2017, Greiner filed a counter-petition in which he asserted a counterclaim for "breach of contract" based on the promises De Capri made in the Form I-864. On June 1, 2018, the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit in and for Walton County, Florida, entered a final judgment dissolving the marriage. Without discussion, the court did not award Greiner any relief based on the Form I-864.
On August 27, 2018, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1183a, Greiner initiated this action to enforce his rights under the Form I-864. Greiner alleges that he has no income and lives "far below the poverty line." Greiner, therefore, seeks an award of the financial support De Capri purportedly owes him under the Form I-864, including the financial support due in 2016 to 2018, plus interest and costs.
De Capri moves to dismiss this action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), insofar as the res judicata doctrine purportedly bars Greiner's claim.
II. Discussion
A. Federal-Question Jurisdiction
De Capri argues that this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this action.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and they possess only the power authorized by Congress or the Constitution. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc. , 545 U.S. 546, 552, 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2616-17, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005) ; Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Congress may "give, withhold or restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion, provided it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution." Kline v. Burke Constr. Co. , 260 U.S. 226, 234, 43 S. Ct. 79, 82, 67 L.Ed. 226 (1922). The validity of a federal court's order depends upon that court having subject-matter jurisdiction. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee , 456 U.S. 694, 701, 102 S. Ct. 2099, 2103, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982). Absent a grant of subject-matter jurisdiction from Congress, a court "is powerless to act." Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co. , 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999) ; Wernick v. Mathews , 524 F.2d 543, 545 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that absent jurisdiction a court is "powerless to consider the merits" of a case). "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Ex parte McCardle , 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868).
Article III of the United States Constitution empowers Congress to give federal courts jurisdiction over "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has broadly construed the "arising under" language of Article III to extend "to all cases in which a federal question is ‘an ingredient’ of the action." Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson , 478 U.S. 804, 807, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 3232, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986) (quoting Osborn v. Bank of United States , 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824) ). The main purpose of federal-question jurisdiction is "the preservation of the constitution and laws of the United States, so far as they can be preserved by judicial authority ...." Ames v. Kansas , 111 U.S. 449, 470-71, 4 S. Ct. 437, 447, 28 L.Ed. 482 (1884) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia , 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 391, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821) ); see also Kansas v. Nebraska , 574 U.S. 445, –––– n.5, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1053 n.5, 191 L.Ed.2d 1 (2015) (recognizing federal judicial authority to give effect to and remedy violations of federal law).
In bestowing general federal-question jurisdiction on federal courts, Congress authorized United States district courts to exercise jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Although this statute uses the same "arising under" language as Article III, the Supreme Court has held that section 1331 confers less jurisdiction on the federal courts than the Constitution permits. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria , 461 U.S. 480, 494, 103 S. Ct. 1962, 1971-72, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983) ("Although the language of § 1331 parallels that of the ‘arising under’ clause of Article III, this Court never has held that statutory ‘arising under’ jurisdiction is identical to Article III ‘arising under’ jurisdiction. Quite the contrary is true."); Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co. , 358 U.S. 354, 379, 79 S. Ct. 468, 484, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959) (noting the reluctance of the Supreme Court "to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts through a broad reading of jurisdictional statutes"). "Jurisdiction of the lower federal courts" therefore "is further limited to those subjects encompassed within a statutory grant of jurisdiction." Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee , 456 U.S. 694, 701, 102 S. Ct. 2099, 2104, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982). The Supreme Court has noted that it has yet to "frame a single, precise definition for determining which cases fall within, and which cases fall outside, the original jurisdiction of the district courts." Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Calif. , 463 U.S. 1, 8, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 2845-46, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983).
To determine whether it enjoys federal-question jurisdiction over an action, a court first must look at the subject matter of the "well-pleaded complaint." Id. ; 463 U.S. at 9, 103 S. Ct. at 2846 ; Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley , 211 U.S. 149, 152, 29 S. Ct. 42, 43, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908) (observing that "a suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon" federal law). Federal-question jurisdiction exists "when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams , 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) ; see Rivet v. Regions Bank of La. , 522 U.S. 470, 118 S. Ct. 921, 925, 139 L.Ed.2d 912 (1998). Courts look to the substance, not merely the labels, of the plaintiff's claims as contained in his complaint. See Mosher v. City of Phoenix , 287 U.S. 29, 30, 53 S. Ct. 67, 77, 77 L.Ed. 148 (1932). Through the well-pleaded complaint rule, the "plaintiff is absolute master of what jurisdiction he will appeal to." Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co. , 237 U.S. 479, 480, 35 S. Ct. 658, 659, 59 L.Ed. 1056 (1915) ; The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co. , 228 U.S. 22, 23, 33 S. Ct. 410, 411, 57 L.Ed. 716 (1913) (observing that "the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon").
A civil action "arises under" federal law at least when a federal statute creates the cause of action. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co. , 241 U.S. 257, 260, 36 S. Ct. 585, 586, 60 L.Ed. 987 (1916) ; see Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC , 565 U.S. 368, 371-72, 132 S. Ct. 740, 744, 181 L.Ed.2d 881 (2012) ; Hudson Ins. Co. v. Am. Elec. Corp. , 957 F.2d 826, 828 (11th Cir. 1992). That is, "federal jurisdiction attaches when federal law creates the cause of action asserted." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning , 578 U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 1569, 194 L.Ed.2d 671 (2016) ; Mims , 565 U.S. at 378, 132 S. Ct. at 749 (observing that "when federal law creates the cause of action and furnishes the substantive rules of decision, the claim arises under federal law, and the district courts possess federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331").
Thus, there "is no serious debate that a federally created claim for relief is generally a ‘sufficient condition for federal-question jurisdiction.’ " Mims , 565 U.S. at 377, 132 S. Ct. at 748 (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. , 545 U.S. 308, 317, 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2369, 162 L.Ed.2d 257 (2005) ). A civil action authorized and created by federal law, therefore, falls within a district court's federal-question jurisdiction. See Gunn v. Minton , 568 U.S. 251, 257, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064, 185 L.Ed.2d 72 (2013) (noting that "a case arises under federal law when federal law creates the cause of action asserted" and that a claim "arose under federal law" "because it was authorized" by federal statutes); Hill v. Marston , 13 F.3d 1548, 1549 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that a case "arises under" federal law "if it is federal law that creates the cause of action"). Indeed, "the vast majority of cases brought under the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts are those in which federal law creates the cause of action." Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. , 478 U.S. at 808, 106 S. Ct. at 3232 ; see Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. , 545 U.S. at 312, 125 S. Ct. at 2366 (noting that federal-question jurisdiction under section 1331 "is invoked by and large by plaintiffs pleading a cause of action created by federal law"). Courts look to see if a federally-created right is an essential element of a plaintiff's cause of action. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank , 299 U.S. 109, 112, 57 S. Ct. 96, 97, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936) ("To bring a case within the statute, a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action.").
Of course, "[n]ot every right created by Congress or defined by an executive agency is automatically enforceable in the federal courts." Salcedo v. Hanna , 936 F.3d 1162, 1165–67, 2019 WL 4050424, at *2 (11th Cir. Aug. 28, 2019).
Here, Greiner's complaint plainly states that he is bringing this action pursuant to section 213A of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a. The Immigration and Nationality Act is federal law. Nobody disputes that the power to regulate immigration is "unquestionably exclusively a federal power." DeCanas v. Bica , 424 U.S. 351, 354, 96 S. Ct. 933, 936, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976) ; Kleindienst v. Mandel , 408 U.S. 753, 766, 92 S. Ct. 2576, 2583, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972) (noting that Congress possesses the power to exclude aliens, to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which aliens may come to the United States, and to have its policy enforced). Indeed, federal immigration law preempts conflicting state law. See Arizona v. United States , 567 U.S. 387, 394, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012) ("The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens."). Furthermore, "the interpretation of the provisions of the INA is a question of federal law." Paredes-Urrestarazu v. U.S. I.N.S. , 36 F.3d 801, 807 (9th Cir. 1994).
In this action, Greiner is seeking to vindicate a right created by federal law and bestowed upon him by federal law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(B) (stating that the affidavit of support "is legally enforceable against the sponsor by the sponsored alien"); 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(d) ("The sponsored immigrant ... may seek enforcement of the sponsor's obligations through an appropriate civil action."). "Federal-question jurisdiction affords parties a federal forum in which ‘to vindicate federal rights’ ...." Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Jackson , 587 U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1745, 204 L.Ed.2d 34 (2019) ; Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. , 288 U.S. 476, 483, 53 S. Ct. 447, 449-50, 77 L.Ed. 903 (1933) ("Federal jurisdiction may be invoked to vindicate a right or privilege claimed under a federal statute.").
The cause of action asserted by Greiner was expressly created by a federal statute; the statute created a federal right that otherwise did not exist; and federal law provides an essential element of the claim. See 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1) and (e) ; see also Jairath v. Dyer , 154 F.3d 1280, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998) (observing that "federal-question jurisdiction may be based on a civil action ... asserting a federal cause of action established by a congressionally created expressed or implied private remedy for violations of a federal statute"). "[T]here is no question that federal law, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1183a, controls" Greiner's "claim to enforce the affidavit of support." Montgomery v. Montgomery , 764 F. Supp.2d 328, 336 (D.N.H. 2011). Accordingly, Greiner's action clearly is one that arises under federal law insofar as federal law created his claim and created the right that is the basis of his claim, and federal law provides the substantive rules that must be applied in his case. See Mims , 565 U.S. at 372, 132 S. Ct. at 744-45 (holding that the action arose under federal law insofar as federal law created the claim and "supplies the substantive rules that will govern the case").
In addition to the fact that federal law created the right at issue and the cause of action, and federal law provides the substantive law that must be applied to the case, Greiner is seeking to assert his federal statutory right in a civil action specifically authorized by federal law. See Gunn , 568 U.S. at 257, 133 S. Ct. at 1064 (noting that a case arises under federal law when a federal statute authorizes the civil action). A subsection of the relevant statute— 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(e) —plainly states: "An action to enforce an affidavit of support executed under subsection (a) may be brought against any sponsor in any appropriate court ... (1) by a sponsored alien, with respect to financial support ...." 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(e).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has recognized that a lawsuit brought pursuant to section 1183a(e) is a civil suit "arising under" federal law. Liu v. Mund , 686 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2012) ("The suit thus arises under federal law ...."). Various district courts have also so held. See Kawai v. UaCearnaigh , 249 F. Supp. 3d 821, 824 (D. S.C. 2017) (holding that " § 1183a(e) authorizes Plaintiff, as the sponsored alien of the I-864 Affidavit executed by Defendant, to bring suit to enforce the I–864 Affidavit, and this action therefore arises under federal law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331"); Madrid v. Robinson , 218 F. Supp. 3d 482, 487 (W.D. Va. 2016) (" Section 1183a(e)(1) creates a specific federal cause of action through which a sponsored alien may enforce their rights under an Affidavit of Support. Accordingly, this court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ...."). It is beyond doubt, therefore, that this action is one "arising under" federal law for which this court enjoys subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to section 1331.
De Capri inexplicably ignores Liu and the district court decisions noted above and instead argues that an unpublished district court decision should govern this case. See Winters v. Winters , No. 6:12-CV-536-ORL-37, 2012 WL 13137011 (M.D. Fla Apr. 25, 2012), adopting the report and recommendation , 2012 WL 1946074 (M.D. Fla. May 30, 2012). In Winters , the plaintiff-wife sued the defendant-husband in federal court for spousal support, child support, health insurance for her and her two children, life insurance for her and her two children, attorney's fees, court costs, and enforcement of the Form I-864. Winters , 2012 WL 1946074, at *1. As one of the rationales for dismissal, the court opined that section 1183a(e)(1) did not grant subject-matter jurisdiction to district courts because it used the term "any appropriate court" instead of explicitly using the words "United States District Courts." See Winters , 2012 WL 13137011, at *3.
District court decisions are not binding precedent but, like any judicial opinion, may illuminate issues and contain a persuasive rationale. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut , 564 U.S. 410, 428, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2540, 180 L.Ed.2d 435 (2011) ; Camreta v. Greene , 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011) ; United States v. Johnson , 921 F.3d 991, 999 (11th Cir. 2019) ; United States v. Cerceda , 172 F.3d 806, 812 n.6 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam).
The Supreme Court, however, has made clear that Congress does not need to employ magic words to bestow subject-matter jurisdiction, or to withhold jurisdiction for that matter. Patchak v. Zinke , 583 U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905, 200 L.Ed.2d 92 (2018) (noting that "this Court does not require jurisdictional statutes to ‘incant magic words’ ") (quoting Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr. , 568 U.S. 145, 153, 133 S. Ct. 817, 824, 184 L.Ed.2d 627 (2013) ). There certainly is no requirement that Congress explicitly state in each statute authorizing a federal cause of action that the "United States Districts Courts" enjoy subject-matter jurisdiction. So long as federal law authorizes a cause of action, a case arises under federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and Congress need not even mention the word "jurisdiction" in the statute that authorizes the cause of action or explicitly confer subject-matter jurisdiction on federal courts. See Merrill Lynch , 578 U.S. at ––––, 136 S. Ct. at 1569 ; Gunn , 568 U.S. at 257, 133 S. Ct. at 1064 ; Mims , 565 U.S. at 371-72, 132 S. Ct. at 744 ; Layne & Bowler Co. , 241 U.S. at 260, 36 S. Ct. at 586.
For example, in Mims , the Supreme Court examined a subsection of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, which stated that a "person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State—" an action pursuant to the Act. Mims , 565 U.S. at 374, 132 S. Ct. at 746 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) ). This provision did not use the terms "United States District Courts" or "subject-matter jurisdiction." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that Congress's authorization of lawsuits in "an appropriate court of that State" did not mean that Congress withheld federal-question jurisdiction to adjudicate actions brought pursuant to the Act. Mims , 565 U.S. at 377-78, 132 S. Ct. at 748-79 (holding that the plaintiff's claim arises under the laws of the United States because "federal law creates the right of action and provides the rules of decision").
Notably, the Winters decision was issued before the Seventh Circuit issued Liu , and thus the Winters court did not have the benefit of the Seventh Circuit's analysis. De Capri does not even attempt to distinguish Liu or explain why this court should follow Winters instead of the Liu holding. De Capri also has not shown that this action arises under anything but federal law, and she has not shown that some law other than federal law defines the elements of Greiner's claim and governs this case. See Montgomery , 764 F. Supp.2d at 336 (observing that "there is no question that federal law, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1183a, controls the plaintiffs' claim to enforce the affidavit of support"). Accordingly, De Capri has failed to demonstrate that the Winters decision controls this case. This court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction to address this civil action.
B. Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Court Jurisdiction
De Capri next asserts that this court should dismiss this action in light of the so-called "domestic relations" exception to federal court jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that "domestic relations are preeminently matters of state law." Mansell v. Mansell , 490 U.S. 581, 587, 109 S. Ct. 2023, 2028, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989) ; Moore v. Sims , 442 U.S. 415, 435, 99 S. Ct. 2371, 2383, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979) ("Family relations are a traditional area of state concern"). In light of the States' strong interest in matters of domestic relations, federal courts have recognized a "domestic relations" exception when federal courts are asked to exercise jurisdiction in certain cases touching upon familial relations. The Supreme Court has noted, however, that the domestic relations exception is not "compelled by the text of the Constitution or federal statute." Marshall v. Marshall , 547 U.S. 293, 299, 126 S. Ct. 1735, 1741, 164 L.Ed.2d 480 (2006).
Rather, it is a judicially-created doctrine "stemming in large measure from misty understandings of English legal history." Id. It originated in the dicta of two Supreme Court cases. See Ex parte Burrus , 136 U.S. 586, 593-94, 10 S. Ct. 850, 852-53, 34 L.Ed. 500 (1890) ("The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states and not to the laws of the United States."); Barber v. Barber , 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584, 16 L.Ed. 226 (1858) ("[w]e disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony"); see generally Jones v. Brennan , 465 F.3d 304, 306-07 (7th Cir. 2006) (examining the historical origins of the doctrine); Spindel v. Spindel , 283 F. Supp. 797, 802-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (same).
Some courts have construed the doctrine to be a type of prudential abstention, and not a divestment of jurisdiction. See Rash v. Rash , 173 F.3d 1376, 1380 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that the domestic relations "exception is narrowly confined; it is not an absolute rule, but rather the question is whether the court in its discretion should abstain"); Jagiella v. Jagiella , 647 F.2d 561, 564 n.11 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (noting the debate whether the domestic relations exception is a matter of abstention or an actual lack of jurisdiction). The Fifth Circuit noted prudential reasons for federal courts to abstain from adjudicating domestic relations cases: "the strong state interest in domestic relations matters, the competence of state courts in settling family disputes, the possibility of incompatible federal and state court decrees in cases of continuing judicial supervision by the state, and the problem of congested dockets in federal courts." Crouch v. Crouch , 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978) ; see Jones , 465 F.3d at 307 (observing that "state courts are assumed to have developed a proficiency in these matters, to have procedures tailored to them, and to work closely with and even employ specialized staff not found in federal courts").
Whether the domestic relations exception is a theory of abstention or an actual divestment of jurisdiction, courts have accepted this doctrine due to its endurance and the fact that Congress has done nothing to undermine or limit it. As Judge Friendly observed:
More than a century has elapsed since the Barber dictum without any intimation of Congressional dissatisfaction. It is beyond the realm of reasonable belief that, in these days of congested dockets, Congress would wish the federal courts to seek to regain territory, even if the cession of 1859 was unjustified. Whatever Article III may or may not permit, we thus accept the Barber dictum as a correct interpretation of the Congressional grant.
Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel , 490 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1973) ; see also Ankenbrandt v. Richards , 504 U.S. 689, 703, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2215, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992) ("Given the long passage of time without any expression of congressional dissatisfaction, we have no trouble today reaffirming the validity of the exception as it pertains to divorce and alimony decrees and child custody orders.").
Regardless of its specific nature, murky origins, and policy justifications, under the domestic relations exception, "only ‘divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees’ remain outside federal jurisdictional bounds." Marshall , 547 U.S. at 308, 126 S. Ct. at 1746 (quoting Ankenbrandt , 504 U.S. at 703, 112 S. Ct. at 2215 ). Accordingly, the domestic-relations exception "does not apply when the parties do not ask the federal court to perform these status-related functions—issuing a divorce, alimony, or child-custody decree—even if the matter involves married or once-married parties." Chevalier v. Estate of Barnhart , 803 F.3d 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2015) ; Loubser v. Thacker , 440 F.3d 439, 442 (7th Cir. 2006).
In this action, Greiner is not seeking a divorce decree, alimony, or a child-custody decree. Rather, he is seeking to enforce a right to financial support granted by operation of a federal statute and pursuant to an affidavit of support required and governed by federal law. "[C]laims of a kind traditionally adjudicated in federal courts, for example, tort or contract claims, are not excepted from federal-court jurisdiction simply because they arise in a domestic relations context." City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons , 522 U.S. 156, 190 n.6, 118 S. Ct. 523, 542 n.6, 139 L.Ed.2d 525 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Ankenbrandt , 504 U.S. at 704, 112 S. Ct. at 2215 (concluding that the domestic relations exception does not apply to tort claims); Lannan v. Maul , 979 F.2d 627, 631 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the domestic relations exception does not apply to an action for breach of contract); Cole v. Cole , 633 F.2d 1083, 1087-89 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that the domestic relations exception did not preclude a federal court from exercising jurisdiction over tort claims against a former spouse because the case would not require the court to adjust family status or establish duties); Crouch , 566 F.2d at 487 (holding that the domestic relations exception was inapplicable to a contract dispute between a divorced couple). "A federal court is not deprived of competence merely because the parties involved" once were spouses. Spindel , 283 F. Supp. at 812.
Regardless of the nomenclature parties employ in describing the nature of a claim, a federal court must independently assess whether a claim is one involving issues peculiarly within the province of a domestic relations court. See Vaughan v. Smithson , 883 F.2d 63, 65 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that courts should assess the gravamen of the action and not rely on the parties' labels in assessing whether the action falls within the domestic relations exception). "Not every case involving a dispute between present or former spouses" involves the domestic relations exception, and federal courts "should sift through the claims of the complaint to determine the true character of the dispute to be adjudicated ...." Kirby v. Mellenger , 830 F.2d 176, 178 (11th Cir. 1987) ; Jagiella , 647 F.2d at 565 (observing that in applying the domestic relations exception courts should inquire "into the nature of the claim" and determine "whether hearing the claim will necessitate the court's involvement in domestic issues").
Looking beyond mere nomenclature, an adjudication of Greiner's claim will not require this court to address issues traditionally considered within the purview and peculiar expertise of a domestic relations court, such as the division of marital property or an award of alimony. See Irish v. Irish , 842 F.3d 736, 741 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting that "state courts are experts at dividing marital property"). Rather, in Greiner's case, he seeks damages, "and the marital status of the parties will not be altered by an adjudication of" Greiner's claim. Spindel , 283 F. Supp. at 812. Furthermore, the parties' prior marital relationship was not a prerequisite to Greiner's action and simply is irrelevant to his claim insofar as many individuals who are not an alien's spouse can serve as a sponsor by signing a section 1183a affidavit. Accordingly, the domestic relations exception does not bar Greiner's claim.
C. Res Judicata
Finally, De Capri asserts that this case must be dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata because the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit in and for Walton County, Florida, already decided that Greiner was not entitled to recover under 8 U.S.C. § 1183a.
In the American system of jurisprudence "the usual rule is that merits of a legal claim once decided in a court of competent jurisdiction are not subject to redetermination in another forum." Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp. , 456 U.S. 461, 485, 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1899, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). According to the doctrine of res judicata—also known as "claim preclusion"—a "final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action." Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie , 452 U.S. 394, 398, 101 S. Ct. 2424, 2428, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981). "[C]laim preclusion operates to prevent parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate between themselves ...." See Shurick v. Boeing Co. , 623 F.3d 1114, 1117 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted)). Once a final judgment has been entered in a court of competent jurisdiction—whether federal or state—the parties are precluded from relitigating claims that were raised and could have been raised in that action. Long v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr. , 924 F.3d 1171, 1178 (11th Cir. 2019) ; Likes v. DHL Express (USA), Inc. , 787 F.3d 1096, 1099 n.4 (11th Cir. 2015) ; Kizzire v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc. , 441 F.3d 1306, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006).
As the Supreme Court has noted, the principles of res judicata were derived from Roman law and now every adjudicatory system has some form of the res judicata doctrine. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco , 545 U.S. 323, 336-37, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2501, 162 L.Ed.2d 315 (2005) (observing that the res judicata rule predates the founding of the United States and exists in every jurisprudential system); Washington, Alexandria, & Georgetown Steam-Packet Co. v. Sickles , 65 U.S. (24 How.) 333, 341, 16 L.Ed. 650 (1861) ("The authority of the res judicata, with the limitations under which it is admitted, is derived by us from the Roman law and the Canonists.").
Res judicata is a judicially-crafted doctrine "with the purpose of both giving finality to parties who have already litigated a claim and promoting judicial economy ...." Eastman Kodak Co. v. Atlanta Retail, Inc. , 456 F.3d 1277, 1284 (11th Cir. 2006). Res judicata serves several important purposes. First, it promotes "the finality of judgments and thereby increases certainty ...." Westwood Chem. Co. v. Kulick , 656 F.2d 1224, 1227 (6th Cir. 1981) ; see Brown v. Felsen , 442 U.S. 127, 131, 99 S. Ct. 2205, 2209, 60 L.Ed.2d 767 (1979) ("Res judicata ensures the finality of decisions."). "Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation ... and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties." Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n , 283 U.S. 522, 525, 51 S. Ct. 517, 518, 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931). Without res judicata, a civil action might last for generations without ever terminating, and the parties could never be certain about their rights and obligations under the law. See Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen , 333 U.S. 591, 597, 68 S. Ct. 715, 719, 92 L.Ed. 898 (1948) (noting that res judicata rests upon the "public policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal relations"). Indeed, repose likely "is the most important product of res judicata." 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT , ET AL. , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4403 (3d ed. 2016).
The ability to relitigate the same claims also would increase the likelihood of courts rendering inconsistent judgments, which would inhibit the creation of clear precedents upon which the common-law system is founded. Taylor v. Sturgell , 553 U.S. 880, 892, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008) ; Montana v. United States , 440 U.S. 147, 153-54, 99 S. Ct. 970, 973-74, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) ; Borrero v. United Healthcare of New York, Inc. , 610 F.3d 1296, 1307 (11th Cir. 2010). The rule of law requires consistency in judicial decisions, and res judicata helps create such consistency and thereby avoid confusion and encourage parties to rely on judicial decisions. Allen v. McCurry , 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S. Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980).
The doctrine of res judicata also conserves judicial resources as well as the temporal and financial resources of the parties. Allen , 449 U.S. at 94, 101 S. Ct. at 415 ; Montana , 440 U.S. at 153-54, 99 S. Ct. at 973-74 ; Borrero , 610 F.3d at 1307. Once a matter has been decided, it would be unfair to give the losing party multiple opportunities to relitigate the same issue, and thereby needlessly burden the prevailing party and the courts. Parklane Hosiery Co. Inc. v. Shore , 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S. Ct. 645, 649, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) ; Topps v. State , 865 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 2004). Without the principles of res judicata, a wealthy party could repeatedly relitigate a matter until the opposing party wearied of the fray, became impoverished, or both.
Furthermore, when a state court has adjudicated a claim, res judicata promotes " ‘the comity between state and federal courts that has been recognized as a bulwark of the federal system.’ " Kremer , 456 U.S. at 466 n.6, 102 S. Ct. at 1889 n.6 (quoting Allen , 449 U.S. at 96, 101 S. Ct. at 414 ); see Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co. , 84 F.3d 1388, 1394 (11th Cir. 1996). This interest in comity is served when federal courts afford preclusive effect to state court decisions. Sykes v. McDowell , 786 F.2d 1098, 1103 (11th Cir. 1986).
Here, De Capri contends that this court must give res judicata effect to a decision of the First Judicial Circuit Court in and for Walton County, Florida. "The preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is determined by federal common law." Taylor , 553 U.S. at 891, 128 S. Ct. at 2171. Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, however, for decisions of state courts, federal courts must look to the res judicata rules of the State from which the judgment originates to determine the extent to which a judgment is entitled to preclusive effect. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 ; Kremer , 456 U.S. at 481-82, 102 S. Ct. at 1898 ; Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S. Ct. 892, 896, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984) (holding that federal courts "must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the state in which the judgment was rendered"); Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. , 857 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (holding that a district court must afford "preclusive effect to a state court judgment to the same extent as would courts of the state in which the judgment was entered") (quoting Kahn v. Smith Barney Shearson Inc. , 115 F.3d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 1997) ).
In the Full Faith and Credit Act, "Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so ...." Allen , 449 U.S. at 96, 101 S. Ct. at 416. On the other hand, "a federal court gives no greater preclusive effect to a state-court judgment than the state court itself would do." Johnson v. De Grandy , 512 U.S. 997, 1005, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2654, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994). Finally, under "the Full Faith and Credit Act, federal courts generally should respect state court judgments, even where erroneous." Lops v. Lops , 140 F.3d 927, 938 (11th Cir. 1998) ; see City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C. , 569 U.S. 290, 297, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1869, 185 L.Ed.2d 941 (2013) (noting that "even an erroneous judgment is entitled to res judicata effect").
Under Florida law, res judicata applies when there is: (1) identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the persons and parties to the action; (4) identity of the capacity of the person for or against whom the claim is made; and (5) the original claim was adjudicated on the merits. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla. , 713 F.3d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir. 2013) ; Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. , 945 So. 2d 1216, 1235 (Fla. 2006). The party asserting the preclusive effect of a prior judgment has the burden of establishing these elements. Lozman , 713 F.3d at 1076 (noting that "the Defendants bear the burden to demonstrate that res judicata applies and that there was a clear-cut adjudication on the merits in the prior suit"); In re Piper Aircraft Corp. , 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001) ("At all times the burden is on the party asserting res judicata ... to show that the later-filed suit is barred."); Prall v. Prall , 58 Fla. 496, 50 So. 867, 870 (1909) ("If there is any uncertainty as to the matter formerly adjudicated, the burden of showing it with sufficient certainty ... is upon the party who claims the benefit of the former judgment."). Accordingly, De Capri has the burden of establishing each of these elements.
In the First Judicial Circuit Court in and for Walton County, Florida, Greiner filed a counter petition in which he asserted a counterclaim for "breach of contract" based on the Form I-864. (Doc. 17-7 at 6). The court subsequently entered a "Final Judgment Of Dissolution of Marriage" which did not grant Greiner the relief he requested but also did not discuss Greiner's counterclaim. (Doc. 17-8).
Three of the five elements of res judicata clearly are satisfied in this case. That is, there is identity of the persons and parties to the respective actions, there is identity of the capacity of the person for or against whom the claim is made, and Greiner's claim in the First Judicial Circuit Court was adjudicated on the merits.
The First Judicial Circuit Court did not explain its reason for rejecting Greiner's claim. "Nothing in the phrase ‘adjudicated on the merits’ requires the state court to have explained its reasoning process." See Sellan v. Kuhlman , 261 F.3d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 2001). This court must give cursory decisions by Florida courts the same preclusive effect that a Florida court would. Allen , 449 U.S. at 96, 101 S. Ct. at 415. The Florida Supreme Court has held that it will decline to give preclusive effect to cursory denials of relief only in cases involving extraordinary writ petitions. See Topps , 865 So. 2d at 1258.
As to one of the remaining elements—identity of the cause of action—res judicata has clear temporal limitations insofar as a second action filed by a party will not be barred when the second action asserts a claim for a breach or harm that had not yet occurred at the time he filed his initial lawsuit. In such instances, there is no identify of the thing sued for, nor is there identity of the causes of action. See Cromwell v. Cty. of Sac. , 94 U.S. 351, 352-53, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876) (noting that res judicata does not bar a second claim based "upon a different claim or demand"); Forero v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC , 223 So. 3d 440, 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (noting that res judicata does not bar a subsequent suit based on actions that "had not yet occurred" when the initial lawsuit was filed).
For example, res judicata will not bar an action for wrongful death when the plaintiff previously brought an action only for personal injury to a living victim, because a wrongful death action does not accrue until the death of the victim, and thus such a claim could not have been brought in the initial lawsuit when the victim was still alive. See Taylor v. Orlando Clinic , 555 So. 2d 876, 878 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Under general claim preclusion rules, "res judicata does not bar claims that are predicated on events that postdate the filing of the initial lawsuit." Morgan v. Covington Township , 648 F.3d 172, 177-78 (3d Cir. 2011). Stated another way, "res judicata does not apply to claims that were not ripe at the time of the first suit." Rawe v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 462 F.3d 521, 530 (6th Cir. 2006) ; Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n , 142 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[R]es judicata will not attach if the claim asserted in the second suit could not have been asserted in the first.").
Thus, a lawsuit for a breach of contract that occurred in the past is not the same thing as—and will not bar—a lawsuit for a breach of contract that occurred after the initial lawsuit was commenced, because the plaintiff could not have sued for a breach that had not yet occurred. The causes of action in the two lawsuits, therefore, are not identical, and the damages "sued for" in each lawsuit also lack identity. See Morgan v. State , 94 So. 3d 677, 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) ; U.S. Project Mgmt., Inc. v. Parc Royale E. Dev., Inc. , 861 So. 2d 74, 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that res judicata would not bar a subsequent lawsuit even though "both actions involve breach of contract" because the second lawsuit was based on a subsequent breach).
Similarly, because a party could not have sued for a financial obligation that had not yet accrued, a later accruing obligation may give rise to a second lawsuit that is not precluded by the fact that a previous lawsuit addressed prior obligations and sought damages for breach of that obligation. See Gilbert v. Florida Power & Light Co. , 981 So. 2d 609, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a new claim for damages is not barred if the underlying cause of action had not accrued at the time of filing the previous lawsuit); see also Greene v. Boyette , 587 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a suit for one installment payment does not preclude a subsequent lawsuit for a later installment). Stated another way, when "several claims due at different times arise out of the same transaction, a judgment as to one or more of such claims will not bar a subsequent action on claims becoming due thereafter." Smith v. Time Customer Servs. , 132 So. 3d 841, 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
"The doctrine of res judicata ... is not applicable where the claims in the two cases concern different periods of time." M.C.G. v. Hillsborough Cty. Sch. Bd. , 927 So. 2d 224, 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). "Claims arising subsequent to a prior action need not, and often perhaps could not, have been brought in that prior action; accordingly, they are not barred by res judicata regardless of whether they are premised on facts representing a continuance of the same course of conduct." Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C. , 347 F.3d 370, 383 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under general rules of res judicata, the crucial date is the date the complaint was filed, or in cases involving a counter-claim, the date that the counter-claim is filed. Forero , 223 So. 3d at 444 ; see Welsh v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. , 860 F.3d 762, 767 n.6 (5th Cir. 2017) (noting that the Second, Eighth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits "have determined that federal res judicata law does not bar claims based on facts that occurred after the filing of the first lawsuit"); Sherrod v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach, Cty. , 272 F. App'x 828, 829-30 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that claim preclusion does not apply to claims that arose after filing of the complaint); Curtis v. Citibank, N.A. , 226 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that claim preclusion "does not preclude litigation of events arising after the filing of the complaint that formed the basis of the first lawsuit"). "The scope of litigation is framed by the complaint at the time it is filed. The rule that a judgment is conclusive as to every matter that might have been litigated ‘does not apply to new rights acquired pending the action which might have been, but which were not, required to be litigated.’ " Manning v. City of Auburn , 953 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. , 750 F.2d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 1984) ); Pleming v. Universal–Rundle Corp. , 142 F.3d 1354, 1357 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that "the parties frame the scope of litigation at the time the complaint is filed"). "The res judicata doctrine does not apply to new rights acquired during the action which might have been, but which were not, litigated." Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. , 126 F.3d 365, 370 (2d Cir. 1997) ; see Gillig v. Nike, Inc. , 602 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ; Lundquist v. Rice Mem'l Hosp. , 238 F.3d 975, 978 (8th Cir. 2001).
Strictly speaking, it is Florida law that controls whether the relevant date is the date Greiner filed his claim or the date the Florida court ruled on his claim. Neither party has offered any authority indicating that Florida law differs on this point from federal law as it has been expounded by the Courts of appeals for the Second, Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits.
When Grenier filed his counter-petition on March 7, 2017, he asserted a counterclaim pursuant to the Form I-864 and could seek only the support due under federal law at the time he filed his claim. That is, he could not seek future support insofar as it would have been impossible for the court to determine in March 2017, for example, whether Greiner would qualify for support in 2018. Thus, the Florida court adjudicated Greiner's entitlement to support under the USCIS Form I-864 up to and including the date Greiner asserted his claim for relief in the Florida court: March 7, 2017. Stated another way, De Capri could not have breached any federal duty to support Greiner for a temporal interval that had not yet occurred. See Inter-Active Servs., Inc. v. Heathrow Master Ass'n, Inc. , 809 So. 2d 900, 902 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that when the "instant damages arose after trial" in the prior case, "identity of the ‘thing sued for’ does not exist"); see Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n , 245 So. 2d 625, 628 (Fla. 1971) ("When other facts or conditions intervene before the second suit, furnishing a new basis for the claims and defenses of the respective parties, the issues are no longer the same and the former judgment cannot be pleaded in bar of the second action.").
Thus, complete identity of the cause of action is lacking. The Florida First Judicial Circuit Court did not adjudicate the merits of any claim that arose after March 7, 2017. Of course, as discussed above, there was partial identity and there was an adjudication on the merits regarding Greiner's claim for support under federal law prior to March 7, 2017. Thus, to the extent that Greiner seeks to recover for a period prior to the filing of his counter petition on March 7, 2017, such recovery would be barred by the res judicata doctrine. But because Greiner's federal action also seeks recovery for a breach of a duty that allegedly existed after March 7, 2017, res judicata is not a bar to this action. Accordingly, De Capri has failed to carry her burden of demonstrating that application of the res judicata doctrine should entail dismissal of this civil action.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, De Capri's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) is DENIED . It is further ORDERED , pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A), that De Capri must answer Greiner's complaint within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of this order.
SO ORDERED this 10th day of September, 2019.