Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-3145, SECTION "C"(5)
January 8, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are (1) Defendant's, Richard L. Stadler's, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or in the Alternative Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Decedent's Siblings Right to Recover for the Loss of Their Brother under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Rec. Doc. 31); (2) Defendants', Quyen Tran and Ed C. Day, Jr., Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or in the Alternative Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Decedent's Siblings Right to Recover for Loss of Their Brother Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Rec. Doc. 23); (3) Defendants', Quyen Tran, Ed C. Day, Jr., and Richard Stadler, Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' State Law Claim of Vicarious Liability (Rec. Doc. 26); (4) Defendants', Quyen Tran, Richard Stadler and Ed C. Day, Jr., Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for Failure to Effect Service of Process on the Fictitious Defendants Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) (Rec. Doc. 27); (5) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack and/or for Failure to Join an Indispensable Party Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. I2(b)(7), (h), and 19 and/or in the alternative for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 30); and (6) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 37).
Defendants', Quyen Tran, Ed C. Day, Jr., and Richard Stadler, Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' State Law Claim of Vicarious Liability is GRANTED, as unopposed and having merit. Plaintiffs' claims asserting that Quyen Tran is vicariously liable for Jane Doe #3 are DISMISSED. (Rec. Doc. 26).
Defendants', Quyen Tran, Richard Stadler and Ed C. Day, Jr., Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for Failure to Effect Service of Process on the Fictitious Defendants Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) is GRANTED, as unopposed and having merit. Plaintiffs' claims against the John and Jane Does in their individual capacities for deliberate indifference to decedent's serious medical needs are DISMISSED. (Rec. Doc. 27).
After a thorough review of the law, the record, the motions, and the memoranda filed in support of and in opposition to the motions, Defendant's, Richard L. Stadler's, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or in the Alternative Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Decedent's Siblings Right to Recover for the Loss of Their Brother under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is GRANTED. (Rec. Doc. 31).
Defendants', Quyen Tran and Ed C. Day, Jr., Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or in the Alternative Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Decedent's Siblings Right to Recover for Loss of Their Brother Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is GRANTED. (Rec. Doc. 23).
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack and/or for Failure to Join an Indispensable Party Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7), (h), and 19 and/or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. (Rec. Doc. 30).
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment by February 9, 2004. (Rec. Doc. 37). The Court shall defer ruling on this matter until the Plaintiffs file a response.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
According to Plaintiffs' complaint, the decedent, Donnie James, was incarcerated at Washington Correctional Institute (hereinafter referred to as "WCI") from March 2, 2001 till October 17, 2001. Upon his transfer to WCI, the decedent informed the defendants that he required medication for seizures and explained his prior medical history. The defendants, although not specifically alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint, apparently are alleged to have refused to give the decedent medication for seizures, despite the fact that the decedent made numerous complaints to three unnamed females, presumably nurses or other medical personnel.
The factual statements listed in this section of the Order and Reasons are taken directly from the complaint. (Rec. Doc. 1). While the factual allegations of Plaintiffs' complaint will be accepted by the Court as true for the purposes of Defendant's, Richard L. Stadler's, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or in the Alternative Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Decedent's Siblings Right to Recover for the Loss of Their Brother under 42 U.S.C. § 1+983and Defendants', Quyen Tran and Ed C. Day, Jr., Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or in the Alternative Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Decedent's Siblings Right to Recover for Loss of Their Brother Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they shall not be accepted as true for the remaining motions.
The identities of these women has not been discovered, and these women were never served. The Plaintiffs' claims against them have been dismissed.
On or about October 16, 2001, the decedent began vomiting and suffering convulsions as a result of withdrawal from the medicine. He called to two unnamed men, presumably prison guards, stating that he required medical attention. Soon thereafter, he was placed in solitary confinement. On October 17, 2001, the decedent was found unconscious and unresponsive in his cell. He never regained consciousness and died later that day. The autopsy revealed that the decedent's cause of death was diabetic ketoacidosis and severe dehydration, petechiae of the pleural surfaces, pulmonary congestion and edema, and cirrhosis of the liver.
Plaintiffs have not made any allegations as to when the medicine was withdrawn.
The identities of these men has not been discovered, and these men were never served. The Plaintiffs' claims against them have been dismissed.
Plaintiffs brought suit on October 17, 2002. Plaintiffs allege that the deliberate indifference of the defendants, Dr. Tran and Warden Ed. C. Day, caused the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs include Kaschandra Greer, who claims to be the daughter of the decedent, and Sarah Scott, Irma Clayton, Sandra Britton, Althea Toliver, Bosie James, Ronnie James, Jewel Scott, Glenn James, Glenda Jones, and Moses Jackson, all of whom claim to be the decedent's siblings.
Defendants have now moved the Court for judgment on the pleadings dismissing the claims of those Plaintiffs claiming to be the decedent's siblings. Defendants also move the Court to dismiss the claims of Kaschandra Greer for failure to join her own siblings, Chantell Payne and Deanda Ross.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A) Defendants' Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or in the Alternative Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Decedents Siblings Right to Recover for the Loss of Their Brother under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule I2(c), the Court must base its decision solely on the pleadings. The court, in Park Center, Inc. v. Champion Int'l Corp., 804 F. Supp. 294, 301 (S.D. Ala. 1992), summarized the standard of review succinctly. On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the court to view the pleading in the light most favorable to, and to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmovant. Park Center, Inc., 804 F. Supp. at 301. The Court may grant judgment on the pleadings if it appears beyond doubt that the nonmovant can plead no set of facts which would entitle him to relief. Kemp v. Metabolife, Inc., 2002 WL 113894, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 25, 2002); Bellizan v. Easy Money of La., Inc., 2001 WL 121909, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb 12, 2001); Youngblood v. Bender, 2000 WL 943209, at *1 (E.D. La. July 7, 2000).
Plaintiffs include Kaschandra Greer, who claims to be the daughter of the decedent, and Sarah Scott, Irma Clayton, Sandra Britton, Althea Toliver, Bosie James, Ronnie James, Jewel Scott, Glenn James, Glenda Jones, and Moses Jackson, all of whom claim to be the decedent's siblings. While the Plaintiffs are suing the defendants for their alleged deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Plaintiffs have not alleged that the defendants violated their constitutional rights. Rather, Plaintiffs have clearly alleged that they seek to recover for the violation of the decedent's constitutional rights. Accordingly, their rights to recover for the death of the decedent are governed by LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2315.1 and LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2315.2. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2315.1 (West 1997 Supp. 2004); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2315.2 (West 1997 Supp. 2004).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.1 provides a cause of action to certain classes of the decedent's survivors for the recovery of the injury caused to the decedent himself by the tortious conduct of others before the decedent's death. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.2 provides a cause of action to certain classes of the decedent's survivors for the recovery of damages caused to the survivors by the loss of the decedent due to the tortious conduct of others.
Under LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.1, the right to bring the decedent's action is bestowed upon four classes of survivors. Under LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.2, the right of the survivors to recover for their own damages is, likewise, bestowed on the same four classes of survivors. However, the statutes do not allow for all of the classes of survivors to bring actions. The existence of a person qualifying for a higher class prevents a person in a lower class from bringing either a wrongful death action or a survival action.
The highest class, under either statute, is "[t]he surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either the spouse or the child or children." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.1(A)(1) (West 1997 Supp. 2004); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.2(A)(1) (West 1997 Supp. 2004). The pleadings clearly allege that Kaschandra Greer is within the highest class. The pleadings allege that Kaschadra Greer is the daughter of the decedent. As the pleadings allege that the decedent left a daughter, her existence prevents the decedent's siblings from proceeding with this action.
Should Plaintiff, Kaschandra Greer, later be unable to prove that she is the decedent's daughter, the Court shall allow Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to substitute the proper parties for Kaschandra Greer. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 15(c); Gorham v. HCA Health Servs. of La., 34, 721 (La.App. 2d Cir. 2001), 786 So.2d 348. However, the parties are admonished not to wait until trial to challenge Kaschandra Greer's assertion that she is the decedent's daughter or, in the case of the Plaintiffs, to voluntarily substitute the proper parties for Kaschandra Greer if it becomes apparent that Kaschandra Greer will be unable to prove that she is the decedent's daughter.
B) Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss for Lack and/or for Failure to Join an Indispensable Party Pursuant to Fed.R. CIV. P. I2(b)(7), (h), and 19 and/or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment.
The Defendants have moved, pursuant to Rules I2(b)(7) and 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the claims of the Plaintiffs for failure to join other parties to this lawsuit who potentially might be the decedents' children or spouse. Should other parties not currently joined in this lawsuit be found to be the children or spouse of the decedent, it is indisputable that they must be joined as parties to this action. Rodriguez v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 2000 WL 798432, at *1 (E.D. La. June 20, 2000). In such a case, the Court does have the power to order those parties joined. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 19.
Nevertheless, while recognizing the Court's power to order joinder in certain cases and giving due attention to the necessity incumbent upon plaintiffs to join their siblings and their deceased parent's spouse in situations similar to this one, the Court does have some doubt as to whether the parties the defendant claims to be the children or spouse of the decedent are indeed the children or spouse of the decedent.
At any rate, even if the Court were certain that the parties not joined in this lawsuit were indeed the children or spouse of the decedent, the Court would not dismiss the lawsuit unless it is certain that the parties could not be joined and that the Court could not proceed in good conscience with the parties before it.
Plaintiffs may amend their complaint to include the parties, subject, of course, to any defenses the Defendants would then raise.
Also, the parties may conduct any discovery they may deem appropriate to determine if the anyone not currently a party to this lawsuit is a child or spouse of the decedent.
C) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs have indicated to the Court that they have located another child or alleged child of the decedent. Plaintiffs have represented to the Court that they will seek to amend their petition to include the second alleged child and will, accordingly, seek a continuance of the trial in order to conduct additional discovery. Defendants have no opposition to this.
Therefore, the Court finds that, at this time, summary judgment is not appropriate as it is premature. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(f).
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants', Quyen Tran, Ed C. Day, Jr., and Richard Stadler, Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' State Law Claim of Vicarious Liability is GRANTED, as unopposed and having merit. Plaintiffs' claims asserting that Quyen Tran is vicariously liable for Jane Doe #3 are DISMISSED. (Rec. Doc. 26).
Defendants', Quyen Tran, Richard Stadler and Ed C. Day, Jr., Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for Failure to Effect Service of Process on the Fictitious Defendants Pursuant to Fed.R. CIV. P. 4(m) is GRANTED, as unopposed and having merit. Plaintiffs' claims against the John and Jane Does in their individual capacities for deliberate indifference to decedent's serious 'medical needs are DISMISSED. (Rec. Doc. 27).
After a thorough review of the law, the record, the motions, and the memoranda filed in support of and in opposition to the motions, Defendant's, Richard L. Stadler's, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or in the Alternative Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Decedent's Siblings Right to Recover for the Loss of Their Brother under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is GRANTED. (Rec. Doc. 31).
Defendants', Quyen Tran and Ed C. Day, Jr., Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or in the Alternative Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Decedent's Siblings Right to Recover for Loss of Their Brother Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is GRANTED. (Rec. Doc. 23).
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack and/or for Failure to Join an Indispensable Party Pursuant to Fed.R. CIV. P. 12(b)(7), (h), and 19 and/or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. (Rec. Doc. 30).
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment by February 9, 2004. (Rec. Doc. 37).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the trial of this matter is continued along with all other like dates. The Court will initiate a preliminary telephone conference to schedule new dates on January 29, 2004 at 10:30 a.m.