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denying Rule 50 motion that primarily reiterated the same arguments raised in prior motion for summary judgment
Summary of this case from Naquin v. Elevating Boats, LLCOpinion
Civ. No. 97-1869, SECTION "K"(1).
March 30, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a "Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or in the Alternative Motion for New Trial" (Doc. No. 178) filed by the Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund ("Tulane"). Having reviewed the memoranda, the Court finds no merit in either the Rule 50 or 59 motions filed by Tulane in this case, and the Court further denies the request for a remittur of the compensatory and back pay damages as ordered by the jury and confirmed by the Court for the reasons that follow.
The Court listened very carefully to the testimony presented in this very contentious but well presented case. The Court also observed the demeanor of the witnesses, equivocations of the witnesses and reviewed virtually every exhibit introduced into evidence. The Court is convinced that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.
Rule 50 Motion
Tulane argues that the jury's finding of sexual harassment was contrary to the evidence and the law. These arguments primarily rehash those urged in the motion for summary judgment filed by Tulane and previously ruled upon by the Court. In the Order and Reasons of April 18, 1999 (Doc. 132) the Court dealt with virtually all of the legal arguments being urged by Tulane here. Additionally, the Court further commented on these same arguments in denying Tulane's Motion for Reconsideration in a minute entry dated August 1, 1999 (Doc. 142). The leitmotif of Tulane's argument is that there is no claim for sexual harassment when an affair has gone wrong. For the reasons previously set forth in the above cited rulings the Court rejects Tulane's contentions, and the Court reiterates the reasons set forth in its previous rulings as if set forth in full herein.
Tulane also argues that there is insufficient evidence to show that Green was subject to "severe and pervasive" harassment so as to be actionable. It must be emphasized that this is a hostile work environment claim and not a quid pro quo claim. The focus of the evidence was not unwelcome sexual advances but the systematic ostracism of Ms. Green after the termination of her affair with Dr. Richardson.
Under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, and in so doing all evidentiary conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the successful party and that party is to be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences. As stated in the seminal case Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969), in considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court should consider all of the evidence — not just that evidence which supports the non-mover's case — but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelming in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could arrive at a contrary verdict, granting the motion is proper. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motion should be denied. See Rutland v. Sundowner Offshore Services. Inc., 1992 WL 236136 (E.D.La. Sept. 2, 1992).
A fundamental principle of litigation is that it is the function of the jury as the traditional finder of fact, and not the Court, to weigh evidence. Treadaway v. Societe Anonyme Louis-Dreyfus, 894 F.2d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1990). Weighing conflicting evidence and the inferences to be drawn from that evidence, and determining the credibility of the witnesses, are the province of the jury, and its decision must be accepted if the record contains any competent and substantial evidence tending fairly to support the verdict. Gibraltar Sav. v. LDBrinkman Corp., 860 F.2d 1275, 1297 (5th Cir. 1988). The Fifth Circuit has defined substantial evidence as "evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions." Transoil (Jersey) Ltd. v. Belcher Oil Co., 950 F.2d 1115, 1118 (5th Cir. 1992). Therefore, a jury verdict must be upheld unless "the facts and inferences point so strongly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict." Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969). The Court can not simply substitute its judgment for that of the jury, for that would deprive litigants of their right to trial by jury.
Applying this standard the Court finds that Tulane's motion does not have merit. It is Ms. Green's position that Dr. Richardson orchestrated a hostile work environment in order to compel her to leave or be "documented out the door." She contends that the primary motivating factor for this conduct stemmed from Dr. Richardson acting upon the wishes of Julie Frentz, a former girlfriend who had "returned to the scene" approximately at the time when Green and Richardson were breaking off their relationship.
Green introduced evidence that from April 10, 1994 through March 21, 1994, she was humiliated; her job duties were substantially diminished; and she was unfairly disciplined in writing. The coup de gras occurred when Julie Frentz was asked by Dr. Richardson to reorganize the department. It should be noted that Green had been in charge of the organization of the department for over 15 years prior to Julie Frentz being called in. The jury was instructed on the law, heard the evidence and found this conduct to be severe and pervasive. There was sufficient evidence introduced upon which the jury could have based its verdict finding a hostile work environment, retaliation and constructive discharge.
Tulane also contends that Green should have sought a similar job and failing to do so, the award of back pay should be vacated. The jury was charged concerning the duty to mitigate and heard considerable evidence about Green's emotional and physical state when she left Tulane. Viewing the totality of the circumstances presented including (1) Green's physical and emotional condition, (2) the testimony of the psychiatrist, (3) the fact that she was suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and (4) the ultimate fact that she did mitigate her front pay award by receiving a nursing degree and eventually a higher paying job, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Green mitigated her damages, and an award of back pay was warranted.
Rule 59 Motion
In its Rule 59 motion, Tulane contends:
(1) the admission of the alleged ultimatum of Julie Frentz was unduly prejudicial;
(2) the admission of evidence regarding other complaints of sexual harassment was similarly prejudicial;
(3) plaintiffs counsel's closing argument misled the jury;
(4) the Court's exclusion of evidence of plaintiffs relationship with another Tulane physician was erroneous;
(5) the Court's failure to read Question No. 4 on the jury verdict form was erroneous; and
(6) alternatively, the Court should grant remittitur.
A trial court has discretion to grant a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although Rule 59 does not specify the grounds for new trial, case law demonstrates that a new trial may be granted if the district court finds that the size of the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages awarded are excessive or inadequate, or the trial was unfair or marred by prejudicial error. Dunn v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 890 F. Supp. 1262, 1287 (M.D.La. 1995), citing Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2807 (1973); Scott v. Monsanto Company, 868 F.2d 786, 789 (5th Cir. 1989). In making its determination, the lodestar is whether the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence or would result in a miscarriage of justice.
As to the evidentiary objections, the Court stands by the rulings made at trial, and it should be noted that limiting instructions were given the jury as to the objection relating to Julie Frentz and the past conduct of Dr. Richardson. The statements were not admitted for the truth thereof but to show the pattern of "documenting out the door."
The Court has no recollection as to the closing argument objection or to the failure to read Question 4 of the jury verdict form. Moreover, the Court has no recollection of any objection being made by defendant as to either of those issues. In any event, this would not be sufficiently prejudicial to grant a new trial.
As to remittitur, defendant moves for new trial because it claims the damages award was excessive. A jury's assessment of damages is entitled to great deference and will not be disturbed unless it is entirely disproportionate to the injury sustained.Dunn, 890 F. Supp. at 1287, citing In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 787 F.2d 1151, 1155 (5th Cir. 1985). In In re Air Crash, the Fifth Circuit reiterated the words of Judge Rubin in reviewing the size of a verdict:
The extent of distortion that warrants intervention is an award so large as to shock the judicial conscience, so gross or inordinately large as to be contrary to right reason, so exaggerated as to indicate bias, passion, or other improper motive, or so clearly exceeding the amount that any reasonable claimant is entitled to recover.Id. [Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.] These same considerations guide the court with respect to an inadequate jury verdict. Ultimately, in determining whether the jury's verdict is adequate, the court must determine whether the jury's verdict was "clearly within the universe of possible awards which are supported by the evidence." Brun-Jacobo v. Pan American World Airways. Inc., 847 F.2d 242, 246 (5th Cir. 1988). Finally, additur is not available to cure an inadequate verdict. Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc., 870 F.2d 982, 985 (5th Cir. 1989). While the adequacy of a jury verdict should be reviewed in light of the facts and circumstances of the individual case, prior awards may be useful in framing the range of damages awarded for comparable types of injuries. Dunn, 890 F. Supp. at 1287.
The Court is unwilling to speculate about the nature of the jurors' deliberations. The jury was alert and attentive at trial. There is no reason to suspect that the jury acted with passion or prejudice to either side, or that they ignored or misunderstood the court's instructions. The arguments of counsel were by no means inflammatory or prejudicial. The jury's award simply reflects their estimation of the injury suffered by plaintiff and its effect on her life, past, present and future. Such conclusions could have been drawn by a reasonable jury from the evidence presented at trial. While the court might not have reached the same result, the jury's verdict does not shock the judicial conscience, was not patently unreasonable, and most importantly, is not against the great weight of the evidence. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or in the Alternative Motion for New Trial (Doe. No. 178) is DENIED.