Opinion
No. 1D19-0133
12-05-2019
Arthur C. GRACE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Arthur C. Grace, pro se, Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Arthur C. Grace, pro se, Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
B.L. Thomas, J.
Appellant, Arthur Grace, seeks review of an order denying a postconviction motion brought pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
Appellant was charged with four counts of robbery with a firearm while wearing a mask, two counts of attempted robbery while wearing a mask, and two counts of false imprisonment while wearing a mask. Appellant was seventeen-years-old when he committed the offenses. Ultimately, Appellant was convicted of the charged offenses and was sentenced to a total of fifty years in prison with a ten-year mandatory minimum. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Grace v. State , 975 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Excluding the present case, Appellant has filed several motions for postconviction relief, including two rule 3.850 and two rule 3.800 motions. The rule 3.850 motions, filed in 2009 and in 2016, were deemed untimely. Appellant's rule 3.800 motions to correct illegal sentence have argued that his sentences violate double jeopardy and due process and were improperly enhanced. Both motions were denied on the merits.
Appellant filed the instant motion, arguing that his sentence is illegal because it does not conform with the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and usual punishment under Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), or Florida law governing juvenile sentencing. Appellant contends that his sentence does not afford a meaningful opportunity for early release.
In Graham , the United States Supreme Court held that a juvenile offender who did not commit a homicide offense could not be sentenced to life without parole. Id. at 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011. In the wake of Graham , the Florida Legislature enacted new juvenile sentencing laws, codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402 of the Florida Statutes, designed to provide a remedy for offenders whose sentences were unconstitutional pursuant to Graham or its progeny. In Johnson v. State , 215 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. 2017), the Florida Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a term-of-years sentence for a juvenile offender who did not commit a homicide and held that relief was limited to offenders "whose life sentences had been vacated pursuant to Graham , but who had not been resentenced under new sentencing guidelines." Id. at 1239. "In order to qualify for resentencing under new juvenile sentencing laws, [the movant] was required to demonstrate that his fifty-year aggregate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment and Graham ." Hart v. State , 255 So. 3d 921, 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).
In the case at issue, Appellant has not demonstrated his term-of-years sentence violates the Eighth Amendment under Graham and is not entitled to relief. Appellant, like the appellant in Hart , is challenging his fifty-year aggregate sentence. This sentence does not violate Graham . He was not sentenced to a life sentence or a de facto life sentence. Appellant has a meaningful opportunity for release during his lifetime, which is the aim of Graham and its progeny.
AFFIRMED .
Winokur and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.