Opinion
C. A. 3:23-4966-JFA-SVH
12-05-2023
Grace Achievement Center for Excellence Academies' Inc. and Reginald Evans in his capacities as Officer and Founder, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Public Charter School District; the Honorable Ellen Weaver; and the Honorable Henry McMaster, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Reginald Evans (“Evans”) filed this action on behalf of Grace Achievement Center for Excellence Academies, Inc. (“Plaintiff”), asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. [ECF No. 1]. On October 17, 2023, the undersigned issued an order advising Evans that he could not file this case on behalf of Grace Achievement Center for Excellence Academies, Inc., and directing that Plaintiff must obtain an attorney by November 6, 2023. [ECF No. 5]. The court permitted Plaintiff an extension until November 27, 2023. [ECF No. 9].
Plaintiff has not complied with the court's order.It is well-established that a corporate entity cannot appear pro se and must be represented by counsel in court.The United States Supreme Court recognized that:
Plaintiff filed a motion requesting this court order the United States Attorney's Office to represent Plaintiff. [ECF No. 11]. The undersigned denies Plaintiff's motion.
Plaintiff has not demonstrated he has any independent standing in this matter.
[i]t has been the law for the better part of two centuries . . . that a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel. As the courts have recognized, the rationale for that rule applies equally to all artificial entities. Thus, save a few aberrant cases, the lower courts have uniformly held that 28 U.S.C. § 1654, providing that “parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel,” does not allow corporations, partnerships, or associations to appear in federal court otherwise than through a licensed attorney.Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993) (internal citations and footnote omitted); see also Honour Technical Group, Inc. v. United States, 326 Fed.Appx. 141, 142 (4th Cir. 2009) (this rule also applies to limited liability corporations); RZS Holdings AVV v. PDVSA Petroleo S.A., 506 F.3d 350, 354 n.3 (4th Cir. 2007). While 28 U.S.C. § 1654 allows individuals to “plead and conduct their own cases personally,” the statute does not extend that right to represent other parties. Therefore, because Plaintiff is not represented by an attorney, despite being permitted ample time to find counsel, this case must be dismissed.
Evans has not shown he has individual standing in this case. Evans was not the applicant in this case. See Grace Achievement Center for Excellence Academies' Inc. and Reginald Evans v. South Carolina Public Charter School District, C/A No. 23-4029-JFA at ECF No. 1-1 at 1. Evans does not even refer to himself personally in the complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends this case be dismissed in its entirety for Plaintiff's failure to retain an attorney.
The court takes judicial notice of its own records. Anderson v. F.D.I.C., 918 F.2d 1139, 1141 n.1 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he Bankruptcy Court is considered ‘a unit of the district court' under 28 U.S.C. § 151, and we believe a district court should properly take judicial notice of its own records ....”); Huber v. Marine Midland Bank, 51 F.3d 5, 9 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that in prior appeal, the appellate court “instructed the [district] court to take judicial notice of the records in [the plaintiff's] bankruptcy case”); see Ceo v. Ozmint, 2006 WL 2850538, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2006) (“This court may take judicial notice of its own records in this prior case.”) (citing Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“. . . ‘[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice of ascertainable facts is in noticing the content of court records.'”)).
The undersigned expresses no opinion about the substance of the underlying complaint. However, the undersigned notes Plaintiff fails to provide any factual allegations showing the application was denied for pretextual reasons, rather than because the application failed to comply with statutory law. The requirement of liberal construction for a pro se party does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be summarily dismissed. If the district judge accepts this recommendation, Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2] will be rendered moot.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).