Opinion
1:21-cv-136
07-26-2021
SHAKAYLA GOTELL, Plaintiff v. JENNIFER CLARKE, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is hereby recommended that the Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis [ECF 8] filed by Plaintiff Shakayla Gotell be granted. It is further recommended that this action be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), but that Plaintiff be provided an opportunity to amend.
II. Report
A. Plaintiffs motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at SCI-Cambridge Springs, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 3. In her motion, Plaintiff states that she is unable to pay the filing fee associated with this case. Based upon this averment, as well as a review of Plaintiff s institutional account statement, it appears that Plaintiff is without sufficient funds to pay the costs and fees of the proceedings. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis should be granted and the Clerk should be directed to docket the Complaint.
B. Background
Gotell's claims stem from her conviction of child abuse crimes in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County and the concurrent removal of her.two children from her custody. Gotell seeks compensatory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. ECF No. 1 at 2-3. As defendants, she has identified the following individuals: Dr. Jennifer Clarke, a physician at the Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh; Denise Dymond, a caseworker with Children and Youth Services of Beaver County; Angela Reed Strathman, a Beaver County Assistant District Attorney; and Judge Mitchell Shahen of the Beaver County Court of Common Pleas. Id. at 3.
Gotell's claims stem from an incident on August 19, 2017, when she took her six-month old son to the Beaver Medical Center seeking medical treatment for an apparent arm fracture. ECF No. 1 at 17. As explained by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania:
On August 19, 2017, Appellant transported her approximately six-month-old son to Heritage Valley Hospital in Beaver, Pennsylvania with s a spiral fracture on his left arm. The child was subsequently transported to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh and admitted. The medical personnel suspected child abuse and noted that Appellant's explanation for her son's injury, i.e., that his two-year-old sibling twisted the arm, was not plausible. Subsequent examinations of the child's limbs revealed six additional injuries in varying stages of healing. The ensuing Child Line investigation led to ... criminal charges.Commonwealth v. Gotell, 249 A.3d 1182 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021). Gotell was ultimately convicted of aggravated assault, aggravated assault-victim less than thirteen, endangering welfare of children, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person. Id. She received a prison sentence of five to ten years and lost custody of her two children. Id.
Set against this backdrop, Gotell alleges that numerous individuals involved in her criminal and child custody proceedings engaged in some form of misconduct. She accuses Dr. Clarke of being “deliberately indifferent” to her son's medical needs by failing to provide orthopedic surgery and offering only an “ace bandage” for his injuries. ECF No. 1 at 20. She states that Dymond “provided UMPC's children's medical personnel with false information pertaining to [her] son's prior medical history which resulted in providing inadequate medical care and the removal of her children.” Id. at 18. Dymond also “recommended that plaintiffs two children should be immediately removed from [her] care .. . and placed together in foster care” which amounted to a “non-prosecutorial governmental finding of plaintiff being unfit to care for her children.” Id. at 22. As to Judge Shahen, Gotell maintains that he displayed bias by “stating that [she] should lose [her] parental rights to [her] children by basing his opinion on a home study” in which her home “was not deemed to be unsafe.” Id. at 14. She also accuses Judge Shahen of being “aware that [her] attorney was not effective” in her criminal case and exceeding his authority by “presid[ing] over both [her] child custody hearing and [her] criminal case simultaneously.” Id. Finally, Gotell alleges that Strathman made “inflammatory remarks during [her] trial and sentencing.” Id. at 24. .
C. Analysis
Flaving been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Among other things, that statute requires the Court to dismiss any action in which the Court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Muchler v. Greenwald, 624 Fed.Appx. 794, 796-97 (3d Cir. 2015). A frivolous complaint is one which is either based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory (such as when a defendant enjoys immunity from suit) or based upon factual contentions which are clearly baseless (such as when the factual scenario described is fanciful or delusional). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The determination as to whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. D'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed.Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, her allegations, “however inartfully pleaded, ” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover, under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997).
After carefully reviewing Gotell's Complaint, the Court concludes that dismissal pursuant to § 1915(e) is warranted on several grounds. Each is discussed below.
1. Rooker-Feldman
To the extent that Gotell seeks an order restoring custody of her minor children, her claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under Rooker-Feldman, “federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3rd Cir. 2010). Application of the doctrine is narrowly restricted to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments . .. and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). In determining whether Rooker-Feldman applies to a particular claim or claims, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has established the following test:
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is derived from the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1993).
[T]here are four requirements that must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff “complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and x(4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284).
Gotell's attempt to regain custody of her children falls squarely within the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Although she generally alleges that Defendants engaged in fraud and misconduct while securing her criminal conviction and terminating her parental rights, the injury she alleges - the removal of her children - flows directly from a state court judgment. Her attempt to induce this Court to “review and reject” that state judgment must be declined. Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 166; Middlebrook at Monmouth v. Liban, 419 Fed.Appx. 284, 285-86 (3rd Cir. 2011) (observing that federal courts “cannot review proceedings conducted by a state tribunal to determine whether it reached its result in accordance with law”).
2. Heck v. Humphrey
Although it is not entirely clear, Gotell may also be seeking monetary damages for her allegedly unlawful conviction or incarceration. If so, those claims are barred by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: “to recover damages [or other relief] for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote and internal citation omitted). In other words, “a prisoner cannot use § 1983 to obtain damages where success would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of a (not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005).
In her complaint, Gotell acknowledges that her conviction has not been invalidated or reversed. Thus, to the extent that she is alleging that her conviction was unconstitutional, her claims for monetary relief are barred by Heck v. Humphrey. See, e.g., Nash v. Kenney, 784 Fed.Appx. 54, 57 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Nash's malicious-prosecution and speedy-trial claims-which challenge his post-arraignment detainment-are barred by the favorable-termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey”), Washington v. State Municipality Philadelphia City, 2020 WL 1922904, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2020) (“Washington's malicious prosecution claim fails because, if his convictions have not been invalidated, he cannot establish favorable termination.”).
3. State actor requirement
To prevail on a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that each t defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In other words, a plaintiff cannot state a viable § 1983 unless she alleges the deprivation “of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). Private actors, on the other hand, “do not act under color of state law” and thus “are not liable under Section 1983.” Gerhart v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 2018 WL 6589586, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2018) (quoting Luck v. Mount Airy #1, LLC, 901 F.Supp.2d 547, 560 (M.D. Pa. 2012)).
Gotell alleges that Dr. Clarke failed to provide her son with constitutionally adequate medical treatment and incorrectly opined that the child had suffered several previous fractures within the two weeks prior to seeking medical treatment. However, because Dr. Clarke is a private physician employed by the Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh, rather than a state actor, she is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and must be dismissed. See, e.g., Massey v. Crady, 2018 WL 4328002, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2018) (“Private citizens, such as [defendants] are not state actors, and therefore .. . any § 1983 claims against [them] should be dismissed.”); Little v. Hammond, 2016 WL 7324593, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2016) (same).
Although they are not identified as defendants, Gotell devotes a significant portion of her pleading to allegations againsf the Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh and her criminal defense attorney, Gerald Benyo. Because neither entity is a state actor, any claims she intended to assert against them must also be dismissed. See, e.g., Ollie v. Lubahn, 2018 WL 10245776, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2018) (dismissing UPMC and St. Vincent Hospitals because neither entity is a state actor); Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 1999) (attorneys are not considered state actors “solely on the basis of their position as officers of the court”); Breslin v. Morgenstern, 2018 WL 4002857, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2018) (dismissing Section 1983 claims against a private attorney where “all of the acts charged to [the attorney] are those which private attorneys traditionally take in the course of representation in litigation.”).
4. Prosecutorial immunity
Gotell next contends that Strathman, an assistant district attorney, made “inflammatory" remarks during [her] trial and sentencing.” ECF No. 1 at 24. In addition to being vague and conclusory, Gotell's allegation against Strathman is barred by the immunity afforded to prosecutors from liability related to their official acts. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 41720 (1976). “More than a mere defense to liability, prosecutorial immunity embodies the right not to stand trial.” Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Under this doctrine, a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for money damages under § 1983 for acts “within the scope of [her] duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 410. “Ultimately, whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity depends on whether she establishes that she was functioning as the state's ‘advocate' while engaging in the alleged conduct that gives rise to the constitutional violation.” Yarris v. Cnty. of Del., 465 F.3d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993)).
Gotell's lone allegation against Strathman concerns her conduct at “trial and sentencing.” ECF No. 1 at 24. Courts have consistently held that advocating on behalf of the state during the trial and sentencing phases of a criminal prosecution falls squarely within the scope of a prosecutor's duties. See Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[P]rosecutors are immune from claims arising from their conduct in beginning a prosecution, including soliciting false testimony from witnesses in grand jury proceedings and probable cause hearings, presenting a state's case at trial, and appearing before a judge to present evidence.”) (internal quotations and quoting sources omitted); Simonton v. Ryland-Tanner, 836 Fed.Appx. 81, 84 (3d Cir. 2020) (“The conduct of a [hearing] and presentation of evidence are undeniably activities ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,' and therefore a prosecutor - enjoys absolute immunity from suit based on those activities.”). As such, Strathman is immune from liability and should be dismissed from this action.
The same principle bars Gotell's claims against Dymond, a child welfare worker for Children and Youth Services of Beaver County. According to the Complaint, Dymond “recommended that plaintiffs two children should be immediately removed from [her] care” and provided “false information pertaining to [her] son's prior medical history.” ECF No. 1 at 18, 22. However, “[c]hild welfare workers taking actions ‘on behalf of the state ... in preparing for, initiating, and prosecuting dependency proceedings' are entitled to absolute immunity” from suit. Lowe v.. Lancaster County Children and Youth Social Services, 2020 WL 7223416, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2020) (quoting Ernest v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cty., 108 F.3d 486, 495 (3d Cir. 1997)). This is because a caseworker's “actions in petitioning and in formulating and making recommendations to the state court” are “analogous to functions performed by state prosecutors.” Ernest, 108 F.3d at 493. This immunity extends even to “false statements or misrepresentations in either the petition or during the hearings.” Lowe, 2020 WL 7223416, at *8. See also Dennis v. DeJong, 867 F.Supp.2d 588, 629 n.194 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (concluding that the employees of CYS were absolutely immune for misstatements of law and fact included in a memorandum to the court); Waithour v. Child & Youth Servs., 728 F.Supp.2d 628, 642-43 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (determining that the CYS.caseworkers were absolutely immune for making false statements to the judge and initiating the proceedings surreptitiously). Because Gotell's claims against Dymond appear to involve her role “in petitioning and in formulating and making recommendations to the state court, ” Dymond is immune from suit. Ernest, 108 F.3d at 493.
5. Judicial immunity
Finally, Gotell alleges that Judge Shehan displayed bias and labored under a conflict of interest while presiding over her criminal and child custody proceedings. “It is a well-settled principle of law that judges are generally immune from a suit for money damages.” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3rd Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). This immunity can only be overcome if the judge's actions are “nonjudicial in nature, or where such actions, while judicial in nature, are taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Van Tassel v. Lawrence County Domestic Relations Section, 659 F.Supp.2d 672, 695 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). Gotell's allegations concern actions taken by Judge Shehan while presiding over criminal and child custody proceedings in the Beaver County Court of Common Pleas, and each of those actions - such as conducting a trial, sentencing Gotell to prison, and terminating her parental rights - falls squarely within the jurisdiction of a Pennsylvania common pleas judge. See, e.g., 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 931(a) (“the courts of common pleas shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings, including all actions and proceedings heretofore cognizable by law or usage in the courts of common pleas”); Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that the act of ordering a person to prison is a “paradigm judicial act”); Muhammad v. Cappellini, 2013 WL 1249029, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2013) (judicial acts include issuing orders, making rulings, and conducting hearings).
In her pleading, Gotell also suggests that Judge Shaher lacked jurisdiction over her child custody proceeding because he was simultaneously presiding over her criminal prosecution. She cites Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 n. 7 (1978), for the proposition that “[a] criminal judge has no authority to try nor preside on a family law civil case.” ECF No. 1 at 25. In Stump, the United States Supreme Court illustrated the difference between “lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction” by noting, purely as an example, that a hypothetical probate judge “with jurisdiction over only wills and estates” would be unable to try a criminal case without acting in the absence of jurisdiction. 435 U.S. at 357 n. 7 (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871).In Pennsylvania, however, Section 931(a) of the Judicial Code vests the courts of common pleas . with “unlimited original jurisdiction [over] all actions and proceedings, including all actions and proceedings heretofore cognizable by law or usage in the courts of common pleas, ” except as otherwise provided by law. 42 Pa.C.S. § 931(a); see also Pa. Const. Art. V, § 5 (providing that the courts of common pleas shall “hav[e] unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law”). As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained, § 931(a) constitutes a “sweeping statutory grant of jurisdiction” to the courts of common pleas over all actions and proceedings “not exclusively vested elsewhere” by statute. In re Administrative Order No. 1-MD-2003, 594 Pa. 346, 936 A.2d 1, 6 (2007). Pursuant to § 931, Judge Shehan plainly had jurisdiction to preside over both criminal and custody proceedings. Because he did not act “in the complete.absence of all jurisdiction”, Van Tassel, 659 F.Supp.2d at 695, he retains judicial immunity and should be dismissed from this action.
In contrast, “a judge of a criminal court.. . [who] convict[s] a defendant of a nonexistent crime . . . would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Bradley, 80 U.S. at 352).
6. Leave to amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). This instruction is equally applicable to pro se litigants and those represented by counsel. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).)
Despite the impediments identified above, it is not entirely inconceivable that Plaintiff might be able to amend her complaint to identify a viable defendant or allege misconduct that is not protected by immunity. Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiff be granted leave to file an amended complaint within a specified time following dismissal. Plaintiff is reminded that an amended complaint “must be complete in all respects. It is a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the complaint already filed.” Williams v. Ferdarko, 2018 WL 3653272, at *1 n. 1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2018) (quoting Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1189 (M.D. Pa. 1992)).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), but that Plaintiff be provided an opportunity to amend her pleading within a reasonable time.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Extensions of time will not be granted. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).