Opinion
2:22-cv-01619-BHH-MGB
08-24-2023
Darrell L. Goss, Sr., #305517, Plaintiff, v. Bryan P. Stirling; Brian Kendell; and M. Wilson, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff Darrell L. Goss, Sr. (“Goss”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 10.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review this case and submit a recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned recommends that this case be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The instant case is one of several federal disputes brought by Goss in relation to his postconviction relief (“PCR”) proceedings before the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas. Specifically, Goss alleges that Defendants refused to provide him with photocopies of his handwritten legal documents and certain legal materials/supplies at Lieber Correctional Institution, which, in turn, “hindered his efforts to pursue viable legal claims in his state [PCR] case.” (Dkt. No. 10 at 10.) Before addressing these claims, however, it is important to understand the extensive legal history underlying Goss's PCR application and the current state of his proceedings.
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the records filed in Goss's underlying PCR proceedings, as well as those filed in his related state and federal actions. See Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296. (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those public records of other courts); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites). For ease of reference, much of the background cited herein is taken from the records filed in Goss's first federal habeas action, Case No. 2:18-cv-2938-BHH-MGB, and third federal habeas action, Case No. 2:22-cv-103-BHH-MGB.
Initial PCR Appeal
On May 27, 2011, Goss filed a PCR application in relation to several criminal convictions from 2007. (Case No. 2011-CP-10-378; see also Case No. 2:18-cv-2938-BHH-MGB, Dkt. No. 39-3 at 93-99.) The PCR court denied Goss's application on or around December 1, 2011 (Case No. 2938, Dkt. No. 39-3 at 191-202), and Goss filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of South Carolina shortly thereafter (App. Case No. 2011-204386; see also Case No. 2938, Dkt. No. 39-7). After briefing was complete, the Supreme Court transferred the case to the South Carolina Court of Appeals to rule on the petition. (Case No. 2938, Dkt. No. 78-3 at 28.) On November 21, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted Goss's petition (Case No. 2938, Dkt. No. 39-6) and held oral arguments on March 7, 2016. The Court of Appeals then issued an unpublished opinion affirming the PCR court's decision on July 27, 2016. (Case No. 2938, Dkt. No. 39-9.) The Court of Appeals denied Goss's subsequent petition for rehearing on September 26, 2016. (Case No. 2938, Dkt. No. 39-11.)
See https://www.sccourts.org/casesearch/ (limiting search to Charleston County) (last visited August 24, 2023).
Remand to PCR Court for De Novo Review
On November 14, 2016, Goss filed another petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of South Carolina. (App. Case No. 2016-2186; see also Case No. 2938, Dkt. No. 39-12.) The petition was granted on October 19, 2017, and oral arguments were held on June 12, 2018. (Case No. 2938, Dkt. No. 39-14.) On October 17, 2018, the Supreme Court issued a published opinion remanding Goss's case to the PCR court for a de novo review. (Case No. 2938, Dkt. No. 39-17 at 5-6.)
First Federal Habeas Action
Two weeks later, Goss filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging, among other things, the “excessive and unjustified delay in the disposition of [his] postconviction remedy proceeding.” (Case No. 2:18-cv-2938-BHH-MGB, Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) Goss then filed a motion in his PCR action requesting to stay the state proceedings until his federal habeas petition was resolved; the PCR court granted Goss's motion and stayed the proceedings on January 29, 2019.
On June 19, 2019, the undersigned issued a report and recommendation in Goss's habeas action recommending that the § 2254 petition be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust all available state court remedies. (Case No. 2938, Dkt. No. 84 at 7.) The district judge adopted the report and recommendation in its entirety on January 31, 2020 (Case No. 2938, Dkt. No. 117 at 5), and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Goss's subsequent appeal on or around August 5, 2020 (App. No. 20-6181; see also Case No. 2938, Dkt. No. 132). Goss then moved to lift the stay in his underlying PCR action and his case was eventually restored to the docket.
Second Federal Habeas Action
On April 13, 2020, Goss filed a second federal habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, once again challenging the duration of his PCR proceedings. (Case No. 2:20-cv-4133-BHH-MGB, Dkt. No. 1 at 7.) On March 10, 2021, the undersigned issued a report and recommendation reiterating that Goss's federal habeas claims were premature and unexhausted in light of the PCR court's ongoing de novo review. (Case No. 4133, Dkt. No. 17 at 6-7.) The district judge adopted the report and recommendation in its entirety on May 17, 2021 (Case No. 4133, Dkt. No. 29), and the Fourth Circuit dismissed Goss's subsequent appeal on August 27, 2021 (App. Case No. 216819; see also Case No. 4133, Dkt. No. 37).
Third Federal Habeas Action
On January 12, 2022, Goss filed a third federal habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, largely renewing the same grounds for habeas relief presented in his previous two petitions. (Case No. 2:22-cv-103-BHH-MGB, Dkt. No. 1.) On February 3, 2022, the undersigned issued a report and recommendation once again finding that Goss could not seek habeas relief under § 2254 until his PCR proceedings concluded and he exhausted his state court remedies. (Case No. 103, Dkt. No. 5 at 7-8.) Before the district judge had an opportunity to rule on the recommendation, Goss's PCR action was dismissed.
Dismissal of PCR Action
Indeed, on June 15, 2022, the court denied Goss post-conviction relief and dismissed his PCR action with prejudice. (Case No. 103, Dkt. No. 48-11.) Goss submitted a fourth motion to amend his PCR application on June 16, 2022, and a “motion to alter or amend judgment” on June 22, 2022. The motions apparently alleged “unfair jury trial” and ineffective assistance of counsel based on the State's purported failure to prove each element of the “accomplice liability theory of hand of one, hand of all” and defense counsel's failure to advance a motion for directed verdict in relation to the same. When the Charleston County Clerk of Court allegedly “refused” to file these two motions in a timely manner, Goss attempted to bring a First Amendment claim against her in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.(See Case No. 2:21-cv-900-BHH-MGB, Dkt. Nos. 19, 23.)
State records suggest that the Charleston County Clerk of Court filed Goss's fourth motion to amend his PCR application on or around July 14, 2022, and his motion to alter or amend the judgment action on or around June 27, 2022. See https://www.sccourts.org/casesearch/ (limiting search to Charleston County) (last visited August 24, 2023).
On July 5, 2022, Goss filed a notice of appeal and motion to proceed pro se with the Supreme Court of South Carolina challenging the PCR court's dismissal of his application. (App. Case No. 2022-924; see also Case No. 103, Dkt. No. 48-12.) Goss later amended his appeal to include his constitutional claims regarding the Charleston County Clerk of Court's delay in filing his fourth motion to amend and his motion to alter or amend judgment. (Case No. 103, Dkt. No. 48-15.)
On September 17, 2022, the South Carolina Supreme Court denied Goss's motion to proceed pro se and directed him to either retain counsel or submit an affidavit of indigency so that he could be assigned an attorney. (Case No. 103, Dkt. No. 48-13.) Goss did not comply with these instructions and, consequently, his appeal was dismissed by order dated October 24, 2022. (Case No. 103, Dkt. No. 48-16.) With respect to the pending federal claims, the district court dismissed Goss's allegations against the Charleston County Clerk of Court, concluding that Goss had failed to state an actionable constitutional violation and the Clerk was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for performing her official duties in any case. (Case No. 900, Dkt. Nos. 20, 25.) The Fourth Circuit denied Goss's subsequent appeal of his § 1983 claims on April 25, 2023. (App. Case No. 22-7387.)
Service of Third Federal Habeas Action
In light of the foregoing, on November 3, 2022, Goss filed a motion for reconsideration in his third habeas action-which was still awaiting a decision from the district judge-noting that since the issuance of the undersigned's initial report and recommendation on February 3, 2022, the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas had denied and dismissed his PCR application. (Case No. 103, Dkt. No. 18.) Based on these developments, Goss argued that the district court had jurisdiction to hear his claims and asked that an updated habeas petition be “recommitted” to the docket and served on the respondent. (Case No. 103, Dkt. No. 18 at 2.) The undersigned agreed and issued an order on November 7, 2022, dismissing the pending report and recommendation as moot and directing the respondent to respond to the updated petition as provided by Goss. (Case No. 103, Dkt. No. 20.)
Goss also filed a similar updated § 2254 petition in a new habeas action, which the undersigned consolidated with Case No. 103 for purposes of judicial efficiency. (Case No. 2:22-cv-4048-BHH-MGB, Dkt. No. 4.)
The respondent filed a return and moved for summary judgment on March 1, 2023. (Case No. 103, Dkt. Nos. 48, 49.) On March 27, 2023, Goss filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and the respondent filed a memorandum in opposition thereto. (Case No. 103, Dkt. Nos. 55, 58.) Goss then filed a reply on April 19, 2023. (Case No. 103, Dkt. No. 59.) With briefing complete, the undersigned issued a report and recommendation on August 9, 2023, concluding that the respondent's motion for summary judgment should be granted and Plaintiff's cross-motion denied. (Case No. 103, Dkt. No. 71.) The district judge has yet to rule on the report and recommendation.
Instant § 1983 Action
It is against this extensive procedural background that Goss now brings the instant action seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Bryan P. Stirling (“Stirling”), Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”); Brian Kendell (“Kendell”), Warden of Lieber Correctional Institution (“Lieber”); and M. Wilson (“Wilson”), Lieber Business Office Personnel (collectively, “Defendants”). (Case No. 2:22-cv-1619-BHH-MGB.) Upon reviewing Goss's original Complaint (Case No. 1619, Dkt. No. 1) in this case, the undersigned issued an order on notifying him that his pleading was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Case No. 1619, Dkt. No. 6.) In light of Goss's pro se status, however, the undersigned gave him an opportunity to cure the identified pleading deficiencies by filing an amended complaint with the Court within twenty-one days. The undersigned warned Goss that if he did not file an amended complaint or cure the identified pleading deficiencies within the time permitted by the order, his case would be dismissed. (Case No. 1619, Dkt. No. 6 at 3.)
In compliance with the undersigned's instructions, Goss filed an Amended Complaint against the same Defendants alleging several constitutional violations based on the following two policies in effect during his time at Lieber: (1) Defendant Stirling allegedly “implement[ed] and enforce[ed] a prison policy that prohibit[ed] . . . Goss from purchasing photocopies of his own handwritten legal documents from the prison's law library;” and (2) Defendants Kendell and Wilson “implement[ed] and enforce[ed] a prison regulation that prohibit[ed] . . . Goss from purchasing legal supplies-i.e., paper, pen, and envelopes-from Lieber's Business Office if he already ha[d] money on his inmate financial account.” (Case No. 1619, Dkt. No. 10 at 6-10.)
As a result of these policies, Goss claims that Defendants violated his right of access to the courts in violation of the First Amendment and his right to due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id.) Goss also claims that Defendant Stirling's policy constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 8.) Beyond damages, the Amended Complaint asks that the Court order “Director Stirling to modify his policy and allow [Goss] to purchase photocopies of his own handwritten legal documents . . . and Warden Kendell and M. Wilson to modify their regulation and allow [Goss] to purchase legal supplies (i.e., paper, pen, and envelopes) from the Business Office even if he already has money on his inmate financial account.”(Id. at 11-12.)
The undersigned notes that these claims completely replace those presented in the original pleading. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Amended Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
Section 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). As stated above, the Amended Complaint rests on three purported constitutional violations under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Even viewing these claims under the more liberal Pro se standard, however, the undersigned finds that Goss's pleading remains subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The undersigned addresses each constitutional claim in turn.
I. Access to the Courts Under the First Amendment
The First Amendment guarantees prisoners the right of meaningful access to the courts. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). The right of access to the courts “assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974). To establish an unconstitutional denial of meaningful access to the courts, a plaintiff must show actual injury or prejudice resulting from the official conduct. See Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1383 (4th Cir. 1993); Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996). Actual injury requires more than theoretical or conclusory allegations; rather, as the undersigned previously explained to Goss (Case No. 1619, Dkt. No. 6 at 2), the plaintiff must show that the purported deprivation of access has impeded or is impeding his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996); Cochran, 73 F.3d at 1317. Goss has failed to do that here.
A. Photocopy Policy
With respect to Defendant Stirling's policy prohibiting inmates from purchasing photocopies of their own handwritten legal documents, the Amended Complaint alleges that Goss “has been hindered . . . in his efforts to pursue viable legal claims in his state post-conviction relief case.” (Case No. 1619, Dkt. No. 10 at 6.) More specifically, Goss references back to the Charleston County Clerk of Court's purported “refusal” to timely file his fourth motion to amend his PCR application and his motion to alter or amend judgment, arguing that his claims of “unfair jury trial” and “ineffective assistance of counsel”-based on the “hand of one, hand of all theory of accomplice liability”-are “likely to be procedurally barred on appellate review and/or federal habeas review.”(Id.) Goss then claims that because he “was prohibited from receiving photocopies of his own handwritten motions . . . prior to mailing them to the court for filing,” he was unable “to retain a copy of these [two] motions for his file.” (Id. at 7.) This is the extent of his claim.
The PCR court has not addressed or ruled on the fourth motion to amend and/or the motion to alter or amend judgment. Thus, it remains unclear as to whether Goss's motions are in fact procedurally barred. See https://www.sccourts.org/casesearch/ (limiting search to Charleston County) (last visited August 24, 2023).
The undersigned notes at the outset that while the Amended Complaint raises this First Amendment claim against Defendant Stirling, the true core of Goss's claim appears to be the delay caused by the Clerk of Court's purported failure to timely file his two motions following the dismissal of his PCR application-an argument that the Court already rejected in Case No. 900.(Case No. 900, Dkt. Nos. 20, 25.) Indeed, similar to Goss's original pleading in the instant action, there is nothing in the Amended Complaint to indicate that Goss's inability to retain photocopies of these motions caused any actual injury or prejudice; rather, the undersigned can only speculate that Goss had hoped to use the photocopies somehow, possibly to rectify the “procedural bar” or resubmit his claims to a higher court for further consideration. Nevertheless, even if this interpretation is correct, Goss's claim still falls short of a constitutional violation because he cannot show the loss of a non-frivolous claim.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that “district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits.” See Bryant v. United States Dep't of Interior, No. 2:18-cv-2593-MBS-MGB, 2018 WL 5258812, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 9, 2018) (referencing Cottle v. Bell, 2000 WL 1144623, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2000) (per curiam)), adopted, 2018 WL 5255009 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018); see also Long v. Ozmint, 558 F.Supp.2d 624, 629 (D.S.C. 2008) (“The District Court clearly had the right to take notice of its own files and records and it had no duty to grind the same corn a second time. Once was sufficient.”) (citing Aloe Crime Labs., Inc., 425 F.2d at 1996).
Notwithstanding the above, the Court generally cannot construct arguments on a pro se plaintiff's behalf. See Stratton v. Mecklenburg Cty. Dep'tof Soc. Servs., 521 Fed.Appx. 278, 290 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that “‘district judges are not mind readers,' and the principle of liberal construction does not require them to ‘conjure up questions never presented to them or to construct full-blown claims'” on a pro se plaintiff's behalf) (citing Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277-78 (4th Cir. 1985)). Accordingly, the undersigned does not offer this interpretation to suggest that there is a viable argument that the lack of photocopies did in fact impede Goss's ability to pursue his claims in state court; the undersigned simply proceeds under this presumption for argument's sake to facilitate a more exhaustive analysis for purposes of the Report and Recommendation.
To demonstrate denial of access to the courts, “[i]t is not enough that a prisoner is prevented from challenging his conviction. He must also show that his claim had merit.” Sewell v. Shearin, No. 8:15-cv-3040-DKC, 2016 WL 6525615, at *16 (D. Md. Nov. 2, 2016); see also Mayweather v. Guice, No. 1:17-cv-100-FDW, 2020 WL 594503, at *8 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 6, 2020) (“The injury requirement is not satisfied by any type of frustrated legal claim; the prisoner must demonstrate that his nonfrivolous . . . claim has been frustrated or impeded. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), aff'd, 806 Fed.Appx. 188 (4th Cir. 2020). Here, the PCR court had already issued its final order of dismissal when Goss attempted to file his fourth motion to amend his PCR application on July 16, 2022, and the motion to alter or amend judgment on July 22, 2022. Notably, in issuing this final order of dismissal, the PCR court considered and rejected a series of arguments very similar to those raised in Goss's subsequent two motions.
With respect to Goss's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the PCR court found “no deficiency in Counsel's handling of [the directed verdict] motion,” and noted that he had reasonably attempted to discredit the “hand of one, hand of all” theory by arguing that “the State had produced no evidence to place [Goss] at the store during the robbery” and had “shown [no] link between the . . . evidence and [Goss].” (Case No. 103, Dkt. No. 48-11 at 23-24; see also Id. at 27, stating that counsel's plan was “to show the State had not met their burden-specifically, that the State did not have any direct evidence linking [Goss] to the incident.”)
With respect to Goss's “unfair jury trial” claim, the PCR court did not explicitly address whether the State satisfied its burden under the hand of one is the hand of all theory of accomplice liability.However, the PCR court's order confirmed that the “evidence in the record support[ed] a charge on the hand of one is the hand of all” theory, and there were “factual issues for the jury to consider” in relation to the same. (Case No. 103, Dkt. No. 48-11 at 24, 27.) Notably, the undersigned considered and dismissed this same issue on the merits in issuing the recommendation in Goss's third habeas action on August 9, 2023. See Garrett v. Angelone, 230 F.3d 1352 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding no prejudice because prisoner was able to bring his lost claim in federal court, where it was determined to be “without merit”). Specifically, the undersigned parsed through the evidence presented against Goss and his explanations for the same, and found that “the evidence was enough to suggest to a reasonable trier of fact that Goss could have been one of the five men involved in the crime.”(Case No. 103, Dkt. No. 71 at 18-20.)
Goss apparently presented this argument in one of his amended PCR applications, but did not raise it at the PCR hearing. (See Case No. 103, Dkt. No. 71 at 18, Dkt. No. 58 at 4-7.)
The undersigned also addressed Goss's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, reiterating that Goss's attorney adequately argued in his motion for directed verdict that the State had failed to meet its burden of proof under the hand of one is the hand of all theory of accomplice liability. (Case No. 103, Dkt. No. 71 at 14-17.)
Accordingly, Goss simply cannot show that Defendant Stirling's policy prevented him from pursuing an otherwise meritorious or non-frivolous claim where the PCR court had already dismissed Goss's application and, significantly, rejected the very arguments he sought to make in his subsequent motions. See Al-Mujahidin v. Franklin, No. 9:15-cv-1978-BHH-BM, 2016 WL 3462520, at *3 (D.S.C. May 31, 2016) (finding no prejudice where defendants allegedly mishandled prisoner's proposed filings because the final order dismissing PCR action had already been entered); Jackson v. Labier, No. 907-cv-1317-RBH, 2008 WL 3992653, at *7 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2008) (concluding that plaintiff had full access to the court where he had already received a ruling on the merits of his writ and was attempting to litigate the same issues for a third time). The Amended Complaint therefore fails to demonstrate an actual injury and Goss's First Amendment claim against Defendant Stirling is still subject to summary dismissal.
B. Legal Supplies Policy
With respect to Defendants Kendell and Wilson, the Amended Complaint asserts that their policy prohibiting Goss from purchasing legal supplies likewise “hindered his efforts to pursue viable legal claims in his state post-conviction relief case.” (Case No. 1619, Dkt. No. 10 at 9-10.) Again, Goss references his fourth motion to amend and the motion to alter or amend judgment filed in his PCR action, alleging that he “was without or had limited paper when drafting his motions and therefore, was not able to argue all of his grounds for relief prior to mailing them to the court for filing.” (Id. at 10.) Goss does not, however, describe these additional grounds for relief or explain why they would change the outcome of his PCR action. Rather, he can only speculate that his litigation may have fared better with more paper, which is insufficient to demonstrate actual injury for purposes of the First Amendment. See Allen v. Moton, No. 6:15-cv-2903-RMG, 2016 WL 3749408, at *3 (D.S.C. July 13, 2016) (explaining that actual injury cannot be established by “conclusory statements” that inmate's claims would have fared better if he had “more or better access” to legal materials); see also Cruse v. Romans, No. 3:15-cv-2282, 2016 WL 7971192, at *7 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 20, 2016) (finding plaintiff's “unsupported suggestion” that the outcome of his court proceedings would have been different if not for the lack of legal supplies “speculative at best” and therefore insufficient to show denial of access to the courts), adopted, 2017 WL 319209 (S.D. W.Va. Jan. 20, 2017).
Notwithstanding the above, the undersigned also notes that Goss's voluminous filings and extensive procedural history belie any claim of inadequate legal supplies. While prison officials must provide inmates with paper, envelopes, writing instruments, and other basic materials needed to draft legal documents, inmates are not entitled to unlimited resources to litigate their cases. See Page v. Padula, No. 9:08-cv-1660-HFF-BM, 2009 WL 10709704, at *1 (D.S.C. July 22, 2009) (noting that prison officials “are not required to underwrite” an inmate's Pro se lawsuit). Although Goss claims that Defendants Kendell and Wilson provided him with “limited paper,” court records show that during the relevant time period, Goss was able to file and/or litigate his PCR action before the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas (Case No. 2011-CP-10-3782); his § 1983 claims against the Charleston County Clerk of Court (Case No. 900); his third federal habeas action (Case No. 103); and the instant § 1983 action against Defendants (Case No. 1619).Goss also filed and/or litigated at least five other § 1983 actions with this Court. (See Case No. 2:21-cv-84-RMG-MGB; Case No. 2:21-cv-558-HMH-MGB; Case No. 2:21-cv-1090-RBH-MGB; Case No. 2:22-cv-104-BHH-MGB; and Case No. 2:22-cv-2791-BHH-MGB.)
The relevant time period covers December 8, 2021, to October 13, 2022, during which Goss was housed at Lieber Correctional Institution. See https://public.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/ (searching “Darrell Goss”) (last visited August 24, 2023).
The numerous filings involved in these cases plainly demonstrate that Goss had ample access to the legal supplies necessary to litigate his lawsuits while housed at Lieber. See, e.g., Allen, 2016 WL 3749408, at *3 (finding that defendants did not deny inmate access to the courts despite limiting his paper, envelopes, and legal materials where he was still able to submit “voluminous filings in several actions”); Guess v. Reynolds, No. 9:10-cv-1161-TLW, 2011 WL 3471533, at *10 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2011) (finding that “numerous filings” refuted claim that “amount of writing and mailing supplies” received impeded inmate's access to courts), adopted, 2011 WL 3471054 (D.S.C. Aug. 8, 2011), aff'd, 458 Fed.Appx. 233 (4th Cir. 2011); Norris v. Mann, No. 8:09-cv-2577-PMD-BH, 2010 WL 610688, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 19, 2010) (finding that “numerous, lengthy” filings indicated plaintiff was not hindered “in his ability to pursue his legal actions”); Mohammed v. Daniels, No. 5:13-CT-3077-FL, 2016 WL 4544017, at *16 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 31, 2016) (noting that the record showed plaintiff was able to “extensively litigate his tort claim,” such that “[a]ny contention by plaintiff that he was not able to effectively litigate his tort claim does not violate the constitution”), aff'd, 673 Fed.Appx. 347 (4th Cir. 2017). The undersigned therefore finds that Goss has failed to demonstrate an actual injury based on Lieber's legal supplies policy, and his First Amendment claim against Defendants Kendell and Wilson is subject to summary dismissal.
II. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the Eighth Amendment
“The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Raynor v. Pugh, 817 F.3d 123, 127 (4th Cir. 2016) (“The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments imposes certain basic duties on prison officials . . . includ[ing] maintaining humane conditions of confinement.”).
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must prove two elements: (1) that objectively the deprivation of a basic human need was sufficiently serious, and (2) that subjectively the prison officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (referencing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1991)). With respect to the first element, the objective inquiry “requires a court to assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993). With respect to the second element, a culpable state of mind is “one of ‘deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison official demonstrates deliberate indifference if he or she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [ ] must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
In the instant case, the Amended Complaint suggests that Defendant Stirling subjected Goss to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment by requiring him to “rewrite lengthy copies of his own handwritten legal documents” under the photocopy policy.(Case No. 1619, Dkt. No. 10 at 8.) Goss alleges that “[a]t all time relevant, Defendant [Stirling] was deliberately indifferent to either a serious or significant physical or emotion injury or a substantial risk of serious harm because he was aware or should have been aware of such serious harm or risk thereof and failed to take corrective action.” (Id.)
The Amended Complaint raises this Eighth Amendment violation against Defendant Stirling's photocopy policy only.
Although the federal pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it demands more than “labels and conclusions.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. However, that is precisely what Goss has done here, as the Amended Complaint is devoid of any substantive factual allegations that demonstrate Defendant Stirling's policy rises to the level of unconstitutional punishment. Indeed, beyond the cursory statement that Goss must “rewrite lengthy copies of his own handwritten legal documents,” the Amended Complaint presents merely a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. Without more, Goss simply cannot show that he has been “deprived of the minimal civilized measures of human necessities in such a palpable way that injury should be inferred.” Brooks v. Padula, No. 6:09-cv-992-MBS-KFM, 2010 WL 3257937, at *6 (D.S.C. June 24, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 3257960 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2010), aff'd sub nom. Brooks v. Padulah, 407 Fed.Appx. 706 (4th Cir. 2011). Consequently, Goss's Eighth Amendment claim is also subject to summary dismissal.
III. Due Process Under the Fourteenth Amendment
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government, whether the fault lies in a denial of fundamental procedural fairness, . . . or in the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Although Goss alleges that Defendants Stirling, Kendell, and Wilson violated his constitutional right to due process by implementing and enforcing their respective policies, the Amended Complaint merely restates-almost verbatim-Goss's First Amendment claims for denial of access to the courts. (See Case No. 1619, Dkt. No. 10 at 7-8, 10-11.) “[W]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, and not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” See Thompson v. Clarke, No. 7:17-cv-111, 2018 WL 4764294, at *9 (W.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2018) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994)). Therefore, Goss “cannot successfully raise a substantive due process claim regarding the same governmental conduct” underlying his First Amendment claims. See Id. (dismissing due process violation where supporting allegations also served as the basis for plaintiff's First and Eighth Amendment claims and were “squarely addressed pursuant to the analytical frameworks” under the same).
Moreover, to allege a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment, “an inmate must demonstrate that he was deprived of a protected liberty interest by governmental action.” Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 374 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting inmates' due process claim because, regardless of whether it was procedural or substantive in nature, both tests require a showing that the inmates could not make- that they had and were deprived of a property interest). With respect to Defendant Stirling's policy, it is well-established that prisoners do not have a protected interest in limitless photocopies for use in lawsuits. See Ladeairous v. Pearson, No. 3:12-cv-307, 2013 WL 5962932, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 6, 2013) (dismissing due process claim because an inmate does not enjoy a protected constitutional right to unlimited photocopying services), aff'd, 553 Fed.Appx. 298 (4th Cir. 2014). Similarly, with respect to Defendants Kendell and Wilson's policy, the undersigned reiterates that prisoners are not entitled to unlimited resources to litigate their cases. See Page, 2009 WL 10709704, at *1 (explaining that a prisoner's constitutional right to legal resources and materials is not without limit). And as stated above, Goss has been afforded sufficient access to the legal materials necessary to litigate his actions in any event. Thus, Goss cannot show that Defendants' respective policies deprived him of any protected interests and his due process claims are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court summarily DISMISS Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 10) without further leave to amend, as he has already had the opportunity to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022); Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018). The Clerk of Court shall not issue the summonses or forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process at this time.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).