Opinion
No. 1:03 cv1487 (JCC).
August 16, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Gorski brought this Title VII action against Colgan Air, her former employer, alleging sex discrimination. Colgan has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant Colgan's summary judgment motion.
I. Background
Gorski was a Air Transportation Supervisor for Colgan Air, a regional air carrier for US Airways. She was hired on January 29, 2001 as a flight attendant. On July 15, 2001, she was appointed to Air Transportation Supervisor. (Def. Ex. 2.) Part of her duties was to complete Competency/Line Checks on flight attendants.
On April 11, 2002, Gorski was assigned to assess a new flight attendant, Abigail Remka, on a series of flights. After the flights, Gorski met with Remka in her hotel room to go over the competency form. (Pl. Ex. 4 (statement of Gorksi); Pl. Ex. 5 (statement of Remka)). Dean Bandavanis, the captain of the flights for that day was also in the room and dressed only in boxer shorts when Remka arrived. (Stip. 18; Finnigan Dep. 60:11-20.) Sexually oriented comments were made and touching between Bandavanis and Remka occurred. Remka complained the next day to management. Mary Finnigan, vice president for marketing and personel, investigated the complaint. (Def. Ex. 7.) Based on the investigation, Bandavanis was suspended for five days and required to take harassment training. Gorski's employment was terminated.
In response, Gorski brought this suit alleging that her termination was based on her gender in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. On June 22, 2004, Colgan brought a summary judgment motion arguing that Gorski fails to make a prima facie case of an unlawful employment action. In addition, Colgan argues that Gorski's employment was not terminated due to her gender but for other reasons including the events of April 11th and other instances.
II. Standard of Review
As set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party can show by affidavits, depositions, admissions, answers to interrogatories, the pleadings, or other evidence, "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment against a party who "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion . . . fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The moving party is not entitled to summary judgment if there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue of fact exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for a nonmoving party. See id. In other words, summary judgment appropriately lies only if there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. See id. Finally, as the Fourth Circuit explained,
[W]e must draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Summary judgment is appropriate only where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, such as where the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case that the non-moving party has the burden to prove.Tuck v. Henkel Corp., 973 F.2d 371, 374 (4th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
III. Analysis
A. McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Test
Under the traditional "pretext" method of proof, the burden-shifting sequence of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981) is a three step process that first requires the employee to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII the employee must show: 1) that she is a member of the class protected by Title VII, 2) that the prohibited conduct in which she engaged was comparable in seriousness to misconduct of employees outside the protected class, and 3) that the disciplinary measures enforced against her were more severe than those enforced against those other employees. Cook v. CSX Transp. Corp., 988 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1993).
If the employee succeeds in establishing the prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the difference in disciplinary action. See id. If the employer is able to advance a non-discriminatory reason, the burden again shifts to the employee to demonstrate, not only that the employer's reasons are merely pretextual, but that the actual reason for the disparate treatment is the employee's gender. See id.; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (1981)) ("[a]t this point, the burden to demonstrate pretext merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the plaintiff has been the victim of intentional discrimination.'").
B. Applying the Test to the Facts
Assuming arguendo that Gorski made a prima facie case, the Court bases its decision on Colgan's list of nondiscriminatory reasons and Gorki's ineffectual rebuttal of those reasons. 1. Legitimate Reasons for Termination
The prima facie case is far from clear here. While Gorksi is clearly a member of a protected class as a female, the parties dispute whether Gorksi was similarly situated with Bandavanis and whether the Gorksi received disparate punishment. Most of the debate revolves around whether Gorski was a supervisor of Remka. She admits that she was supervisor in the complaint but now disputes that she has supervisorial authority over Remka. Colgan argues that Gorski was supervising Remka at the time of the hotel room incident while Bandavanis was off duty, thus, the difference in roles justifies the difference in punishment (termination versus suspension). In any event, the discussion below demonstrates that Gorski has not presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that sex was a motivating factor in any adverse employment action by Colgan.
Colgan's legitimate reasons for termination are Plaintiff (1) abused her supervisory authority over Remka; (2) invited Remka to her hotel room to complete the evaluation; (3) conducted the evaluation in front of another employee; (4) criticized Remka's performance in front of passengers; (5) opened the cockpit door during flight in violation of Federal Aviation Regulations; (6) attempted to violated the sterile cockpit regulation; (7) violated the dress code; and (7) exhibited a series of poor decision making. By citing several instances where Gorski has violated work rules, Colgan has satisfied its burden. 2. Pretext
The burden on defendant is one of "production." Therefore, the defendant must merely provide evidence that plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, but it is unnecessary that the defendant "persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
Because Colgan has argued non-discriminatory reasons for her termination, Gorski must both demonstrate pretext and that the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination. Cook v. CSX Transp. Corp., 988 F.2d at 511. Gorksi argues in response that these reasons lack in substance and were fabricated to justify the disparity between Bandavanis and Gorki's punishment. Further, she contends that Finnigan investigated the matter in an incomplete manner, refusing to interview a key witness (the first officer on board that day) and giving more credence to Bandavanis's and Remka's conflicting testimony.
For purposes of this disciplinary action, the Court must look at the facts as they appeared to Finnigan, who met with Gorski and made the decision that disciplinary action was warranted. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc. 354 F.3d 277, 293 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that the court must look at the facts from the viewpoint of the person making the decision in evaluating whether an employee has been terminated because of a proteced trait). It is not the Court's role to become a "super personnel department." DeJarnette v. Corning, Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Jiminez v. Mary Washington College, 57 F.3d 369, 376 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that Title VII is not a vehicle for substituting the judgment of a court for that of the employer); EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 946 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that the federal courts should "not . . . direct the business practices of any company").
Gorski entirely relies on the fact that she was fired while Bandavanis was suspended. Gorksi has failed to provide any other facts to show discriminatory intent. Instead she only asserts her subjective belief that she was treated differently and unfairly. After the end of the discovery period, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that Finnigan, a member of the protected class, harbored any discriminatory animus toward women. No evidence was supplied that showed the company's practices, prior discriminatory acts, or a pattern of conduct weighed improperly against women. Thus, the Court is not persuaded that the Plaintiff's pretext argument has the ardor she attributes to it.
IV. Conclusion
Gorski has failed to demonstrate by legally sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence that her sex was "a motivating factor" for her termination by Colgan, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m), because she has failed to demonstrate that any relevant decisionmaker at Colgan harbored such a discriminatory motivation. Gorski likewise has failed to establish her termination claim under the burden-shifting framework of Burdine and McDonnell Douglas. Even if it could be said that a prima facie case had been stated, Gorski could not prevail because Colgan articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination decision, and Gorski has come forward with no credible evidence to demonstrate that the reason proffered by Colgan was a pretext for discrimination on the part of its relevant decision makers. Accordingly, Colgan's summary judgment will be granted. For the reasons stated above, Colgan's summary judgment motion will be granted. An order will follow.