Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-1845, SECTION "R" (2).
July 15, 2003.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are the motion and supplemental motion for attorney's fees of plaintiff, GMAC Commercial Mortgage Corporation ("GMAC"). Defendant did not file any opposition to these motions. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART plaintiff's motions.
I. Background
GMAC, acting on behalf of LaSalle National Bank, Trustee, filed a foreclosure suit seeking to foreclose by ordinary process on certain property known as the Country Gables Apartments in Slidell, Louisiana. GMAC is the Master and Special Servicer for LaSalle, as trustee for the registered holders of the Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-HF2. The owner of the Property is defendant Chateau Deville Apartments Partnership. Chateau DeVille has two partners, Scott L. LaFavre and Shari L. LaFavre.
In an Order and Reasons dated August 26, 2002, this Court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The relief granted to plaintiff included recognizing and enforcing the lien of plaintiff's mortgage against the Property, the assignment of leases and rents, and the security interest in movable property. The relief also included the award to plaintiff of the principal sum of $3,250,079.36 plus interest, penalties and attorneys' fees. Plaintiff's right to attorneys' fees is set forth in the note and mortgage, in which Chateau DeVille agreed to be liable for all expenditures and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, paid or incurred by the mortgagee following an event of default. The Court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on October 24, 2002. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) provides that a motion to assess attorneys' fees "must be filed and served no later than 14 days after entry of judgment." Plaintiff filed a Motion For Attorney's Fees on November 7, 2002, which is within the time limit set forth in Rule. 54(d).
After plaintiff filed the motion for attorney's fees, plaintiff incurred additional attorney's fees to defend its claims against an intervenor, J.B. Fortson ("Fortson"). Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgement against Fortson, who then voluntarily dismissed his claims in intervention. This Court dismissed Fortson's Intervention and Complaint without prejudice on May 19, 2003. Plaintiff filed an Expedited Motion for Supplemental Attorney's Fees on May 21, 2003, again within the time limit set forth in Rule 54(d).
II. Discussion
Federal courts sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum state, including determinations as to whether a party is entitled to attorneys' fees. Northwinds Abatement, Inc. v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 258 F.3d 345, 353 (5th Cir. 2001); Mid-Continent Casualty Company v. Chevron Pipe Line Company, 205 F.3d 222, 230 (5th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit recently confirmed that "[s]tate law controls both the award of and the reasonableness of fees awarded where state law supplies the rule of decision." Mathis v. Exxon Corporation, 302 F.3d 448, 461 (5th Cir. 2002). Therefore, because this Court is sitting in diversity and plaintiff's right to attorneys' fees is set forth by contract, Louisiana law governs plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees.
Under Louisiana law, courts may exercise their inherent power to regulate the practice of law to inquire as to the reasonableness of attorneys' fees. Department of Transportation and Development v. Williamson, 597 So.2d 439, 441-42 (La. 1992) The factors to be considered in making a determination of reasonableness include:
(1) the ultimate result obtained;
(2) the responsibility incurred;
(3) the importance of the litigation;
(4) amount of money involved;
(5) extent and character of the work performed;
(6) legal knowledge, attainment, and skill of the attorneys;
(7) number of appearances made;
(8) intricacies of the facts involved;
(9) diligence and skill of counsel; and
(10) the court's own knowledge.
Id. at 442; Rivet v. Department of Transportation and Development, 800 So.2d 777, 780 n. 3 (La. 2001). These factors are derived from Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Williamson, 597 So.2d at 442 n. 9. Among the factors listed in Rule 1.5(a) is "[t]he fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services." Id. An accepted method with which to begin a calculation of a fee award under Louisiana law is to multiply the hours worked by an hourly rate the Court deems to be reasonable. See Fourchon Docks, 849 F.2d at 1568.
These guidelines are permissive and consideration of all of them is not necessary. Fourchon Docks, Inc. v. Milchem Incorporated, 849 F.2d 1561, 1568 (5th Cir. 1988).
A. Hours Worked
Plaintiff counsel submitted detailed descriptions of the hours incurred in the representation of GMAC with each motion for attorney's fees. These descriptions, in the form of invoices submitted to GMAC for services rendered, include a description of the tasks performed by each attorney or paralegal and the amount of time expended to accomplish each task. The Court reviewed these invoices and finds that the hours incurred are reasonable. The tasks performed are properly billed at an attorney or paralegal rate, as appropriate.
B. Hourly Rate
The invoices detail the tasks performed by each attorney or paralegal and the applicable billing rate. Plaintiff's motions include affidavits by plaintiff's counsel, submitting that the applied billing rates are reasonable for the locality. Considering the Williamson factors discussed above, the Court finds that certain billing rates are excessive. "The actual time expended and the complexity of the case are the dominant factors in a court's determination of reasonableness or excessiveness." National Information Services, Inc. v. Gottsegen, 737 So.2d 909, 920, 98-528 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/1/99) (citing First Nat. Bank of Commerce v. Pontchartrain Leasing Co., Inc., 519 So.2d 262, 264 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1988)). The ultimate result obtained and the amount of money involved were significant, but the issues involved in this case were not particularly complex, and the defendant never appeared to contest the plaintiff's action.
Plaintiff counsel's invoices indicate hourly billing rates of $310.00 for partners with 10 years experience, $265 for senior counsel with 14-15 years experience, $190.00 for a second-year associate (as of supplemental motion), and $110-115 for paralegals. Based on the market rates in this area, the Court finds that the partner and second-year associate hourly rates of $310 and $190, respectively, are higher than the market rate for attorneys with their levels of experience, performing uncontested foreclosure services. The Court therefore reduces the partner billing rate to $270 per hour and the second-year associate billing rate to $160 per hour. The Court finds that the remaining hourly rates are reasonable. Utilizing the Court's adjusted billing rates, the court grants plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of $101,220. This amount is well within the range of attorney's fees awarded in similar cases.
See Rivet, 800 So.2d at 782 (affirming an hourly rate of $250 in land appropriation litigation); Liberty Bank and Trust Co. v. Dawson, 580 So.2d 1124, 1126 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1991) (finding that an hourly rate of $150 is area custom in mortgage foreclosure case); In re Property Company of America Joint Venture, 110 B.R. 244, 253 (Bankr. N.D.Tx., 1990) (reducing requested attorney's fees ranging from $135 — $285 per hour to amounts ranging from $80 — $250 per hour).
Of the $83,040 requested in the plaintiff's initial motion, the Court grants $74,545, and of the $31,127.50 requested in plaintiff's supplemental motion, the Court grants $26,675, for a total of $101,220.
The Court notes that the plaintiff's supplemental motion for attorney's fees included some mathematical errors. First, the partner hourly rate was listed as $310, but the total fees requested included the hours for one of the partners calculated at rate of $320. Thus, plaintiff's supplemental motion should have requested $30,300 in attorney's fees, not $31,127.50. Second, plaintiff's initial motion requested attorney's fees of $83,040, and the supplemental motion requested attorney's fees in the amount of $31,127.50. These two requested amounts total $114,167.50, not $109,520.50 as indicated in the plaintiff's supplemental motion.
Williamson, 597 So.2d at 443 (awarding $175,000 in attorney's fees in land expropriation case involving complicated land valuation issues and a trial); Gottsegen, 737 So.2d at 920 (awarding $75,000 in attorney's fees related to petition for deficiency judgement after mortgage foreclosure); Federal Services Corp. v. Mule-Durel, Inc., 676 So.2d 597, 600 95-2192 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/15/96) (affirming attorney's fees in mortgage foreclosure case in the amount of $7,000, which was 25% of original suit amount as stipulated in the note).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court therefore GRANTS IN PART plaintiff's petition and supplemental petition for attorney's fees and awards plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of $101,220.