Opinion
CA 9:19-cv-01770-MBS-MHC
07-20-2021
Tekoa Tobias Glover, a/k/a Toby Glover, Plaintiff, v. Chuck Wright, Sheriff of Spartanburg County; Major Freeman, Spartanburg County Detention Center; Captain C. Hayes; Lt. Freeman; T. Medueder, Director Bodiford; Deputy Director Hollister; Major Stowers; Lieutenant McCombs; Sergeant Norris, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the above-named Defendants, ECF No. 84, and a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Tekoa Tobias Glover (“Plaintiff”), ECF No. 96. Both Motions are ripe for review. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.). Because the Motions are dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action on June 21, 2019, alleging that his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated during pretrial detention. Specifically, he alleges that his access to the courts was violated because there was no law library where he was housed, he was limited to the use of postcards for non-legal mail, some of his legal mail was not sent, some of his legal mail was opened outside of his presence, and the government was given some of his legal mail. He also claimed he was impermissibly punished by being placed in more restrictive custody without due process.
Plaintiff is no longer a pretrial detainee and is currently incarcerated at the La Tuna Federal Correctional Institution in New Mexico. See ECF No. 104.
After a partial Order of Dismissal, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 84. A Roseboro order was entered on January 22, 2021. ECF No. 85. Plaintiff filed, inter alia, a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion for Extension of Time. ECF Nos. 96, 102. The undersigned granted Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to the extent Plaintiff sought to file a Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 103. The deadline for filing a Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement ran, with Plaintiff failing to file a Response.
Plaintiff's claims for injunctive and/or declaratory relief were dismissed as moot, his claims regarding access to a law library were summarily dismissed, and Defendant Josev Brewer was dismissed from the action. ECF No. 46.
Consequently, as Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes his Cross Motion for Summary Judgment also as a Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
At the times giving rise to the allegations in his Complaint, Plaintiff was a federal pretrial detainee temporarily housed at the Spartanburg County Detention Facility (“SCDF”) and the Greenville County Detention Center (“GCDC”). ECF No. 1 at 4, 7. Plaintiff was held at the SCDF from July 25, 2018, to November 6, 2018, when he was transferred to the GCDC. See ECF No. 12 at 6-7. Plaintiff was held at the GCDC from November 6, 2018, until May 10, 2019, when he was transferred back to the SCDF, and where he remained until November 1, 2019. See ECF No. 1-2 at 12. The named Defendants who were employees of or have a relation to the SCDF are Defendants Chuck Wright, Major Freeman, Captain C. Hayes, Lieutenant Freeman, and T. Medueder (correctly spelled Medvedev) (collectively, “SCDF Defendants”). See ECF No. 1 at 23; ECF No. 1-2 at 2-4. The named Defendants who were employees at the GCDC are Director Bodiford, Deputy Director Hollister, Major Stowers, Lieutenant McCombs, and Sergeant Norris (collectively, “GCDC Defendants”). See ECF No. 1 at 2-3; ECF No. 1-2 at 2-4.
A. Claims arising while Plaintiff was housed at SCDF from July 23, 2018 to November 6, 2018
In early August 2018, Plaintiff attempted to mail a letter to President Trump. ECF No. 843 at 1. According to Defendant Hayes, there were threats of violence in the letter, so the letter was returned to Plaintiff. ECF No. 84-3 at 1. The letter was returned to Plaintiff on August 6, 2018, and, on August 7, 2018, Plaintiff filed a grievance about the letter's rejection. ECF No. 84-3 at 4. Defendant Hayes spoke to the Plaintiff on August 8, 2018, regarding his grievance and explained that Plaintiff could send mail to President Trump, but, per the SCDF Inmate Handbook, the letter could not contain threats of violence. ECF No. 84-3 at 1-2, 4. Plaintiff maintains that SCDF Defendants violated his First Amendment rights to free speech in restricting his mail communication in this manner. See ECF No. 1-2 at 19.
B. Claims arising while Plaintiff was housed at GCDC from November 6, 2018 to May 10, 2019
According to Defendant McCombs, on April 16, 2019, Defendant Stowers gave Defendant McCombs a letter that had been intercepted. ECF No. 87-1 at 2, 5. The letter was addressed to the Greenville Police Department at “4 McGee St.” and had a return address for a local attorney but was postmarked in Miami, Florida. ECF No. 87-1 at 2, 5. Inside the envelope was a letter and a stamped return envelope addressed to “Inmate Tekoa Glover” at the GCDC, with the same attorney's return address. ECF No. 87-1 at 2, 5. The letter was typed on a blank sheet of white paper, was not on an official letterhead, and was not signed by anyone. ECF No. 87-1 at 2, 5. The letter requested incident reports and arrest records for an individual who was not Plaintiff, to be returned in the stamped envelope addressed to “Inmate Tekoa Glover” (i.e, Plaintiff). ECF No. 87-1 at 2, 5.
Defendant Stowers contacted the attorney's office listed as the return address on the letter to the Greenville Police Department and the stamped return envelope addressed to Plaintiff, and reportedly the attorney denied any knowledge of the letter. ECF No. 87-1 at 2, 5. Based on the findings, it was believed that Plaintiff was attempting to obtain information about another person without following the proper Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) procedure. ECF No. 87-1 at 2, 5. Any information received in this manner would be considered contraband under GCDC policies. ECF No. 87-1 at 2, 5. As a result, Plaintiff was sanctioned to three days of disciplinary detention in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) for his actions and informed that he must use proper channels for obtaining public records. ECF No. 87-1 at 2, 5.
After learning about the opening of this mail, which Plaintiff contends was his, Plaintiff filed a grievance at the GCDC on April 22, 2019, arguing that all legal mail is supposed to be opened in his presence. ECF No. 87-1 at 7. Defendant McCombs replied via written response to Plaintiff's grievance that same day, explaining that the mail was “confiscated by Administration due to [it] being suspicious, therefore it was searched.” ECF No. 87-1 at 7. Defendant McCombs noted a letter mailed from Greenville to the Greenville Police Department would not contain a postmark from Miami, Florida. He further stated that the information requested from the Greenville Police Department in the cover letter was not requested by the attorney identified on the letter's envelope and that the attorney's office denied representing Plaintiff. ECF No. 87-1 at 7. Plaintiff appealed this response, stating that he is required to be present when his legal mail is opened. Plaintiff asked, among other things, who the attorney identified on the letter was. ECF No. 87-1 at 7.
Defendant Stowers replied on April 23, 2019. ECF No. 87-1 at 8. Defendant Stowers further notified Plaintiff that the office of the attorney, whose name and address was listed as the sender on the envelopes to the Greenville Police Department and to Plaintiff, would be notified of the matter so that they could “take any action necessary to either verify that they sent the correspondence or seek remedy against [Plaintiff] for utilizing their information without their consent.” ECF No. 87-1 at 8.
Plaintiff submitted a second appeal in response that same day (April 23), alleging that his privacy rights were violated and that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment in searching his legal mail outside his presence without a warrant. ECF No. 87-1 at 8. Plaintiff again complained that no one identified the attorney listed on the return address of the envelope. ECF No. 87-1 at 8. Additionally, Plaintiff complained of another occurrence of officers opening his legal mail on April 22, 2019, stating that Defendant Norris “opened [his] mail, read the mail, then said it was not legal [and] then took it with her.” ECF No. 87-1 at 8. According to Plaintiff, that mail was addressed from William Ehlies, his court appointed attorney. Plaintiff again asked the name of the attorney listed on the envelope from April 16. See ECF No. 87-1 at 8. Plaintiff intimated that he may file a lawsuit because of the alleged violations. ECF No. 87-1 at 8.
In the context of Plaintiff's grievance, this appears to have occurred in Plaintiff's presence. See ECF No. 1-2 at 8, ¶ 28.
Defendant Hollister replied to Plaintiff's second appeal that afternoon (April 23), acknowledging the matter but declining to “discuss how [he] became aware of this matter or what instructions [he] gave to the staff at the Detention Center.” ECF No. 87-1 at 9. Plaintiff filed a third appeal, again asking for the name of the law firm on the envelope of the letter sent to the Greenville Police Department on April 16, 2019. ECF No. 87-1 at 9.
On April 30, 2019, Defendant Hollister replied to Plaintiff's third appeal, stating:
On April 29, 2019 [Defendant] Stowers and I met with you in Professional Visitation in an attempt to discuss this matter. You chose not to discuss this matter in person. Nevertheless, I did explain to you that an envelope was received at the-Law Enforcement Center that contained no intended recipient name. This letter was
opened to determine the intended recipient. Enclosed was a written request for information and a return envelope addressed to you. The return envelope also identified a local Attorney. An employee in the Records Management Division contacted the Attorney identified on the return envelope to determine if they in fact represent you in any matters. The Attorney stated that they were court appointed to represent you, but that he did not send the letter to the Law Enforcement Center or make a request for any information.
From this point forward subsequent mail received from this Attorney's Office has been searched. These searches have revealed that mail is being sent to you from someone who is misrepresenting the sender. Disciplinary sanctions taken against you to this point are in response to the previously mentioned.
Your court appointed Attorney has notified us of what his actual mail should look like. Any such mail received from this point forward will first be verified with his office, and if determined to be legitimate; it will be treated as Legal Mail. Any mail received that does not fit this description and/or is not verified with the Attorney's Office will not. Furthermore, any mail addressed to you being represented as “Legal Mail” received from any source will first be verified before being treated as such.ECF No. 87-1 at 9.
Laverne McKinney, a civilian Administrative Support Specialist who handled incoming mail at the GCDC during the time period Plaintiff was housed there, and Defendant Norris, who was the mail room supervisor at the same time, detailed the GCDC's mailroom procedures in submitted affidavits. Both identified GCDC policy number 5.4.1 “Inmate Correspondence” as applicable to the handling of inmate mail. ECF Nos. 87-2 at 2, 87-3 at 2. They both stated that, pursuant to the GCDC policy, mail room personnel have the right to inspect incoming and outgoing mail, but that typically only the Watch Commander or a command staff member can inspect outgoing mail. ECF Nos. 87-2 at 2, 87-3 at 2. Both McKinney and Defendant Norris averred:
Prior to opening mail for inspection, the Mail Room clerk sorts all mail to determine if any mail meets the criteria for legal mail. The Mail Room clerk contacts one of the Support Services supervisors for any questionable legal mail. Once incoming legal mail is verified as such, it is opened in front of the inmate to be inspected for any items that could be converted into contraband. Only legal mail, publications and books, and acceptable money orders may be sent to the GCDC. Non-legal mail is sent to a different location and scanned into a computer system so inmates may view it via the housing area kiosks. Any non-legal mail received at the GCDC will
be marked “Return to Sender” because it is unauthorized mail. These policies and procedures are in place in an effort to reduce contraband being introduced into the GCDC by mail.ECF Nos. 87-2 at 2, 87-3 at 2 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff maintains that his First and Fourth Amendment rights were violated by GCDC Defendants because of the way his legal mail was handled. ECF No. 1-2 at 19-27. He further contends that GCDC Defendants impermissibly punished him by placing him in the SHU. ECF No. 1-2 at 7-8, 12, 23
C. Claims arising while Plaintiff was housed again at SCDF from May 10, 2019 to November 1, 2019
When Plaintiff was transferred back to SCDF on May 10, 2019, he filed “numerous grievances regarding the three inches of legal materials policy” at the SCDF. ECF No. 84-2 at 2. As alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff argued in his grievances that the policy, which apparently limits detainees to three inches of legal materials, was unconstitutional and that the stated reason for the policy-a need to ensure there is not a fire hazard-is merely a smoke screen and its real purpose is to make litigations more difficult for inmates/detainees. ECF No. 1-2 at 27-28.
After Plaintiff filed these grievances, Plaintiff was moved to the Behavioral Management Unit (“BMU”) on May 24, 2019, to finish completing the intake process so he would be aware of the policies and procedures at the SCDF. ECF No. 84-2 at 2. According to Defendant Major Freeman, Plaintiff had the right to switch out his legal materials as needed in order to maintain compliance with the three-inch policy. ECF No. 84-2 at 2. Plaintiff was housed in the BMU for less than a twenty-four-hour period while he completed the re-intake process. ECF No. 84-2 at 3, 5.
There is a Defendant Lieutenant Freeman identified in the case caption. In the Complaint, Plaintiff often only refers to a “Defendant Freeman” in detailing his allegations. Accordingly, it is often unclear to whom Plaintiff is referring.
On May 29, 2019, according to the Complaint, Plaintiff sent a letter to his court appointed attorney. ECF No. 1-2 at 29. However, on May 31, 2019, the letter was returned to Plaintiff because it was deemed “not legal” by Defendant Medvedev. ECF No. 1-2 at 29-30. On June 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed a grievance as to the rejection of his mail, arguing that his First Amendment rights had been violated and that the delay interfered with his communication with his attorney. ECF No. 84-2 at 7.
Defendant Major Freeman averred that the U.S. Marshals had informed the SCDF that Plaintiff had been known to use legal mail for his own personal correspondence, and therefore it was “verified as legal mail before it was treated as such.” ECF No. 84-2 at 3, 7. Both Defendants Medvedev and Major Freeman noted that SCDF officers and employees follow SCDF policies with regard to legal and non-legal mail and identified those policies. ECF Nos. 84-2 at 2, 84-4 at 2. Both stated that any legal mail received is opened in front of the inmate by a designated officer so it can be inspected for any items that could be classified as, or converted to, contraband. ECF Nos. 84-2 at 2, 84-4 at 2. Defendant Major Freeman stated that the SCDF policies regarding mail were implemented to “help prevent contraband from entering the SCDF, and to ensure the safety and security of the SCDF, inmates, and staff.” ECF No. 84-2 at 2.
Plaintiff contends that SCDF Defendants impermissibly punished him by placing him in the BMU. ECF No. 1-2 at 8, 14-15, 27. Plaintiff further claims that SCDF Defendants violated his access to the courts and/or freedom of speech rights via the three inches of legal materials policy and the “postcard” policy, and by “interfere[ing] with privileged correspondence” by improperly classifying his mail as “not legal.” See ECF No. 1-2 at 26-30.
II. DISCUSSION
Both parties move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF Nos. 84, 96. Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact” and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.
Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, although the Court views all the underlying facts and inferences in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving “party nonetheless must offer some ‘concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor.'” Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC, 809 F.3d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). That is to say, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
Additionally, pro se filings are to be “liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting “we are obliged to construe [a complaint's] allegations liberally and with the intent of doing justice”). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.”).
A. First Amendment Claims.
Plaintiff asserts that his First Amendment rights were violated by Defendants. As detailed below, Plaintiff maintains that his right of access to the courts and to freedom of speech were violated. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to the access to the courts claims and the freedom of speech claims.
1. Access to the courts.
As detailed above in Section C of the Facts, Plaintiff contends that the SCDF policy limiting detainees to three inches of legal materials violates his constitutional right of access to the courts. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees state inmates their First Amendment right to “adequate, effective, and meaningful” access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977), abrogated by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). “[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Id. at 828.
To raise a claim that he has been unconstitutionally denied access to the courts, Plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory allegations-rather, he must identify with specificity an actual injury resulting from Defendants' conduct. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1382-84 (4th Cir. 1993)). That is to say, Plaintiff must show that prison officials caused an injury, such as the late filing of a court document or the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious claim. See id.; Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-54.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that SCDF Defendants violated his First Amendment right of access to the courts. Specifically, he maintains that the purpose of the “three inches of legal material” policy-which apparently limits detainees to possessing only three inches of legal materials-is to “frustrate Plaintiff's access to the courts;” the policy has “caused Plaintiff to miss deadlines in filings;” the SCDF Defendants “Interfere[d] with privileged correspondence” when they wrongly classified his mail as “Not legal;” and the SCDF Defendants “interfere[d] with Court Access” when they did not allow him to send a letter to President Trump. See ECF No. 1-2 at 19, 27-30. However, outside of these conclusory allegations, Plaintiff has not identified any affidavits, court documents, or any other evidence to substantiate his claims that the SCDF Defendants interfered with access to the courts.
Although Plaintiff alleges that he missed a filing deadline, he has not identified a case number or court name. He has not identified in what county these cases are pending, nor has he provided any affidavits, court documents, or other evidence to substantiate his claim that the “three inches of legal materials” rule has “caused Plaintiff to miss deadlines in filings.” See ECF No. 12 at 27-28. Plaintiff has likewise failed to show injury from the refusal to send President Trump Plaintiff's letter, which Defendant Hayes found to contain threats of violence. See ECF No. 84-3 at 1. In other words, Plaintiff has failed to show an actual injury from the alleged conduct, and therefore his claims must fail. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 (noting the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action to survive summary judgment); Thompson, 312 F.3d at 649 (noting conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion).
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff also accuses GCDC Defendants of denying his access to the courts, these claims fail for the same reason: Plaintiff has failed to show any injury.
2. Freedom of Speech.
Plaintiff contends the Defendants interfered with his receiving and sending mail. The First Amendment, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits states from “abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. “This proscription extends to both government regulations that directly burden speech and those that have indirect chilling effects.” Haze v. Harrison, 961 F.3d 654, 658 (4th Cir. 2020).
As a general matter, prisoners have the right to send and receive mail. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404-08 (1989); Pellv. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826-28 (1974). Restrictions on this right are valid if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974) (determining a prisoner's First Amendment interest in correspondence does not preclude prison officials from examining mail to ensure that it does not contain contraband; prison officials may open mail from an attorney that is addressed to a petitioner only in the prisoner's presence). Legitimate penological interests include preserving prison security and maintaining order and discipline. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 91-92. Although courts generally accord deference to the dayto-day judgments of prison officials, see id. at 89, “[w]hen neither common sense nor evidence demonstrates a reasonable causal nexus between a prison administrator's ends and chosen means, summary judgment for the defendant administrator is inappropriate.” Haze, 961 F.3d at 659 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
With the above law in mind, the Court turns to the allegations against each group of Defendants.
a. GCDC Defendants.
Plaintiff maintains that GCDC Defendants impermissibly opened his legal mail outside his presence on April 16, 2019, and April 22, 2019. ECF No. 1 at 19-27. “Opening an incarcerated person's legal mail outside of his presence can chill protected speech.” Haze, 961 F.3d at 658. As the gravamen of Plaintiff's allegations against GCDC Defendants involve the two pieces of mail identified above, the Court addresses each in turn.
First, as to the April 16 letter, the Court notes that the parties have not provided a copy of this letter, the envelope that contained it, or the stamped return envelope. However, the information in the record reflects that this letter was not addressed to Plaintiff; rather, it was addressed to the Greenville Police Department, it had a return address for a local attorney, and it was postmarked in Miami, Florida. “[D]ue to [it] being suspicious, it was searched” by Defendant McCombs. ECF No. 87-1 at 7. Defendant McCombs opened the envelope that contained April 16 letter, and inside the envelope was (1) an unsigned letter typed on a blank sheet of white paper with no official letterhead and (2) a stamped return envelope addressed to “Inmate Tekoa Glover” at the GCDC, with the same attorney's return address. ECF No. 87-1 at 2, 5. This tipped off GCDC Defendants that Plaintiff was likely abusing the legal mail system.
Plaintiff complains of the opening of the envelope that contained the April 16 letter, and maintains that this was his legal mail. Although it is uncontested that this mail was opened outside of Plaintiff's presence, the envelope with the April 16 letter was not addressed to him, and therefore it was not his mail, legal or otherwise. Indeed, based on the addressee and the return address on the outside of the envelope (a local attorney in Greenville), it was not Plaintiff's mail at all. Thus, regardless of whether the April 16 letter was general or legal mail, its opening outside of his presence cannot be a violation of the First Amendment, as the envelope was neither addressed to him nor was there any indication that it was his. See Jolly v. Johnson, No. CA 1:10-1158-TLW-SVH, 2011 WL 4054849, at *2 (D.S.C. June 30, 2011) (“Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants had any knowledge that the envelope opened was legal mail, and therefore it was not required to be opened in Plaintiffs presence. If such mail is not so marked, it may be opened outside an inmate's presence.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV.A. 1:10-1158-TLW, 2011 WL 4054820 (D.S.C. Sept. 12, 2011).
The stamped return envelope addressed to Plaintiff, contained inside the April 16 envelope and therefore not visible to Defendant McCombs before he opened the envelope, does not somehow transform the mail into protected correspondence.
Second, as to the April 22 letter: although Plaintiff argues that his First Amendment rights were violated, he states explicitly in his Complaint that he was present when Defendant Norris opened his mail that day, and Plaintiff detailed this encounter in his grievance appeal dated April 23, 2019. See ECF No. 87-1 at 8. Thus, Defendant Norris's actions were in line with the GCDC policy that requires officers to open legal mail in the inmate's presence. See ECF Nos. 87-2 at 2, 87-3 at 2. As the GCDC staff were “instructed to verify Plaintiff's ‘Legal Mail' was actually legal mail before treating it as such” after the April 16 letter incident, see ECF No. 87-1 at 2, it appears that Defendant Norris was verifying whether Plaintiff's legal mail was, in fact, legal mail. This is not a violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576-77 (determining a prisoner's First Amendment interest in correspondence does not preclude prison officials from examining mail to ensure that it does not contain contraband; prison officials may open mail from an attorney that is addressed to a petitioner only in the prisoner's presence).
“On April 22, 2019, Plaintiff was summoned to visitation. Upon arrival, he encountered Sgt. Norris and Ms. McKinney. Sgt. Norris stated that she had legal mail for plaintiff and wished to give it to me. Defendant Norris then opened the mail, read the mail, then took two pieces of the mail, over plaintiff's objection.” ECF No. 1-2 at 8; see also id. At 20.
To the extent Plaintiff alleges Defendant Norris read his legal mail, Plaintiff has produced no evidence to support this claim. Moreover, even assuming this were true, a single isolated incident is not enough to implicate a violation of constitutional magnitude. See Buie v. Jones, 717 F.2d 925, 926 (4th Cir. 1983) (affirming dismissal where isolated instances of the plaintiff's mail being opened outside his presence appeared to have been “either accidental or the result of unauthorized subordinate conduct” and were therefore “not of constitutional magnitude” (emphasis added)).
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges there were other instances where his identified legal mail was opened outside of his presence, a conclusory allegation in the Complaint does not create a genuine dispute of material fact sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Plaintiff has produced no evidence of these letters-much less identified them with any sort of specificity- nor has he otherwise shown that any other legal mail was opened outside his presence. See Thompson, 312 F.3d at 649 (noting conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion). Consequently, GCDC Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
b. SCDF Defendants.
Plaintiff alleges that his rights to free speech were violated by SCDF Defendants when they did not send a letter to President Trump, by the SCDF's “postcard only rule, ” and by their inspection and classification of his mail. ECF No. 1-2 at 19-27, 29-30.
With regard to the letter to President Trump and SCDF's “postcard only rule, ” SCDF Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. The letter to President Trump contained threats of violence, which was not acceptable per the policies outlined in the SCDF Inmate Handbook. ECF No. 84-3 at 1-2, 4. Thus, SCDF Defendants did not violate Plaintiff's First Amendment rights by not sending the letter. See Altizer v. Deeds, 191 F.3d 540, 548-49 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting personal correspondence that included “threats” could be censored, and that the inspection of outgoing mail serves legitimate penological purpose). Likewise, the SCDF's “postcard only rule” does not raise constitutional concerns, as it is rationally related to a legitimate penological purpose to prevent contraband from entering the facility. See, e.g., Barnes v. Wilson, 110 F.Supp.3d 624, 632-33 (D. Md. 2015) (holding a county jail's policy of restricting an inmate's mail to postcards did not violate his First Amendment right to send and receive mail); Althouse v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Off., No. 12-80135-CIV, 2013 WL 536072, at *5-6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2013) (upholding postcard-only mail policy because, inter alia, it was rationally connected to prison security).
As to SCDF Defendants' inspection and classification of Plaintiff's mail, Plaintiff maintains that on May 29, 2019, Plaintiff sent a letter to his court appointed attorney. ECF No. 12 at 29-30. Plaintiff alleges that this letter was identified as legal mail, but the letter was returned because it was deemed “not legal” by Defendant Medvedev. ECF No. 1-2 at 29-30. However, as Defendant Major Freeman averred that the U.S. Marshals had informed the SCDF that Plaintiff had been known to use legal mail for his own personal correspondence, it would appear Defendant Medvedev was merely verifying the letter was “legal mail before it was treated as such.” ECF No. 84-2 at 3, 7. Moreover, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to support his claim that this letter was actually opened outside of his presence, nor has he shown that this was, in fact, legal mail. Consequently, SCDF Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. See Kershaw v. Padula, No. CIV.A. 6:10-951-MBS, 2011 WL 1750222, at *5 (D.S.C. Apr. 6, 2011) (granting summary judgment where, inter alia, the plaintiff did “not allege[] nor show[] that the defendants opened or otherwise mishandled his legal mail”), report and recommendation adopted, No. CA 6:10-0951MBS, 2011 WL 1700009 (D.S.C. May 4, 2011).
B. Sixth Amendment claims.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants' actions regarding the interference with his mail violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. ECF No. 1-2 at 24, 26, 31; ECF No. 96 at 11-13. As noted above, the Fourth Circuit has held that the opening and inspection of an inmate's mail is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and therefore, constitutional. Altizer, 191 F.3d at 547548. However, the court also noted that “[i]nspecting an inmate's legal mail may implicate the inmate's Sixth Amendment right to communicate freely with his attorney in a criminal case.” Id. at 549 n.14 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 575). To establish that his Sixth Amendment rights have been violated by Defendants, Plaintiff must demonstrate that there was some actual harm or prejudice to his ability to communicate with the court or counsel. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-56; see also Lloyd v. Vincent, C. A. No. 4:03-1546-25H, 2004 WL 3249250, *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 10, 2004) (“To state a claim based on delay or nondelivery of legal mail, a prisoner must allege adverse consequences as a basis for the allegation that the delay or nondelivery deprived him of meaningful access to the courts.”), aff'd, 121 Fed.Appx. 531 (4th Cir. 2005).
Here, Plaintiff has set forth only conclusory allegations that Defendants' actions have compromised his ability to communicate with his court appointed counsel. He fails to show specific adverse consequences-Plaintiff does not provide any details, such as a case number, to show that a specific case has been compromised, nor does he provide any details about the mail, such as the general subject of the communication. Because Plaintiff has failed to show any harm or adverse consequences, it is recommended that Defendants be granted summary judgment as to this claim. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 (noting the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action to survive summary judgment); Thompson, 312 F.3d at 649 (noting conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion).
C. Due Process claims.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his due process rights. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that GCDC Defendants impermissibly punished him by placing him in the SHU, and that SCDF Defendants impermissibly punished him by placing him in the BMU. See ECF No. 1-2 at 8, 14-15, 20.
As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff possesses a constitutional right to be free from punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534-36 (1979). Claims as to conditions of confinement for state pretrial detainees are evaluated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (rather than under the Eighth Amendment). See id. at 535 n.16; Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 174 n.15 (4th Cir. 2018).
An individual pretrial detainee may raise a substantive due process challenge to these conditions where they are so disproportionate or arbitrary that they are not related to legitimate penological objectives and amount to punishment. Williamson, 912 F.3d at 174-76. To prevail on such a claim, a detainee must show that the challenged treatment or conditions were either (1) imposed with an express intent to punish, or (2) not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive objective, in which case an intent to punish may be inferred. Id. at 178.
In addition, a pretrial detainee may assert a procedural due process violation based on the conditions of his pretrial confinement. Id. at 174-76. Jail officials may impose nonpunitive restrictions on a pretrial detainee for disciplinary or administrative reasons, but, as these restrictions implicate a detainee's liberty interests, he is entitled to certain procedural protections. Id. at 174-75. Where restrictions are imposed as a disciplinary measure of institutional misconduct, the detainee must be provided notice, a hearing, and a written explanation of the disciplinary action taken. Id. at 176. Where such restrictions are imposed instead for administrative reasons, the detainee is owed some notice of the proposed action and an opportunity to present his views. Id. at 175-77. In addition, the detainee must be afforded periodic review of his confinement. Id. at 176-77.
With the above standards in mind, the Court turns to the allegations against each group of Defendants.
1. The individually-imposed restriction at the GCDC was disciplinary, and Plaintiff has failed to show he was not afforded the proper procedural due process.
Plaintiff maintains that GCDC Defendants violated his due process rights by placing him in the SHU. As set forth in the affidavit of Defendant McCombs, Plaintiff was placed in SHU for three days at the GCDC because he improperly attempted to obtain information about another person without following the proper FOIA procedure, and because he disguised that attempt as legal mail. See ECF No. 87-1 at 2; see also ECF No. 1-2 at 20. Any information obtained in the manner that Plaintiff attempted would have been considered contraband. ECF No. 87-1 at 2. Plaintiff was informed that he must use the proper channels for obtaining public records. ECF No. 87-1 at 2.
Here, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to sustain a substantive due process claim, such a claim fails. Upon review of the record, it is clear the individually-imposed restriction-moving Plaintiff to SHU for three days-was a disciplinary measure imposed as result of Plaintiff's misconduct. This is not unconstitutional “punishment.” See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 176 n.18 (“[Disciplinary measures based on a pretrial detainee's misconduct in custody and proportional thereto are not “punishment” within the meaning of Bell and therefore are not unconstitutional.”). Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to show, much less allege, that the disciplinary measure here was excessive or arbitrary, such that it rose to the level of prohibited punishment. See id. (“The key difference between permissible ‘disciplinary' restrictions and unconstitutional ‘punishment' is that the former are intended to advance - and are reasonably related to - ‘the effective management of the detention facility.'” (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 540)).
Likewise, Plaintiff has failed to show a procedural due process violation. Plaintiff acknowledged that he was informed why he was being placed in SHU in his Complaint, and he fails to show that GCDC Defendants failed to follow proper procedural guarantees in placing him there. See ECF No. 1-2 at 20-27. Consequently, GCDC Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to these claims. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Thompson, 312 F.3d at 649.
2. The individually-imposed restriction at the SCDF was administrative, and Plaintiff has failed to show he was not afforded the proper procedural due process.
Plaintiff maintains that SCDF Defendants impermissibly punished him by placing him in the BMU. When Plaintiff was transferred back to the SCDF on May 10, 2019, he filed numerous grievances regarding the “three inches of legal materials” policy. ECF No. 84-2 at 2. On May 24, 2019, Plaintiff was moved to BMU for less than a twenty-four-hour period to finish the re-intake process. ECF No. 84-2 at 5. The purpose of moving Plaintiff was so he could finish the re-intake process and so “he would be aware of the policies and procedures at the SCDF” which included his right to switch out his legal materials as needed. ECF No. 84-2 at 2.
To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to sustain a substantive due process claim, such a claim fails. Upon review of the record, it is clear the individually-imposed restriction-moving Plaintiff to the BMU for less than twenty-four hours-was an administrative measure imposed so Plaintiff could finish the re-intake process and be apprised of the SCDF's policies and procedures. This is not unconstitutional “punishment.” See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 175 (noting jail officials are entitled “to impose restrictions for administrative purposes without running afoul of Bell' which include measures “to maintain security and order”). Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to show, much less allege, that the administrative measure here was excessive or arbitrary, such that it rose to the level of prohibited punishment.
With regard to procedural due process, the level of process to which a pretrial detainee is entitled diminishes when the “restriction imposed by the jail officials is for administrative purposes-which include[s] managerial and security needs[.]” Id. In those situations, such as the one here, “courts of appeals have generally concluded that some level of process must be afforded to the pretrial detainee, even if the process is provided after the restriction has been imposed.” Id.
Plaintiff has failed to show a procedural due process violation. The record shows that the SCDF has a grievance/kiosk system that allows inmates to file grievances with the facility, just as Plaintiff admits he did on May 24, 2019. See ECF No. 1-2 at 15; see also ECF No. 84-2 at 2. Indeed, Plaintiff's Complaint is riddled with examples of him having access to the grievance/kiosk system at the SCDF. Moreover, Plaintiff acknowledged that he was informed why he was being placed in BMU in his Complaint, and he fails to show, or allege, that SCDF Defendants otherwise failed to follow proper procedural guarantees in moving him there for re-intake. Accordingly, SCDF Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to these claims. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Thompson, 312 F.3d at 649.
D. Defenses.
Defendants raise various defenses, which they argue are additional reasons entitling them to summary judgment.
1. Eleventh Amendment.
Plaintiff sued Defendants in their individual and official capacities. ECF No. 1 at 2-3; ECF No. 1-2 at 2-4. To the extent Plaintiff has brought his § 1983 action against Defendants in their official capacities, it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts are barred from hearing claims against a state or its agents, instrumentalities, and employees, unless the state has consented to the suit. Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 279 (4th Cir. 2020); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (“It has long been settled that [the Eleventh Amendment's] reference to ‘actions against one of the United States encompasses not only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.”). Unless a state has consented to suit or Congress has waived a state's immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, a state (and its agencies) may not be sued in federal or state court. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Congress has not abrogated the states' sovereign immunity under § 1983, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979), and South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal district court. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e).
Here, all named Defendants were, at all times relevant to the present action, state officials, as they were serving as Deputy Sheriffs or employees on behalf of the Greenville County Sheriff or the Spartanburg County Sheriff. Therefore, they enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. See McIlweine v. Harris, No. CIVA 4:07-1117 CMCTE, 2008 WL 2909358, at *12 (D.S.C. July 22, 2008) (noting South Carolina Sheriffs and their employees are state agents who are not amenable to suit in federal court by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment). Accordingly, Defendants, in their official capacities, are entitled to summary judgment.
Moreover, for purposes of § 1983, Defendants are not considered “persons” amenable to suit. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.”); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26-27 (1991).
2. Supervisory liability.
Defendants maintain that Defendants Wright, Bodiford, Major Freeman, and Hollister are entitled to dismissal because Plaintiff is attempting to attach liability to them through the actions of subordinate officers. The Court agrees.
Pure supervisory liability will not lie in § 1983 actions. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.” (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977))). Rather, to hold a supervisor liable for a constitutional injury inflicted by a subordinate under § 1983, Plaintiff must show facts establishing the following elements: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to people like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the subordinate's conduct; and (3) there is an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the plaintiff's constitutional injury. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).
As set forth above, there has been no constitutional injury inflicted by any subordinate, such that there is no basis for supervisor liability. Plaintiff has failed to show, much less argue, any of these required elements with regard to Defendants Wright, Bodiford, or Major Freeman. Indeed, outside of being named as supervisors, Plaintiff does not mention any actions on account of these Defendants. As for Defendant Hollister, while the evidence shows that he had direct involvement with Plaintiff regarding the allegations at the GCDC, see ECF No. 87-1 at 9, Plaintiff cannot establish any of the requisite elements against Defendant Hollister for purposes of supervisory liability. Consequently, the Court recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants Wright, Bodiford, Major Freeman, and Hollister.
3. Qualified Immunity.
Finally, Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's claims. The Court agrees.
The doctrine of qualified immunity offers some protection to a government employee being sued in his or her individual capacity, as is the case with Defendants here. The Supreme Court has held that “[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Renn by and Through Renn v. Garrison, 100 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 1996).
“The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether a plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a clear constitutional violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002). If a violation of a constitutional right in fact exists, qualified immunity nonetheless shields a prison official from liability, unless the violation was of a “clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
a. Access to the courts, freedom of speech, right to counsel, and due process claims.
As set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to his First Amendment access to the courts claims and freedom of speech claims, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel claims, and his Fourteenth Amendment due process claims. Because none of Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, they are also shielded from liability by qualified immunity in their individual capacities as to these claims.
b. Fourth Amendment claims.
Plaintiff contends that, in opening his legal mail outside of his presence, Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights. ECF No. 1-2 at 21, 24-27. The Fourth Amendment, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits state actors from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A government agent's search is unreasonable when it infringes on an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable.” United States v. Castellanos, 716 F.3d 828, 832 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims. Neither the Fourth Circuit “nor the Supreme Court has previously considered the question of whether incarcerated persons have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their legal mail.” Haze, 961 F.3d at 661. Moreover, there is no “consensus of persuasive authority on the matter” which would guide the Court to concluding “interference with an incarcerated person's legal mail [is] . . . violative of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. Consequently, Defendants have met their burden to show that their actions did not violate “clearly established” law for purposes of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims. See Wilson, 337 F.3d at 397.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 84) be GRANTED, and it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 96) be DENIED.
The parties are directed to the next page for their rights to file objections to this recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).