Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-3353, Section "K" (1).
June 21, 2005
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff, Mark Lou Glass, a state prisoner, filed this federal civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against former interim Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff Bill Hunter. Plaintiff claims that, as a result of defendant's policy not to provide prescription eyeglasses to inmates, plaintiff's serious medical needs are being met with deliberate indifference.
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, which plaintiff has opposed. On June 10, 2005, defendant supplemented his motion. Plaintiff was given until June 16, 2005, to file a supplemental memorandum in opposition to the motion, but he has not done so. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.
Rec. Doc. 10.
Rec. Doc. 15.
Rec. Doc. 17.
Rec. Doc. 16.
Rec. Doc. 11.
The principal purpose of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court may grant judgment when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "Procedurally, the party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."Taita Chemical Co., Ltd. v. Westlake Styrene Corp., 246 F.3d 377, 385 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). The party opposing summary judgment must then "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56); see also Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). There is no "genuine issue" when the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmovant. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Summary judgment will be granted against "a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id. at 322-23.
The Court has no duty to search the record for evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment. Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). "The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which the evidence supports his or her claim."Id. Conclusory statements, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence and will not suffice to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id.; Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996). "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate in any case where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis deleted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this lawsuit, plaintiff claims that he experiences headaches and dizziness as a result of a vision problem. He further contends that his vision problem is being met with deliberate indifference due to defendant's policy of refusing to provide inmates with prescription eyeglasses.
Defendant takes the position that plaintiff's claim necessarily fails because his vision problem does not amount to a serious medical need so as to trigger constitutional protections. In support of that argument, defendant has submitted a certified copy of plaintiff's prison medical records. Those records include the following references to plaintiff's vision problem.
Rec. Doc. 10, Exhibit A.
In October, 2003, plaintiff submitted a sick call request complaining of headaches and dizziness. He was seen by a physician on October 7, who prescribed Motrin for the headaches and referred plaintiff to the eye clinic at the Medical Center of Louisiana.
On April 29, 2004, plaintiff was seen by Dr. Sadiq Syed at the Medical Center of Louisiana. Plaintiff was diagnosed with myopia and prescribed eyeglasses. On May 5, 2004, a prison physician ordered that plaintiff be given a copy of the prescription so that his family could purchase the eyeglasses.
On September 19, 2004, plaintiff submitted a sick call request saying he was "having very serious headaches and dizz[i]ness." The medical staff noted that plaintiff thought the problem was due to his need for prescription eyeglasses. Within a few days, he was seen by a prison physician who again prescribed Motrin for the headaches and Antivert for the dizziness.
On January 26, 2005, plaintiff submitted a sick call request stating that he was "having serious headaches and dizz[i]ness." He was examined by a prison physician on February 2, 2005, who again prescribed Motrin for the headaches and Antivert for the dizziness.
In addition, defendant has submitted an affidavit of Dr. Richard Inglese, who states:
1. He is the medical director of the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff Office.
2. He has reviewed and is familiar with the medical records of Mark Lou Glass previously attached to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
3. He is aware that Mr. Glass is near-sighted and to correct his vision fully would require a prescription of negative 2.00 in the right eye and negative 2.25 in the left eye.
4. However, Mr. Glass is confined to a jail dormitory.
5. He is able to read and write legal documents as indicated by filing with this Court.
6. Due to his confinement in a jail dormitory, he is not engaged in any activity that requires vision over a long distance.
7. Mr. Glass' condition is not a serious medical need that prevents him from functioning in a jail setting.
8. He is a board-certified internist, experienced in the evaluation and treatment of headaches and vertigo (dizziness).
9. In his professional opinion, the headaches and dizziness alleged by Mr. Glass are not the result of his refractive, and Mr. Glass is being provided medication and treatment for his complaints.
Rec. Doc. 17.
It is clearly established that the constitutional rights of a convicted prisoner may be violated if his serious medical needs are met with deliberate indifference on the part of penal authorities. Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 1999). "For an official to act with deliberate indifference, the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held:
Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet. . . . [T]he plaintiff must show that officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs. Furthermore, the decision whether to provide additional treatment is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment. And, the failure to alleviate a significant risk that [the official] should have perceived, but did not is insufficient to show deliberate indifference.Domino v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, "deliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely from a negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm." Thompson v. Upshur County, Texas, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001). "Deliberate indifference encompasses only unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain repugnant to the conscience of mankind." McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1999).
As previously noted, defendant contends that plaintiff's claim necessarily fails because his vision impairment does not rise to level of a "serious medical need" so as trigger constitutional protections. It is clear that, in some circumstances, a vision impairment may be so severe as to constitute a serious medical need. See Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86 (2nd Cir. 1996) (vision impairment resulting in double vision, loss of depth perception, headaches, and near blindness was a serious medical need). However, less severe vision impairments do not qualify.See Roddy v. McBride, No. 93-4063, 1995 WL 377062, at *2 (7th Cir. Apr. 26, 1995) (unpublished) (finding that deterioration in inmate's eyesight resulting from the failure to provide eyeglasses "was not a serious medical need demanding immediate attention"). Defendant is correct in his contention that moderate nearsightedness, such as that described by plaintiff, simply is not a medical need sufficiently serious to implicate constitutional protections. See Swaissi v. Cotten, No. 3-01-CV-1607-D, 2002 WL 492905, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2002) (nearsightedness causing difficulty reading, writing, and watching television was not a serious medical need); see also Bellah v. McGinnis, No. 94-1704, 1994 WL 664926, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 23, 1994) (unpublished) ("[M]oderate nearsightedness does not constitute a serious medical need."); but see Benter v. Peck, 825 F. Supp. 1411 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (holding that denial of eyeglasses to a prisoner with 20/400 vision constituted deliberate indifference to a serious medical need).
Additionally, even if plaintiff's vision problem did rise to the level of a "serious medical need," that need has not been met with deliberate indifference. The jail medical department has not ignored plaintiff's complaints. Rather, they initially treated him with medication. When plaintiff continued to complain, they sent him to an eye specialist at the Medical Center of Louisiana, who determined that plaintiff was moderately nearsighted. Based on that evaluation and plaintiff's other medical records, Dr. Richard Inglese, the medical director of the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff's Office, has provided a sworn affidavit stating that, in his professional opinion, plaintiff's headaches and vertigo are unrelated to his vision problem. Plaintiff has provided no evidence to the contrary, and there is no indication that he would be able to do so even if a trial were held. Moreover, while plaintiff may disagree with Dr. Inglese's professional opinion, a mere disagreement between an inmate and the medical staff concerning whether certain medical treatment is appropriate generally is not actionable absent exceptional circumstances. Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1995). Additionally, while the medication being given to plaintiff has not yet alleviated his symptoms, the mere fact that a prisoner's medical treatment is unsuccessful does not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action. Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991).
Rec. Doc. 17.
This Court is not unsympathetic to plaintiff's plight. There is no question that prescription eyeglasses would improve his quality of life. However, the issue before this Court is not whether plaintiff could benefit from prescription eyeglasses. Rather, the issue is whether defendant's refusal to provide plaintiff with prescription eyeglasses constitutes deliberate indifference to a "serious medical need" such that the United States Constitution has been violated. The Court reluctantly finds that it does not. While the Court notes that it would be laudable if prison officials provided plaintiff with prescription eyeglasses, the Constitution does not require such magnanimity.
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and plaintiff's federal civil rights claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.