Opinion
No. 1D21-2900
02-08-2023
Justin Lee GIVENS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Justin Foster Karpf, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Miranda L. Butson, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Justin Foster Karpf, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Miranda L. Butson, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
B.L. Thomas, J.
Justin Lee Givens appeals his judgment and sentence for sexual battery with threat of force. He argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, because the State failed to prove that he threatened to use force or violence likely to cause serious personal injury and had the present ability to execute that threat.
At trial, the victim testified that he had fetal alcohol syndrome and that while he was in confinement in the Bay County jail Appellant was his roommate. The victim testified that Appellant "started getting very aggressive and he started hitting on me and making me do things I don't want to do." Appellant's physical aggression began with a slap and, by the third instance, had escalated to putting the victim in a headlock and punching him in the face with a closed fist. The victim testified the punches "actually left marks and kind of a little bit of swelling." The victim testified that Appellant threatened that "he'd have somebody come and beat me up and physically get me to cower down to him." And that "he would have somebody come over there and get in the cell with me and physically beat me down."
The victim testified that on three occasions Appellant forced the victim to perform sexual acts on Appellant. The victim was afraid that Appellant would continue to beat him, "and have other people do it, too." The victim testified that Appellant threatened: "[Y]ou're either going to get hit or you're going to open your mouth." The victim testified "He turned around, hit me with his right fist, walked back around the room, said are you going to open it now, are you going to open your mouth now?" The victim testified that Appellant threatened: "I'll send somebody over there to beat you down and I'll have them bring you back ... you're not going to leave me, not after ... everything I did for you."
Officer Carter testified she came in contact with the victim when he was rehoused from the confinement unit to the dorm she supervised. She stated the victim had confided in another inmate about what happened in confinement and that inmate told her. She testified she spoke to the victim and he initially denied having any concerns. She noticed the victim had a black eye and he told her he hit his head on the bunk. Officer Carter spoke with the victim again about an hour later and this time he relayed the allegations. In the second conversation the victim said the black eye was caused by Appellant. Officer Carter described the victim as "child-like" and "a little slow," and "small in stature." She did not take pictures of the black eye, but said she reported it to her supervisor. She estimated it may have occurred "over a couple of days."
Officer David Delaney of the Bay County Sheriff's Office investigated Appellant in response to a Prison Rape Elimination Act report. Officer Delaney testified that there are multiple reasons an inmate might be sent to confinement, including the inmate's safety. There are cameras in confinement, in each cell and throughout the dormitory. All of the cameras are monitored, but not all are recorded. The officer monitoring those cameras is also responsible for answering phones and controlling doors remotely. The cells generally have "dead spots" that the cameras do not pick up, which Delaney thought inmates would usually find. In addition to the video surveillance, officers patrol the dorm every 30 minutes or so. The cameras in the cells run 24/7, but do not record.
34 U.S.C. § 30301, et seq.
The State rested and Appellant moved for judgment of acquittal on Count One, arguing there was no present ability to carry out the threat of having people beat up the victim while in confinement and that punching someone is not great bodily harm or pain. The motion was denied and the jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts.
The standard of review on a motion for judgment of acquittal is de novo. Pagan v. State , 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002) "A motion for judgment of acquittal is appropriate only where there is no legally sufficient evidence on which the jury may find defendant guilty." Fletcher v. State , 428 So. 2d 667, 667–68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). "Like the trial court, the appellate court must consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to the state." Brown v. State , 243 So. 3d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). "Where the State has produced competent evidence to support every element of a crime, the denial of a judgment of acquittal must be affirmed." Cameron v. State , 290 So. 3d 632, 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (citing Anderson v. State , 504 So. 2d 1270, 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) ).
Count One alleged sexual battery with the threat of force under section 794.011, Florida Statutes (2020). Sexual battery is accomplished with a threat of force when "[t]he offender coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force or violence likely to cause serious personal injury on the victim, and the victim reasonably believes that the offender has the present ability to execute the threat." § 794.011(4)(e) 2., Fla. Stat. (2020). A "serious personal injury" is one that causes "great bodily harm or pain , permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement." § 794.011(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphasis added).
Appellant argues that there was no evidence he was capable of inflicting great bodily harm. He asserts there was no evidence that he could or would inflict greater harm than he had already, which resulted in minor harm at most. Additionally, he argues it would not have been feasible to cause harm to the victim in confinement because of security protocols.
Appellant threatened to beat the victim, hit him, and have him beaten down so that he would "physically cower down" to Appellant. The jury heard testimony that these threats were accompanied by escalating physical attacks. Whether Appellant's threatened use of force was likely to cause serious personal injury or pain is a question for the jury, where there is any evidence to support such a likelihood. See Hufham v. State , 400 So. 2d 133, 134 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (holding, under a different subsection of § 794.011, that "how much ‘force’ satisfies this requirement is essentially a question for the jury"). We note furthermore that a "single blow" can result in an "extremely serious brain injury." See, e.g. , McKnight v. State , 492 So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Appellant repeatedly threatened the victim with beatings and had, in fact, begun beating the victim with increasing force. Thus, the jury received legally sufficient evidence that the threatened conduct could have resulted in serious bodily injury or pain.
Additionally, even with the security protocols of confinement, there was ample evidence from which the jury could infer that the victim was reasonable in his belief that Appellant had the "present ability to execute" his threats. The two men were jailed in a cell together, supervised by officers who were "kind of busy" and did not view everything that happens in prisoners’ cells in real time. Appellant had already slapped and punched the victim without intervention from corrections officers. He had forced the victim to engage in sexual acts that went undetected. The victim testified that he was afraid that Appellant would continue to beat him, or have him beaten by others, and there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that this belief was reasonable.
The evidence here when viewed in a light most favorable to the State is sufficient to support a finding that Appellant threatened to use force or violence likely to cause serious personal injury or pain on the victim, and the victim reasonably believed that Appellant had the present ability to execute the threat. Thus, the trial court's denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal was proper and his judgment and sentence is affirmed.
AFFIRMED .
Rowe, C.J., and Long, J., concur.