Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 05AS01881
RAYE, J.A trailer towed by a truck owned by defendant Cal-West Concrete Cutting, Inc. (Cal-West) broke loose and careened across the road into oncoming traffic, striking a car driven by plaintiff Ramon M. Garcia. Ramon and his wife, plaintiff Elva F. Garcia, suffered extensive injuries. The Garcias brought a negligence action. Cal-West did not dispute liability and the case was tried before a jury on the issue of damages.
For clarity, plaintiffs will be referred to individually by their first names. No disrespect is intended.
Cal-West brought a motion in limine to “preclude Plaintiffs from offering evidence of medical expenses allegedly incurred but not charged to Plaintiffs.” The trial court denied the motion. A jury awarded Elva $795,807 in past medical damages and Ramon $21,231.
Cal-West appeals, arguing the trial court erred in allowing the Garcias to recover damages for past medical expenses in excess of the amount actually incurred. In the alternative, Cal-West contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying Cal-West’s request for a continuance to conduct discovery. We shall affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 2005 a Cal-West truck lost its trailer, which veered into oncoming traffic, striking the Garcias’ vehicle. The trailer contained a compressor, which exploded on contact with the Garcias’ car. An ambulance transported the couple to a local hospital.
The Garcias filed a complaint against Cal-West, alleging personal injury and seeking loss of consortium damages. Cal-West did not dispute liability, and the case continued on the issue of damages.
Prior to trial, Cal-West brought a motion in limine requesting an order from the court precluding evidence of medical expenses in excess of the amount actually charged to the Garcias. Cal-West provided documentation from the Garcias’ insurer, Kaiser Permanente, as proof of the amount actually charged.
Cal-West argued the jury should not be allowed to hear evidence that the reasonable value of the medical expenses exceeded the amount actually charged. Cal-West also argued the Garcias could not recover more than the actual amount paid to satisfy their medical bills.
The trial court denied the motion but stated the option was open for Cal-West “to make a post-trial motion to reassess this situation, to address it then in context, maybe with -- a hearing . . ., I’ll leave that to your discretion.”
At trial, the physician who treated Elva immediately after the accident testified regarding her injuries. Elva required immediate surgery on her colon. Following surgery, Elva suffered complications while in intensive care. After her release, Elva continued to experience complications.
An orthopedic surgeon who treated Ramon also testified. Prior to the accident, the surgeon performed knee replacement surgery on Ramon. After the accident, Ramon suffered pain and swelling in the knee.
Over Cal-West’s objection, the Garcias presented evidence of the medical expenses incurred as a result of the accident. Elva’s medical damages totaled $795,556.85; Ramon’s totaled $21,058.25.
The jury awarded Elva $795,807 in past medical damages and awarded Ramon $21,231. Following entry of judgment, Cal-West filed a motion for reduction in judgment. In support of the motion, Cal-West provided documentation of the expenses incurred by Kaiser. According to the documents, Ramon’s expenses totaled $2,968.05 and Elva’s totaled $462,440.25, for a total of $465,408.30.
The documentation consisted of a letter dated August 28, 2006, from attorney Anthony J. Kern, who represented Kaiser, to Cal-West’s attorney. The letter stated Kaiser provided Medicare replacement coverage to the Garcias. Kern’s letter also stated that Kaiser had processed $462,440.25 in benefits to date for Elva and $2,968.05 for Ramon, yielding a combined interest to Kaiser of $465,408.30.
Cal-West refers to the amounts listed in the letter as “liens.”
In the letter, Kern responded to an inquiry from Cal-West’s attorney as to whether Kaiser would negotiate its lien claim directly with Cal-West. Cal-West offered Kaiser $310,427.34. Kern rejected the offer and made a counter-offer of $400,000 with two conditions: receipt of funds by September 8, 2006, and an agreement by Cal-West to sign an indemnification agreement for any claims the Garcias might have concerning the direct negotiation of Kaiser’s lien.
In opposition to Cal-West’s motion, the Garcias submitted a declaration from Kern. Kern stated he represented Kaiser “in its attempt to enforce a lien against any judgment obtained” by the Garcias. Under the Garcias’ membership agreement with Kaiser, the Garcias remained responsible “for reimbursing Kaiser for the reasonable value of the medical care provided to them by Kaiser, and as submitted by them as part of their claimed damages . . . .”
According to Kern’s declaration, the negotiations reflected in the letter submitted by Cal-West had “nothing to do with the reasonable value of Kaiser or other medical services as determined by the jury.” Kaiser’s willingness to reduce its lien to $400,000 “was and is motivated by business considerations.” The Kaiser “combined interest” of $465,408.30 reflected only “a variety of internal financial and other considerations,” not the reasonable value of medical expenses.
During the hearing, Cal-West’s counsel argued past medical damages should be reduced to $465,408.30. Counsel acknowledged he was “not unpersuaded” by the Garcias’ argument that “as we sit here today, we don’t know what Mrs. Garcia is going to pay for that lien. . . . That is an argument that makes some sense to me.” He also stated his negotiations with Kern “broke off just before trial at Mr. Kern’s request, he will not speak to us anymore.”
Cal-West argued “the best evidence we have” of “actual out-of-pocket damages” is “the lien amount as reported by Tony Kern.” In the alternative, Cal-West requested a continuance to have a hearing in six weeks, with the opportunity to take depositions “to discover the true amount that the Garcias are going to pay.”
The trial court denied Cal-West’s motion. Cal-West filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
At the outset, the Garcias argue Cal-West’s posttrial motion for a reduction in judgment was procedurally improper. According to the Garcias, the time to correct the verdict was before judgment, not after. Cal-West should have requested that the trial court delay entry of judgment until the issue of medical damages was resolved. In addition, Cal-West failed to file a motion for a new trial or a motion to vacate the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 663.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
We disagree. Section 663 allows the trial court to set aside or modify the judgment where the judgment, as entered, is based on an incorrect or erroneous legal basis. Section 657 provides for a new trial based on excessive or inadequate damages.
As Cal-West points out, it moved the trial court for a reduction in judgment 15 days after the entry of judgment, within the time limit for a motion for a new trial or a motion to vacate the judgment. In its motion, Cal-West argued the damages awarded to the Garcias were excessive, rendering the judgment erroneous.
Even though Cal-West did not title its motion a motion for a new trial or a motion to vacate the judgment, the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the motion. When a party brings a timely posttrial motion, the trial court has broad discretion to determine the relief being requested. The styling of a party’s request, the label placed upon it, is not determinative. (Shapiro v. Prudential Property & Casualty Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 722, 727.)
II
Where there are no disputed facts and the trial court’s determination does not require an exercise of discretion, we review the decision de novo. (Crocker National Bank v. City and County of San Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881, 888.)
III
Cal-West argues the trial court erred in denying its posttrial motion to reduce damages because, as a matter of law, the Garcias cannot recover damages for past medical care in an amount exceeding the actual amount charged to them. The Garcias counter that Cal-West failed to establish their medical expenses had been paid in some reduced amount.
In order to properly address Cal-West’s claim, we must consider several cases that explore the issue of recovery for medical damages in somewhat similar situations.
In Hanif v. Housing Authority (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 635 (Hanif), the trial court awarded the plaintiff the reasonable value of medical services, despite the fact that the hospital accepted a reduced amount from the plaintiff’s Medi-Cal insurance and wrote off the balance. (Id. at p. 639.) We held that under basic principles of tort law, a plaintiff may not be placed in a better position than he would be in had the wrong not been done. A damage award for past medical expenses in an amount greater than its actual cost constitutes overcompensation. (Id. at p. 641.)
Under the facts of Hanif, we concluded that “when the evidence shows a sum certain to have been paid or incurred for past medical care and services, whether by the plaintiff or by an independent source, that sum certain is the most the plaintiff may recover for that care despite the fact it may have been less than the prevailing market rate.” (Hanif, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 641.)
Nishihama v. City and County of San Francisco (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 298 (Nishihama) followed Hanif. In Nishihama, the plaintiff provided evidence of the normal rates charged by the hospital for the care provided to her. However, the plaintiff participated in a Blue Cross health plan under which the hospital accepted a lesser amount from Blue Cross as payment in full for the services. Unaware of this arrangement, the jury awarded the plaintiff medical costs based on the hospital’s “normal rates.” (Id. at pp. 306-307.)
Citing Hanif, the appellate court in Nishihama held it was error for the jury to award a sum for medical expenses greater than the actual amount paid or incurred. (Nishihama, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 306-309.) The plaintiff did not contest that the hospital accepted the lesser amount as payment in full for the services provided. However, the plaintiff argued the hospital had filed a lien against the judgment reflecting its normal rates and argued she risked the possibility she would have to pay this greater amount to the hospital because of its lien. (Id. at p. 307.) The court found the hospital’s lien rights did not extend beyond the amount it agreed to receive as payment in full from Blue Cross. Since the hospital had been paid that amount, it had no lien rights in the damages awarded the plaintiff. (Ibid.)
In Parnell v. Adventist Health System/West (2005) 35 Cal.4th 595 (Parnell), a plaintiff participated in a health plan that contracted with a preferred provider organization (PPO) to give discounts on medical care to its beneficiaries. The plaintiff received treatment at a hospital that was a preferred provider and that accepted the discounted rate as payment in full under the hospital’s agreement with the PPO. (Id. at pp. 598-599.) The hospital filed a notice of lien against the plaintiff’s tort claim to recover the difference between the cost of its medical services and the amount it received under the plaintiff’s health care contract. (Id. at p. 599.)
The Supreme Court noted that a lien under California’s Hospital Lien Act (HLA; Civ. Code, §§ 3045.1-3045.6) is a legal claim upon the property of another in satisfaction of a debt owed by a patient for medical services provided by the lien claimant. (Parnell, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 607-608.) Therefore, the hospital could not recover more than the amount it accepted as payment in full. The court reasoned: “Because Parnell no longer owes a debt to the hospital for its services, we conclude that the hospital may not assert a lien under the HLA against Parnell’s recovery from the third party tortfeasor.” (Id. at p. 609.)
Finally, in Katiuzhinsky v. Perry (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1288 (Perry), the plaintiffs received services from medical providers who secured a lien against any recovery in the plaintiffs’ personal injury actions. Some of the providers later sold the plaintiffs’ accounts, at a discount, to a financial services company, MedFinManager California, L.L.C. (MedFin). As a result, the medical providers wrote off the balance but the plaintiffs remained liable to MedFin for payment of their medical bills. (Id. at p. 1291.)
Relying on Hanif and Nishihama, the trial court forbade the plaintiffs from recovering or introducing evidence of medical expenses beyond the discounted rate paid by MedFin to their medical providers. The court reasoned that the sums paid by MedFin represented the actual amount the health care providers were willing to accept for their services. MedFin operated as a money lender, and the difference between the amount MedFin paid and the full amount of the bill was akin to a finance charge or money that the plaintiffs borrowed from MedFin to finance their medical care. We concluded the court incorrectly applied Hanif and Nishihama. (Perry, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1291, 1293.)
We distinguished Hanif and Nishihama on several grounds. We noted that unlike the plaintiffs in the previous cases, the plaintiffs in Perry remained fully liable for the amount of the medical providers’ charges for care and treatment. As we explained: “Under the trial court’s ruling, plaintiffs are placed in a worse position than had the tort not been committed. Despite the fact that plaintiffs are liable for the full amount of the medical bills, the tortfeasor is answerable only for a discounted rate paid by a bill collector who bought the lien from a health care provider. The result is that plaintiffs are undercompensated and the tortfeasor receives a windfall.” (Perry, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1296.)
Secondly, we noted that while the medical providers could opt to sell their bills to MedFin, they were under no obligation to do so. Whether sold to MedFin or not, the charges billed to the plaintiffs reflected the reasonable value of the services they received. We noted: “A subsequent assignment of the bill to a third party cannot result in a decrease in the value of services that have already been rendered.” (Perry, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1297.) The plaintiffs had no interaction with MedFin; their only contractual relationship was with the health care providers. The plaintiffs agreed to pay the charges billed and gave the providers a lien to secure the debt. (Ibid.)
The defendants argued that because the health care providers extended services only after they were assured they could later sell their bills at a discount to MedFin, the discounted rate paid to MedFin represented a more accurate reflection of the reasonable amount of the services than the amounts billed. (Perry, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1297.)
We soundly rejected this reasoning. Unlike Hanif and Nishihama, the medical providers in Perry were under no legal compulsion to accept MedFin’s payment as full compensation for treating the plaintiffs. When the providers decided to sell the bill to MedFin and write off the balance, each party received something of value: the provider received immediate payment and transferred the expense of collection and risk of nonpayment to someone else; MedFin acquired the bill as well as the lien securing it and would make a profit if it were successful in its collection efforts. We concluded: “The fact that a hospital . . . for administrative or economic convenience, decides to sell a debt to a third party at a discount does not reduce the value of the services provided in the first place. . . . [¶] We conclude that the trial court erred in limiting recovery of special damages for medical expenses to the amounts paid by MedFin to purchase plaintiffs’ accounts.” (Perry, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1298.)
IV
Cal-West argues it provided documentation of the amount of the actual charges for medical expenses incurred by the Garcias, which demonstrated that the actual charges were much lower than those set forth in the medical bills. According to Cal-West, hospital liens issued by Kaiser, the Garcias’ medical care provider, revealed the total medical expenses actually charged to Ramon Garcia were $2,968.05 and to Elva Garcia were $462,440.25, for a total of $465,408.30, which is $339,474.26 less than the medical bills provided by the Garcias.
The documentation of the liens Cal-West refers to consists of the amounts cited in the letter from Kaiser’s attorney to Cal-West’s attorney. In the letter, attorney Kern states: “To date, my client has processed $462,440.25 in benefits to date on behalf of Elva Garcia, and $2,968.05 in benefits to date on behalf of Ramon Garcia. As a result, my client’s combined interest stands at $465,408.30. It is my understanding that Elva is still treating (her above listed paid amount does not reflect her recent readmittance to Kaiser Roseville due to complications related to the subject accident), so my client’s interest concerning Elva should only increase.”
Kern also discusses negotiating with Cal-West, noting Cal-West had offered two-thirds of Kaiser’s interest to date, or $310,427.34. Kern rejected the offer, noting: “While we would be willing to work with you directly in attempting to resolve my client’s interests, my client is also mindful that direct negotiation will affect the underlying settlement amount of its insured, it will affect plaintiffs’ attorney’s case (and strategy), it could affect my firm’s (and my client’s) relationship with plaintiffs’ attorney’s firm on unrelated matters, etc.” Kern then proposed a counter-offer of $400,000 to be paid on a date certain, with Cal-West’s agreement to sign an indemnification agreement protecting Kaiser from any claim by the Garcias. Kern requested Cal-West’s attorney consult with his client. No further negotiations between the parties appear in the record.
Cal-West asserts that the lien amounts quoted during negotiations between it and Kaiser represent the true value of the medical services Kaiser provided to the Garcias. Under Cal-West’s reasoning, any recovery over that amount runs afoul of Hanif, Nishihama, and Parnell.
We find several problems with this analysis. In Hanif, the hospital accepted a reduced sum from the plaintiff’s Medi-Cal insurance and wrote off the balance. In Nishihama, the hospital received a reduced sum from Blue Cross as payment in full for the services. In Parnell, the hospital accepted a discounted rate from a PPO as payment in full for services.
Here, Cal-West provides no evidence that Kaiser has agreed to accept the amount quoted during negotiations as payment in full for the Garcias’ medical expenses. Cal-West provides no evidence that Kaiser has come to an agreement to accept any amount as payment in full. Kern’s letter states that all amounts quoted are “to date” and notes Elva’s quoted expenses do not include her readmission to the hospital. Kern does not state that Kaiser’s negotiated amount will relieve the Garcias of any further obligation to reimburse it for medical expenses stemming from the accident. All Cal-West has provided by way of proof of the Garcias’ expenses is an amount quoted during negotiations and never acted upon.
Cal-West asserts that “it is not necessary for Cal-West to establish that Kaiser has paid the Garcias’ ‘tab.’ Rather, as has been conclusively established through the Kaiser liens and correspondence from Kaiser’s attorney, it is only necessary to show that the Garcias incurred a lesser amount of past medical expenses, and that the provider seeks to recover only that lesser amount. [Citation.] As shown above, the Kaiser lien proves that point.”
However, the “liens” and “correspondence” Cal-West refers to do not establish either that the Garcias have incurred that lesser amount or that Kaiser seeks to recover only that lesser amount. All Kern’s letter establishes is that during negotiations, Kaiser made a counter-offer. Kaiser did not state it would accept that amount as payment in full; in fact, Kaiser specifically stated the amount did not reflect Elva’s readmittance to the hospital because of complications from the accident.
Cal-West also attempts to distinguish Perry, arguing that no third-party financing company purchased the right to collect on the Garcias’ accounts with Kaiser. According to Cal-West: “Instead, like in Hanif and Nishihama, Kaiser made a business decision to reduce the cost of the Garcias’ medical care and to accept less than the full value of those services as compensation. As reflected in the August 3 and August 28, 2006 letters from Kaiser’s lawyer to Cal-West, Kaiser independently reduced the cost of the benefits provided to the Garcias. [Citation.] The Garcias’ healthcare provider has never claimed an amount above that stated in the August 28, 2006, letter ($465,408.30).”
In Perry, we determined that the intervention of a third party in purchasing a medical lien does not prevent a plaintiff from recovering the amounts billed by the medical provider as long as the plaintiff legitimately incurs those expenses and remains liable for their payment. (Perry, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291.) The Garcias provided documentation of the expenses incurred; Cal-West has failed to establish that the Garcias do not remain liable for payment of those expenses.
In sum, we find the trial court did not err in declining to reduce the Garcias’ damages to reflect the amounts mentioned in a negotiation letter between Kaiser’s counsel and Cal-West’s counsel. The Garcias did not recover more than the amount of medical expenses they paid or incurred.
V
Cal-West complains that it should have been given the opportunity “to discover the true amount that the Garcias are going to pay” but does not explain what magical forms of discovery would permit a court to divine that amount. There is no doubt that Kaiser, in advance of the verdict, appeared willing to compromise its claim for medical expenses. The vagaries and uncertainties of litigation often lead to compromise. However, once the value of the medical care has been determined and reduced to judgment, it is unrealistic to suppose that Kaiser would cling to its earlier negotiating posture. Perhaps the Legislature should create a mechanism to insure that any postverdict compromises of medical billings inure to the benefit of the tortfeasor, but existing law neither compels nor permits modification of a jury verdict based on speculation regarding a compromise of lien rights. Nor is a jury verdict held in limbo until the plaintiff and the medical provider settle their accounts.
Cal-West also insists that the true amount of the Garcias’ medical expenses is the amount Kaiser asserted as a lien against the Garcias’ recovery. It argues that the Garcias’ counsel prevented it from obtaining information about Kaiser’s liens after negotiations broke down between Kaiser and Cal-West. However, in the face of Kaiser’s recalcitrance, Cal-West took no action to force discovery of this information, which it regarded as critical in determining the value of medical care provided the Garcias. Having failed to conduct formal discovery on a matter of great importance to the jury’s deliberations, and to possible postverdict proceedings, Cal-West cannot wait for the jury’s verdict and then insist on the right to conduct further discovery.
A continuance based on the moving party’s assertion that it might be able to discover favorable evidence is not a matter of right. It is a matter that is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion except on a clear showing that it has been abused. (Wiler v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 621, 628.) Moreover, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance to discover further evidence when the action has been pending for some time and extensive discovery has already been conducted. (Fisher v. Larsen (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 627, 648.) We find no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Garcias shall recover costs on appeal.
We concur: NICHOLSON, Acting P.J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.