Opinion
No. HHD CV11 5035380 S
April 4, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
I
Judith K. Fusari (Fusari) seeks to institute this matter through an application for waiver of fees pursuant to General Statutes § 52-259b. Fusari alleges that she is unable to pay the filing fees or marshal fees due to her financial condition. Inasmuch as Fusari meets the financial requirements of subsection (b) of the statute, this court has no discretion and, therefore, waives the filing fee.
Section 52-259b provides:
(a) In any civil or criminal matter, if the court finds that a party is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees payable to the court or to pay the cost of service of process, the court shall waive such fee or fees and the cost of service of process shall be paid by the state.
(b) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process if (1) such person receives public assistance or (2) such person's income after taxes, mandatory wage deductions and child care expenses is one hundred twenty-five per cent or less of the federal poverty level. For purposes of this subsection, `public assistance' includes, but is not limited to, state-administered general assistance, temporary family assistance, aid to the aged, blind and disabled, supplemental nutrition assistance and Supplemental Security Income.
(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process. If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant, schedule a hearing on the application.
Initially, this court denied the application for waiver of fees on January 7, 2011 because the allegations are clearly barred by any statutes of limitations. Fusari then filed another application for waiver of fees to appeal the denial. The application was denied by the court, Graham, J., on February 3, 2011 because "[General Statutes] § 52-259b(c) directs that a hearing at the Superior Court is the next step if the applicant disagrees with the judge." Fusari apparently attempted to appeal the matter, but the papers were returned to her on February 14, 2011 as the appeal forms were not endorsed by the trial court. Fusari subsequently requested a hearing on the denial of the application of the fee waiver on March 4, 2011 and a short hearing was held before this court on March 30, 2011.
II
In Fusari's purported complaint, she alleges nineteen counts against St. Vincent's Medical Center (St. Vincent's) for being admitted "against her will to Hallbrook Psychiatric Hospital in Branford. CT. 10 years ago" and the subsequent treatment of her while she was there for fifteen days. Insofar as the counts of her complaint may be construed to be medical malpractice, Fusari appends no written opinion of a similar health care provider to prove that there is a good faith basis for her claim as required by General Statutes § 52-190a. Therefore, these counts must be dismissed pursuant to General Statutes § 52-190a(c). See also Rios v. CCMC Corp., 106 Conn.App. 810, 820, 943 A.2d 544 (2008) (concluding that motion to dismiss properly granted where plaintiff failed to comply with § 52-190a).
She alleges negligence, medical malpractice, force, refusing, invasion of privacy, risk of injury, aggravation, negligence again, risk of endangerment, discrimination and bias, humiliation, abuse and use, mental cruelty, taunting, battery, trauma, temporary insanity, denying and harassing.
Section 52-190a(a), in relevant part, provides: "No civil action . . . shall be filed to recover damages resulting from personal injury . . . occurring on or after October 1, 1987, whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury . . . resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, unless the attorney or party filing the action . . . has made a reasonable inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant. The complaint . . . shall contain a certificate of the attorney or party filing the action . . . that such reasonable inquiry gave rise to a good faith belief that grounds exist for an action against each named defendant . . . To show the existence of such good faith, the claimant or the claimant's attorney . . . shall obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar health care provider, as defined in section 52-184c . . . that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a detailed basis for the formation of such opinion . . . The claimant or the claimant's attorney . . . shall retain the original written opinion and shall attach a copy of such written opinion, with the name and signature of the similar health care provider expunged, to such certificate . . ."
Section 52-190a(c) provides: "The failure to obtain and file the written opinion required by subsection (a) of this section shall be grounds for the dismissal of the action."
Insofar as Fusari's allegations may be construed to be other causes of action, they are other torts and any conceivable statutes of limitations have clearly run their course because any of the alleged acts by St. Vincent's occurred during fifteen days "10 years ago." See, e.g., General Statutes § 52-577 (three-year statute of limitations from date of act or omission complained of); General Statutes § 52-584 (two-year statute of limitations from date injury is sustained or discovered or should have been discovered, but no action may be brought within three years from date of action or omission).
It is also noted that the complaint does not contain any allegations of a continuing course of conduct.
In a letter to the judicial authority with her case initiation documents, Fusari argues that she is not subject to any statute of limitations because she is a minor. At a hearing before this court on March 30, 2011, Fusari admitted that she is over the age of eighteen. Therefore, she is not a minor.
Nevertheless, Fusari argues that she should be considered to be a minor because she has the mental capacity of a minor. Fusari does not cite and the court knows of no special statutes of limitations for minors (except for General Statutes § 52-577d relating to damages to minors caused by sexual abuse) or of any authority for the argument that mental capacity as opposed to chronological age is the correct measure of whether one has obtained the age of majority.
"Practice Book § 10-1 requires each pleading to `contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts' and a signature on a pleading constitutes `a certificate . . . that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it.' Practice Book § 4-2(b). This court possesses inherent authority to limit the filing of frivolous or repetitive lawsuits that ultimately are destined for withdrawal or dismissal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re 34 Fee Waiver Applications by Frank Perrelli, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven (October 27, 2008, Lager, J.).
"[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party . . . Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Solomon v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 85 Conn.App. 854, 861, 859 A.2d 934 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 906, 868 A.2d 748 (2005).
Because Fusari's complaint does not comply with § 52-190a and her allegations are barred by the statutes of limitations, the court dismisses this action sua sponte pursuant to its inherent authority. The taxpayers of this state need not spend any further monies on this case. A copy of this memorandum of decision shall be forward by the clerk to Fusari and St. Vincent's Medical Center.