Opinion
No. HHD CV 11 5035321
March 2, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
I
Judith K. Fusari (Fusari) seeks to institute this matter through an application for waiver of fees pursuant to General Statutes § 52-259b. Fusari alleges that she is unable to pay the filing fees or marshal fees due to her financial condition. Inasmuch as Fusari meets the financial requirements of subsection (b) of the statute, this court has no discretion and, therefore, waives the filing fee.
Section 52-259b provides: "(a) In any civil or criminal matter, if the court finds that a party is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees payable to the court or to pay the cost of service of process, the court shall waive such fee or fees and the cost of service of process shall be paid by the state.
"(b) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process if (1) such person receives public assistance or (2) such person's income after taxes, mandatory wage deductions and child care expenses is one hundred twenty-five per cent or less of the federal poverty level. For purposes of this subsection, `public assistance' includes, but is not limited to, state-administered general assistance, temporary family assistance, aid to the aged, blind and disabled, supplemental nutrition assistance and Supplemental Security Income.
"(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process. If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant, schedule a hearing on the application."
II
Since 2008, Fusari has sought to bring well over 100 civil actions. See Fusari v. Hospital of Central Conn., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 11 5015216 (January 19, 2011, Pittman, J.). "The majority of her proposed lawsuits have been filed against health care providers or the manufacturers of medical products." See Fusari v. N.B. EMS, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 10 5015037 (July 1, 2010, Pittman, J.). Many of her civil actions appear to have been dismissed based upon her failure to attach a written opinion of a similar health care provider as required by General Statutes § 52-190a. See, e.g., Fusari v. Hospital of Central Conn., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 11 5015216.
In this proposed complaint, Fusari seeks monetary damages for medical malpractice allegedly committed by "Dr." Qin Li while performing dental work in 2007 "in the dental clinic at UConn Medical Health Center." Insofar as this proposed lawsuit alleges medical malpractice against Li, Fusari appends no written opinion of a similar health care provider to prove that there is a good faith basis for her claim as required by § 52-190a. Therefore, the proposed lawsuit must be dismissed pursuant to General Statutes § 52-190a(c). See also Rios v. CCMC Corp., 106 Conn.App. 810, 820, 943 A.2d 544 (2008) (concluding that motion to dismiss properly granted where plaintiff failed to comply with § 52-190a).
Fusari seeks "one thousand four hundred million tax free dollars for pain, suffering, disfigurement, scarring, hemorrhaging, shock, mental insanity, and abandonment."
Section 52-190a(a), in relevant part, provides: "No civil action . . . shall be filed to recover damages resulting from personal injury . . . occurring on or after October 1, 1987, whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury . . . resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, unless the attorney or party filing the action . . . has made a reasonable inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant. The complaint . . . shall contain a certificate of the attorney or party filing the action . . . that such reasonable inquiry gave rise to a good faith belief that grounds exist for an action against each named defendant . . . To show the existence of such good faith, the claimant or the claimant's attorney . . . shall obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar health care provider, as defined in section 52-184c . . . that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a detailed basis for the formation of such opinion . . . The claimant or the claimant's attorney . . . shall retain the original written opinion and shall attach a copy of such written opinion, with the name and signature of the similar health care provider expunged, to such certificate . . ."
Section 52-190a(c) provides: "The failure to obtain and file the written opinion required by subsection (a) of this section shall be grounds for the dismissal of the action.
Fusari also alleges that she is suing Li "for not forwarding compensation that the Supreme/Appellate court ruled on in [her] favor." Such allegations are common and false in Fusari's proposed lawsuits. See, e.g., Fusari v. Root, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 10 5014961 (April 30, 2010, Pittman, J.). In the present case, these allegations are also false. See Fusari v. UConn Health Center, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 08 5009557 (withdrawal of action); Fusari v. UCoun Health Center, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 09 5013842 (judgment without trial; appeal dismissed October 7, 2009); Fusari v. Li, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 09 5013903 (judgment without trial; appeal dismissed October 8, 2009).
Finally, this court notes that it has dismissed many of Fusari's complaints for failure to obtain permission from the claims commissioner prior to bringing suit, among other things. See, e.g., Fusari v. Kwanashie, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 10 5035146 (October 26, 2010, Berger, J.). Once again, the court reiterates that it has no subject matter jurisdiction in a money damages action against the state or a state employee because the state, through the claims commissioner, has not waived its sovereign immunity. See Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 317-18, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is dismissed sua sponte.
It is noted, however, that the materials that Fusari seeks to file to initiate this suit include a certification of service which indicates that she sent the papers to the claims commissioner.