Opinion
No. 1D21-2285
08-24-2022
Carlester FRYSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Carlester Fryson, pro se, Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Adam B. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Carlester Fryson, pro se, Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Adam B. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
B.L. Thomas, J.
Appellant faced a "tsunami" of evidence against him at trial, after which he was convicted of armed robbery with a firearm, attempted robbery with a firearm, armed carjacking with a firearm, and three counts of aggravated battery with a firearm. The evidence proved that Appellant and his accomplice engaged in a brutal criminal rampage in two counties, during which Appellant pistol whipped three women and crashed into another victim's car. Appellant filed an amended motion for post-conviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 based on alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
The trial court summarized the evidence in its thorough order denying Appellant's amended motion:
The evidence of the Defendant's guilt was overwhelming and is summarized here. At trial the evidence established that on December 3, 2016 the Defendant, armed with a handgun, robbed two women employees at a Dollar General store in the Fort Braden community of Leon County, Florida. The Defendant had an accomplice in the commission of these crimes, one Brittany Nutter, who stayed outside the store in a white truck and assisted the Defendant in making his escape.
Much of the Defendant's actions during the robbery were captured on the store surveillance camera, the recording of which was admitted in evidence at his trial. During the robbery, the Defendant "pistol-whipped" both women (struck them in the face with the firearm). Additionally, he struck one of the women a second time with the gun, this time in the back of her head. Both women and a customer testified that the Defendant fired the gun inside the store. While the surveillance video of the robbery did not capture clear images of the Defendant firing the gun, witnesses both inside and outside of the store heard the gunshot. Another witness entered the store shortly after the gunshot, and while he did not hear it, he testified that he was familiar with firearms and smelled gunpowder. A spent shell casing was found on the floor behind the registers. A few days after the robbery, a projectile was recovered inside the store, lodged in a display of DVD's. The trajectory of the projectile was consistent with it having been fired from where the Defendant was standing when the women testified that he fired the gun during the robbery.
The evidence further established that during their escape after the robbery of the Dollar General store, the Defendant and Ms. Nutter used their truck to cut off and stop another vehicle that was travelling on a road some distance from the Dollar General store. Neither this
vehicle nor its driver had any connection to the store or the robbery. This victim was on her way to go Christmas shopping. After cutting off the car, the Defendant got out of the truck and pointed a gun at the driver. He then pulled her out of the car. After pulling her out of the car, the Defendant struck her in the face and head with the gun, knocking her down on the roadway and stealing her car. Even though the Defendant had managed to escape from the scene of the robbery and was already in a vehicle, he committed a carjacking. In doing so, he pistol-whipped yet a third woman in the face and head.
A responding Liberty County Sheriff's Department deputy located the Defendant in the newly carjacked vehicle and Ms. Nutter, still driving the white truck, travelling one behind the other westbound on Highway 20. The vehicles were hugging the centerline and running other cars off the road while going approximately ninety miles per hour. When the deputy attempted to make a traffic stop on the vehicles, Ms. Nutter pulled over, but the Defendant did not. He continued to flee westbound, and a high-speed pursuit of the Defendant ensued. The deputy testified that speeds reached "around a hundred miles an hour."
As the pursuit slowed somewhat, Ms. Nutter reappeared and managed to get her white truck in between the deputy and the Defendant. The pursuit continued into the City of Bristol in Liberty County. As the Defendant approached an intersection, he crashed into another car and "began flipping." Ms. Nutter stopped her truck, got out, and apparently helped extricate the Defendant from his now crashed and carjacked vehicle. The Defendant reentered Ms. Nutter's truck, and the two of them continued to flee westbound, both now in the white truck. During a search of the car the Defendant had carjacked and then crashed, a gun was found.
The deputy did not continue the pursuit because he had to attend to the victims of the hit-and-run crash. The Defendant and Ms. Nutter were ultimately taken into custody in Calhoun County after a Florida Highway Patrolman found them with the white truck, which had broken down on the side of Highway 20. Shortly after the robbery, the Defendant was identified in a photographic lineup and later by eyewitnesses in open court. The projectile found in the store was matched to the gun found in the vehicle the Defendant carjacked, crashed, and fled from. Furthermore, the gun had a mixture of DNA evidence on it including four individuals. The DNA expert testified that it is 4.9 million times more likely that the mixture contains the DNA of the Defendant and three unknown individuals than four unknown individuals.
R. at 216–19 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
The trial court correctly denied all of Appellant's postconviction claims based on the lack of any possible prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ("The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."); Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 112, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) ("The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable."); Maxwell v. Wainwright , 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) ("[Counsel's] clear, substantial deficiency ... must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined."). And the trial court determined that Appellant's counsel was more credible than Appellant regarding his unsupported claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Wait v. State , 212 So. 3d 1082, 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (explaining that a postconviction court's factual findings are reviewed for competent substantial evidence and that an appellate court "will not substitute its judgment for that of the post-conviction court on questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight given to the evidence."). The trial court established that Appellant knew he was facing life in prison, and that his defense counsel's strategy was sound and the only viable strategy in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
Thus, we affirm the trial court's thorough and thoughtful order.
Bilbrey and Winokur, JJ., concur.