Opinion
A20-0976
04-12-2021
Roger Foster, et al., Petitioners, Adam Dennis Sanborn, Appellant, v. Minnesota Department of Corrections, et al., Respondents.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Daniel R. Shulman, Teresa Nelson, Ian Bratlie, Isabella Salomão Nascimento, American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant) Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Steven R. Forrest, Cicely R. Miltich, Assistant Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn . R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Affirmed
Johnson, Judge Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CV-20-633 Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Daniel R. Shulman, Teresa Nelson, Ian Bratlie, Isabella Salomão Nascimento, American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant) Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Steven R. Forrest, Cicely R. Miltich, Assistant Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents) Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
The primary issue in this appeal is whether a person imprisoned in the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Moose Lake must be released on the ground that the Minnesota Department of Corrections, its commissioner, and the prison's warden are not complying with their duties to protect him from the novel coronavirus, COVID-19. The district court denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and for a writ of mandamus. We affirm.
FACTS
This action was commenced in April 2020 by three persons serving prison terms at the Moose Lake prison: Roger Foster, Kristopher Mehle, and Adam Dennis Sanborn. The three men jointly petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of mandamus. Petitioners alleged that the department of corrections, its commissioner, and the Moose Lake warden were not taking reasonable measures to protect them and other Moose Lake prisoners from the COVID-19 virus. Their petition requested that the district court certify a class of similarly situated prisoners "(1) who have either less than six months to serve in their sentences or pre-existing conditions or age rendering them particularly vulnerable to COVID-19; (2) whose release will not be a danger to the community; and (3) who have a safe place to stay and socially isolate during the pendency of the COVID-19 pandemic." In their prayer for relief, petitioners requested the immediate release of themselves and other members of the putative class and the issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling respondents to perform their duties to protect petitioners and other prisoners from COVID-19.
In June 2020, respondents filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the petition along with eight declarations signed by the commissioner, the Moose Lake warden, and other department personnel, as well as numerous exhibits. Petitioners then filed a reply with legal argument along with six affidavits executed by two physicians and 12 prisoners, including Foster and Sanborn. Petitioners did not move for certification of the putative class.
In July 2020, the district court filed a 33-page order in which it denied the petition with respect to Foster and Sanborn. The district court dismissed the petition with respect to Mehle because he had been released from the Moose Lake prison and placed on supervised release.
Foster and Sanborn filed a timely notice of appeal. In October 2020, Foster was released from prison and placed on supervised release. In January 2021, this court granted the department's motion to dismiss the appeal with respect to Foster on the ground that it is moot. Sanborn remains imprisoned at Moose Lake. Accordingly, we will proceed to consider the appeal as it concerns Sanborn.
DECISION
I. Habeas Corpus
Sanborn first argues that the district court erred by denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus is guaranteed by the state constitution. Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. The relevant chapter of statutes begins: "A person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of liberty . . . may apply for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from imprisonment or restraint." Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2020). A habeas petition is an appropriate means of challenging the conditions of a prisoner's confinement. State ex rel. Crosby v. Wood, 265 N.W.2d 638, 639 (Minn. 1978); State ex rel. Cole v. Tahash, 129 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Minn. 1964).
In this case, the district court denied habeas relief after conducting an extensive review of the evidence presented by the parties in their written submissions. The district court began by acknowledging the well-known facts concerning the COVID-19 virus, such as its infectiousness, its risks of morbidity and mortality, and the lack of a vaccine at that time. The district court noted that the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had recommended preventive measures such as "testing, social distancing, wearing masks, and increasing focus of hygiene and additional handwashing in correctional settings." The district court noted that prisons generally are more susceptible to transmission of the virus because of the difficulty of imposing social-distancing measures. The district court also recited the evidence concerning the Moose Lake prison in particular, including its capacity, the nature of its cells and living units, and its healthcare system.
The district court stated that the department of corrections and the Moose Lake prison began preparing for the COVID-19 virus before the governor declared a state-wide peacetime emergency on March 13, 2020. On that date, the department's medical director implemented guidelines for screening, testing, and prevention protocols for all of the department's prisons. The district court described the protocols as requiring "enhanced hygienic measures, assessment of all symptomatic patients and inmates entering new facilities, the use of appropriate personal protective equipment by staff, and isolation and quarantine procedures." Thereafter the department collaborated with the state department of health and updated its guidelines as more information became known about the virus and as the federal government issued additional guidance about managing prisons during a pandemic.
The district court also identified particular actions taken by respondents to minimize the risks presented by the virus, including the following actions. On March 6, 23, and 26, 2020, the commissioner sent memoranda to all prisoners to warn them of the virus and to encourage good hygiene and social-distancing. On March 11, 2020, the department distributed additional bars of soap to prisoners. On the same date, the prison suspended in-person visits. On March 16, 2020, the department implemented procedures for temperature-screening of staff and contractors. On March 18, 2020, the prison installed additional hand-washing stations at numerous locations. On March 27, 2020, the prison stopped accepting new prisoners, including transfers of prisoners from other facilities. In early April 2020, the prison distributed cotton face masks to all prisoners, initially recommending their use and later requiring it. In April and May of 2020, the department implemented policies concerning when staff members should wear N95 face masks. The prison limited the movement of prisoners and their freedom to commingle. The prison isolated prisoners who tested positive for the virus and quarantined other members of such prisoners' living units. Notably, the district court stated that the commissioner had implemented a conditional medical-release policy for high-risk prisoners, which had resulted in the release of 17 prisoners from the Moose Lake prison and 84 prisoners system- wide, and had expanded an early-work-release program, which had benefitted 166 prisoners system-wide. The district court also noted that Sanborn had not been in either isolation or quarantine.
In analyzing the habeas claim, the district court cited the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. The district court stated that, to prove a violation of the Eighth Amendment, petitioners must prove that respondents were deliberately indifferent to petitioners' health and safety. The district court summarized the evidence described above by stating that respondents "engaged and continue[] to engage in an extensive and systemic approach to combat COVID-19." The district court also stated, "The record shows that respondents have taken the threat seriously and responded with reasonable and appropriate steps to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 and to identify, isolate, and treat those who have contracted the disease." The district court concluded that the evidence in the record conclusively showed that respondents were not deliberately indifferent to petitioners' health and safety.
On appeal, Sanborn makes three arguments for reversal with respect to his habeas claim. First, he argues that the district court erred by limiting its legal analysis to the federal constitutional principles arising from the Eighth Amendment without considering his claim under state law. Second, he argues in the alternative that the district court erred by concluding that his claim fails when analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. Third, he argues that the district court erred by denying his petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. We analyze each argument below, beginning with the second argument.
A. Eighth Amendment
Sanborn argues that, if he must prove a violation of the Eighth Amendment to obtain habeas relief, he has done so.
Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, prison officials may not have "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291 (1976). Similarly, the Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to not be deliberately indifferent to prison conditions that expose prisoners to a "substantial risk of serious harm" to their health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1984 (1994). A prison official cannot be liable under the Eighth Amendment unless "the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Id. at 837, 114 S. Ct. at 1979. Rather, "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id.; see also Haavisto v. Perpich, 520 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 1994).
To prevail under the Eighth Amendment, Sanborn must prove that respondents have shown deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm arising from the COVID-19 virus. The evidence submitted by both parties shows that, as of July 2020, when the district court filed its order, respondents were not indifferent, deliberately or otherwise, to the risks presented by the COVID-19 virus. As described above, respondents had taken numerous measures to protect prisoners by minimizing the risks of infection. They did so at an early stage, even before the governor declared a state-wide peacetime emergency on March 13, 2020, and they frequently revised and updated their policies and procedures as the situation evolved. Significantly, respondents developed a conditional medical-release program and expanded a work-release program for prisoners at a higher risk of harm from the virus.
Sanborn does not contend that the above-described policies and procedures were counterproductive. Similarly, Sanborn does not identify any particular policy or procedure that respondents did not adopt but should have adopted. Rather, Sanborn contends that respondents were deliberately indifferent because prison staff did not actually comply with the COVID-19 protocols implemented by respondents. For example, Sanborn contends that prison staff did not consistently engage in social-distancing and mask-wearing, which he has characterized as "systemic breaches of duty." In his reply brief, he states, "The DOC is correct that, for the most part, petitioners complain about the implementation of the guidelines, rather than the guidelines themselves." But Sanborn cannot prove an Eighth Amendment claim by showing that prison staff did not consistently follow COVID-19 protocols or that prison staff were not properly trained or supervised. See Haavisto, 520 N.W.2d at 734 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841-42, 114 S. Ct. at 1981). To prevail, he must show that the commissioner and the warden "knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Id. at 734. Sanborn has submitted numerous affidavits of prisoners, but those affidavits do not contain evidence that the commissioner or the warden knew that prison staff were creating an excessive risk by not following social-distancing and mask-wearing protocols.
Sanborn also contends that the commissioner's medical-release and work-release programs were inadequate, asserting that respondents "fail[ed] to provide appropriate protection for those most vulnerable to COVID-19 by reason of age or pre-existing conditions" and abandoned the conditional medical-release program. But Sanborn does not explain why those programs have not provided appropriate protection. His evidence on that issue, a declaration of a physician, goes no further than to say that the department did not "identify a procedure being used to proactively identify those inmates who fall into the CDC categories for individuals most vulnerable to COVID-19." The respondents introduced evidence that prisoners were permitted to apply for the programs, and petitioners introduced evidence that, as of June 9, 2020, a total of 1,636 prisoners had applied for the medical-release program and 130 prisoners had applied for the early-work-release program. Petitioners introduced no evidence specifically relating to any prisoner who was denied early release pursuant to either program.
Thus, the district court did not err by concluding that Sanborn's evidence does not establish that respondents were deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of serious harm to the health of Sanborn and other prisoners.
B. State Law
Sanborn's primary argument on appeal is that the district court erred by analyzing his habeas claim only under the Eighth Amendment without considering other sources of law, including the state constitution, state statutes, and state common law.
Sanborn identified various provisions of state law in his petition. He cited a provision of the Minnesota Constitution that prohibits cruel or unusual punishments. See Minn. Const. art. I, § 5. He cited four statutes that, he asserted, require the commissioner to establish and maintain minimum standards for correctional facilities, particularly regarding healthcare. See Minn. Stat. §§ 241.021, subds. 1, 4, 5; 243.57 (2020). In addition, he cited two administrative rules that, he asserted, require the commissioner to establish policies and provide conditions for correctional facilities that do not endanger health, although he does not cite them on appeal. See Minn. R. 2911.0300, subp. 2; Minn. R. 2911.5800, subps. 4, 8. But the petition did not engage in legal argument; it merely asserted in conclusory fashion that respondents violated such laws. In his memorandum in support of the petition, he again cited the same laws but again did not attempt to demonstrate how respondents had violated the laws.
As a general matter, a plaintiff in a civil action may elect to assert any and all legal theories that may apply and may plead them in the alternative. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.05(b). Similarly, a petitioner in a habeas action may elect to assert both federal and state claims. See, e.g., Cole, 129 N.W.2d at 906. The district court acknowledged that petitioners are not limited to federal law but noted that petitioners had not cited caselaw in support of their other claims. On appeal, Sanborn again cites state law, although he does not develop an argument in which he applies state law to the facts of this case. Nonetheless, we will consider the applicability and viability of the state-law claims identified by Sanborn on appeal.
1. Minnesota Constitution
Sanborn contends that the district court should have considered his claim under a constitutional provision prohibiting "cruel or unusual punishments." See Minn. Const. art. I, § 5. The language of that provision differs slightly from the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment." See U.S. Const. amend. VIII (emphasis added). In the context of reviewing the constitutionality of a criminal sentence, the supreme court has stated that the difference in language is "not trivial because the United States Supreme Court has upheld punishments that, although they may be cruel, are not unusual." State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 263 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). In that context, it is appropriate to "separately examine whether the sentence is cruel and whether it is unusual." Id. (quotation omitted). But in the context of a habeas action challenging a petitioner's conditions of confinement, the supreme court has not interpreted Minnesota's cruel-or-unusual-punishments clause differently from the corresponding clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Cole, 129 N.W.2d at 905-08.
Even if we were to analyze Sanborn's state constitutional claim by separately examining whether his conditions are cruel and whether they are unusual, see Vang, 847 N.W.2d at 263, his claim nonetheless would fail. Sanborn's evidence does not show that respondents' actions in response to COVID-19 have been cruel. As described above, the record reflects that respondents have taken multiple actions to create policies and procedures to protect Sanborn and other prisoners from the COVID-19 virus. Likewise, Sanborn's evidence does not show that the conditions of his confinement are unusual. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant effect on all Minnesotans, and Sanborn's situation is fairly similar to that of some persons who are not imprisoned, such as residents of nursing homes and other congregate-living facilities.
Thus, Sanborn cannot establish a claim of cruel or unusual punishments under the state constitution.
2. Minnesota Statutes
Sanborn also contends that the district court should have considered his claim under certain state statutes. He cites three subdivisions of section 241.021, which, he asserts, require the department and the commissioner "to promulgate rules for the security, safety, health, and treatment of prisoners, . . . to provide professional health care to persons confined in institutions under the control of the commissioner of corrections, . . . [and] to monitor and require remediation of prisons not conforming to the standards set for security, safety, and health." See Minn. Stat. § 241.021, subds. 1, 4, 5.
It is unclear whether Sanborn's statutory claim is legally viable in a habeas action. In Crosby, the supreme court noted that the appeal raised "the issue of whether habeas corpus is available as a remedy for conditions of confinement which abridge interests protected by statute rather than by the constitution." 265 N.W.2d at 639. But the supreme court did not resolve that issue "because the petition fail[ed] to present even a minimal showing that the appropriate procedures . . . were not followed." Id. The same is true in this case. The evidentiary materials submitted by both parties show that respondents took numerous actions to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 in state prisons and provided health care to prisoners who required it. The record shows that the department took the COVID-19 pandemic seriously at an early stage and continually created and implemented protocols to minimize risks to the health of prisoners. Accordingly, we need not resolve the legal issue reserved by the supreme court in Cole.
Thus, Sanborn cannot establish a habeas claim based on state statutes.
3. Minnesota Common Law
Sanborn also contends that the district court should have considered his claim based on common-law principles.
Sanborn cites three cases in support of his common-law theory: Cooney v. Hooks, 535 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1995); Sandborg v. Blue Earth Cnty, 601 N.W.2d 192 (Minn. App. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 615 N.W.2d 61 (Minn. 2000); and Davis v. State Dep't of Corrections, 500 N.W.2d 134 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. July 15, 1993). The first and second of the cases were civil actions in which the plaintiffs alleged tort claims against counties and sought money damages based on the injury or death of an inmate of a county jail. Cooney, 535 N.W.2d at 610; Sandborg, 601 N.W.2d at 195. In each of those cases, the appellate court recognized that a county has a duty to an inmate if the county knows or should know of a foreseeable harm to the inmate. See Cooney, 535 N.W.2d at 611; Sandborg, 601 N.W.2d at 196-97. The third case also was a civil action in which the plaintiff, an inmate of a state prison, alleged a tort claim against the state and sought money damages based on an injury sustained while performing assigned work duties. Davis, 500 N.W.2d at 134. This court held that the plaintiff's exclusive statutory remedy against the state department of corrections was to submit a claim for compensation to the legislature. Id. at 135. None of the opinions cited by Sanborn arise in the context of a habeas action. We are unaware of any caselaw for the proposition that an inmate of a state prison may rely on a common-law duty as the basis of a habeas action.
Thus, Sanborn cannot establish a habeas claim based on a common-law duty.
C. Evidentiary Hearing
Sanborn argues that the district court erred by denying his habeas petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
At the conclusion of its analysis of Sanborn's claims, the district court expressly stated the reasons why an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary:
Habeas corpus is a summary proceeding. The record before this court is extensive. The law is clear that a court need not hold an evidentiary hearing when Petitioners fail to establish a prima facie case, there are no factual disputes, or the issues raised can be determined as a matter of law. Seifert v. Erickson, 420 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. May 18, 1988); Sander v. State, 400 N.W.2d 175, 176 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 1987). An evidentiary hearing is not necessary, because even accepting Petitioners' allegations as true, Petitioners have failed to establish Respondents' deliberate indifference to Petitioners' health and safety during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The procedures that apply to habeas actions are contained in chapter 589 of the Minnesota Statutes. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is required to state, among other things, that the person is imprisoned or restrained of liberty and the basis of the confinement or restraint. Minn. Stat. § 589.04(a), (d) (2020). After being served, the detaining authority shall respond by stating, among other things, "the reason for detention and authority under which the person is being detained." Minn. Stat. § 589.08(b) (2020). After a response is made, the district court "shall examine the facts set forth in the return [and] the cause of the imprisonment or restraint." Minn. Stat. § 589.12 (2020). If, after such an examination, the district court "finds no legal cause to support imprisonment or restraint of the petitioner, the judge shall discharge the petitioner." Minn. Stat. § 589.13 (2020).
In some circumstances, "the district court may conduct an evidentiary hearing with the petitioner and Commissioner present to offer evidence and testimony that will provide a record for the district court's decision." State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297, 303 (Minn. 2015). An evidentiary hearing is not required in a habeas proceeding unless the petition alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle petitioner to relief. State ex rel. Roy v. Tahash, 152 N.W.2d 301, 306 (Minn. 1967). In other words, a habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if the petition alleges facts that state a prima facie case for relief and there is a factual dispute that must be resolved. See Crosby, 265 N.W.2d at 639; Seifert, 420 N.W.2d at 920 (citing State ex rel. Rankin v. Tahash, 149 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Minn. 1967)), Sanders, 400 N.W.2d at 177; see also 9 Henry W. McCarr & Jack S. Nordby, Minnesota Practice—Criminal Law & Procedure § 40:1 (4th ed. 2020).
To state a prima facie case of unlawful conditions of confinement, a habeas petitioner must submit "a verified statement detailing," among other things, the "facts respecting the treatment claimed to be cruel and unusual" or otherwise in violation of law. Cole, 129 N.W.2d at 907-08. A habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to relief. State ex rel. Young v. Schnell, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, No. A17-1741, 2021 WL 1112879, *10 (Minn. Mar. 24, 2021); Breeding v. Swenson, 60 N.W.2d 4, 7 (1953).
Sanborn contends that the district court erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing on the ground that there are disputed fact issues. Specifically, he identifies the following issues:
(1) whether the DOC conducted reasonable testing for COVID-19; (2) whether the DOC implemented and enforced social distancing; (3) whether the DOC provided sufficient masks for prisoners and staff and enforced its directives about wearing masks; (4) whether the DOC required appropriate sanitation practices; and (5) whether the DOC took extra precautions to protect the most vulnerable prisoners, such as those above the age of 60 and those with pre-existing conditions like respiratory disease.Whether these factual issues must be resolved depends on the viability of the legal theories asserted by Sanborn and the substantive criteria of the applicable law. As discussed above, to obtain habeas relief, he must prove that the commissioner and the warden have shown a deliberate indifference to a substantial risk to his health, that his conditions of confinement are either cruel or unusual, or (perhaps) that respondents have not complied with their statutory duties. See supra part B. The resolution of those legal issues does not depend on the resolution of the factual issues identified by Sanborn. The evidentiary submissions of the parties make clear that the commissioner and the warden have not been deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk to Sanborn's health, that Sanborn's conditions of confinement are neither cruel nor unusual, and that respondents have not failed to comply with their statutory duties. Given the legal bases of Sanborn's claims and the voluminous evidence submitted by both parties, Sanborn cannot show that there are disputed facts that, if established in his favor, would require his release from prison. Thus, the district court did not err by not conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Sanborn's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
II. Mandamus
Sanborn also argues that the district court erred by denying his petition for a writ of mandamus.
A writ of mandamus "may be issued to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station." Minn. Stat. § 586.01 (2020). A writ of mandamus "is an extraordinary legal remedy." State v. Pero, 590 N.W.2d 319, 323 (Minn. 1999). "Mandamus may issue against a public officer only to compel a ministerial act and not when the official has discretion with respect to the act in question." Duncan v. Roy, 830 N.W.2d 48, 51 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. July 16, 2013). A writ of mandamus may not issue to direct how an official duty must be performed or how discretion must be exercised. See State v. Davis, 592 N.W.2d 457, 459 (Minn. 1999); State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Serv. Bd., 42 N.W.2d 729, 730 (Minn. 1950). A district court's grant of mandamus is only for the "rare cases that the officials act in so clearly an arbitrary and capricious a manner that their action may be reviewed on mandamus." Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162, 176 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
To obtain a writ of mandamus, a petitioner must show that three conditions are present: (1) the respondent has failed to perform an official duty that is clearly imposed by law; (2) the official's failure to perform the official duty has caused injury to the petitioner specifically and the petitioner suffered a public wrong; and (3) there is no other adequate legal remedy. Breza v. City of Minnetrista, 725 N.W.2d 106, 109-10 (Minn. 2006). The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating "every material fact necessary to show the existence of the plain duty to act with respect to the relief sought." Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 179; see also Ebenezer Soc'y v. Minnesota State Bd. of Health, 223 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Minn. 1974). This court applies a de novo standard of review to a district court's denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus if the decision is "based solely on a legal determination." Breza, 725 N.W.2d at 110.
In its order denying relief, the district court reasoned that Sanborn is not entitled to a writ of mandamus because the relief he seeks concerns matters over which respondents have discretion. The district court reasoned that Sanborn essentially is seeking to control "the particular manner in which the DOC fulfills its duty to provide medical care and reasonable safety measures to incarcerated persons." The district court also reasoned that court oversight may be counter-productive given the adaptive and flexible approach necessary during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Sanborn asserts that there is an issue as to "whether the DOC is performing its duty—doing what it knows must be done at Moose Lake: testing, social distancing, masks, etc." But Sanborn has not shown that respondents have failed to perform an official duty that is clearly imposed by law. As described above, the legal duties applicable to respondents are stated generally, not with specificity. Respondents have taken many actions to comply with the generally stated duties. Sanborn's request that the district court determine "whether the DOC was complying with" its duties and if not, "order the DOC to comply" invites judicial intrusion into matters for which respondents have discretion. As stated above, mandamus is not appropriate to control how a duty is performed or how discretion is exercised. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 171.
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Sanborn's petition for a writ of mandamus.
Affirmed.