Opinion
Case No. 01-CV-10001-BC
March 14, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The plaintiff in this case is a state prisoner presently confined at the Standish Maximum Correctional Facility in Standish, Michigan ("SMF"). He has filed a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that his federal constitutional rights were abridged while he was a prisoner at another state facility. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder for full case management. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, asserting, among other things, that the plaintiffs case was subject to dismissal for both failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to state a claim under the guidelines of Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 64] (1997). The Magistrate Judge submitted a Report and Recommendation recommending that the defendant's motion he granted and the case dismissed. The plaintiff filed objections, and the matter is now before the Court for de novo review. Because the Magistrate Judge correctly determined the applicable law and correctly applied it to the allegations of the plaintiffs complaint, the report and recommendation will be adopted, and the plaintiffs complaint will be dismissed.
I.
This case arises from what appears to have been a longstanding personality conflict between the parties. Defendant, Sandra Monroe, is a registered nurse employed at the Alger Maximum Correctional Facility in Munising, Michigan. Although the plaintiff is currently incarcerated at SMF, he was previously housed at the Alger facility, and his claims in this case arise from that period of incarceration.
The plaintiff's pro se prisoner civil rights complaint, brought under 42 U.S. § 1983, alleges five causes of action against the defendant claiming that she unlawfully denied his prescribed medication on over seventy-six separate occasions, she impermissibly retaliated against him, assaulted him, verbally abused him, and wrongfully discussed his confidential medical issues with others at the facility. The plaintiff seeks both injunctive and monetary relief.
II
Current federal law states that before any prisoner may file a civil rights suit challenging prison conditions, he must exhaust all internal administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). A prisoners failure to demonstrate exhaustion of internal remedies requires dismissal See Brown it Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998). The internal administrative procedures must be followed oven if they do not offer the precise relief that the prisoner seeks See Booth K. Churner, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 1825 (2001); see also Porter it Nussle, No. 00-853, 2002 WL 261683 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2002). Dismissal without prejudice is required even if the time for filing the required grievance has expired. See Wright v. Morn, 111 F.3d 414, 417 n. 3 (6th Cir. 1997). A prisoner cannot abandon the grievance process before completion and then claim to have exhausted administrative remedies. Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 309 (6th Cir. 1999). To demonstrate exhaustion of his administrative remedies, the Sixth Circuit requires that an inmate attach copies of his filed grievances as proof of exhaustion. Brown, 139 F.3d at 1104. Failure to provide this affirmative showing of exhaustion justifies dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint. See Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of prisoner-plaintiffs claims for failure to attach proof of exhaustion to his complaint, even though it appeared that the prisoner had in fact exhausted his administrative remedies).
The Magistrate Judge correctly explained that the MDOC has a multi-stop grievance process in place. Each step has a time limit that can be wavied with good cause. First, within two business days, the prisoner should attempt verbally to resolve the dispute with those involved. If that fails, the inmate then must submit a Step I grievance within five days. The prison staff is required to respond within fifteen days. If the inmate is dissatisfied with the response, he may request a Step II appeal form within five days, and then has five additional days to submit it. If an inmate is dissatisfied with the result at Step II, he has ten business days to appeal to Step III, which concludes the grievance process. See generally MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130.
The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his claims alleging verbal abuse, physical assault, and unlawful disclosure of confidential information. Although the plaintiff did properly attach several Step III grievance denials to his complaint, none of those appeared to concern these three claims: instead, they complained of the defendant's failure to provide the plaintiff with his medication and her retaliation against him for his complaints about her. Because the claims alleging verbal abuse, physical assault, and unlawful disclosure of confidential information were not properly presented to the MDOC for internal review, they are not properly before the Court either. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The plaintiff objects to this finding, and claims that the exhibits he attached to his response to the defendant's motion clearly demonstrate that these three claims were exhausted. Pl.'s Obj. ¶ 3, at 4. The plaintiffs exhibits incorporate several inches of material, and the Court's examination confirms the Magistrate Judge's finding that the plaintiffs formal grievances only pertained to his denial of medical care and retaliation claims.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims concerning alleged verbal abuse, physical assault, and improper disclosure of confidential information will be dismissed without prejudice.
III
The plaintiff's two remaining claims each address issues that were repeatedly raised in prisoner misconduct hearings. As the Magistrate Judge explained, at each hearing, the defendant was exonerated and the plaintiff was found guilty of insolence or threatening behavior, both of which are prohibited by MDOC rules. The real problem, the hearing officers found, was not that the defendant was refusing to give the plaintiff his medications, but that the plaintiff was not following the procedures to receive his medications, which required him to ask for his medications and back up against the wall to ensure the nurses' safety. Frequently, the hearing officers found, the plaintiff would either not acknowledge the nurses at all, or instead refuse to back up against the far wall, choosing instead to shout "Get your bitch ass away from the door. I'll break your m*****-f***** neck [if you] open this door," and various other obscene provocations. See, e.g., Major Misconduct Report of 1/11/2000. To the extent that the plaintiff claims that misconduct hearings made erroneous findings, he is improperly attempting to collaterally attack the findings of those tribunals.
In 1994, the Supreme Court barred prisoners from raising claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that challenged the underlying validity of their convictions. See Heck v. Humphrey. 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). To raise such a claim, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that his conviction has been overturned on direct appeal, expunged by executive order or tribunal, or placed in doubt by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. Id. Otherwise, the plaintiffs only resort is to the writ of habeas corpus itself The Supreme Court subsequently recognized that the same principles prevented prisoners from collaterally attacking the outcomes of prison misconduct hearings in federal court. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997). in short, because the plaintiff in this case cannot prevail on his denial of medical care and retaliation claims without calling into question the hearing officers' rejection of the plaintiffs complaints, the Magistrate Judge correctly found that the plaintiff could not seek a contrary determination in federal court without demonstrating that his internal misconducts had been overturned or otherwise vacated.
The plaintiff raises several objections to this finding. First, he claims that barring collateral challenges to his misconduct tickets unlawfully conflicts with the Sixth Circuit's holding that a prisoner proving subjective intent to retaliate can state a claim for relief See Pl.'s Objs. ¶ 2 at 3-4. The plaintiff is incorrect. Heck and Edwards create a threshold requirement: if the plaintiffs claim is barred by previous findings against him, the Court cannot reach the merits of the claim. Even if the plaintiff were correct that Sixth Circuit case law conflicted with Heck and Edwards, the Sixth Circuit principles clearly would be forced to give way to the determinations of the United States Supreme Court in Heck and Edwards. Second, the plaintiff claims that because misconduct findings are non-grievable, he cannot exhaust them. Pl.'s Objs. ¶ 4 at 5. The plaintiff; however, is conflating the two issues: heck and Edwards have nothing to do with exhaustion. The Court has already found that the plaintiff properly exercised his rights through the MDOC grievance process to exhaust his claims concerning denied medications and retaliation. To overcome adverse misconduct hearing findings, however, the plaintiff needs to have those findings overturned — a mere grievance does not suffice, and, as the plaintiff points out, is not permitted by MDOC rules anyway. Third, the plaintiff complains that the MDOC hearing process has been found to be illegal. PI.'s Objs. ¶ 5 at 5. The closest authority on this point the Court can find is lied v. Van Ochten, 126 F. Supp.2d 487 (W.D. Mich. 2001), which approved a settlement forcing MDOC to improve its hearing procedures. The case did not, however, declare those procedures to be "illegal," and did not issue a ruling on the merits. Finally, the plaintiff complains that his complaint was never heard on the merits, that his rights were violated, that credibility issues require a trial, and that his request for a preliminary injunction was not heard. Pl.'s Objs. ¶¶ 1, 5, 6, 7. The reason the plaintiffs complaint was not heard on the merits was because it was never properly before the Court. A plaintiff who brings claims before the Court that are unexhausted or which collaterally attack previous losses essentially brings no cognizable claim at all.
IV.
The plaintiffs five claims are either barred by Supreme Court precedent or have not been exhausted through the MDOC grievance process, contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Because no claims remain upon which relief can be granted, the Court will dismiss the complaint.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED.
It is further ORDERED that the defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment [dkt #13] is GRANTED. The plaintiffs complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiffs remaining motions, including, but not limited to his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction [dkt #8], Motion for Order to Compel Discovery [dkt #17], and his second Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction [dkt #19] are DENIED AS MOOT.