Opinion
Case No. 5:00CV01810
September 21, 2001
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 45) and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 52). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 19, 2000, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against his former employer, the Hoover Company ("Hoover"), and his former union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 1985 ("the International Brotherhood"), alleging discrimination under Title VII, ( 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) and Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02 (A), as well as certain ERISA violations. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on September 6, 2000, which added allegations of negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress. (ECF No. 6). On November 22, 2000, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the International Brotherhood pursuant to Federal Civil Rule 41(a)(1)(i). (ECF No. 20).
Counts I, II, IV, V, and VI of the Amended Complaint remain pending against Defendant Hoover. Counts I and II allege that Hoover discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his race in violation of Title VII ( 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), and § 4112.02(A) of the Ohio Revised Code. Count IV alleges that Hoover negligently or intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon Plaintiff. Count V alleges that Hoover violated ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1166, by failing to provide Plaintiff with notice of his right to continued health coverage. Count VI alleges that Hoover's failure to notify Plaintiff of his health coverage options constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.
On August 1, 2001, Hoover filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 45). Plaintiff filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on September 5, 2001. (ECF No. 52).
II. FACTS
This case arises out of an incident that occurred on July 31, 1999, when Plaintiff was working at Hoover as a general laborer. Id. at 4. During his shift, Plaintiff, an African American, walked by a break table at which a number of his co-workers were seated. Id. As Plaintiff passed by, he overheard one of his Caucasian co-workers, Kenny Lunn, say to others at the table that he was glad that Plaintiff did not see what was inside his Tupperware container. Id. Lunn then opened the container to reveal that it contained watermelon. Id.
Plaintiff became irate over Lunn's remark and said to Lunn that "if he made a comment like that again, me and him was going to have a major problem." Id. Plaintiff threatened that he was going to get even with Lunn, then angrily left the area with a group leader and another employee who unsuccessfully attempted to calm Plaintiff down. (ECF No. 45, p. 4).
After the break ended, Plaintiff returned to Lunn's work area, and asked him why he would make such a comment. (ECF No. 45, Ex. A, Statement of Christopher Fite). Lunn attempted to apologize, but Plaintiff refused to accept his apology and instead shouted: "Say it louder! What did you say? Say it again!" id. Plaintiff then told Lunn, "I'm not going to rest until you pay for what you said to me." Id. At some point during the course of the altercation, Plaintiff aggressively stepped toward Lunn, and made physical contact with him, knocking his hat off of his head. (ECF No. 52, Ex. A, p. 20). A number of employees who observed the incident claim that Plaintiff also threw a wastepaper basket at Lunn, knocked a vacuum out of his hand, and threatened to kill him. (ECF No. 55, Exs. E-3, E-4, E-5, E-11, E-12). Although Plaintiff claims that Lunn called him a "nigger" during the altercation, the four employees he listed as having overheard the statement did not corroborate that claim. (ECF No. 52, Ex. A, p. 9).
After learning about the altercation, a foreman gave Plaintiff a pass allowing him to leave work before the end of his shift. Id. Rather than going home. Plaintiff waited in his car in a parking lot across the street from the Hoover facility for approximately one hour until the end of Lunn's shift. Id. Lunn and another employee claim that Plaintiff "followed Lunn for a brief period after Lunn pulled out of the parking lot at the end of the shift. (ECF No. 55, Exs. E-1, E-4). Plaintiff admits that he waited in the lot, but denies following Lunn. (ECF No. 52, Ex. A, pp. 22-23).
The Monday after the altercation, Plaintiff and Lunn were notified that they were under suspension pending further investigation. Id. at 23, 28. Tom Sack, Hoover's Labor Relations Manager, conducted the investigation by interviewing and obtaining written statements from Plaintiff and Lunn, and by obtaining written statements from thirteen co-workers who had witnessed at least some portion of the incident. (ECF No. 55, Ex. B). The statements of Plaintiff's co-workers confirm that Lunn made an inappropriate remark and that Plaintiff reacted to that remark by verbally and physically attacking Lunn. Id. at E-1 through E-12.
After reviewing the information obtained during the course of his investigation, Sack determined that Plaintiff had violated the following company rules:
Rule 10 Provoking a fight on company premises.
Rule 14 Endangering the safety of self or others by neglectful or careless behavior
Rule 27 Use of abusive language, threatening or intimidating another employee.
(ECF No. 45, p. 7). All Hoover employees are provided with a handbook listing these and other company rules. According to the handbook — which Plaintiff admits that he received — violation of any one of the above rules can result in suspension or discharge for a first offense. Id.
Sack decided that termination was warranted in Plaintiff's case because Plaintiff had attempted to continue the dispute and because several co-workers who witnessed the incident confirmed that Plaintiff had behaved in a threatening and physically confrontational manner. (ECF No. 50, pp. 17-20). Hoover terminated Plaintiff on August 11, 1999. Within 30 days of his last day of company-sponsored health care coverage (August 31, 1999), Professional Claims Management, Hoover's third party health plan administrator, sent Plaintiff a written notice concerning the availability of COBRA insurance benefits. (ECF No. 45, Ex. D). Although Plaintiff claims that he did not receive the notice, a receipt from the U.S. Postal Service reveals that the notice was mailed to him on September 24, 2001. Id.
Sack also found that Lunn had violated Rule 10. As a result of this finding, Hoover suspended Lunn for two weeks without pay. (ECF No. 50, p. 17). Plaintiff contends that Hoover's decision to suspend Lunn while terminating him was racially motivated. Defendant argues that Hoover terminated Plaintiff not because of his race, but because he violated three company rules, and that this decision was made after a thorough investigation.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. The Summary Judgment Standard
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The court is to determine "whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Libery Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The court views the evidence of record and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir. 1993).
Summary judgment is appropriate if a party who bears the burden of proof at trial does not establish an essential element of its case. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-248. In order for there to be a genuine issue for trial, there must be sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 249.
As stated by the Supreme Court:
. . . Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' [citations omitted] . . . Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
B. Plaintiff's Discrimination Claims
Plaintiff alleges that he was discriminatory discharged by Hoover in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000 and Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02 (A).
Section 2000e-2(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states in pertinent part;
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1) (1964).
Section 4112.02 of the Ohio Revised Code states in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
(A) For any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, age, or ancestry of any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment.
Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A) (1996).
In McDonnell Douglas corp. v. Green, the United States Supreme Court set forth the allocations of burdens and order of presentation of proof for cases alleging Title VII race discrimination. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of race discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 801-3. If the plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case, the employer must articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's discharge. Id. at 802. If the employer satisfies this second step, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's articulated reasons for discharging the plaintiff are a pretext for impermissible discrimination. Id. at 804. The Ohio Supreme Court has adopted the McDonnell Douglas standard for the adjudication of state law discrimination claims. Cincinnati Bar Assoc. v. Young, 89 Ohio St.3d 306, 315 (2000); Genaro v. Central Trans., Inc., 84 Ohio St.3d 293, 295 (1999); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Ingram, 69 Ohio St.3d 89, 93 (1994).
To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he: (1) is in a protected class; (2) suffered an adverse employment action; (3) was qualified for the employment position; and (4) comparable non-protected persons were treated more favorably. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp, 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th 1992); Myers v. Goodwill Industries of Akron, Inc., 122 Ohio App.3d 294, 302 (1997). To satisfy the fourth element and prove that an employer treated a "comparable non-protected person" more favorably, an employee "must show that the `comparables' are similarly-situated in all respects." Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 583; Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 858 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiffs chief difficulty in this case comes in establishing that he and Lunn were similarly situated in all respects. In order to establish that he and Lunn were similarly situated in all respects, Plaintiff must prove that Lunn has: (1) dealt with the same supervisor; (2) been subjected to the same standards; and (3) "engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them." Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 583, Lanear v. Safeway Grocery, 843 F.2d 298 (6th 1988) (stating that plaintiff must prove that he and Caucasian employee were similarly situated in all respects and the Caucasian employee's acts were of comparable seriousness to his own).
In this case, Plaintiff and Lunn are not "similarly situated in all respects." Hoover's investigation revealed that Plaintiff violated three company rules while Lunn violated only one rule. The Sixth Circuit has held that an employee who violates two or more company rules is not "similarly situated" to employees who violate only one company rule. Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 497 (6th Cir. 2001) (employee terminated for violation of two company rules not similarly situated to employees suspended for violation of a single company rule). Regardless of the number of rules each employee violated, an examination of the undisputed facts reveals that Plaintiff's behavior was far more disruptive than Lunn's behavior. Although Lunn made an inappropriate remark, he subsequently apologized for the remark and attempted to diffuse the situation. Plaintiffs on the other hand, sought to continue the dispute by repeatedly confronting Lunn during the remainder of the shift with both verbal threats and physical contact. It is apparent from these facts that Plaintiff and Lunn were not similarly situated in all respects. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under either Title VII or Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02(A).
Even if Plaintiff were able to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, he would be unable to meet his burden of proof under McDonnell Douglas. In order to establish that the employer's stated reason was a pretext, the plaintiff must produce evidence that could cause a reasonable jury to reject the defendant's explanation and infer that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d at 493. Such evidence must demonstrate "that the employer did not honestly believe in the proffered non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action." Id. at 494. In determining whether an employer had an "honest belief' in the proffered basis for the adverse employment action, courts must look to `whether the employer can establish its reasonable reliance on the particularized facts that were before it at the time the decision was made." Id.
Hoover has met its burden under McDonnell Douglas by asserting that Plaintiff was discharged because employee statements and interviews indicated that he violated three company rules. The only evidence Plaintiff offers to suggest that Hoover intentionally discriminated against him is the following:
Q. * * * Other than Lunn being white and you being black, upon what else do you base your claim that this decision was racially motivated?
A. Discipune was not equally imposed.
Q. Okay. Is that it?
A. That's the whole basis of it.
(ECF No. 48, pp. 37 — 38). As the Sixth Circuit's recent decision in Braithwaite v. Timken Co., reveals, a plaintiff must go far beyond such conclusory allegations to establish that an employer's claim that it terminated an employee based upon violations of company rules was a mere pretext for racial discrimination. 258 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2001).
In Braithwaite, the defendant employer terminated the plaintiff, an African American employee, who allegedly shoved and threatened a co-worker. Id. at 495. The plaintiff claimed that he did not shove the other employee and that his termination was racially motivated. Id. The employer produced evidence indicating that the plaintiffs termination was based not on his race, but upon his violation of two company rules — one which prohibited employee's from striking another person and another which prohibited employees from threatening another person. Id. at 492. The employer's finding that the plaintiff had violated these rules was based upon written statements provided by several employees who witnessed some portion of the altercation. Id. at 494.
The plaintiff responded to the employer's explanation of the legitimate business reason for his termination by arguing that: (1) management ignored statements helpful to him; (2) the company discouraged other employees from making statements; and (3) the company did not allow him to make a statement. Id. at 494. Despite the plaintiffs arguments, the Sixth Circuit held that summary judgment was properly granted to the defendant because "the plaintiffs allegations did not present any material evidence that Timken did not `make a reasonably informed and considered decision' and did not `honestly believe' that [plaintiff] shoved [another employee] when they fired him." Id. United States District Court, at 497. Like the plaintiff in Braithwaite, Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence indicating that Hoover did not "make a reasonably informed and considered decision" and did not "honestly believe" that Plaintiff had violated three company rules when it terminated him. For this reason, summary judgment in favor of Hoover is appropriate with regard to Plaintiff's federal and state law discrimination claims.
C. Plaintiff's Claims for Intentional or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In order to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff must prove the following elements:
(1) that the actor either intended to cause emotional distress or knew or should have known that actions taken would result in serious emotional distress to the plaintiff;
(2) that the actor's conduct was extreme and outrageous, that it went beyond all possible bounds of decency and that it can be considered as utterly intolerable in a civilized community;
(3) that the actor's actions were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs psychic injury; and
(4) that the mental anguish suffered by Plaintiff is serious and of a nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 71 Ohio St.3d 408, 410 (1994); Miller v. Premier Industries Corp., 136 Ohio App.3d 662, 674 (2000).
The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that ". . . in order to state a claim alleging the intentional infliction of emotional distress, the emotional distress alleged must be severe. Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen helpers of America, 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 374 (1983). Further, [s]erious emotional distress requires an emotional injury which is both severe and debilitating." Burkes v. Stidham, 107 Ohio App.3d 363, 375 (1995) (citing Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St.3d 72 (1983) (emphasis added)).
The Ohio Supreme Court has described "extreme and outrageous conduct," as required by the second element, as follows:
It [is not] enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by `malice,' or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, `Outrageous!' The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.Yeager at 374. The Supreme Court has applied these standards in the employment context. See, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 134 (1997) (An employer's secret videotaping and subsequent discharge of an employee based on information obtained from the videotape does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct); Thatcher v. Goodwill Indus. of Akron, 117 Ohio App.3d 525 (1997) (An employer who has actual knowledge of an employee's mental disorder, speaks to the employee coarsely, advances threateningly toward him, and subsequently discharges him has not engaged in conduct that rises to the requisite level of "outrageousness.").
Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence to satisfy any of the four required elements articulated in Phung and Miller, supra. First, "Hoover could not have known that discharging Plaintiff would result in serious emotional distress. Plaintiff voluntarily engaged in actions that he knew could ultimately result in his discharge. Therefore, any emotional distress is attributable to Plaintiff's own conduct. Second, Plaintiff cannot prove that Hoover's conduct in discharging him was `extreme and outrageous." Hoover discharged Plaintiff because he violated known rules that expressly prohibit certain conduct within the workplace. This decision was made after a considered investigation that included the interviewing of numerous witnesses, including Plaintiff. Furthermore, employees are routinely discharged for violating company policies and rules. Discharging an employee who has assaulted and threatened to kill his co-worker would be justified under any circumstances. When such conduct violates a known rule, the discharge is even more reasonable. At the very least, such action by an employer cannot be considered "utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Third, Hoover's actions did not proximately cause Plaintiff's psychological injury, if any. Plaintiffs own actions are the proximate cause of whatever damages or injuries he has sustained, if any. Plaintiff has produced no evidence demonstrating serious mental anguish arising from his discharge. In fact, Plaintiff has produced no evidence of any psychological harm.
In Kulch and Thatcher, the employers engaged in intrusive, affirmative, and egregious conduct toward an employee. Even so, summary judgment was granted in favor of the employers and upheld on appeal. In the present case, Hoover neither demeaned the Plaintiff nor invaded his privacy. At no time did Hoover manifest any animus or condescension toward the Plaintiff. Consequently, Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Ohio courts do not recognize a separate tort for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context. Tschantz v. Ferguson, 97 Ohio App.3d 693, 714 (1994). Therefore, Plaintiff can only recover for emotional harm negligently inflicted by Hoover by instituting a traditional claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. The elements that must be established to prevail on a traditional claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress require Plaintiff to demonstrate that he: (1) was a bystander to an accident; (2) reasonably appreciated the peril thereof; and (3) suffered serious or foreseeable emotional distress as a result of his cognizance or fear of the peril. Id.
The facts giving rise to this case do not involve an accident. As such, Plaintiff could not have been a bystander to an accident. Thus, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the first element of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and therefore, his cause of action in this regard must fail.
D. Plaintiff's ERISA Claims
Pursuant to ERISA, an employer has certain duties with respect to providing a former employee with notice of his or her right to continuation of coverage under a group health plan. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1166 states in pertinent part:
(2) the employer of an employee under a plan must notify the administrator of a qualifying event described in paragraph (1), (2), (4), or (6) of section 1163 of this title within 30 days (or, in the case of a group health plan which is a multiemployer plan, such longer period of time as may be provided in the terms of the plan) of the date of the qualifying event. * * * *
(4) the administrator shall notify —
(A) in the case of a qualifying event described in paragraph (1), (2), (4), or (6) of section 1163 of this title, any qualified beneficiary with respect to such event, and . . . of such beneficiary's rights under this subsection.
Contrary to Plaintiff's allegations, Hoover, by and through its health plan administrator, Professional Claims Management, notified Plaintiff of all benefits available to him under ERISA within thirty days of the date of his health care insurance termination date. (ECF No. 45, Ex. D). Plaintiff has produced no evidence to dispute this fact other than his own unsubstantiated allegations that he did not receive the notice. Without more, Plaintiff's ERISA causes of action, as set forth in Counts V and VI, must fail.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to each of the claims in his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6), he has failed to produce evidence sufficient enough to sustain any of his claims. It is undisputed that Plaintiff initiated a verbal and physical altercation with Lunn that was in violation of Hoover's company rules. It is also undisputed that Hoover conducted an investigation into the events surrounding the incident before it decided to terminate Plaintiff. The only evidence that Plaintiff has offered in support of his discrimination claims is the fact that he received a more severe punishment than a Caucasian employee who engaged in entirely different conduct. Such evidence cannot establish a prima fade case of discrimination under either federal or state law, and certainly cannot support a judgment in Plaintiff's favor.
Plaintiffs intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are even more problematic. Although Plaintiff amended his initial Complaint to add these claims, he does not address them in his Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 52) and has produced absolutely no evidence relating to them. In the absence of any evidence that Hoover behaved in an outrageous manner or that Plaintiff was a witness to an accident, Plaintiff cannot sustain, let alone obtain a favorable judgment on his intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.
Plaintiffs ERISA claims are also unsubstantiated. Plaintiff claims that Hoover failed to notify him that he was eligible for continued health benefits under COBRA. Hoover responded to this allegation by producing an affidavit and supporting documents indicating that its agent sent Plaintiff a letter detailing his health rare options within the required time period. Plaintiffs failure to produce any evidence to the contrary makes it impossible for him to establish that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his ERISA claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 52) must be DENIED.
Defendant Hoover, meanwhile, has produced substantial evidence indicating that it had a legitimate business reason for terminating Plaintiff and that it abided by federal law when notifying him about the possibility of continuing his health care coverage. Defendant has no obligation to offer any evidence in opposition to Plaintiff's infliction of emotional distress claims as Plaintiff has not offered any evidence in support of these claims. Because there are no genuine issues of material fact and Defendant has established that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with regard to all of the claims in the Amended Complaint, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment No. 45).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
This Court, having filed its Memorandum of Opinion and Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 45), hereby enters judgment in favor of the defendant, The Hoover Company, and against the plaintiff, Christopher E. Fite. Accordingly, this action is hereby terminated pursuant to Federal
IT IS SO ORDERED.