Opinion
No. 18-16389
04-26-2019
JOHNATHAN ARTHUR FIELDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUSTIN McQUEEN, #8063; Police Officer at Phoenix Police Department, Defendant-Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-02863-GMS MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Johnathan Arthur Fields appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising from his arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008) (dismissal based on the statute of limitations). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The district court properly dismissed Fields's Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure claim as time-barred because Fields filed this action after the applicable statute of limitations had run. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542; TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999) (two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in Arizona); see also Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2015) ("[F]ederal law holds that a cause of action for illegal search and seizure accrues when the wrongful act occurs, even if the person does not know at that time that the search was warrantless." (internal citation omitted)).
The district court dismissed Fields's malicious prosecution claim because Fields failed to allege that he was prosecuted in the absence of probable cause. However, Fields alleged that defendant McQueen falsely stated in his police report that Fields had consented to a search. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim. See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066-68 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth elements of a malicious prosecution claim and stating that a finding of probable cause can be rebutted by "showing that the criminal prosecution was induced by fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith"). We reverse the district court's judgment in part and remand for further proceedings on Fields's malicious prosecution claim. Furthermore, because the district court did not address Fields's false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, we remand for the district court to consider these claims in the first instance.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fields's motions for leave to amend the complaint because Fields failed to comply with the local rules. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review); Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Broad deference is given to a district court's interpretation of its local rules." (citation omitted)).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Fields's "motion for answering brief" (Docket Entry No. 22) is denied as unnecessary.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.