Opinion
No. 2001-2174.
June 16, 2008.
Marissa A. Furnari, Administrative Judicial Secretary, Lawrence Superior Court, Essex County.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This is a slip and fall action in which the plaintiff, Robert J. Fales, Sr., alleges negligence on behalf of the defendant, Ellen Hooten. Hooten now moves for summary judgment. For the following reasons, Hooten's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby ALLOWED .
BACKGROUND
The relevant undisputed and disputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are as follows:
On May 24, 1998, Fales visited his estranged wife, Nina Galante, at the first-floor apartment she rented from Hooten on 32 Garland Street, Chelsea, Massachusetts. Fales entered the apartment from the rear entrance. This required him to walk across a 10' x 12' wooden deck leading to the back door. Walking toward the rear entrance, one is bordered by the house on the right side and a railing on the left side. At the time of the incident, there were two doors at the rear entrance, one storm door and one exterior door with a single window. Going into the apartment, the storm door opened left to right outward with the hinge on the right and the exterior door opened inward right to left with the hinge on the left.
As Fales left the apartment after his visit, he exited through the rear entrance. He walked through the kitchen and turned left to walk down a passageway to the rear entrance deck. Fales opened the exterior door inward, from his left to the right. Using his left hand, Fales then opened the storm door outward, from his right to the left. His right hand was not on anything. Fales crossed the door's threshold, stepping out with his right foot first. As Fales put his foot down, it landed on the edge of the exterior doormat placed on the deck in front of the storm door. His ankle rolled, and he sustained injuries to his right ankle and knee.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the summary judgment record shows "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(c); DuPont v. Comm'r of Corr., 448 Mass. 389, 397 (2007). A fact is "material" if it would affect the outcome of the suit. Carey v. New England Organ Bank, 446 Mass. 270, 278 (2006); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is "genuine" where a reasonable finder of fact could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Flesner v. Technical Commc'ns Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 809 (1991), citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a triable issue and the summary judgment record entitles it to judgment as a matter of law. Ng Bros. Constr., Inc. v. Cranney, 436 Mass. 638, 644 (2002), citingPederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 17 (1989); Kourouvacilis v. Gen. Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991). The moving party may satisfy its burden by submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the opposing party's case or by demonstrating the non-moving party has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of his case at trial. Flesner, 410 Mass. at 809; Kourouvacilis, 410 Mass. at 716 (adopting reasoning contained in Celotex Corp. v.Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), that "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case").
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141, 143 (2006), citing Coveney v. President Trs. of the Coll. of the Holy Cross, 388 Mass. 16, 17 (1983); see Simplex Techs., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 Mass. 196, 197 (1999). If the moving party has carried his burden, and the opposing party has not responded with specific facts to establish a genuine, triable issue, the court grants the motion for summary judgment. Cmty. Nat'l Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 554 (1976); see Ng Bros., 436 Mass. at 644 (stating even where the facts are disputed, "summary judgment is still available if the party with the burden of proof at trial . . . fails to present in the summary judgment record, taking everything it says as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, sufficient facts to warrant a finding in its favor"), citing White v. Univ. of Mass. at Boston, 410 Mass. 553, 557 (1991).
II. Fales' Arguments
Fales argues Hooten breached her duty of care to keep her premises in a reasonably safe condition. Under Massachusetts law, a private landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to all persons who are lawfully on her premises. Greenwood v. Town of Easton, 444 Mass. 467, 474 (2005). While a property owner is not required to provide a place of maximum security, Barry v. Beverly Enterprises-Massachusetts, Inc., 418 Mass. 590, 593 (1994), they are obliged to maintain premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn visitors of any unreasonable dangers or defects of which the owner is aware or reasonably should be aware.Davis v. Westwood Group, 420 Mass. 739, 743 (1995).
Fales contends the rear entrance doors were installed incorrectly. Had Hooten properly installed the doors, the exterior door's knob and the storm door's handle would have been on the same side and both doors would have opened in the same direction. Fales alleges the combination of the incorrect installation of the doors and the placement of the doormat created a defective condition causing him to contort his body as he exited, thus landing awkwardly on the edge of the doormat and sustaining injury.
Fales does not, however, point this court to any evidence showing Hooten knew, or should have known, the placement of the doormat, in conjunction with the way the doors opened, created an unreasonably dangerous condition on the premises. The evidence is the mat was beneath the rear entrance doorway, one step down. There is no evidence Hooten knew anything about the doormat or who had placed it there. Indeed, Fales testified in his deposition he had never met Hooten and he never told his wife to complain to Hooten regarding a condition of the property. (Joint Statement of Facts, ex. 4, Fales Deposition, p. 115). As there is no evidence in the record Hooten was aware of an alleged defect on the premises, she cannot be liable. See, e.g.,Richardson v. Star Market Co., 356 Mass. 731 (1969) (verdict for defendant not error where defendant did not know, or should have known, items existed on floor of premises which caused plaintiff to fall and sustain injury); Allen v. Albert Zallen Co., 340 Mass. 785 (1960) (not error to enter order of directed verdict in favor of defendant where plaintiff tripped and fell on a rolled up mat in defendant's store but where defendant did not have reason to know of dangerous condition of mat); Santos v. Bettencourt, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 90, 91 (1996) (upholding order allowing defendant's motion for summary judgment where plaintiff did not present any evidence the defendant knew or should have known scaffolding set up at his house was dangerous).
Fales also does not proffer an expert opinion or intend to call an expert to testify the door installation was incorrect. Nor does he point to any regulations with regard to the installation of doors and which side the hinge and door handle or knob must be placed.
ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that Hooten's Motion for Summary Judgment is ALLOWED .