Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-379, c/w 03-572", SECTION "R" (5)
September 15, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the motion of defendants St. Bernard Parish School Board and Larry Cowan for a Rule 7(a) reply. For the following reasons, the Court grants defendants' motion.
I. Background
Plaintiffs allege that defendant Charles O'Neil sexually molested their minor children while the children were students at P.G.T. Beauregard Middle School. Plaintiffs assert that at the time of the alleged molestation, O'Neil was a physical education teacher at P.G.T. Beauregard. Plaintiffs allege claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against O'Neil, the St. Bernard Parish School Board, and P.G.T. Beauregard's principal, Stephen "Larry" Cowan. Plaintiffs allege that the School Board and Cowan were aware of O'Neil's actions well before the acts complained of in their complaints and yet did nothing to remedy the situation. Plaintiffs contend that the defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference to the constitutional right of bodily integrity and due process of their minor children, that Cowan developed and maintained policies or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the P.G.T. Beauregard students, and that it was the policy and/or custom of the School Board and/or P.G.T. Beauregard to inadequately supervise and train its teachers. Plaintiffs also allege claims under Louisiana state law.
II. Discussion
Plaintiffs allege that the defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 42 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]Id. Defendants now move the Court to order plaintiffs to file a reply under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a) to respond to Cowan's assertion of the defense of qualified immunity. See FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a). It is well established that qualified immunity shields public officials from suit and liability under § 1983, "unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted); see also Gibson v. P.A. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995). Since qualified immunity does not merely offer immunity from liability, but provides immunity from suit, see Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 1994), plaintiffs must allege more than conclusory allegations to support their claims. See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). In Section 1983 cases against individual public officials, the Fifth Circuit requires "claims of specific conduct and actions giving rise to a constitutional violation." Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433-34; McGee v. Hunter, 2003 WL 21991662 (E.D.La.) (concluding that "in order to survive a qualified immunity defense the plaintiff must allege particularized facts that support his allegation.") (emphasis in original).
The Fifth Circuit has also stated that it would be unfair to require a plaintiff to anticipate the qualified immunity defense when drafting a complaint. See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1430; see also Mahrous v. O'Brien, 1998 WL 166189, at *1 (E.D.La.). Accordingly, the court designed a unique pleading procedure to manage such cases. See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433-34. First, a plaintiff is required to file a short and plain statement of his complaint relying on more than mere conclusions. A district court may then, in its discretion, insist that a plaintiff file a reply specifically responding to the defendants' qualified immunity defense. See id.; Todd v. Hawk, 72 F.3d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 1995). "Vindicating the immunity doctrine will ordinarily require such a reply, and a district court's discretion not to do so is narrow indeed when greater detail might assist." Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434; see also Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that when faced with sparse details of claimed wrongdoing by officials, trial courts should "routinely" require plaintiffs to file a reply under Rule 7(a) to qualified immunity defenses).
Here, plaintiffs' complaints contain only conclusory allegations. Plaintiffs assert that Cowan and the School Board had notice of O'Neil's conduct well before their children revealed O'Neil's sexual molestation, but plaintiffs fail to allege any specific facts to support this conclusory statement. In a case with similar allegations by the plaintiff, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court committed clear error by not ordering the plaintiff to reply to the defendant's qualified immunity defense. See Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1996) (determining that plaintiff's claims required more specific facts when they alleged only that the investigating officer "knew, or should have known" that a witness's statements were false or that the officer "knew" that the evidence was insufficient to take to trial). Accordingly, the Court orders plaintiffs to file a reply under Rule 7(a) tailored to answer Cowan's assertion of qualified immunity.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants defendants' motion for a Rule 7(a) reply and orders plaintiffs to file a reply to Cowan's assertion of qualified immunity under Rule 7(a) by September 26, 2003.