Opinion
EP-03-CA-0517-DB, EP-01-CR-1737-DB.
June 10, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S AMENDED MOTION TO VACATE
Before the Court is Petitioner Francisco Javier Estrada's ("Estrada") Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("Amended Motion to Vacate") [Docket no. 114], filed through counsel on February 17, 2005. After review, the Court concludes that Estrada is clearly not entitled to relief regarding any of his claims. The Court will accordingly dismiss this matter with prejudice pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases. It will additionally deny Estrada a Certificate of Appealability.
I. BACKGROUND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. Criminal cause no. EP-01-CR-1737-DB
On October 3, 2001, the Grand Jury sitting in El Paso, Texas returned a one-count Indictment against Estrada, charging him with conspiring to import 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(1), 960(b)(1)(G), and 963. Estrada opted for a bench trial. On March 1, 2002, the Court found Estrada guilty as charged in the Indictment and set the matter for sentencing. The Court entered Judgment on April 29, 2002, sentencing him to a 235-term of imprisonment and a 10-year term of supervised release. The Court additionally ordered Estrada to pay a $100 special assessment.
Estrada timely appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because there was no evidence that he conspired to import anymore than 332.37 kilograms of marijuana. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Estrada's argument and affirmed his conviction on March 14, 2003. Estrada did not seek a writ of certiorari.
B. Estrada's Original Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
Estrada filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("Original Motion to Vacate") [Docket no. 84] on December 16, 2003. Therein, he raised nine claims for relief, arguing that the Government secured his conviction with evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure, an unlawful arrest, and a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination (Original Claims One through Three, respectively); failed to disclose evidence favorable to him (Original Claim Four); and violated the prohibition against double jeopardy (Original Claim Five). Estrada additionally alleged that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney, Kenneth Del Valle ("Del Valle"), filed no motions; failed to cross-examine Special Agent David Weatherly ("Weatherly") regarding a statement Weatherly made at a detention hearing; did not object to the Court testifying against his client concerning co-conspirator Maria Luisa Martinez; did not object to prosecution witness Raul Medina's testimony that he did not have a plea agreement with the Government; did not establish relevant conduct; did not raise a Fourth Amendment issue; did not calculate the amount of marijuana involved in the conspiracy; did not raise a due process defense; did not present witnesses favorable to Estrada; allowed Estrada to appear in court dressed in a blue jump suit; and allowed the Court to cause Estrada to incriminate himself (Original Claim Six). Estrada further asserted that he was denied due process (Original Claim Seven), the right to notice (Original Claim Eight), and the right to confront the witnesses against him (Original Claim Nine). The Government filed a Response [Docket no. 96] to Estrada's Original Motion to Vacate on June 21, 2004.
C. Estrada's Amended Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
On June 18, 2004, three days before the Government filed its Response to Estrada's pro se Original Motion to Vacate, attorney Arturo M. Hernandez ("Hernandez") entered an appearance on Estrada's behalf and requested a 60-day extension of time in which to file an Amended Motion to Vacate. Hernandez advised the Court that he had been recently retained to represent Estrada and required more time to review the records and issues in this cause. The Court granted the extension in an Order dated July 20, 2004. After being granted a number of additional extensions (the details of which are more fully recounted in the Court's Order [Docket no. 116] dated March 23, 2005, and Hernandez' Motion for Reconsideration [Docket no. 117], filed on April 27, 2005), Hernandez filed an Amended Motion to Vacate on February 17, 2005.
In the Amended Motion to Vacate, Hernandez, who does not incorporate any of Estrada's original claims by reference, abandons all of Estrada's former claims in favor of a new ineffective assistance of counsel claim and two claims based on the Supreme Court's recent holding in United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___ 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (" Booker"). Specifically, Hernandez alleges that Estrada's conviction and sentence should be vacated because the findings which formed the basis for his enhanced sentence were not admitted by Estrada or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (Amended Claim One). Second, Hernandez argues that, in light of Booker, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the quantity of marijuana attributable to Estrada exceeded 1000 kilograms, and thus did not justify the application of a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(G) (Amended Claim Two). Lastly, Hernandez asserts that Del Valle labored under a conflict of interest and thus rendered ineffective assistance because he focused his energies on negotiating a plea agreement rather than on preparing for trial (Amended Claim Three).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
After a defendant has been convicted and exhausted or waived any right to appeal, a court is normally "entitled to presume that [he] stands fairly and finally convicted." Accordingly, "relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice." A criminal defendant seeking relief from his conviction or sentence in a Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 must therefore establish one of the following: (1) his sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence imposed exceeded the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.
United States v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1592 (1982); United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 231-31 (5th Cir. 1991)).
United States v. Gaudet, 81 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
See United States v. Seyfert, 67 F.3d 544, 546 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
Moreover, "when raising issues of jurisdictional or constitutional magnitude for the first time on collateral review, a defendant ordinarily must show both cause for his procedural default and actual prejudice resulting from the error." This cause-and-actual-prejudice standard is "significantly more rigorous than even the plain error standard applied on direct appeal." The procedural bar does not apply, however, to claims which could not have been raised on direct appeal, such as those alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
Gaudet, 81 F.3d at 589.
Id.
III. BOOKER'S NON-RETROACTIVITY AND THE UNTIMELINESS OF ESTRADA'S AMENDED CLAIMS UNDER THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996
For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that Estrada's amended claims are untimely under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132 § 105, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996). The Court first considers whether, regarding his Booker-based claims, Estrada may rely on the date of that decision's release as the event triggering the one-year limitations period. The Court concludes that he may not.
A. Booker's holding
In Booker, the Supreme Court considered whether the Apprendi line of cases applied to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and if so, what portions, if any, of the Sentencing Guidelines remained in effect. Booker reaffirmed the Supreme Court's earlier holding in Apprendi: "Any fact (other than that of a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." Applying the principle that "the Sixth Amendment requires juries, not judges, to find facts relevant to sentencing," Booker excised the provision of the federal sentencing statute making it mandatory for district courts to apply the Sentencing Guidelines. While the district court must consider the Sentencing Guidelines, it may also tailor a defendant's sentence in light of the statutory concerns set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment. B. Retroactivity of new rules announced by the Supreme Court of the United States
See United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 747 n. 1 (2005) (stating the questions presented for review); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Booker, ___ U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at 748.
See Booker, ___ U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at 748; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).
See Booker, ___ U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at 757; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
When a Supreme Court decision results in a new rule, that rule applies to all criminal cases still pending on direct review. The new rule applies in only limited circumstances, however, to convictions that are already final.
Schriro v. Summerlin, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2522 (2004); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
Schriro, ___ U.S. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2522.
New substantive rules generally apply retroactively to convictions that are already final. New substantive rules result from decisions narrowing the scope of a criminal statute by limiting its terms, or from constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State's power to punish. "Such rules apply retroactively because they necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him."
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2522-23 (internal quotations omitted).
In contrast, new procedural rules generally do not apply retroactively, because "[t]hey do not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct the law does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise." Due to the more speculative connection between the invalidated procedure and innocence, only "a small set of watershed rules of criminal procedure" ( i.e., those implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding) are given retroactive effect. It is not enough that a new procedural rule is "fundamental in some abstract sense." Rather, the new rule must be one "without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." This class of rules is extremely narrow.
Schriro, ___ U.S. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2523.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Id.; see also Beard v. Banks, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 124 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2004) (observing that the Supreme Court has yet to find a new rule that falls within this category).
A district judge may determine whether a new decision of the Supreme Court applies retroactively and thus whether a collateral attack pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ¶ 6(3). C. Booker represents a new procedural rule that is not retroactive to cases on collateral review.
Ashley v. United States, 266 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Wiegand v. United States, 380 F.3d 890, 892-93 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that the district court should decide retroactivity in a first instance); Dodd v. United States, 365 F.3d 1273,1278 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Every circuit to consider this issue has held that a court other than the Supreme Court can make the retroactivity decision for purposes of § 2255 ¶ 6(3).").
Rules that regulate only the manner of determining a defendant's culpability are procedural. Judged by this standard, Booker's holding, which rests entirely on the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee, is properly classified as procedural. The rule announced in Booker merely alters the range of permissible methods for determining whether a defendant's conduct is punishable, requiring a jury rather than a judge to find the essential facts bearing on punishment. "Rules that allocate decisionmaking authority in this fashion are prototypical procedural rules" and do not apply retroactively to convictions that are already final. Although "the right to jury trial is fundamental to our system of criminal procedure . . . it does not follow that, when a criminal defendant has had a full trial and one round of appeals in which the [Government] faithfully applied the Constitution as we understood it at that time, he may nevertheless continue to litigate his claims indefinitely in hopes that we will one day have a change of heart."
Schriro, ___ U.S. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2523; Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998).
See Schriro, ___ U.S. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2523.
Id.
Schriro, ___ U.S. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2523; see Guzman v. United States, No. 03-2446, ___ F. 3d ___, ___, 2005 WL 803214, *1, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5700, *3 (2d. Cir. Apr. 8, 2005) (holding that Booker is not retroactive and does not apply to judgments that were final before Jan. 12, 2005); United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 845 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that Booker does not apply to initial habeas corpus petitions brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255); Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 856 (6th Cir. Feb. 25, 2005) (holding that Booker does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review); Varela v. United States, 400 F.3d 864, 868 (11th Cir. Feb. 17, 2005) (" Booker's constitutional rule falls squarely under the category of new rules of criminal procedure that do not apply retroactively to § 2255 cases on collateral review."); McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. Feb. 2, 2005) ("We conclude . . . that Booker does not apply retroactively to criminal cases that became final before its release on Jan. 12, 2005.").
Schriro, ___ U.S. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2526.
In sum, this Court, in keeping with every circuit court of appeals to decide the issue, concludes that Booker does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Court additionally finds that January 12, 2005, the date on which the Supreme Court decided Booker, rather than June 24, 2004, the date on which it decided Blakely, is the appropriate dividing line for determining whether a judgment may be attacked pursuant to the new rule. That is, petitioners whose judgments became final before January 12, 2005 may not claim relief pursuant to Booker. D. Because the rule announced in Booker does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, any claim Estrada wishes to raise based on Booker or any other legal theory is time-barred.
See Lloyd v. United States, No. 04-cv-03687, 2005 WL 1155220, at *6, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 8699, at *19 (3rd Cir. May 17, 2005); Guzman, ___ F. 3d ___, ___, 2005 WL 803214, at *1, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5700, at *3; United States v. Price, 400 F.3d at 845; Humphress, 398 F.3d at 856; Varela, 400 F.3d at 868; McReynolds, 397 F.3d at 481.
In the words of Judge Easterbrook, " Blakely reserved decision about the status of the federal Sentencing Guidelines, so Booker itself represents the establishment of a new rule about the federal system." McReynolds, 397 F.3d at 481.
In the AEDPA, Congress established a one-year limitation period for filing a motion to vacate sentence pursuant to § 2255, which states:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 ¶ 6 (West Supp. 2004).
The AEDPA thus describes four different events which could trigger the limitations period. Because this Court has determined that the rule announced in Booker does not apply retroactively to convictions on collateral review, the relevant time, for purposes of all Estrada's amended claims, is the date on which his Judgment became final.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ¶ 6(1) (stating that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date that judgment becomes final); compare 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ¶ 6(3) (stating that the limitations period begins to run on the date that the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review).
Here, Judgment became final on June 14, 2003, ninety days after the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and the time for seeking certiorari review expired. Estrada therefore had until June 14, 2004 to file claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. While Estrada's Original Motion to Vacate came within the limitations period, he did not proffer his Amended Motion to Vacate until February 17, 2005. The claims in his Amended Motion to Vacate are therefore time-barred unless the claims in his timely Original Motion to Vacate subsume them pursuant to the "relation back" doctrine.
See S.CT.R. 13.
E. Relation-Back of Pleadings
When determining whether an amendment to an original motion to vacate should be considered as time-barred, the Fifth Circuit has adopted the principles found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) ("Rule 15(c)"). In Saenz, the Fifth Circuit applied Rule 15 to § 2255 proceedings and determined that "[a]n amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading." Accordingly, while amendments that expand upon or clarify facts previously alleged will typically relate back, those that significantly alter the nature of a proceeding by injecting new and unanticipated claims are treated far more cautiously.
United States v. Saenz, 282 F.3d 354, 355-56 (5th Cir. 2002).
Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(2)).
Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 762 (9th Cir. 1999) ("If the amended complaint alleged a new claim for relief that arose out of different conduct or transactions it would not relate back to the original complaint."); FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1385-86 (5th Cir. 1994) ("The theory that animates this rule is that `once litigation involving particular conduct or a given transaction or occurrence has been instituted, the parties are not entitled to the protection of the statute of limitations against the later assertion by amendment of defenses or claims that arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as set forth in the original pleading.'" (citations omitted)); 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1497, at 84 (2d ed. 1990).
In the context of § 2255 amendments, courts in general have taken a relatively consistent approach to the "relation back" doctrine. Although Rule 15(c) could be read to mean that the relevant "occurrence" is the claimant's trial and sentencing, this interpretation has been justly resisted. In most cases, a prisoner's claims for collateral relief will arise out of the same criminal conviction; therefore, if the defendant's trial and sentencing are construed to be the "occurrence," virtually any purported amendment will relate back. Such a result would be difficult to square with Congress' decision to expedite collateral attacks by placing stringent time restrictions on § 2255 motions to vacate.
United States v. Pittman, 209 F.3d 314, 318 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F.3d 501, 505 (10th Cir. 2000); Davenport v. United States, 217 F.3d 1341, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 2000); and United States v. Craycraft, 167 F.3d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 1999).
For example, in United States v. Craycraft, the Eighth Circuit held that an untimely claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not filing an appeal did not relate back to timely claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for not pursuing a downward departure, not objecting to the characterization of the drugs, and not raising challenges to his prior state conviction. The court observed that amendments to a pleading under Rule 15(c) "relate back" "only if the claim asserted in the original pleading and the claim asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence." The court determined that "[i]f the ineffective conduct alleged by Craycraft in his first petition cannot be said to have arisen out of the same set of facts as his amended claim, his amendment cannot relate back and his claim must be time-barred since it was filed after the statutory period of limitation." The court concluded that counsel's "[failure] to file an appeal is a separate occurrence in both time and type from a failure to pursue a downward departure or failure to object to the type of drugs at issue."
Craycraft, 167 F.3d at 456-57.
Id. at 457.
Id.
Id.
As emphasized by the Eighth Circuit, "[t]he rationale of Rule 15(c) is that a party who has been notified of litigation concerning a particular occurrence has been given all the notice that statutes of limitation were intended to provide." The court noted "Craycraft's original complaint alleged deficiencies of representation distinctly separate from the deficiency alleged in his amendments." Thus the Eighth Circuit concluded that "[w]e cannot say that his original petition would provide notice of such a different sort of theory" and "[t]herefore, the amendment cannot relate back under Rule 15(c) and it must be time barred."
Id.
Id.
Id.
In United States v. Pittman, the defendant sought to amend his timely-filed § 2255 motion to vacate by asserting claims unrelated to any claim in his original motion to vacate. In his first motion to vacate, the defendant alleged that the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to impose an enhanced sentence based on prior convictions, the enhancement was improper, and the Government had not proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the drugs at issue were crack cocaine. In his amended motion to vacate, he asserted that counsel's failure to appeal constituted ineffective assistance, and the sentencing court improperly enhanced his sentence for obstruction of justice. In upholding the district court's denial of the defendant's request to amend, the Fourth Circuit held that the "new claims do not relate back to his original claims because they arise from separate occurrences of both time and type." Concerning the new enhancement for obstruction of justice claim, the Fourth Circuit stated that "[w]hile this claim has the same form as the original claims for improper enhancement, it arises out of wholly different conduct." The Fourth Circuit unequivocally rejected the defendant's argument that his new claims should relate back because the "`occurrence' for purposes of Rule 15(c) should be the entire trial and sentencing proceeding." The court reasoned that to allow amendment simply because the amended claims relate to the same trial and sentencing proceedings as those in the original motion to vacate "would undermine the limitations period set by Congress in the AEDPA."
Id.
Id.
Id. at 318 (quotation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lastly, in Davenport v. United States, the defendant timely filed a § 2255 motion to vacate raising four claims, three concerning alleged errors in his trial and sentencing and a fourth alleging that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the first three. After the Government responded, the defendant sought to dismiss his motion to vacate without prejudice or, in the alternative, to amend. The court denied the motion to dismiss, but granted the defendant permission to amend. In his amendment, the defendant raised three more ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on different conduct. In determining that the new claims raised in the defendant's amended motion to vacate were untimely and could not be saved by the relation back provision of Rule 15(c)(2), the Davenport court noted that,
Id. at 1343.
Id.
[i]n his original § 2255 motion, Davenport claimed his counsel was ineffective for not objecting that the drugs Davenport had were not "crack cocaine," because they lacked sodium bicarbonate, for not objecting to the drug weight as improperly including certain moisture content, and for not asserting that the government allowed its witness to perjure himself by claiming he expected no benefit. In contrast, Davenport's three new claims were that his counsel was ineffective for (1) allowing Davenport to be sentenced based on three grams of cocaine that were not part of the same course of conduct as the other forty-nine grams of cocaine, (2) relying on a summary lab report instead of requesting the complete lab report, and (3) failing to advise him that a plea agreement might be possible.
Id. at 1346.
The Court further explained that
Although Davenport's original § 2255 motion challenged the moisture content and the lack of sodium bicarbonate in the drugs and counsel's failure to raise those issues, his original motion gives no indication that three grams in one drug transaction were not part of the same course of conduct or a common scheme of the other larger drug transaction and does not allege that his counsel was ineffective for not exploring this issue. The original claims thus dealt with the chemical makeup of the drugs, whereas the amended claims addressed the relationship between the drug transactions and his counsel's having improperly relied on a one-page lab summary instead of obtaining the full eleven-page lab report. Regarding the new claim asserting counsel's failure to advise Davenport of a possible plea agreement, Davenport's original § 2255 motion contains no mention of any such pre-trial activity or inactivity.
Id.
Thus, the court in Davenport found that the defendant's three new claims did not arise out of the same set of facts as his original claims, but arose from separate conduct and occurrences in both time and type.
Id.
Turning to the instant case, the only amended claim that even arguably might relate to Estrada's original claims is his allegation that Del Valle rendered ineffective assistance. On closer examination, however, the Court concludes that the amended claim rests on distinct conduct than that alleged in the Original Motion to Vacate. Where Estrada originally alleged that Del Valle failed to file motions, cross-examine certain witnesses, object to certain testimony; raise certain defenses, and call favorable witnesses, he now claims that Del Valle labored under a conflict of interest because he concentrated on negotiating a plea agreement rather than on preparing to defend his client against the charges at a trial.
The Court recognizes that in cases in which such notice has been afforded, for example where the petitioner's amendment seeks merely to elaborate upon his earlier claims, this effort should not generally be barred by the statute of limitations. However, in cases such as this one, where Estrada attempts to add claims that were not properly alleged in the original motion to vacate so as to provide proper notice, any attempt to add these additional claims should be denied.
Dean v. United States, 278 F.3d 1218, 1222 (11th Cir. 2002) ("When the nature of the amended claim supports specifically the original claim, the facts there alleged implicate the original claim, even if the original claim contained insufficient facts to support it. One purpose of an amended claim is to fill in facts missing from the original claim."); Duffus, 174 F.3d at 337 ("Certainly the court could have permitted an amendment to clarify a claim initially made.").
In filing his Amended Motion to Vacate, Estrada places the Government and the Court on notice for the first time of the theories and allegations included therein, all of which raise issues that broadly relate to Estrada's trial and sentencing as a whole and not to the specific allegations made in his Original Motion to Vacate. The Court finds it impossible to say that Estrada's Original Motion to Vacate would provide notice of the different theories presented in his Amended Motion to Vacate. To allow any of Estrada's amended claims to proceed, therefore, would permit him to circumvent the principles of Rule 15(c), the purpose of the AEDPA, and Congress' decision to expedite collateral attacks by placing stringent time restrictions on § 2255 motions to vacate. This, the Court will not do. Under the present circumstances, the Court concludes that the "relation back" doctrine of Rule 15(c) cannot be applied to save Estrada's amended claims.
See Pittman, 209 F.3d at 318 (stating that to allow untimely amendments bringing new claims arising out of the same trial proceeding as the original claims "would undermine the limitations period set by Congress in the AEDPA"); United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 337 (3rd Cir. 1999) (holding that granting motion to amend "would have frustrated the intent of Congress that claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 be advanced within one year after a judgment of conviction becomes final").
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
The AEDPA converted the "certificate of probable cause" ("CPC") required to appeal from the denial of a petition for federal habeas corpus relief, including the denial of § 2255 Motions to Vacate, into a Certificate of Appealability ("CoA"). To appeal the denial of a habeas corpus petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the petitioner must obtain a CoA. Appellate review of a habeas petition is moreover limited to the issues on which a CoA is granted. In other words, a CoA is granted or denied on an issue-by-issue basis, thereby limiting appellate review to solely those issues on which CoA is granted.
See Hill v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 78, 80 (5th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the "substantial showing" requirement for a CoA under the AEDPA is merely a change in nomenclature from the certificate of probable cause standard); Muniz v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 43, 45 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the standard for obtaining a CoA is the same as for a CPC); see also Robison v. Johnson, 151 F.3d 256, 259 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1100 (1999) (stating that the CoA requirement supersedes the previous requirement for a certificate of probable cause to appeal for federal habeas corpus petitions filed after the effective date of the AEDPA); Hallmark v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 1073, 1076 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Monroe v. Johnson, 523 U.S. 1041 (1998) (same).
See Miller-El v. Johnson, 537 U.S. 322, 335-6 (2003); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(2) (West Supp. 2003).
See Crutcher v. Cockrell, 301 F.3d 656, 658 n. 10 (5th Cir. 2002), (holding that a CoA is granted on an issue-by-issue basis, thereby limiting appellate review to those issues); Jones v. Cain, 227 F.3d 228, 230 n. 2 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding the same); Lackey v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the scope of appellate review of denial of habeas petition is limited to issue on which CoA granted).
See Crutcher v. Cockrell, 301 F.3d at 658 n. 10; Lackey v. Johnson, 116 F.3d at 151; Hill v. Johnson, 114 F.3d at 80; Muniz v. Johnson, 114 F.3d at 45; Murphy v. Johnson, 110 F.3d 10, 11 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1997); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(3) (West Supp. 2003).
A CoA to appeal the denial of a habeas corpus petition shall be granted only upon "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." The showing necessary to obtain a CoA on a particular claim depends upon the manner in which the District Court has disposed of a claim. If this Court rejects a prisoner's constitutional claim on the merits, he must then demonstrate that reasonable jurists could find the Court's assessment of the constitutional claim to be debatable or wrong. If the petitioner wishes to challenge this Court's dismissal of a claim for a reason not of constitutional dimension, such as procedural default, limitations, or lack of exhaustion, he must show that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and whether this Court was correct in its procedural ruling. This Court is authorized to address the propriety of granting a CoA sua sponte.
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).
Miller-El v. Johnson, 537 U.S. at 338.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. at 484 (holding that when a district court denies a habeas claim on procedural grounds, without reaching the underlying constitutional claim, a CoA may issue only when the petitioner shows that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether: (1) the claim is a valid assertion of the denial of a constitutional right; and (2) the district court's procedural ruling was correct).
Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000).
After considering the entire record and the parties' pleadings, the Court concludes that jurists of reason would not debate whether Estrada has stated a valid claim for relief or whether a procedural ruling in this case is correct. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue Estrada a Certificate of Appealability regarding any of his claims.
V. CONCLUSION ORDER
In sum, the Court concludes that Petitioner Francisco Javier Estrada's Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 should be denied and this matter dismissed with prejudice. The Court further finds that Petitioner is not entitled to a Certificate of Appealability. Accordingly,
1. Petitioner Francisco Javier Estrada's Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, filed on February 17, 2005, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, is DENIED and this matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2. The Court DENIES Petitioner Francisco Javier Estrada a Certificate of Appealability.
3. All pending motions in this cause, if any, are DENIED AS MOOT.