Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:00-CV-1975-L
September 30, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed November 15, 2001; Plaintiffs First Motion to Amend Complaint and Join Additional Party, filed December 5, 2001; and Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Amended Complaint, filed February 11, 2002. After careful consideration of the parties' motions, responses, Plaintiff's complaint, and the applicable law, the court denies Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and grants Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Amended Complaint.
Because of a childhood disease, Plaintiff Julie Dunlop Espinoza ("Espinoza") has a physical condition that requires her to walk with crutches or use a scooter for mobility. In May of 2000, Espinoza attempted to renew her drivers license at the Department of Public Safety ("DPS") office located in Mesquite, Texas where a DPS clerk observed Espinoza and later filed a report, stating that Espinoza had a condition, which might make her an unsafe driver. Based on this report, DPS told Espinoza she would have to take a comprehensive examination to demonstrate her driving ability in order to renew her license.
On September 8, 2000, Espinoza filed this action against DPS, alleging that DPS' process for renewing drivers licenses discriminated against persons with disabilities. Specifically, Espinoza claims that DPS' requirement that she submit to a comprehensive examination to demonstrate her qualifications as a driver in order to renew her drivers license violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101, et seq. (1995) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 794- 794a (1999). In her original complaint, Espinoza sought a temporary and permanent injunction, declaratory relief, damages, and attorney's fees.
The ADA forbids discrimination against disabled individuals in major areas of public life, among them employment (Title I of the Act), 42 U.S.C. § 12111-12117 (1995), and public services (Title II), §§ 12131-12165. At issue in this case is whether Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Title II suits under the ADA.
In November of 2001, DPS filed a motion to amend its answer to add the defense of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and moved to dismiss the action in light of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) that suits brought against state agencies pursuant to Title I of the ADA were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Shortly thereafter Espinoza filed two motions to amend her complaint. The parties then filed a joint motion to stay the proceedings to permit the parties to file briefs addressing DPS' motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity and Espinoza's motion to amend her complaint. The court granted the motion, staying the proceedings until a period of thirty days after the court ruled on the parties' motions.
The Court did not decide whether Title II suits under the ADA were also barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 358 n. 1.
II. Motion to Dismiss Standard
A. Rule 12(b)(1) Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of a federal district court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). A claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the claim. See Home Builders Assoc., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims. See e.g., Stockman v. Federal Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Veidhoen v. United States Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1994)). Thus, a federal court must dismiss an action whenever it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. Stockman, 138 F.3d at 151.
In considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, "a court may evaluate (1) the complaint alone, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 424 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 1059 (2002). Thus, unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district court is entitled to consider disputed facts as well as undisputed facts in the record. See Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986). Uncontroverted allegations of the complaint, however, must be accepted as true. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As, 241 F.3d at 424.
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Failure to State a Claim
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) "is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Lowrey v. Texas AM Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997). A district court cannot dismiss a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). Stated another way, "[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 122 S.Ct. 992, 998 (2002) (quoting Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). In ruling on such a motion, the court cannot look beyond the pleadings. Id.; Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1229 (2000). The ultimate question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a valid cause of action when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 247. A plaintiff, however, must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992).
III. Analysis
Since the Garrett decision, the Fifth Circuit in Reickenbacker v. M.J. Foster, 274 F.3d 974, 976 (5th Cir. 2001), determined that claims against the State under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are also barred by immunity, based on the same reasoning and analysis applied in Garrett. Reickenbacker, 274 F.3d at 983-84. In light of the Fifth Circuit's holding in Reickenbacker, DPS contends that Espinoza's discrimination claims against DPS, a state agency, under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. DPS therefore argues that Espinoza's claims should be dismissed.
A. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
Espinoza alleges in her original complaint that DPS "is an agency of the State of Texas that conducts programs or activities receiving Federal financial assistance as defined by the Rehabilitation Act. . . ." She therefore argues that because DPS accepted federal funds, it waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity defense under the Rehabilitation Act. In response, DPS contends that Espinoza's argument that DPS' receipt of federal funds waives Eleventh Amendment immunity was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). DPS therefore argues that the "mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a state has consented to suit in federal court." Id. at 59 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246-247 (1985)). The court disagrees.
As noted above, the Court's statement that the receipt of federal funds does not alone establish a state's consent to be sued in federal court is a quote from Atascadero State Hospital. In Atascadero, the Court held that Congress had not unequivocally waived states' sovereign immunity in the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 235. In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Atascadero State Hospital, however, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act by enacting the "equalization" provision, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7, which "craft[ed] an unambiguous waiver of the States Eleventh Amendment immunity." Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 199 (1996). That section provides in pertinent part:
A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [ 29 U.S.C.A. § 794] . . . the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 [ 42 U.S.C.A. § 6101], . . . or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance.42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994).
While the Fifth Circuit in Reickenbacker declined to address the issue of whether receipt of federal funds waives state sovereign immunity, it noted that the Supreme Court in Lane held that 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 created a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to those statutes listed in Section 2000d-7. Reickenbacker, 274 F.3d at 984 n. 73. Therefore, Lane still reflects the current law in this circuit until the Fifth Circuit addresses the issue. Assuming Espinoza's allegation that DPS receives federal funds is true, as the court must when considering a motion to dismiss, then DPS waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from claims for money damages or injunctive relief under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by accepting federal funds.
In Reickenbacker, the Fifth Circuit explicitly declined to consider plaintiffs' argument that Louisiana had waived its immunity under the Rehabilitation Act when it accepted federal funds, because plaintiffs had failed to raise the issue in the district court. Reickenbacker, 274 F.3d at 984.
Since Reickenbacker, two other district courts have addressed applying the holding of Reickenbacker to a Rehabilitation Act claim and have held similarly that receipt of federal funds waives sovereign immunity. See August v. Mitchell, 205 F. Supp.2d 558, 561 (E.D. La. 2002); Johnson v. Louisiana, No. 01-2002, 2002 WL 83645, *5 (E.D. La. Jan. 18, 2002). The court finds the reasoning set forth in these cases persuasive.
B. Title II of the ADA
Espinoza acknowledges that her ADA claim against DPS is barred by immunity but requests that she be allowed to amend her complaint to meet the Ex Parte Young exception allowing suits against state officials for alleged violations of federal law. "To meet the Exparte Young exception, a plaintiffs suit alleging a federal law violation must be brought against individual persons in their official capacities as agents of the state, and the relief sought must be declaratory or injunctive in nature and prospective in effect." Aguilar v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, Espinoza requests she be allowed to amend her complaint to join the current director of DPS, Tommy Davis, in his official capacity and to strike her request for monetary damages, leaving only her request for prospective injunctive relief and attorney's fees. In response, DPS urges the court to not grant Espinoza's motions to amend, because they were filed after the March 12, 2001 deadline in the court's scheduling order. The court again disagrees.
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Espinoza's motion includes additional amendments, but they are not relevant to the court's analysis of this issue.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend apleading "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). The federal rules permit liberal pleading and amendment to facilitate adjudication of the merits by avoiding excessive formalism. See Lowrey v. Texas A M Univ., 117 F.3d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 1997). The decision whether to grant leave lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Louisiana v. Litton Mortgage Co., 50 F.3d 1298, 1302-03 (5th Cir. 1995). Leave to amend should be given in the absence of "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility of amendment." In re Southmark Corp., 88 F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1057 (1997).
On December 12, 2000, the court entered a scheduling order requiring the parties to file all motions to amend and motions to join additional parties by no later than March 12, 2001. On November 14, 2001, DPS moved to amend its answer to include the defense of immunity. On December 5, 2001, Espinoza filed her First Motion to Amend Complaint, Join Additional Party, and Brief in Support. On February 11, 2002, she filed a Motion to Substitute Amended Complaint to substitute Tommy Davis, the current DPS director, for Dudley Thomas, the former director of DPS listed in Espinoza's first motion to amend. All of these motions, including DPS', were filed after the court's March 12, 2001 deadline; however, the deadlines for discovery and all other proceedings set forth in the court's scheduling order were stayed by the court's order of December 20, 2001 by request of the parties. Thus, DPS' argument that Espinoza's motions were untimely is without merit.
Moreover, the court finds it inconsistent with fair play for DPS to seek denial of Espinoza's motion to amend for "untimeliness" when the court allowed it to amend well past the deadline for amendment of pleadings. Although DPS opposes Espinoza's proposed amendments, it has failed to demonstrate how the amendment would unduly prejudice its case or how any delay was either undue or in bad faith. Espinoza, on the other hand, contends that the amendments in no way change or add to the relief sought, require no additional discovery, and will not require extension of the court's scheduling deadlines. The court agrees.
Absent evidence of bad faith, prejudice or undue delay, and in light of the liberal amendment policies of the federal rules, the court must grant Espinoza's motions to amend her complaint unless it can be shown that the proposed amendments are a futility. The court therefore considers DPS' arguments that Espinoza should not be allowed to amend her complaint because even with the proposed amendments, she cannot meet the Ex Parte Young exception to its Eleventh Amendment immunity for the following reasons: (1) her remedies for damages and attorney's fees exceed the prospective injunctive relief allowed by Ex Parte Young; (2) she failed to allege no state forum is available; (3) the injunctive relief requested is inappropriate because it involves a "special sovereignty interest" of the State; and (4) the Fifth Circuit does not recognize the "deliberate indifference" standard alleged.
1. Remedies for Damages and Attorney's Fees
DPS first contends that only injunctive relief is permitted under Ex Parte Young and that Espinoza's request for monetary damages and attorney's fees therefore exceeds the relief allowable. The court disagrees. Espinoza' s amended complaint excluded money damages and, contrary to DPS' assertion, the United States Supreme Court has held that attorney's fees are not subject to the Eleventh Amendment's constraints on actions for damages because they constitute "reimbursement of `expenses incurred in litigation seeking only prospective relief,' rather than `retroactive liability for prelitigation conduct.'" Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 278 (1989) (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 695 (1979)).
2. Failure to Allege Unavailability of State Forum
DPS next cites Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), arguing that Espinoza failed to allege that no state forum was available to vindicate her federal interests. DPS further maintains that there is a state forum in which Espinoza could bring her claim-the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. As Espinoza notes, however, the Court's opinion in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe was a plurality opinion in which Justice Kennedy was joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist. A majority of the Court in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion expressly disapproved of the unavailability of a state forum prerequisite, because it constituted a marked departure from the Court's early Young cases. Id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Scalia and Thomas, J.J.) ("Not only do our early Young cases fail to rely on the absence of a state forum as a basis for jurisdiction, but we also permitted federal actions to proceed even though a state forum was open to hear the plaintiffs claims."). Moreover, the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act deals with employment discrimination, which is not the basis of Espinoza's claim. See Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.001 (Vernon 1996).
3. Special Sovereignty Interest
DPS contends that the Ex Parte Young exception is never appropriate where, as here, the injunctive relief sought interferes with a state's "special sovereignty interest." Specifically, DPS argues that under Texas state law, it is vested with the power and authority to issue drivers licenses to "qualifying applicants" and it has a "special sovereignty interest" in regulating drivers license procedures. DPS therefore contends that it would be inappropriate for the court to grant Espinoza's injunctive relief; that is, for the court to determine who are "qualified" drivers in the State of Texas, or what testing facilities and procedures should be employed by DPS to make that determination. In response, Espinoza argues that DPS' characterization of her suit and the relief sought is incorrect. According to Espinoza, she only requests that DPS be ordered or required to follow its written regulations and enjoined from treating persons with disabilities in a discriminatory manner when renewing drivers licenses. The court agrees that Espinoza's complaint as amended seeks prospective injunctive relief as contemplated by Ex Parte Young to address an ongoing violation of federal law by prohibiting further discriminatory action. Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 1760 (2002) ("In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a `straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.'") (quoting Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. at 296).
4. Deliberate Indifference Standard
Finally, DPS argues that that the Fifth Circuit does not recognize the "deliberate indifference" standard Espinoza alleged in her complaint. Espinoza does not allege a claim under this standard in her amended complaint. The court therefore need not address the issue.
For the reasons set forth herein, the court cannot say the amendment of Espinoza's complaint would be futile. Accordingly, denying her leave to amend on this ground would be inconsistent with Rule 15(a) and an abuse of the court's discretion,
IV. Conclusion
The court concludes that DPS' acceptance of federal funds waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Accordingly, DPS' motion to dismiss Espinoza's claims against DPS under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is denied and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Espinoza's claims against DPS under Title II of the ADA is denied as moot.
Having found no evidence of undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of Espinoza, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to DPS, or futility of amendment, the court grants Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Amended Complaint and denies Plaintiffs First Motion to Amend Complaint and Join Additional Party as moot. Plaintiff shall file an original copy of Plaintiffs Substituted Amended Complaint within ten days of this order and Plaintiffs Original Complaint is hereby withdrawn once Plaintiff files her Substituted Amended Complaint, which will take the place of the withdrawn complaint.
In light of the court's ruling in this matter, the court's order of December 4, 2001, staying all proceedings is lifted. Counsel for the parties shall confer and submit a joint status report with respect to the following: (a) time needed for additional discovery; (b) a trial date and estimated length of trial; (c) prospects for settlement, whether some type of Alternative Dispute Resolution is appropriate, and, if so, when it should take place; and (d) any other matter that would aid the disposition of this matter. The joint status report shall be submitted by no later than October 16, 2002.