Opinion
No. 99 C 1183.
September 29, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
James Ellett, who has epilepsy, has worked for Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Company, an automotive sealing product manufacturer and distributor, since 1976. He started with the company as a general factory worker; then in about 1984, after completing a five-year Tool and Die Maker apprenticeship, Ellett became a grinding operator in the Stamping Department's tool room. In September 1998, the company announced that it planned to close its Stamping Department, and as an employee affected by the decision Ellett received a letter advising him of the closing and suggesting that the company would help try to find him another position within the company.
A Collective Bargaining Agreement between Chicago Rawhide and the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local Union 100A, Unit #221, AFL-CIO, CLC, required the company to internally post job openings within the plant, allowing any interested employees to sign up to be considered. The company filled the vacancies from the pool of interested, eligible employees based on seniority. In late September, the company posted a job opening for a mold maker in the Molding Department. Ellett, along with at least nine other employees, threw his name into the hat, and consistent with the CBA, Ellett eventually was selected for the job based on his seniority.
The CBA provided that any employee promoted under the internal posting provisions would have to prove himself or herself capable of doing the new job:
Any employee promoted under the posting provisions shall be given up to a three (3) week break-in period during which the Company shall be the judge of his ability or fitness for the job. If the Company is not satisfied as to the fitness or ability of the employee for the particular job at the end of the break-in period, this time may be extended for a further period, which in no event shall exceed an overall break-in period of sixty (60) days, including the original three (3) weeks. However, in the case of transfers to specially skilled jobs, this trial period may be extended for such time as the Company and the union may agree to be necessary in determining the fitness and ability of the persons transferred to said jobs. . . . In the event such employee does not qualify, he shall return to his previous job without loss of seniority. CBA, Art. VII, § 1(f) (November 16, 1997) (attached as Exhibit C to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment).
The "break-in outline" for new employees in the Molding Department specified that the total break-in time for positions in the department would not exceed 100 days. See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit F. It also specified that the break-in period consisted of two sections, one covering the engine lathe during which the transferee would have to perform certain delineated tasks on the engine lathe within a specified period of time, and one covering the CNC lathe, during which the transferee would have to perform certain delineated tasks on the CNC lathe within a specified period of time. Id. The break-in outline expressly stated, as did the CBA, that internal candidates who could not complete the tasks outlined would be disqualified and returned to the department from which they transferred. Id.
Ellett transferred to the Molding Department on December 15, 1998 and immediately began his "break-in" period. But Ellett was unable to complete many of the tasks within the allotted time, and, on February 12, 1999, Ellett was transferred back to the Stamping Department. When that department closed, he was reassigned to a metal preparation operator position, in Ellett's words, a "lower-paying factory job." Ellett filed this action on February 23, 1999, alleging that the company discriminated against him because of his epilepsy in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Chicago Rawhide now asks the Court to enter summary judgment in its favor.
A few days after being transferred to the Molding Department. Ellett filed a grievance with the EEOC. The substance of that grievance is unclear as neither party has seen fit to include a copy of the grievance in the record. But because Ellett filed the grievance and received his right-to-sue letter before he was even disqualified from the mold maker position, the Court assumes that the grievance did not challenge his disqualification and subsequent reassignment to what he has described as a lower-paying job within the factory. Additionally, the right-to-sue letter suggests that Ellett may have alleged age discrimination, not disability discrimination in that charge. These facts alone may be grounds for the Court to dismiss Ellett's complaint. See Cheek v. Western Southern Life Insurance Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500, 501 (7th Cir. 1994) (an allegation raised in a federal discrimination complaint must be "like or reasonably related to the allegations of the [EEOC] charge"; "the EEOC charge and the complaint must, at minimum, describe the same conduct and implicate the same individuals.") (quoting Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1976) ( en banc)) (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, because the Court cannot know for sure whether Ellett's complaint is reasonably related to his EEOC charge, the Court will consider the merits of Ellett's claim.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the record, and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The Court will grant the motion "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Once the moving party has demonstrated that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the non-moving party must show, by specific factual allegations, the existence of such an issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Not every fact dispute defeats summary judgment; only disputes that could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will preclude entry of judgment for the moving party. Thomas Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 291 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 929 (1998).
As in any other type of employment discrimination case, an ADA plaintiff may establish discrimination by direct or indirect means. Leffel v. Valley Financial Services, 113 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 968 (1997). Ellett has chosen to proceed via the latter route, invoking the burden-shifting framework first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Thus, Ellett must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination; that is, he must offer "evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a[n] [illegal] discriminatory criterion. . . ." O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996). If he succeeds in doing so, the company must then articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action; the onus then shifts to Ellett to establish that the company's reason is really a pretext for discrimination. Leffel, 113 F.3d at 792. Here, because Chicago Rawhide has come forward with a plausible, nondiscriminatory reason for reassigning Ellett, the Court dives right in at steps two and three and asks whether Ellett can show that the company's reasons were a pretext for discrimination. See Jaysinghe v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 760 F.2d 132, 135 (7th Cir. 1995) (the prima facie threshold is no longer a relevant issue once the defendant has come forward with evidence of legitimate reasons for its actions that would rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination) (citing United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-15 (1983)). See also Gorbitz v. Corvilla, Inc., 196 F.3d 879, 883 (7th Cir. 1999) ("The issue whether there is a prima facie case is close — and one we need not reach at all since Corvilla has offered a perfectly plausible and nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.") (Cudahy, J. concurring).
Chicago Rawhide argues that it disqualified Ellett from the mold maker position and transferred him back to the Stamping Department because he could not complete the tasks specified in the break-in outline. The evidence supports the fact that Ellett was unable to make the specified parts within the allotted times. For example, the break-in outline required Ellett to make an "inner top insert to print unassisted in 15 hours," Exhibit F to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; Ellett failed to make a passable part on several attempts and finally succeeded only after 25 hours (ten hours beyond the deadline). See Probationary Employee Report for the week ending January 29, 1999 (attached as Exhibit H to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment). The break-in outline also required him to "make a lower core or bottom to print unassisted in 15 hours," Exhibit F to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, which he was similarly unable to do. According to the probationary report for the week ending February 12, 1999, Ellett "failed his Lower Core test. He turned part in to inspection and two diameters were wrong and a hole drill size was in-correct. The time was also (22-1/2) which is over the 15 max." Exhibit H to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Ellett admitted at his deposition that he was unable to make an acceptable ITI within the time allowed under the break in outline. Ellett Deposition, pp. 226, 230-31. He also admitted that he was unable to make an acceptable lower core, despite being given a week to practice on this particular part. Id. at 242-43, 246.
Nevertheless, Ellett argues that the company's stated reason for disqualifying him from the Molding Department tool room is a pretext for discrimination. To support his argument, he states simply that "[n]o time guidelines are ever used in the day to day operations at Defendant's plant. To say that Plaintiff necessarily had to be removed from a position after only 100 hours instead of allowing him a few additional hours to learn a new process due to the interests of the business is simply not credible." Plaintiffs Memorandum Supporting His Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 11. But it is not this Court's place to say that the qualification process or break-in procedure was silly or baseless. The Court does not sit as a super personnel department to review an employer's business decisions. And "[i]t is no business of a court in a discrimination case to decide whether an employer demands too much of its workers." Ransom v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 217 F.3d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992); Coco v. Elmwood Care, Inc., 128 F.3d 1177, 1179-80 (7th Cir. 1997)). The Court "will not second-guess an employer's policies" as long as they are "facially legitimate," Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1035 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Debs v. Northeastern Illinois Univ., 153 F.3d 390, 396 (7th Cir. 1998)), and a policy requiring employees to qualify for what Ellett concedes was a "skilled" position is facially legitimate. Significantly, the policy at issue in this case was not unilaterally imposed by the company; it was bargained for and negotiated with the employees' union and incorporated into the CBA.
Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that the company used its break-in process to discriminate on the basis of disability — or on the basis of anything other than skill and proficiency with a lathe. Ellett admitted he was aware from the outset that employees who wanted to work in the Molding Department had to pass the tests set out in the break-in outline, whether they came from inside the company or from outside; he was also aware that the qualification requirement was part of the union's CBA, to which he was bound. Ellett Deposition, pp. 135, 158. He also knew that every employee who came into the Molding Department tool room had to qualify through the protocol outlined in that break-in outline. Id., pp. 161, 162. Ellett admitted that he knew of no employee (whether or not disabled) who was excused from having to perform the break-in tasks; nor was he aware of any employee being given extra time to make passable parts or learn the ropes in the department. Id., pp. 259-60. Indeed, Ellett testified that no employee was treated more favorably than he was. Id., p. 270. When Ellett failed to do the tasks specified in the break-in outline, the company disqualified him and sent him back to his old department, just as it had Reyes DeLeon and Karen Williams, the two employees who had tried and failed to qualify for the mold maker job before Ellett (as far as the Court can tell, neither of these employees was disabled).
Ellett himself seemed less than convinced that the company disqualified him because of his epilepsy. At his deposition, Ellett alleged that the employees in the Molding Department wanted to make it impossible for him to qualify because they did not want anyone with greater seniority rights infringing on their turf; in other words, they disqualified him not because of his epilepsy but because he started working for the company long before they did. Ellett Deposition, p. 195. He also testified that nervousness — not the symptoms associated with his epilepsy — prevented him from satisfying the break-in requirements. Id., p. 257. To be kept from a coveted job for either of these reasons would be understandably upsetting for Ellett. But neither will support a claim under the ADA.
Under the ADA, two distinct categories of disability discrimination claims exist: failure to accommodate and disparate treatment. The Court has construed Ellett's complaint as asserting the latter; the fact that his response to the motion for summary judgment speaks in terms of the McDonnell- Douglas analysis buttresses this conclusion because that analysis is irrelevant in a failure to accommodate claim. See Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 100 F.3d 1281, 1283-84 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding the McDonnell-Douglas framework inapplicable and inappropriate for analyzing reasonable accommodation claims, which are direct proof claims). But even if Ellett had intended to assert a failure to accommodate claim, the result would be the same because the Court would still find that the qualification process or break-in procedure was legitimate and nondiscriminatory, and nothing in the ADA requires an employer to accommodate an employee's disability by "abandon[ing] its legitimate, nondiscriminatory company policies defining job qualifications, prerequisites, and entitlements to intracompany transfers." Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir. 1998). See also Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 912-13 (7th Cir. 1996) (employer not required to violate the provisions of a CBA to reassign a disabled employee under the ADA).
For the reasons explained above, Chicago Rawhide's motion for summary judgment [36-1] is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the defendant.