Opinion
Civil Action 12-cv-02060
05-31-2023
MELVIN ABDULLAH EL-AMIN, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant
Mariani, Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Introduction
This case involves various Social Security claims brought by a state inmate. (Doc. 1). Melvin Abdullah El-Amin's pro se complaint protests certain reductions and denials of supplemental security income benefits that were previously awarded to the plaintiff. Alleging violations of his constitutional rights, obstruction of justice, and other forms of malfeasance by the Social Security Administration, El-Amin demands the restoration of his full benefits and the repayment of various sums that he claims were wrongfully withheld from him.
In fact, it appears that the adjustments to El-Amin's benefits payments simply reflect the financial consequences of a series of misdeeds on his part. For example, El- Amin has been incarcerated at various times serving criminal justice sentences. While in custody, El-Amin was not entitled to receive Social Security benefits since his needs are being directly addressed by his jailers. Likewise, a series of benefits reductions have been imposed upon the plaintiff as a result of a Maryland Child Support Enforcement Administration garnishment order directing the Social Security Administration to withhold $432.50 per month from his benefits to pay a child support delinquency. Finally, the Social Security Administration has withheld some benefits after discovering that El-Amin allegedly received an overpayment as a result of the plaintiff's unreported work activity.
Moreover, with respect to a number of these payment calculation issues, ElAmin has been advised that his avenue to challenge the Commissioner's actions in through an administrative appeal. Yet, despite receiving this notice from the Social Security Administration, El-Amin has not followed the path prescribed by statute, choosing instead to bring this action in federal court without first exhausting his administrative remedies.
Given these facts, the Social Security Administration has moved to dismiss ElAmin's complaint arguing that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these claims and asserting that El-Amin has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 17). For the reasons set fort below, we agree that this complaint is fatally flawed. Therefore, we recommend that the complaint dismissed.
II. Factual Background and Procedural History
In this case, El-Amin's pro se complaint appears to allege three disputes that this prisoner-plaintiff has with the Social Security Administration. First, El-Amin apparently is upset that his entitlement to benefits was curtailed during period when he has been incarcerated. Second, according to El-Amin, the Commissioner has wrongfully garnished and applied some of his benefits to pay an outstanding child support obligation. Finally, El-Amin contends that the Commissioner has erroneously concluded that he received a $14,649.50 overpayment due to unreported work activity.
With respect to these allegations, the uncontested facts are as follows: El-Amin initially began receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits in July 2003. (Doc. 18-6, ¶ 2). In September of 2017 El-Amin's benefits were converted to retirement benefits based on his age.
At various times during this period, El-Amin has been incarcerated. Due to these criminal convictions and during his periods of confinement, El-Amin's benefits have been suspended. (Id., ¶ 3). These benefits were curtailed during El-Amin's incarceration in accordance with the law since, by statute:
[N]o monthly benefits shall be paid under this section or under section 423 of this title to any individual for any month ending with or during or beginning with or during a period of more than 30 days throughout all of which such individual-- (i) is confined in a jail, prison, or other penal
institution or correctional facility pursuant to his conviction of a criminal offense.”42 U.S.C. § 402 (x)(1)(A)(i). See Bierley v. Barnhart, 188 Fed.Appx. 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2006).
On March 17, 2011, Social Security received an “Earnings Withholding Notice” from the Maryland Child Support Enforcement Administration directing it to withhold $432.50 per month from Plaintiff's benefit payments. (Id., ¶ 4). At the time that it first received this notice, Social Security could not release any funds to pay El-Amin's outstanding child support obligations because the plaintiff was in prison. (Id., ¶ 5). However, after El-Amin's July 2011 release from prison, his benefit was reinstated and on August 15, 2011, Social Security notified El-Amin that it withheld $432.50 from his next scheduled payment to pay his obligation for child support. (Id., ¶¶ 6-7). Social Security sent El-Amin additional notices including on August 16, 2011, and June 13, 2012, informing him that it would withhold $432.50 per month from the plaintiff's monthly benefit payment to pay his obligation for child support. (Id., ¶ 8, Exhibits D and E). Consistent with federal law, these notices explained to El-Amin in clear and precise terms that if he disagreed with these child support deductions, he needed to address that issue with the state court and agency that issued the garnishment order. (Id.)
Aside from these deductions resulting from El-Amin's imprisonment and his alleged child support delinquency, El-Amin also received an overpayment notice from Social Security due to unreported work activity. Specifically, the Commissioner also informed El-Amin on August 15, 2011 that it was withholding monthly benefits to recover an overpayment paid to him in the amount of $15,782.00. (Id., ¶¶ 9-10, Exhibit C). This notice specifically advised El-Amin that if he disagreed with this overpayment assessment, he had 60 days to request an appeal. (Id., ¶ 11). Despite receiving this explicit notice, to date no administrative law judge has issued a decision in El-Amin's favor regarding the overpayment, nor has the Appeals Council reviewed such a decision. (Id., ¶ 12). Therefore, there is no final agency decision for consideration by this court.
On these facts, the Commissioner has moved to dismiss this complaint, asserting that all of El-Amin's claims are jurisdictionally barred, and his complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief my be granted. (Doc. 17). This motion is now ripe for resolution.
On this score, we note that El-Amin has never directly responded to this motion despite be instructed to do so. (Doc. 25). Instead of responding to the merits of this motion, El-Amin has persisted in the idiosyncratic notion that he has prevailed by default in this case.
For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the motion be granted, and the complaint be dismissed.
III. Discussion
A. Rule 12(b)(1)-Standard of Review
At the outset, the Commissioner has moved to dismiss this case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Rule 12(b)(1) permits the dismissal of an action for “lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) thus challenges the power of the court to hear a case or consider a claim. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006). When faced with a 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff has the burden to “convince the court it has jurisdiction.” Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Kehr Packages v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991) (“when subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff must bear the burden of persuasion”).
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Morten v. First Fed. Sav. And Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1997). First, a facial attack “contests the sufficiency of the pleadings.” Common Cause of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 558 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 187-88 (3d Cir. 2006). Such a facial challenge “attacks the complaint on its face without contesting its alleged facts, [and] is like a 12(b)(6) motion in requiring the court ‘to consider the allegations of the complaint as true.” Hartig Drug Company, Inc. v. Senju Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 836 F.3d 261,268 (3d Cir. 2006). Thus, in ruling on such a motion, the court assumes the truth of the allegations in the complaint but must analyze the pleadings to determine whether they state an action that comes within the court's jurisdiction. United States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 514 (3d Cir. 2016). A facial 12(b)(1) motion should be granted only if it appears certain that the assertion of subject-matter jurisdiction is improper. Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d 1406, 1408-09 (3d Cir. 1991); Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. United Food & Commericial Workers Health & Welfare Fund of Ne. Pa., 285 F.Supp.3d 573, 577 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
In contrast, a “factual” attack on subject-matter jurisdiction asserts that, although the pleadings facially satisfy jurisdictional requirements, one or more allegations in the complaint is untrue, which therefore causes the action to fall outside the court's jurisdiction. Carpet Group, Int'l v. Oriental Rug Imps. Ass'n, Inc., 227 F.3d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 2000); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1997). In ruling on factual challenges, a court must consider the merits of the disputed allegations, since “the trial court's . . . very power to hear the case” is in dispute. Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. As the Third Circuit has aptly observed:
A factual attack, . . ., is an argument that there is no subject matter jurisdiction because the facts of the case-and here the District Court may look beyond the pleadings to ascertain the facts-do not support the asserted jurisdiction. So, for example, while diversity of citizenship might have been adequately pleaded by the plaintiff, the defendant can submit proof that, in fact, diversity is lacking. See id. at 891 (“[T]he trial court is free to weigh the evidence ... and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.”). In sum, a facial attack “contests the sufficiency of the pleadings,” In re Schering Plough Corp., 678 F.3d at 243, “whereas a factual attack concerns the actual failure of a [plaintiff's] claims to comport [factually] with the jurisdictional prerequisites.” CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).Const. Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014).
Thus, when considering a factual attack upon the court's subject matter jurisdiction:
In a factual challenge, the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion to show that jurisdiction exists. Gould, 220 F.3d at 178; Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. If the defendant presents evidence contesting any allegations in the pleadings, the presumption of truthfulness does not attach to the plaintiff's allegations and the plaintiff may present facts by affidavit or deposition or in an evidentiary hearing. Gould, 220 F.3d at 177; Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891, 893 n. 18.Moyer Packing Co. v. United States, 567 F.Supp.2d 737, 748 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
B. Rule 12(b)(6) - Standard of Review
In the alternative, the Commissioner has moved to dismiss this complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S.__, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id., at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[After Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.' ”Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
C. El-Amin's Complaint Should Be Dismissed.
In this case, El-Amin's pro se complaint founders upon a series of insurmountable legal and jurisdictional obstacles. At the outset, El-Amin's belated recourse to this court to address his longstanding disputes concerning past Social Security determinations ignores the fundamental structure of the Social Security Act. The Act prescribes a clearly defined pathway for judicial review of agency determinations. Thus, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), (h) and 1383(c)(3) describe the exclusive jurisdictional basis for judicial review of Social Security cases. In this regard, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.Id. Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) limits federal court jurisdiction in these cases and plainly states that:
The findings and decision of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Commissioner of Social Security shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the Commissioner of Social Security, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of title 28, United States Code, to recover on any claim arising under this title.Id. (emphasis added). Simply put, by its terms the Social Security Act “demands the ‘channeling' of virtually all legal attacks [on Social Security decisions] through the agency.” Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13, 120 S.Ct. 1084, 1093 (2000). Therefore, where plaintiffs endeavor to by-pass the agency itself and immediately seek relief in federal court without complying with this agency channeling requirement, courts have often rebuffed these efforts as jurisdictionally improper and premature. Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Sec'y United States Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 2 F.4th 121, 131 (3d Cir. 2021); Fanning v. United States, 346 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2003).
Thus, to the extent that El-Amin now seeks to challenge a 2011 determination by the Commissioner that he received an overpayment due to undisclosed work activity, his exclusive pathway for such a challenge lies through an appeal to the agency, followed by judicial review of that final agency determination. Since it is uncontested that there has been no final agency determination of this issue in this case, we lack jurisdiction to entertain this dispute and this aspect of El-Amin's complaint should be dismissed.
Likewise, El-Amin's complaints regarding the denial of benefits while he has been in custody is unavailing since by statute:
[N]o monthly benefits shall be paid under this section or under section 423 of this title to any individual for any month ending with or during or beginning with or during a period of more than 30 days throughout all of which such individual-- (i) is confined in a jail, prison, or other penal institution or correctional facility pursuant to his conviction of a criminal offense.”42 U.S.C. § 402 (x)(1)(A)(i). See Bierley v. Barnhart, 188 Fed.Appx. 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2006). In light of this clear statutory command, we cannot provide any relief to El-Amin. Washington v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 718 F.2d 608, 610 (3d Cir. 1983). Moreover, to the extent that El-Amin believes that there has been a miscalculation of this withholding of his benefits due to his imprisonment, he should channel this claim through the agency for its determination, subject only to judicial review once there has been a final agency determination.
Finally, in his complaint, El-Amin essentially invites us to intervene in some on-going child support matter which is pending against him in Maryland and review, re-examine, and set aside an outstanding garnishment order related to child support delinquencies. We should decline this invitation since Congress has specifically prohibited civil actions seeking to challenge the garnishment efforts of the United States and federal agencies in 42 U.S.C. § 659(f), which provides that:
Neither the United States, nor the government of the District of Columbia, nor any disbursing officer shall be liable with respect to any payment made from moneys due or payable from the United States to any individual pursuant to legal process regular on its face, if the payment is made in accordance with this section and the regulations issued to carry out this section.Id. at (f)(1).
Given this clear statutory directive, a rising tide of caselaw has held that efforts by Social Security recipients like El-Amin to collaterally challenge support orders in federal court fail as a matter of law. See, e.g., Dockery v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 2016 WL 3087453, at *2-3 (D. Md. June 1, 2016) (finding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a claim challenging SSA's garnishment of the plaintiff's retirement benefits pursuant to a child support order); Edwards v. Colvin, 2014 WL 5493473 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2014); Trimble v. United States Soc. Sec., 369 Fed.Appx. 27 (11th Cir. 2010) (deciding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim challenging SSA's garnishment efforts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 659(f)(1)).
In sum, El-Amin's claims are jurisdictionally barred and meritless given the structure and explicit text of the Social Security Act. Therefore, these claims all fail as a matter of law, and the motion to dismiss this complaint should be granted.
IV. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. 17) be GRANTED.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.