Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-416-R
August 18, 1999.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion to remand (doc. #3). For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED.
I.
Plaintiff Courtney Edwards, a black male, was formerly employed by Defendant United Parcel Service Co. ("UPS") as an airplane pilot. His employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between UPS and his union. Plaintiff filed this action in Jefferson County Circuit Court after his termination. Plaintiff alleged race discrimination in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS 344.040. Defendants removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) and 1446, alleging federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Defendants claim that federal subject matter jurisdiction is based on the Railway Labor Act's, 45 U.S.C. § 151-188 (RLA), preemption of Plaintiff's state law claim. Defendant alleges that Plaintiff's claim involves interpretation of the CBA. Plaintiff has filed a motion to remand, and Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss.
II.
If removal was not proper, then this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and must remand the case to Jefferson Circuit Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Removal was based on federal question jurisdiction. As a general rule a plaintiff can avoid removal to federal court by alleging only state law claims. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429-30, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Removal jurisdiction is limited by the "well-pleaded complaint rule." That rule states that a plaintiff must present a substantial federal question on the face of a properly pleaded complaint before the defendant may remove the action based on federal question jurisdiction. Id.
A federal defense, including the defense that federal law preempts Plaintiff's claim, does not give Defendant the right to remove to federal court. Caterpillar at 392-93, 107 S.Ct. at 2429-30. However, complete preemption can be a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1547-48, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987). Unlike normal preemption, the inquiry for complete preemption is not merely whether Congress intended uniformity in the field, but whether "the preemptive force of a statute is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule." Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 342 (6th Cir. 1989). A federal law completely preempts a state claim only when Congress clearly manifests its intent to completely preempt a particular area. Id. Removal jurisdiction based on complete preemption and normal preemption analysis are two separate and distinct concepts. Caterpillar at 398, 107 S.Ct. at 2432.
The defense of preemption can prevent a claim from proceeding, but in contrast to complete preemption, it does not convert a state claim into a federal claim. The Supreme Court has found complete preemption in only three areas: 1) § 502(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), Metropolitan Life 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55; 2) § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Intern. Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 88 S.Ct. 1235, 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968); and 3) in the possessory interest of Native American tribes to lands obtained by treaty, Oneida Indian Nation of New York State v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 414 U.S. 661, 94 S.Ct. 772, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974) (considered a complete preemption case by the Supreme Court; see Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. at 2430 n. 8).
The issue becomes whether the RLA completely preempts Plaintiff's state law civil rights claim. Several Circuits have dealt with the issue of whether removal under the RLA based on preemption of state law was proper. See Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the RLA did not completely preempt state law worker's compensation claim) ; Deford v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 867 F.2d 1080 (8th Cir.) (finding Railway Labor Act preempts state law claim), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 927, 109 S.Ct. 3265, 106 L.Ed.2d 610 (1989). Even the Sixth Circuit implicitly found that removal based on an RLA preemption defense was not improper. Beard v. Carrollton R.R., 893 F.2d 117,121 (6th Cir. 1989). However, none of those cases addressed the question of congressional intent necessary for removal jurisdiction based on complete preemption.
In Warner v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 1995)( en banc), and Strong v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, 78 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 1996) the Sixth Circuit set forth a standard for determining whether a federal statute satisfies the complete preemption doctrine: whether the preempting federal statute creates a parallel federal cause of action to replace the preempted state law cause of action. Congressional intent to convert the state cause of action into a federal cause of action and establish removal jurisdiction is expressed through the creation of a federal remedy. 78 F.3d at 260. Under this standard, the RLA does not satisfy the complete preemption doctrine because it does not create a parallel federal cause of action. Railway Labor Executives Assn v. Pittsburgh Lake Erie R.R. Co., 858 F.2d 936 (3rd Cir. 1988); Tyree v. The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co., 973 F. Supp. 786 (W.D.Tenn. 1997).
Defendant has the burden of proving removal jurisdiction. Plaintiff's complaint solely alleges state law civil rights claims, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Defendant has not pointed to any federal cause of action created by the RLA within which Plaintiff's claim falls. In fact, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has no federal cause of action and his claim must be dismissed. Defendant characterizes Plaintiff's claim as a minor dispute, one of two classes of disputes requiring arbitration under the RLA. Minor disputes under the RLA "involve controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation." Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252-53, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994). While the Supreme Court adopted its precedents under § 301 of the LMRA as the standard for determining when the RLA preempts a state law claim, Id., the Court did not address the complete preemption issue. In fact, Hawaiian Airlines only dealt with the preemption as a defense issue because the case was before the Supreme Court on a grant of certiorari from the Supreme Court of Hawaii. Clearly, the RLA does not create a parallel federal cause of action, such as found in § 301 of the LMRA and § 502(a) of ERISA.
Analyzing the congressional intent of the RLA, this Court concludes that Congress did not intend to completely preempt Plaintiff's state law claim. This Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to address the merits of UPS's preemption defense. This court expresses no opinion on whether the Kentucky Civil Rights Act is preempted by the RLA or whether the National Railway Arbitration Board has exclusive jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. This case must be remanded to the Jefferson County Circuit Court to decide the preemption issues and other defenses. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
An appropriate order shall issue.
ORDER
Plaintiff having filed a motion to remand, and upon consideration by the Court,
IT IS ORDERED:
Plaintiff's motion to remand (doc. #3) is GRANTED. This case is remanded to the Jefferson County Circuit Court.
Plaintiff's motion for costs of removal is DENIED.