Opinion
No. 1:03CV0097TC.
August 23, 2004
ORDER
This case involves Plaintiff Bruce C. Edwards' challenge to an Ogden City ordinance, enacted in 2001, regulating vacant buildings. The case is presently before the court on (1) Defendants' motion to dismiss, (2) Mr. Edwards' two opposition motions to Defendants' motion to dismiss; (3) Mr. Edwards' objections to the Honorable Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba's Report and Recommendation, which recommends dismissing Mr. Edwards' complaint without prejudice, and (4) Mr. Edwards' motion to amend.
Background
Mr. Edwards has had numerous grievances against Defendant Ogden City. After several meetings and attempted meetings with Ogden City officials to discuss his grievances, in October 2001, Mr. Edwards put several signs in the windows of vacant buildings that he owned. The signs read:
In addition to Ogden Cty, Mr. Edwards named the following individuals, acting in their official capacities as Ogden City officials, in his complaint: Matthew Godfrey; Jon Greiner; Michael Junk; Wayne Glover; Norm Ashton; M. Denise Dalton; Stuart Reid; Kenneth Alford; Fasi Filiaga; Mary Hall; Rick Safton; Andrea Lockwood; Carolyn Backman; Scott Brown. For ease of reference, Ogden City and these individual defendants will collectively be referred to as "Ogden City" or "Defendants."
(1) "Ogden City Administration is a determent [sic] to the health, safety and welfare of the public[.]"
(2) "Why would anyone do business in Ogden?"
(3) "Ogden City is the dope capital of Utah[.]"
(4) "Why would anyone live in Ogden?"
(5) "Ogden City is not safe[.]"
(6) "Rape[.]"
(Comp. at 7-8.)
In December 2001, the Ogden City Council passed Ordinance 2001-69, 12-4-2001 (the "Ordinance"). Among other things, the Ordinance required owners of vacant buildings to register those buildings, file maintenance and repair plans with the City, keep the buildings secure, and keep the buildings' windows free from obstructions. The Ordinance also prohibited the display of certain signs in or on vacant buildings.
Based on the Ordinance, Mr. Edwards was criminally charged for his signs. Additionally, Ogden City filed a civil action against Mr. Edwards in state court, seeking a preliminary injunction preventing Mr. Edwards from using his property to display his signs. Mr. Edwards filed a counterclaim arguing that the Ordinance, on its face, violated his First Amendment rights. On October 1, 2003, the Honorable Parley Baldwin of the Second Judicial District Court, State of Utah, granted Mr. Edwards' motion for summary judgment. Judge Baldwin concluded that the Ordinance was "over-broad and content-based and fails as a time-place-manner restriction," and as a result, it violated the First Amendment on its face. Judge Baldwin then severed the Ordinance from the broader code section dealing with vacant buildings, which he left intact.
Before Judge Baldwin issued his decision, however, Mr. Edwards filed his complaint in this action on August 29, 2003. Mr. Edwards filed an amended complaint on September 17, 2003, and Ogden City filed a motion to dismiss on September 18, 2003. Mr. Edwards filed two motions opposing the Defendants' motion to dismiss.
Mr. Edwards' amended complaint contains 31 causes of action, including claims that Ogden City violated the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Mr. Edwards seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.
Mr. Edwards complaint contains the following 31 causes of action (there are two 24th causes of action): (1) First Amendment to Unites States Constitution — facial challenge; (2) Article I Section 1 of Utah Constitution; (3) Fourth Amendment to Unites States Constitution; (4) Article I Section 14 of Utah Constitution; (5) Fifth Amendment to Unites States Constitution (due process); (6) Article I Section 7 of Utah Constitution; (7) Fourteenth Amendment to United States Constitution (equal protection); (8) Article I Section 24 of Utah Constitution; (9) Article I Section 9 of United States Constitution; (10) Article I Section 18 of Utah Constitution; (11) Article I Section 9 of United States Constitution (again); (12) First Amendment to Unites States Constitution — as applied; (13) United States and Utah Constitutions, generally (14) Utah state law; (15) First Amendment to United States Constitution (again); (16) Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-401 to -408; (17) state law claim for malicious prosecution; (18) state law claim for defamation; (19) state law claim for conspiracy to defame; (20) state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional harm; (21) state law claim for tortious interference with business relationships; (22) state law claim for fraud; (23) state and federal equal protection claim; (24) state and federal equal protection claim; (24) (sic) state law claim for invasion of privacy; (25) United States and Utah Constitutions, generally; (26) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (27) First Amendment to United States Constitution (again); (28) United States and Utah Constitutions, right to privacy; (29) state law action for trespass; (30) state law claim for appropriation of likeness.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the court referred the matter to the Honorable Chief United States Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba to receive motions, conduct hearings, and issue a report and recommendation as appropriate. On December 15, 2003, a hearing on the motion to dismiss and Mr. Edwards opposition motions was held before the Judge Alba. Thereafter, on March 12, 2004, Mr. Edwards filed a motion to amend his complaint. Judge Alba issued his Report and Recommendation on April 6, 2004, recommending that this court dismiss without prejudice Mr. Edwards' complaint because the state-court action is still pending and Mr. Edwards has already litigated his First Amendment claim in that court. Judge Alba reasoned that the state-court action involved exactly the same facts as the present action, and Mr. Edwards could amend his counterclaim in state court to include all of the state and federal claims he has raised here. Because of his recommendation to dismiss, Judge Alba also concluded that the court should deny Mr. Edwards' motion to amend, apparently because it would obviously be moot.
The court adopts the substance of Judge Alba's Report and Recommendation — this court should not hear the case at this time, for three reasons. First, Mr. Edwards' claims in both the state and federal case involve a federal constitutional challenge to a local law (constitutional abstention). Under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, abstention is proper to allow the state court to consider the constitutional questions first. Second, abstention is proper because the two actions are nearly identical, and allowing both to continue would at least result in piecemeal litigation (Colorado River abstention). Third, because res judicata prevents re-litigation of at least some of Mr. Edwards' claims, abstention would be appropriate to allow the state court to rule on all claims before it, and give certainty to the preclusive effects of its decision.
Accordingly, the court stays this action until the state-court action is complete.
Analysis
I. Constitutional Abstention.
"Abstention is appropriate `in cases presenting a federal constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law.'" Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976) (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959)); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) (same); Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941) (same); Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., Washington, D.C. v. Empie, 778 F.2d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir. 1985) ("In the paradigmatic Pullman abstention case, the federal question is avoidable because the case presents a federal constitutional issue that might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law.") (citingColorado River); c.f. Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 511 (1972) (abstention proper when case involves potential conflict between state law and federal constitution);United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134, 135-36 (1962) (similar). Accordingly, abstention is appropriate here.
II. Colorado River Abstention.
Even when viewed under the much stricter abstention doctrine for non-constitutional cases, as outlined in Colorado River, abstention is still appropriate. In Colorado River, the Supreme Court noted that although the federal district courts have an obligation to hear cases over which they have jurisdiction, there are certain circumstances in which the federal courts may abstain. As explained by the Court, this doctrine "rest[s] on considerations of `[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.'" Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)).
Before performing the Colorado River analysis, the court must address the threshold issue of whether the state and federal actions are actually parallel. Fox v. Maulding, 16 F.3d 1079, 1081 (10th Cir. 1994); Romine v. Compuserve Corp., 160 F.3d 337, 339 (6th Cir. 1998). Importantly, the cases need not be exactly parallel; it is enough if they are "`substantially similar.'" Romine, 160 F.3d at 340 (quoting Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Allen v. Board of Educ., Unified School Dist. 436, 68 F.3d 401, 403 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Suits are parallel if substantially the same parties litigate substantially the same issues in different forums."). This means that merely adding parties or claims does not destroy parallelism. Romine, 160 F.3d at 340; Lumen Constr., Inc. v. Brant Constr. Co., 780 F.2d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 1985).
Here, there is no doubt that the two actions are parallel. Both cases arise from the same set of facts: (1) Mr. Edwards' grievances with Ogden City; (2) Mr. Edwards' posting of signs in the windows of his businesses to air his grievances; (3) Ogden City's passing of the Ordinance; and (4) the damage, if any, the Ordinance and Defendants' actions have done to Mr. Edwards. Also, Mr. Edwards and Ogden City are parties to both actions. Although in the federal action Mr. Edwards did name additional defendants not present in the state suit, this does not defeat parallelism.Lumen, 780 F.2d at 695 ("If the rule were otherwise, theColorado River doctrine could be entirely avoided by the simple expedient of naming additional parties."); Romine, 160 F.3d at 340 (additional claims in state action did not defeat parallelism). Furthermore, the added defendants are officials from Ogden City. Accordingly, the two actions are sufficiently parallel.
Moving on to the analysis itself, in Colorado River and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has provided several factors that district courts should consider when deciding whether to abstain. These factors are: (1) whether the state court has assumed jurisdiction over any res or property; (2) whether the federal forum is less convenient to the parties; (3) avoidance of piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained; (5) whether the source of governing law is state or federal; (6) the adequacy of the state court action to protect the federal plaintiff's rights; (7) the relative progress of the state and federal proceedings; and (8) the presence or absence of concurrent jurisdiction. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818-19; Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 21-28 (1983); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 664-65 (1978).
Importantly, however, district courts do not apply the factors mechanically; courts are to apply those factors that fit the particular facts of the case at hand, and all factors do not have to be given equal weight. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 15-16 (cases require "a careful balancing of the important factors as they apply in a given case"); Allen, 68 F.3d at 403.
Here, several factors either do not apply or provide no guidance. Factor one doesn't apply because the court does not have to take possession of real property. Factor two provides no guidance because both the state and federal courts are relatively close in location. Factor five also provides no guidance because both cases involve state and federal law. Finally, factor eight provides no guidance because both the state and federal court have concurrent jurisdiction.
All of the other factors, however, weigh in favor of abstention, including those at the heart of Colorado River abstention analysis. Factor three weighs in favor of abstention because proceeding with the federal case would certainly result in piecemeal litigation. The First Amendment claim (and perhaps others) have been (and will be) heard in state court, while others, including, oddly enough, the state-law tort claims, would be heard in federal court. As for factor four, the state court obtained jurisdiction first, which weighs in favor of letting that court hear the dispute first. Factor six weighs in favor of abstention because, as Judge Baldwin's decision makes completely clear, the state court is capable of protecting Mr. Edwards' rights. Indeed, that court ruled for Mr. Edwards and held that the Ordinance violates the First Amendment. Lastly, as for factor seven, the state and federal case are at different stages, with the state case considerably farther along than the federal. Mr. Edwards could add the claims from this case to the state case, and conceivably by so doing he would be that much closer to a resolution of the entire matter.
In sum, factors three, six and seven — the danger of piecemeal litigation, the adequacy of state courts to protect Mr. Edwards' rights, and the progress of each case — are most important here. The overlap between the claims, the state court's proven ability to protect Mr. Edwards' rights, and the advanced nature of the state court action all heavily point toward abstention. Romine, 160 F.3d at 341-42 (holding danger of piecemeal litigation and the advanced nature of the state court suit mandated abstention).
III. Res Judicata.
Mr. Edwards has already prevailed on his First Amendment challenge to the Ordinance in the state-court action. Ogden City v. Edwards, Civ. No. 020900777PR slip op. at 22 (Utah Second Jud. Dist. Ct., Oct. 1, 2003). Here, however, Mr. Edwards has stated at least four causes of action that also claim the Defendants violated his First Amendment rights. To allow Mr. Edwards to relitigate his First Amendment challenge based on the same facts and occurrences, would violate the principle of res judicata. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 ("Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action."); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (federal courts give full faith and credit to state court decisions); Rhodes v. Hannigan, 12 F.3d 989, 991 (10th Cir. 1993) ("In determining whether a state court judgment precludes a subsequent action in federal court, we must afford the state judgment full faith and credit, giving it the same preclusive effect as would the courts of the state issuing the judgment.").
Accordingly, abstention makes sense because allowing the state decision to become final would prevent duplicate litigation and allow this court to give the appropriate preclusive effect to that state court decision.
I. The Proper Remedy.
The court finds that the prudent course would be to stay the federal action until completion of the state court action. This remedy preserves Mr. Edwards' right to litigate in federal court (albeit in the future) on these facts while at the same time it avoids piecemeal litigation and allows the state court action to become final.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, the court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss, Mr. Edwards' objections to Judge Alba's Report and Recommendation, and both of Mr. Edwards' opposition motions to Defendants' motion to dismiss. Additionally, the court STAYS this action until the state-court action is complete, and ORDERS the parties to notify the court in writing within ten (10) days of final judgement being entered in, and termination of, the state-court action.
SO ORDERED.