Opinion
No. CV98 035 43 49
April 16, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a personal injury action involving a motor vehicle collision in Milford, Ct. on August 26, 1996. Default entered against the defendant, MS Muffler, on March 27, 2001. Following a hearing in damages on May 18, 2001, The Honorable Mottolese entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $23,122.13. During the course of litigation, the defendant's insurance company went into rehabilitation and the State of New York Liquidation Bureau assumed handling of any claims against the insurer. The plaintiff, unable to collect its judgment against the defendant, M S Muffler, initiated postjudgment discovery on March 1, 2002.
The defendant, M S Muffler, a New York corporation, now moves this court for a permanent stay of the enforcement proceedings claiming that this court lacks subject matter and/or personal jurisdiction. The defendant's request will be treated as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a motion which can be raised at any point during the proceeding. Dowling v. Slotnick, 244 Conn. 781, 788, 712 A.2d 396 (1998). This court heard oral argument on February 24, 2003, at which time briefs were requested by the court. Memoranda of law were timely submitted and argument was again scheduled for April 14, 2003. Defense counsel presented; however, plaintiff's attorney did not. The court agreed to decide the matter on the papers.
The defendant opines that because it is a New York Corporation, without contacts in Connecticut, this court is without subject matter jurisdiction over the postjudgment proceedings. M S does not contest this court's original jurisdiction pursuant to Connecticut's Longarm Statute. Citing Presidential Capital Corp. v. Reale, 240 Conn. 623, 692 A.2d 794 (1997), the defendant opines that this "enforcement proceeding" is separate and distinct from the underlying personal injury action and requires an independent basis of jurisdiction.
In Presidential Capital Corp. v. Reale, supra, the Supreme Court examined whether the denial of a protective order seeking relief from discovery pursuant to Connecticut General Statute § 52-351b could be immediately appealed. The Court held that Connecticut General Statute § 52-351b creates a proceeding that is separate and distinct from the underlying action. Nonetheless, the denial of the protective order did not terminate the rights of the parties; therefore, it was not subject to an interlocutory appeal. The Court's determination that the proceeding was "separate and distinct" was for the purpose of analyzing the availability of an interlocutory appeal. The trial court's jurisdiction over the postjudgment proceeding was not explored.
Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 52-350d (a) and § 52-351b (a) this court has jurisdiction, both subject matter and personal, over the discovery procedures requested by the plaintiff. The court agrees with the defendant, however, that any enforcement of the judgment, for instance, by way of execution, must be pursued in New York.
§ 52-350d (a): For the purposes of post-judgment procedures, the Superior Court shall have jurisdiction over all parties of record in an action until satisfaction of the judgment or, if sooner, until the statute limiting execution has run, except the Superior Court shall have jurisdiction at any time to determine exemption rights and grant appropriate relief.
§ 52-351b. Discovery by Judgment Creditor: (a) A judgment creditor may obtain discovery from the judgment debtor, or from any third person he reasonably believes, in good faith, may have assets of the judgment debtor, or from any financial institution to the extent provided by this section, of any matters relevant to satisfaction of the money judgment.
The defendant's motion for stay is denied.
WOLVEN, J.