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finding $375 per hour reasonable for a civil rights lawyer with six years' experience
Summary of this case from Salama v. City of N.Y.Opinion
No. 13 Civ. 3710(KPF).
04-29-2015
Ingrit ECHEVARRIA, Plaintiff, v. INSIGHT MEDICAL, P.C., Al Okhravi, and Dr. Steve Okhravi, individually, Defendants.
Edward Joseph Kennedy, Phillips & Associates, Attorney at Law, PLLC, Jesse Curtis Rose, The Rose Law Group PLLC, New York, NY, for Plaintiff. Tahanie Ahmad Aboushi, Aymen A. Aboushi, The Aboushi Law Firm, New York, NY, David S. Greenhaus, Jackson Lewis P.C., Melville, NY, for Defendants.
Edward Joseph Kennedy, Phillips & Associates, Attorney at Law, PLLC, Jesse Curtis Rose, The Rose Law Group PLLC, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
Tahanie Ahmad Aboushi, Aymen A. Aboushi, The Aboushi Law Firm, New York, NY, David S. Greenhaus, Jackson Lewis P.C., Melville, NY, for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge:
Plaintiff Ingrid Echevarria accused her former employer, as well as its owner and manager, of subjecting her to sexual harassment at her workplace and terminating her employment when she complained about the harassment. On June 30, 2014, after a four-day trial, a jury found that Plaintiff had proven her retaliation claims under federal and New York City law, and awarded her $50,000 in compensatory damages. (Dkt. # 54). On December 22, 2014, the Court denied Defendants' post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. (Dkt. # 89). Echevarria v. Insight Medical, P.C., 72 F.Supp.3d 442, 2014 WL 7250956 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2014).
On January 6, 2015, the parties filed a joint letter proposing a briefing schedule for Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs (Dkt. # 90); the Court so-ordered the schedule the following day (Dkt. # 91). Plaintiff filed her motion on January 23, 2015 (Dkt. # 93–95); Defendants filed their opposition papers on February 6, 2015 (Dkt. # 96); and the briefing was completed with the filing of Plaintiff's reply brief on February 13, 2015 (Dkt. # 97).
Plaintiff seeks attorneys' fees in the amount of $95,643.25 and costs in the amount of $1,845.04. Defendants ask the Court to reduce the fee figure by 50%, challenging the reasonableness of both counsel's rates and the hours billed. For the reasons set forth in the remainder of this Opinion, the Court awards Plaintiff attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $82,970.04.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
1 Defendants concede that Plaintiff is a “prevailing party” in the instant litigation. (See Def. Fee Opp. 1). Both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York City Human Rights Law (the “NYCHRL”) authorize the award of attorneys' fees to prevailing parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k) (allowing “a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees)” to prevailing parties under Title VII); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–502 (“In any civil action commenced pursuant to this section, the court, in its discretion, may award the prevailing party costs and reasonable attorney's fees.”). A district court has discretion to determine the amount of attorneys' fees that would be appropriate to satisfy a fee award. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d).
234 To determine the amount of attorneys' fees to which a party is entitled, a court must calculate the “presumptively reasonable fee,” often (if imprecisely) referred to as the “lodestar.” Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. County of Albany (“Arbor Hill” ), 522 F.3d 182, 183, 189–90 (2d Cir.2008); accord Millea v. Metro–North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir.2011). This amount reflects “the rate a paying client would be willing to pay ... bear[ing] in mind that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively.” Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190; see also Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010). Courts calculate the presumptively reasonable fee by multiplying the reasonable number of hours that the case requires by the reasonable hourly rates. Millea, 658 F.3d at 166.
567 In reviewing a fee application, a district court must examine the particular hours expended by counsel with a view to the value of the work product to the client's case. See Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 133 (2d Cir.1994) (per curiam). The court is to exclude “excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours, as well as hours dedicated to severable unsuccessful claims.” Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422, 425 (2d Cir.1999). A party seeking attorneys' fees bears the burden of supporting its claim of hours expended by accurate, detailed, and contemporaneous time records. N.Y.S. Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey (“Carey”), 711 F.2d 1136, 1147–48 (2d Cir.1983).
B. Calculating the Attorneys' Fees
1. Determining the Reasonable Hourly Rates
8910 A reasonable hourly rate represents what “a reasonable, paying client would be willing to pay,” and varies by both practice area and location. Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 184, 192; see also Perdue, 559 U.S. at 552, 130 S.Ct. 1662 (“a ‘reasonable’ fee is a fee that is sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the representation of a meritorious civil rights case”). A court's determination of this rate “ ‘contemplates a case-specific inquiry into the prevailing market rates for counsel of similar experience and skill to the fee applicant's counsel,’ ” and may “ ‘include judicial notice of the rates awarded in prior cases and the court's own familiarity with the rates prevailing in the district.’ ” Townsend v. Benjamin Enter., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 59 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Farbotko v. Clinton County of New York, 433 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir.2005)). The Second Circuit has further suggested that courts consider
the complexity and difficulty of the case, the available expertise and capacity of the client's other counsel (if any), the resources required to prosecute the case effectively (taking account of the resources being marshaled on the other side but not endorsing scorched earth tactics), the timing demands of the case, whether an attorney might have an interest (independent of that of his client) in achieving the ends of the litigation or might initiate the representation himself, whether an attorney might have initially acted pro bono (such that a client might be aware that the attorney expected low or non-existent remuneration), and other returns (such as reputation, etc.) that an attorney might expect from the representation.
Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 184.
Plaintiff seeks attorneys' fees in the amount of $95,643.25, and costs in the amount of $1,845.04. (Declaration of Jesse Rose (“Rose Decl.”) (Dkt. # 95); id. Ex. B; see also Pl. Fee Reply 9 & Ex. D). Over a period of approximately two years, Plaintiff's counsel (i) investigated the case; (ii) drafted and filed a complaint alleging gender discrimination and retaliatory termination under federal, state, and local law; (iii) conducted discovery; (iv) participated in a court-ordered mediation program; (v) successfully opposed a defense motion for summary judgment; (vi) prepared for and successfully represented Plaintiff in a four-day jury trial; (vii) successfully opposed defense post-trial motions; and (viii) prepared the briefing for the instant application for fees.
According to the Declaration submitted by Jesse Rose, the attorney with principal responsibility for this case, the attorneys' fees figure reflects the work undertaken by three attorneys: Rose, Edward Kennedy, and Thomas Kocian. (Rose Decl. ¶¶ 1–27). Rose—whose billings represent the lion's share of the fee figure—provides considerable information concerning his own qualifications. (Id. at ¶¶ 2–14). He is a 2008 graduate of Hofstra Law School, with extensive experience in employment law that is evidenced both in his law school endeavors (including work on the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal and an employment trial competition) and in his professional life (including stints at several law firms specializing in labor and employment law). Rose is currently principal of his own law firm, which specializes in labor and employment law matters, and is as well Of Counsel to the law firm of Phillips & Associates, which has a similar focus. (Id. at ¶¶ 2–4, 9–11). Rose has worked on literally hundreds of employment actions, frequently with no supervision and/or no assistance. (Id. at ¶ 13). He seeks payment at an hourly rate of $425.
Much less information is provided to the Court about the other two attorneys seeking fees for their representation of Plaintiff. Rose recites that Edward Kennedy is “known to [him] to be [a] very proficient and talented attorney [ ]” (Rose Decl. ¶ 23), who has “litigated numerous cases as lead counsel and tried several cases” (id.), and who is “a highly respected litigator with extensive experience” (id. at ¶ 26). Significantly, however, Rose provides no detail about Kennedy's educational or experiential background to justify the $425 hourly rate Kennedy seeks. Similarly, Thomas Kocian is described as another “proficient and talented attorney[ ]” (id. at ¶ 23) with 15 years of experience, but with no detail justifying the $350 hourly rate Kocian seeks.
11 “A reasonable starting point for determining the hourly rate for purposes of a lodestar calculation is the attorney's customary rate.” Parrish v. Sollecito, 280 F.Supp.2d 145, 169–70 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (collecting cases). Rose avers that the hourly rates for him, Kennedy, and Kocian are $425, $425, and $350, respectively. (Rose Decl. ¶¶ 25–27). However, he provides no supporting documentation, such as sample fee agreements or affidavits from former clients. To the contrary, Rose asserts that over 90% of his clients retain him on a contingency basis. (Id. at ¶ 14). Plaintiff also suggests that the Court look to the hourly rates of opposing counsel, Aymen Aboushi and Tahanie Aboushi, who ostensibly billed Defendants at hourly rates of $425 and $350, respectively, and who moved for attorneys' fees seeking hourly rates of $350 and $300, respectively. (Pl. Fee Br. 11; Pl. Fee Reply 3; see also Dkt. # 69 (affirmations of Defendants' counsel in support of post-trial fee application)). While clever, this analogy only goes so far, inasmuch as (i) the Court denied the earlier motion without addressing the reasonableness of the fees sought and (ii) counsel for Defendants did not aver that their clients had actually paid them at such rates.
2. Determining the Hours Reasonably Expended
The next step in the Court's analysis is to determine whether the hours expended by Plaintiff's counsel were reasonable. In support of her fee application, Plaintiff has submitted a summary of time records that “specify, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done.” Carey, 711 F.2d at 1148. According to these records, Rose billed 209 hours on this litigation, Kennedy billed 8 hours, and Kocian billed 4 hours.
C. Calculating Reimbursable Costs
Plaintiff claims reimbursable costs in the amount of $1,845.04. (Pl. Fee Br. 13; Pl. Fee Reply 8). Defendants seek substantiation of the costs claimed by Plaintiff. (Def. Fee Opp. 12). Rose provided a list of the expenses in Exhibit B to his declaration, and Plaintiff provided backup for those expenses in Exhibit D to her Reply Brief. While it might have been preferable to submit the backup documentation earlier, the Court finds that the costs of $1,845.04 have been adequately supported.
D. Imposition of Attorneys' Fees and Costs
Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $82,970.04. In reaching this figure, the Court applied the lodestar method as follows: