No. 05-04-00924-CR
Opinion Filed November 14, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 380-82054-03. Affirmed.
Before Justices MORRIS, WRIGHT, and FRANCIS.
Opinion By Justice FRANCIS.
A jury convicted Richard Cecil Dusek of possession of methamphetamine in an amount of one gram or more but less than four grams. After appellant entered pleas of true to two enhancement paragraphs, the jury assessed punishment at confinement for life. In four issues, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in admitting illegally-seized evidence, the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to affirmatively link him to the methamphetamine, and an accomplice-witness's testimony was not corroborated. We affirm.
Background
The trial evidence shows appellant, Pauline Duenes, Carl Matthew Davis, and Beth Leyva drove from Lawton, Oklahoma to Allen, Texas where they checked into a hotel. Appellant registered the hotel room in his name and described his car on the registration form. Subsequently, hotel manager Patricia Elmougy called Allen police to report that Davis was behaving strangely. Allen police officer Robert Hembest responded to Elmougy's call. Hembest found Davis sitting in the passenger seat of appellant's car apparently under the influence of narcotics. Hembest asked Davis if he was okay. As Davis exited the car, Hembest observed a roach clip, used to hold marijuana cigarettes, on the car console. When Hembest asked to see the contents of his pockets, Davis pulled out an illegal butterfly knife. Hembest arrested Davis for carrying the illegal knife. While searching Davis incident to arrest, Hembest discovered Davis was carrying a syringe which he believed Davis had recently used to inject methamphetamine. While searching the car, Hembest found a loaded handgun protruding from under Davis's seat. Sergeant James Foust and patrol officer Michelle Peal arrived to assist Hembest. After Hembest reported to Foust what he had found, Foust decided to impound the car. Elmougy then informed the officers that the car and hotel room were registered to appellant rather than to Davis. Davis could not remember his room number, so Elmougy provided the officers with appellant's hotel registration information for room 229. Elmougy told the officers that she would refund appellant's money if the officers would make the occupants of room 229 leave the hotel. Foust agreed to ask the occupants to leave, but he explained to Elmougy that he could not compel them to leave. Foust admitted at trial that one of his motives in going to room 229 was to get inside the room and look around. No one answered Foust's first knock on the door of room 229. Foust knocked again and said, "Richard, let me in." Duenes then answered the door. Foust informed Duenes that Davis had been arrested and that the police intended to tow the car. Duenes told Foust that she did not know anything about Davis or the car and that the other man in the room was named "James." Duenes then closed the door and the officers walked away. As the officers were leaving, Duenes came out of the room with car keys. When Foust asked her where she was going, she replied that she was moving the car so it would not be towed. Because Duenes had given him inconsistent information, Foust asked Duenes for her identification. While he inspected Duenes's identification, Foust asked to speak to "James." Appellant was lying on the southernmost of the two double beds with only his feet visible from the doorway. The beds were two-to-three feet apart. Appellant rose from the bed and came to the door. Appellant identified himself truthfully. After Foust told him that his car was being impounded, appellant asked Foust for directions to Allen from Oklahoma so he could arrange transportation. While speaking with appellant at the doorway, Foust learned that Duenes had outstanding warrants. Foust asked appellant if the officers could enter the room to speak to Duenes. Appellant responded "Sure, come on in" and all three officers entered the room. Peal contacted Duenes and placed her under arrest. Foust saw an open map on the desk and walked over to it so he could show appellant the directions from Oklahoma. Hembest visually inspected the room for the officers' safety. On the desk, Foust and Hembest observed about thirty boxes of cold medication containing pseudoephedrine. Foust knew that the cold medications could be used to make methamphetamine. After Foust finished giving appellant directions, appellant asked to use the telephone. Appellant then sat on the northernmost bed and made a telephone call. Leyva was asleep or passed out on the same bed. On the bedspread, Hembest saw a clear, plastic bag of methamphetamine. The bag was positioned where it could not be observed from the doorway but it was plainly visible to someone inside the hotel room. When Hembest held up the bag, appellant asked, "What's that?" Near the plastic bag, Hembest saw an unzipped, red leather bag. Inside the red bag, Hembest could see more clear, plastic bags like the one containing the methamphetamine. At that point, the officers handcuffed appellant and Leyva. Hembest searched appellant but did not find any weapons or drugs on him. However, Hembest found a loaded handgun on the floor about one foot away from appellant. The red bag contained methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. Peal discovered a black bag with more methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Before appellant's trial, Leyva agreed to plead guilty to possession of methamphetamine and to testify against appellant as part of a plea bargain agreement with the State. Leyva testified that all four members of her group were addicted to methamphetamine. Leyva admitted that she had been previously convicted of possession of methamphetamine. Leyva related that the group left Lawton just to get out of town. Both Davis and appellant brought methamphetamine on the trip. Everyone understood that during the trip they would shoplift ephedrine which is used to make methamphetamine. After arriving in Texas, appellant drove from store to store while Davis shoplifted the ephedrine pills. While waiting for Davis, appellant and Duenes injected methamphetamine in a parking lot. Leyva estimated that appellant and Duenes injected methamphetamine about three times over a fifteen-hour period. Everyone was high and had been using the methamphetamine that Davis and appellant had brought on the trip. The group used all of appellant's methamphetamine before they arrived at the hotel. Everyone was going to share Davis's methamphetamine. Although Leyva admitted that she had been up for three days before falling asleep in the hotel room and that methamphetamine impairs short-term memory, she was certain that the red leather bag belonged to Davis and that appellant did not own any of the remaining drugs. Although appellant did not have the right to possess the drugs, Leyva admitted that appellant might "bum" some drugs off of Davis. Leyva testified the room was registered to appellant because he had identification. L.C. Dotson, supervisor of the narcotics unit of the Allen Police Department, collected the drug evidence from room 229. Dotson collected thirty-two boxes of pseudoephedrine and some lithium batteries from the desk. Dotson testified that the pseudoephedrine and lithium batteries are ingredients in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Inside the red bag, Dotson found ten clear, plastic bags containing methamphetamine and residue, a plastic bag of marijuana, another plastic bag with marijuana residue, 200 marijuana cigarettes, six lithium batteries, a cut straw used to inhale drugs, a metal piece from a smoking device, and three coffee filters, one of which contained methamphetamine residue. The black bag contained a plastic bag of methamphetamine, six lithium batteries, a marijuana pipe, a butane lighter, and a syringe. Police also recovered a digital scale. Dotson testified that, in his opinion, appellant's group was gathering materials to make methamphetamine in the hotel room. The room, however, did not exude the strong, chemical odor associated with methamphetamine manufacturing. The State called two forensic specialists to testify. One said that no fingerprints could be recovered from the drug bags and the gun found in the hotel room. The second testified that the various powders and residues found in the drug bags did, in fact, contain methamphetamine. A total of 2.05 grams of methamphetamine was recovered from the hotel room. After the State presented its evidence, the defense rested without calling any witnesses. Ruling On Motion To Suppress
In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the drug evidence. As a result of the error, appellant contends, the trial court admitted illegally-obtained evidence in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution. We review a trial judge's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of discretion, giving almost total deference to the trial judge's determination of historical facts but reviewing search and seizure law de novo. Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). If the issue involves the credibility of witnesses, making the evaluation of the witnesses' demeanor important, we defer to the trial judge's determination of the facts. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. When the trial court does not file findings of fact, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and assume the trial court found facts favorable to its ruling when the record supports the implicit findings. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855. When the defense relitigates the suppression issues at trial, we may consider evidence from the trial in reviewing the motion to suppress. See Rachal v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799, 809 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Appellant does not make a separate argument regarding the state and federal constitutional violations. Indeed, he concedes that the state and federal protections offer similar protection. See Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 232 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) (concluding that the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 9 protect the same right to the same degree). Accordingly, we will not discuss separately the state constitutional issue. See Rachal, 917 S.W.2d at 808 n. 7. Appellant's motion to suppress sought to suppress all evidence arising from his detention and the allegedly illegal search of his hotel room. The motion alleged that the officers did not seek permission before entering and searching the room. Appellant contended the officers acted without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. During his hearing on the motion, appellant denied giving the officers permission to enter. Appellant testified Foust told him that his car was "arrested," but would not tell him why. Foust told him the manager would like him to leave and would refund his money. Appellant agreed to leave but informed Foust that he would need to make a telephone call and he asked Foust for directions from Oklahoma. At that point, Foust walked into the room uninvited. Foust never told appellant about Duenes's warrants or her being arrested. Appellant testified Duenes was arrested in the hallway and was already handcuffed when he went into the hallway. Appellant admitted the boxes of cold medication and the batteries were on the desk by the map. Appellant denied knowing about the bag of methamphetamine, the red bag, or the gun. Appellant testified he kicked the gun aside when he stumbled over it. The State called all three officers and Elmougy to testify. Elmougy testified that she encountered Davis, one of appellant's traveling companions, in the hallway of the hotel. Davis was lying on the floor and could not remember his hotel room number. After Davis went down to the parking lot with car keys, Elmougy became alarmed that Davis presented a danger to public safety. Elmougy called the police to report Davis was behaving suspiciously. The three officers gave abbreviated versions of their trial testimony, focusing on their interactions with Duenes and appellant at the doorway to room 229 and their conduct and observations inside the hotel room. Having already found drugs outside, Foust admitted that the officers were looking for "an angle" to enter the room to search for more drugs. All three officers testified that Foust requested permission to enter the room to talk to Duenes and appellant had expressly consented to the officers' entry. Hembest admitted that he had not individually requested permission to enter the room. However, Foust recollected that he had asked appellant if "we" could enter to talk to Duenes. Elmougy, who was waiting down the hallway within earshot, confirmed that an officer had asked for permission and appellant had told the officers to "come on in." Hembest admitted that if he had gone straight to Duenes to place her under arrest, he would not have seen the drugs from the doorway. Peal admitted the officers never asked for permission to search the room. The State contended that the officers and manager credibly testified that the officers had consent to enter the room. Once the officers were in the room, the officers saw a bag of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in plain view, and thus a search warrant was not required. Additional bags, like the one containing methamphetamine, were visible in the red bag and protruding from the black pouch. Moreover, the red bag and black pouch could be searched incident to arrest. The gun was discovered during a search incident to appellant's arrest. After hearing the evidence and argument, the trial court found that the search was consensual and it denied appellant's motion. On appeal, appellant now contends the officers' contact with appellant at his doorway constituted a detention, that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him, that the contraband was discovered during an illegal search conducted without his consent, that any consent given was not voluntary, and that the officers exceeded the scope of his consent. Appellant's contentions are not meritorious. The Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 9 protect persons from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 9. The constitutional search and seizure protections extend to hotel guests and their rooms. Fontenot v. State, 792 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no pet.). However, not every encounter between a police officer and a citizen triggers these constitutional protections. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); Hunter v. State, 955 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). Officer Foust had the same right as any other citizen to knock on appellant's door, inform him of what transpired with Davis and the car, and relay Elmougy's request that he leave the premises. See Hunter, 955 S.W.2d at 104; Fontenot, 792 S.W.2d at 254. Foust's questions and requests to appellant would be considered consensual and not a detention triggering constitutional protections unless the totality of the circumstances shows Foust conveyed a message that compliance with his questions and requests was required and a reasonable person would not feel free to disregard Foust and go about his business. See Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629 (2003); Hunter, 955 S.W.2d at 104. On appeal, appellant contends he did not feel free to end his contact with Foust. Appellant points out that three officers asked to speak specifically to him, Foust never informed him that he could refuse to speak with the officers, they had arrested his friend and impounded his car, and although the officers asked to come inside to speak to Duenes, Foust "maintained close contact" with him during the visit. As evidence of the effect the officers' conduct had on him, appellant points to testimony showing he asked for Foust's permission before making his telephone call. Viewing the evidence under the appropriate standards, we cannot agree with appellant that he was detained as a result of his encounter with the officers. When Foust first contacted Duenes, she spoke briefly with him and then closed the door, thus indicating through her conduct that she understood the contact was voluntary. The officers then began to leave. When the officers returned, they waited at the threshold and asked to speak with appellant and then again with Duenes. Only Foust spoke with appellant. The officers' weapons were not drawn. Foust did not accuse appellant of anything, did not request permission to search the room, and did not threaten to get a search warrant. The officers did not enter the room until appellant expressly invited them inside. Once inside, Foust focused his attention on appellant because appellant asked for his help with directions. The trial court, as fact finder, was free to disregard any inference from appellant's request for permission to use the telephone. We conclude the officers did not convey a message that appellant's compliance with their requests was required and, therefore, the record shows appellant's encounter with the officers was consensual. See Hunter, 955 S.W.2d at 104. Regarding appellant's contention that the search was conducted without his consent, the trial court heard conflicting evidence of what happened at the threshold of room 229. Appellant's testimony during the suppression hearing, if believed, would establish that he did not consent to the officers' entry into the room. In finding the encounter consensual and denying the motion to suppress, the trial court resolved the disputed factual issues in favor of the State. We will defer to the trial court's determination of the witnesses' credibility. See Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 857. See also Fontenot, 792 S.W.2d at 252-54 (concluding that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to suppress where police officers and defense witnesses gave conflicting testimony regarding whether defendant had consented to officers entering his motel room). Having found appellant was not detained and having deferred to the trial court's finding that the officers entered room 229 with appellant's consent, we likewise conclude the contraband was not seized in an illegal search. Appellant's invitation to the officers to enter his hotel room cannot be construed as consent to a search. See Alberti v. State, 495 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973) (op. on reh'g). However, after appellant invited the officers to come inside, they were not trespassers, and they had the right to seize without a warrant any evidence in plain sight. See Alberti, 495 S.W.2d at 237; Bell v. State, 676 S.W.2d 219, 220 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1984, pet. ref'd). Evidence is considered to be in plain sight, and thus subject to seizure, if officers can see the evidence from a vantage point where they have a right to be and there is probable cause to associate the evidence with criminal activity. Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 685 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Upon entering the hotel room with appellant's consent, the officers could lawfully seize the methamphetamine that was in plain sight. See Alberti, 495 S.W.2d at 237; Bell, 676 S.W.2d at 220. As we will discuss more thoroughly in conjunction with appellant's sufficiency issues, the circumstances affirmatively linked appellant to the methamphetamine. Having arrested appellant and his companions for possessing the methamphetamine in plain sight, the officers could lawfully search incident to arrest the arrested persons and the areas within their immediate control in order to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence such as the remaining drugs, drug paraphernalia, and the handgun. See McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1004 (2003). Regarding appellant's contention about the voluntariness of his consent, appellant's motion to suppress alleged he had not consented to the officers' entry into the room. Appellant testified that the officers entered without first obtaining his consent. Appellant did not raise a voluntariness issue and thus may not raise this contention for the first time on appeal. See Hailey v. State, 87 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). See also Wade v. State, 164 S.W.3d 788, 791-93 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (failure to raise issue in trial court precluded appellate review of contention that guest could not consent to police search of defendant's motel room). Moreover, even if appellant could argue that his consent was involuntary, the trial court found otherwise. In denying appellant's motion, the trial court orally found the officers' search of appellant's room was consensual. Implicit in the trial court's finding of consent and ruling on the motion to suppress is a finding that appellant's consent was voluntarily given. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (holding that voluntariness of consent to search is question of fact to be determined from totality of the circumstances). Finally, we consider appellant's contention that the officers exceeded the scope of his consent. Although appellant did not raise this issue in his motion to suppress and he testified that he gave no consent, the record from the suppression hearing does show that counsel cross-examined the officers about their conduct in the room extraneous to the arrest of Duenes. Assuming, without deciding, that the defense raised an issue of the scope of consent, the contention lacks merit. The record shows appellant invited the officers in to speak with Duenes and to help him with directions. Appellant and Foust went to the desk to review the map. Hembest visually scanned the room for possible security threats. We agree with the State that any reasonable person inviting police officers into his hotel room would expect the officers to scan the room to ensure there are no threats to their safety. The officers had reason to be cautious because Davis had been armed. Hembest's failure to detect the loaded gun on the floor demonstrates the limited scope of his visual inspection of the room. We conclude the officers did not exceed the scope of appellant's invitation. Viewing the evidence under the appropriate standard, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion to suppress. See Alberti, 495 S.W.2d at 237; Fontenot, 792 S.W.2d at 252-54; Bell, 676 S.W.2d at 220. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's first issue. Sufficiency of The Evidence
In his second and third issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to show he exercised actual care, control, and management over the methamphetamine and knew the methamphetamine was contraband. We conclude the evidence is sufficient. In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Sanders v. State, 119 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). In reviewing a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the fact-finder was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). We will find the evidence to be factually insufficient when the evidence supporting the verdict, considered by itself, is too weak to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or when the contrary evidence is so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. Id. at 484-85. Under either review, the fact-finder is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647-48 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Harvey v. State, 135 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly or intentionally possessed methamphetamine in an amount of one gram or more but less than four grams. See Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(a), (c) (Vernon 2003). To do so, the State had to prove appellant exercised care, control, or management over the methamphetamine and knew it was contraband. See Guiton v. State, 742 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987); Taylor v. State, 106 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). Control over the contraband need not be exclusive and can be jointly exercised by more than one person. See McGoldrick v. State, 682 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985); Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 831. If the accused does not have exclusive possession of the place where the contraband was found, the State must affirmatively link the accused to the contraband. See Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995); McGoldrick, 682 S.W.2d at 578. The link need not be so strong as to preclude every other reasonable explanation except the accused's guilt. Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 748. No set formula exists to dictate a finding of affirmative links sufficient to support an inference of knowing possession of contraband. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 831. The number of links is less important than the degree to which the links, alone or in combination, tend to affirmatively link the accused to the contraband. Id. Possible affirmative links include whether the defendant was present when the drugs were found, whether the drugs were in plain view, whether the drugs were found in proximity to and accessible by the defendant, whether the defendant was under the influence of drugs when arrested, whether the defendant possessed other contraband or drug paraphernalia, whether the defendant made incriminating statements when arrested, whether the defendant attempted to flee, whether the defendant made furtive gestures, whether there was an odor of drugs, whether the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found, whether the place the drugs were found was enclosed, the amount of drugs found, whether the defendant possessed weapons, and whether the defendant possessed a large amount of cash. Id. Although appellant was present and the hotel room was registered to him, he contends the State could not affirmatively link him to the drugs so as to establish his mens rea to possess methamphetamine because the contraband belonged to Davis and was found in Davis's personal effects, he was not near the drugs when the police first arrived, he cooperated with the police, the small quantity of drugs and his actions in moving toward the drugs and the gun show he was unaware of the contraband, he did not appear to be under the influence of drugs, he did not have much cash, and Leyva was not a credible witness. Additionally, we observe that none of the officers saw appellant actually possess the guns or drugs. No fingerprint evidence was admitted showing appellant touched the bags of drugs. Officer Hembest admitted it was possible that the gun found at appellant's feet was left there by a previous occupant of the room. Nevertheless, we conclude the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to link appellant to the methamphetamine. Appellant was present in an enclosed hotel room, registered to him, with methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. Methamphetamine was in plain view within a few feet of appellant's bed and ingredients to manufacture additional methamphetamine were in plain view on the desk. A gun was found at appellant's feet. Although appellant himself did not appear to be under the influence of drugs, Davis showed obvious signs of being under the influence of drugs and Leyva was passed out on the bed. Finally, Leyva's testimony connects appellant to the methamphetamine found in his hotel room. Leyva testified that all four members of the group were methamphetamine addicts. Although Leyva testified that Davis owned the drugs in the red bag, all four addicts were freely sharing the drugs appellant and Davis brought on the trip. Leyva estimated that appellant had injected methamphetamine three times in the previous fifteen hours. Appellant drove Davis to stores so Davis could shoplift ephedrine pills to make more methamphetamine. We conclude the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to affirmatively link appellant to the jointly-possessed methamphetamine found in his hotel room and to show he knew the substance was contraband. See id. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's second and third issues. Corroboration of Accomplice-Witness Testimony
In his fourth issue, appellant contends the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to corroborate Leyva's testimony as required by article 38.14 of the code of criminal procedure. Article 38.14 provides: "A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 38.14 (Vernon 2005). It is not necessary that the corroborating evidence directly connect the defendant to the crime or that it be sufficient by itself to establish guilt; it need only tend to connect the defendant to the offense. Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). If the combined weight of the non-accomplice evidence tends to connect the defendant to the offense, the requirement of article 38.14 has been fulfilled. Id. Each case must be considered on its own facts and circumstances. Reed v. State, 744 S.W.2d 112, 126 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988). Because Leyva entered a guilty plea to the same offense, she was an accomplice to the possession of methamphetamine as a matter of law. See Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). Appellant concedes that some corroborating evidence exists; but he contends that only Leyva's testimony establishes his mens rea to commit the offense. Without Leyva's testimony, appellant contends, the evidence merely shows he possessed a hotel room and he was present when drugs were found in the room. Appellant further contends that Leyva's testimony is inconsistent with any corroborating evidence in that she testified that Davis possessed the drugs and appellant had no right of possession except to "bum" drugs from Davis. Furthermore, appellant challenges Leyva's credibility in light of her plea bargain, drug addiction, lack of sleep, and memory problems. Finally, appellant compares his actions to Duenes's actions and concludes the evidence against him is far less probative for showing he possessed methamphetamine. The State's non-accomplice evidence shows the police found methamphetamine, marijuana, numerous items of drug paraphernalia, and ingredients for methamphetamine manufacturing in a hotel room registered to appellant. Appellant was present when the drug evidence was discovered. Appellant was lying on a bed two-or-three feet from a visible, plastic bag of methamphetamine. More bags of drugs were visible in an unzipped red bag also within a few feet of appellant. Thirty-two boxes of pseudoephedrine and several lithium batteries-ingredients used to manufacture methamphetamine-were on the desk. A loaded pistol was on the floor beside appellant's bed. One of appellant's companions, armed and apparently high on drugs, was arrested in the parking lot with a used syringe. We conclude that these facts tend to connect appellant to the drugs and corroborate Leyva's testimony. Contrary to appellant's suggestions, we see no inconsistencies either within Leyva's testimony or between her testimony and the corroborative evidence. Nothing in the evidence precluded Davis from both owning the drugs and sharing them with his friends. To the contrary, the fact finder could infer joint possession of the drugs from the fact that Davis left his drugs in the hotel room when he went down to the parking lot. The jury heard evidence about Leyva's drug addiction, memory lapses, and lack of sleep, but found her credible anyway. Finally, given the overwhelming evidence that both Duenes and appellant knowingly possessed the methamphetamine, it is immaterial that appellant reacted differently from Duenes to the presence of the police at the door. The jury could reasonably infer that Duenes adopted a strategy of deception while appellant chose to behave nonchalantly, both unsuccessfully attempting to conceal the offense being committed in their room. We conclude the evidence sufficiently corroborates Leyva's accomplice-witness testimony to comply with article 38.14. See Cathey, 992 S.W.2d at 462. Therefore, we overrule appellant's fourth issue. We affirm the trial court's judgment.