Opinion
No. 92-1206.
June 30, 1993.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Broward County, George A. Brescher, J.
Marc L. Goldman, Law Offices of Marc L. Goldman, Miami, and Mark H. Klein, Law Offices of Mark H. Klein, Miami, for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
Norman Dreese appeals an award of $10,000.00 as attorney's fees pursuant to a contingency fee agreement. Although the trial court found that the attorney had reasonably spent 138.3 hours on this case, and that $150.00 per hour was a reasonable fee, the trial court only awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $10,000.00, as opposed to $20,745.00. The trial court reduced the award for the stated reason that the judgment was obtained by default. Under Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), this was error.
The supreme court held in Rowe that a trial court may reduce a lodestar figure depending on the "results obtained." The "results obtained" may reduce the lodestar, but only if the prevailing party is successful on a claim, and unsuccessful on other unrelated claims. Id. at 1151. In the instant case, the appellant was successful on its entire claim. Therefore, the trial court erred when it reduced the lodestar. Upon remand, the trial court should enter attorney's fees in the amount of $20,745.00.
In addition, the trial court failed to consider a contingency risk factor when awarding attorney's fees. Under Standard Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1990), this too was error. Though the trial court does not have to impose a contingency risk factor, the trial court must address this factor upon remand. Id. at 831.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
HERSEY and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.
STONE, J., dissents with opinion.
I would affirm. In my judgment it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to limit Plaintiff's attorney's fee to $10,000 on a claim for $7,000 in commissions owed. There is no reason why a trial court may not consider the amount of the claim and judgment relative to the fee awarded, the nature of the action, and the fact that no trial was required, in arriving at a reasonable fee, notwithstanding that the time expended by counsel and the hourly rate sought are otherwise reasonable.
I also cannot read Rowe and Quanstrom as mandating an explanation of why no "multiplier" was applied where the fee awarded by the court is already three times higher than the amount counsel would receive on a one-third contingency payable out of the recovery.