Opinion
No. 32248.
May 25, 1936.
1. TIME.
Under statute providing that owner or any person interested in land sold for taxes may redeem it at any time within two years after date of sale, in order that two full years may elapse, day of sale must be excluded, since law does not recognize any fractional part of a day in computing period for bar of an action or right by lapse of time (Code 1930, sec. 3264).
2. TIME.
Land held redeemed from tax sale within time allowed by law, and hence purchaser of land was not entitled to confirm tax title, where sale was made on April 7, 1930, and land was redeemed on April 7, 1932, which was within two years after day of sale (Code 1930, sec. 3264).
APPEAL from chancery court of Jackson county. HON. D.M. RUSSELL, Chancellor.
Mize, Thompson Mize, of Gulfport, for appellant.
The only question in the case is a question of the construction of the statute with reference to time. The lot was sold on the 7th of April, 1930. It was attempted to be redeemed on April 7, 1932. The statute with reference to redemption of property that was in force in 1932 is Section 3264 of the 1933 Supplement, which is the same as Section 3264 of the Code of 1930 in so far as the time within which it may be redeemed, and among other things provides as follows: ". . . may redeem the same . . . at any time within two years after the day of sale."
The question then is when does the time expire. Section 1393 of the Code of 1930 provides that the term year when used in the statute means a calendar year unless a contrary contention be expressed. A calendar year in common acceptation and ordinarily means three hundred sixty-five days except leap year.
9 C.J. 1118, sec. 1397; Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Tompkins, 111 Miss. 592; Rayl v. Thurmond, 124 So. 432.
If the statute on redemptions should be read that a party has two years next after the date of sale within which to redeem, then the court below was correct, but the statute not reading that way we submit that it was the intention that the redemption should be made inside of two years, and that the word "next" could not be read into the statute.
Other cases throwing light on the computation of time areas follow:
Provident Life Acc. Ins. Co. v. Jemmison, 120 So. 180; Childs v. Board of Supervisors, 128 So. 338; Tripp Furniture Co. v. Cox, 133 So. 238; Winchester v. State, 142 So. 454.
We respectfully submit that the redemption was not made in time and to have been made in time within two years after the day of the sale next means that it would have had to have been redeemed by midnight of April 6th.
Ford Ford, of Pascagoula, for appellees.
Redemption laws like exemption laws should be and have always been construed by this court liberally in favor of the redemptionist. The statute under which this redemption was made is Section 3264 of the Code of 1930 which reads: "The owner or any person for him or with his consent . . . may redeem the same . . . at any time within two years after the date of sale."
Manifestly reading after the day of sale, the general construction of statutes should be followed. Section 1397 of the Code, while not exactly in point on this question specifically provides that when any number of days shall be prescribed, one day shall be excluded and the other included. As this court has repeatedly held, the law does not know and does not recognize a fraction of a day.
Provident Life Acc. Ins. Co. v. Jemmison, 120 So. 180; Childs v. Supervisors Webster County, 128 So. 338; Grocery Co. v. Tompkins, 111 Miss. 592.
Manifestly, since the law does not recognize a fraction of a day, the entire day of sale should be excluded and not included as contended for by appellant.
Redemption laws are construed liberally in favor of the redemptionists.
Maris v. Lindsey, 124 Miss. 742.
This is an appeal from a decree of the chancery court of Jackson county sustaining a demurrer to and finally dismissing a bill of complaint filed by the appellant, Wesley G. Dougall, seeking to confirm a tax title to land therein described.
The bill of complaint alleged that said land was duly and legally assessed for taxes for the year 1929, that on April 7, 1930, after legal advertisement, it was sold to Mrs. Evelyn Hunt Conner for the delinquent taxes for the year 1929, and that on May 5, 1932, the said Mrs. Evelyn Hunt Conner conveyed it to the appellant by quitclaim deed. There was no tax collector's deed exhibited with the bill, but there was filed as an exhibit thereto a copy of the record of tax sales to individuals for the year 1930, showing a sale of said land on April 7, 1930, and the redemption or an attempted redemption thereof by C.A. Carriere on April 7, 1932, and the payment of the redemption money to Mrs. Evelyn Hunt Conner on April 14, 1932.
In disposing of this appeal, the only point necessary to be decided is whether or not the land in question was redeemed from the tax sale within the time allowed by law. The statute authorizing the redemption of land from tax sales, which is section 3264, Code of 1930, provides that: "The owner, or any person for him with his consent, or any person interested in the land sold for taxes, may redeem the same, . . . at any time within two years after the date of sale."
The law does not recognize any fractional part of a day in computing the period for the bar of an action or right by the lapse of time, and it is our view that, in order that two full years may elapse "after the day of sale," the day of sale must be excluded. In the cases of Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Tompkins, 111 Miss. 592, 71 So. 866, and Rayl v. Thurman, 156 Miss. 1, 123 Miss. 853, 124 So. 432, the court had under review limitations provided by the words "next after the rendition of such judgment or decree," and, in construing these provisions to require the exclusion of the day the judgment or decree was entered, the court seems to have attached some force to the word "next" in the phrase within seven years or within six months "next after the rendition of such judgment or decree." But upon further consideration we can see no substantial difference in the meaning of the phrases "within two years next after the day of sale," and "within two years after the day of sale."
The only import of the word "next" in the phrase is to make more definite and certain the intention to limit the time to the stated period immediately following the day of sale, but for this purpose it is mere repetition, as the phrase "within two years after the day of sale" clearly and fully limits the period of time to that immediately following the day of sale.
In the case at bar the sale was made on April 7, 1930, and the land was redeemed on April 7, 1932, which was "within two years after the day of sale." Consequently, the decree of the court below will be affirmed.
Affirmed.