Opinion
3:21-CV-00133-CDL-CHW
03-10-2022
JAMES DORSEY, Petitioner, v. Sheriff STEVE THOMAS, Respondent.
RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL
CHARLES H. WEIGLE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
In accordance with the Court's previous orders and instructions, pro se Petitioner James Dorsey, an inmate currently confined in the Franklin County Detention Center in Carnesville, Georgia, has paid the filing free required to proceed with his application for federal habeas corpus, in which he seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1). Under the rules governing habeas corpus actions, district courts are required to promptly examine every application filed and thereafter enter a summary dismissal “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4; see also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2243. This review establishes that it is plain on the face of the Petition that Petitioner is not now entitled to relief in this Court.
Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts allows the Court to apply the rules to other types of habeas corpus petitions.
The federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), “limits the power of a federal court to grant a writ of habeas corpus vacating the conviction of a state prisoner on the ground that the conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States.” Hardy v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c)). One of those limitations is that a district court “may not grant such applications unless . . . the applicant has exhausted state remedies.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181. This exhaustion requirement also applies to habeas corpus petitions filed under § 2241. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 489-92 (1973) (exhaustion necessary under § 2241 and § 2254); Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 814 (11th Cir. 2004) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (“Among the most fundamental common law requirements of § 2241 is that petitioners must first exhaust their state court remedies.”). A state prisoner is required (with few exceptions) to “exhaust[] his state remedies by presenting his constitutional claim to the State courts, to afford them an opportunity to correct any error that may have occurred.” Hardy, 684 F.3d at 1074.
“A failure to exhaust occurs . . . when a petitioner has not ‘fairly presented' every issue raised in his federal petition to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review.” Pope v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr. 680 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal alterations omitted); Mason v. Allen, 605 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). The exhaustion requirement thus reflects a policy of comity between state and federal courts and reduces “friction between the state and federal court systems by avoiding the ‘unseem[liness]' of a federal district court's overturning a state court conviction without the state courts having had an opportunity to correct the constitutional violation in the first instance.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999) (alteration in original). “If a petitioner fails to exhaust his state remedies, a district court must dismiss the petition without prejudice to allow for such exhaustion.” Gore v. Crews, 720 F.3d 811, 815 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
In this case, Petitioner completed a standard form petition for writ of habeas corpus under § 2241. On this form, Petitioner complains that he has been held in the Franklin County Detention Center for approximately two years without a bond, and he also alleges that his detention is unconstitutional because various individuals withheld exculpatory evidence; tampered with or stole evidence; conspired to manufacture charges against him; and lacked authority to arrest Petitioner. Pet. 2, 6-7, ECF No. 1. Petitioner, however, checked “No” in response to the question, “Did you appeal the decision, file a grievance, or seek an administrative remedy?” Id. While Petitioner does appear to suggest elsewhere in his Petition that he filed at least one writ of mandamus with the Georgia Court of Appeals, he also acknowledges that he is still waiting for those proceedings to be resolved. See id. at 21 (stating that he is “[w]aiting for granting/denial Petition for Certiorari Georgia Supreme Court” and acknowledging that “[i]f the Supreme Court doesn't grant certiorari on the mandamus petition then the stated claims will be ripe for review”). Petitioner has therefore failed to exhaust with respect to any state court mandamus petition he may have filed. Petitioner also indicated that he filed a separate § 2241 proceeding in the Northern District of Georgia, id. at 23, but this filing would not serve to exhaust any remedies Petitioner had in the Georgia state courts.
It should also be noted that with the possible exception of his claims concerning any alleged denial of bond, Petitioner's claims recount alleged violations of his rights that should be addressed during the pending criminal proceedings against him. Because these claims “are properly brought during his criminal case and subsequent direct appeal, ” they may not be challenged via § 2241 petition. Garcon v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 291 Fed.Appx. 225, 226 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of § 2241 petition as premature where petitioner argued his indictment was invalid and arrest warrant was not supported by probable cause, among other things); see also Braden, 410 U.S. at 493 (emphasizing that a federal habeas corpus petitioner would not be permitted to “derail[] a pending state proceeding by an attempt to litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court”). The Petition also fails to assert any reason why these remaining claims are not barred by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971), which generally prohibits federal courts from intervening in pending state criminal proceedings unless there is evidence that the proceedings were brought in bad faith, the party seeking federal court intervention would suffer irreparable injury, or there is no adequate alternative state forum for that party to raise his constitutional challenges. See Hughes v. Attorney Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1263 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2004).
For these reasons, it is plain on the face of the Petition that Petitioner has failed to exhaust, and the failure to exhaust cannot be cured by providing Petitioner an opportunity to amend. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's application be DISMISSED without prejudice and that his motion for a show cause hearing (ECF No. 4) be DENIED as moot. Petitioner would be permitted to return to federal court if necessary after affording the State a full opportunity to review his grounds for relief.
The undersigned also finds that Petitioner has no absolute entitlement to appeal a dismissal of his claims. Before he may appeal, the district court must first issue a certificate of appealability (“COA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 11(a); Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d 1363, 1364 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[S]tate prisoners proceeding under § 2241 must obtain a COA to appeal.”). If “the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, ” a COA will not be issued unless the prisoner can show, at least, “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). Because it is clear on the face of this application that Petitioner failed to exhaust available state judicial remedies before filing in federal court, reasonable jurists could not find that a dismissal of the instant action was debatable or wrong. It is thus RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be DENIED a COA. See Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (approving denial of COA before movant filed a notice of appeal).
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to these recommendations with the Honorable Clay D. Land, United States District Judge, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this Recommendation. The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing written objections. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge's order based on factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
SO RECOMMENDED.