Opinion
KNLCV175015307
01-05-2018
Jessie DOE v. NORWICH ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESAN CORPORATION, et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Calmar, J.
The defendant moves to dismiss on the ground that the challenged allegations, subparagraphs 42(b), (c), (d), (h), (s), and (aa) of count one, are barred by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and article first, § 3, of the constitution of Connecticut.
FACTS
This case arises out of alleged childhood sexual abuse at a day school operated by a Catholic diocese. The plaintiff, J. Doe, alleges that in the fall of 1995, at the age of thirteen, he was placed by the Connecticut Department of Children and Families (DCF) at The Academy at Mount Saint John (Academy), a day school operated by the Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation (Diocese), where Brother K. Paul McGlade (Brother Paul), the now deceased and former director and teacher at the Academy, allegedly sexually abused the plaintiff. Bishop Daniel Reilly (Bishop Reilly) was the Bishop and chief executive officer at the Diocese from 1975 through 1994; and Bishop Daniel Hart (Bishop Hart), now deceased, was the Bishop and chief executive from 1995 through 2003. The plaintiff alleges that he was placed at the Academy from fall of 1995 through the spring of 1997.
The plaintiff filed the four-count complaint against the defendants, Diocese, Academy and Bishop Reilly, on January 4, 2017, in which the plaintiff alleges negligence, recklessness, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. On April 13, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss (# 114) certain paragraphs of count one, sounding in negligence, which was accompanied by a memorandum of law (# 115). On June 12, 2017, the plaintiff filed an objection (# 124) to the motion to dismiss and the defendants filed a reply on July 11, 2017. The matter was argued at short calendar on October 10, 2017. During oral argument, the plaintiff indicated he would file an amended complaint to resolve the alleged jurisdictional defects asserted in the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on October 10, 2017. The defendants filed a reply memorandum on October 16, 2017.
During oral argument on October 10, 2017, the court indicated that 37(d), (h), and (s) of count one in the companion case, Doe v. The Norwich Catholic Diocesan Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-17-5015369-S, were secular claims that did not implicate matters of religious doctrine and practice. Those subparagraphs are identical to 42(d), (h) and (s) in the present case. The court did not formally rule on the defendants’ motion to dismiss as to those subparagraphs during oral argument. Therefore, for purposes of completeness, this memorandum of decision will address all the challenged allegations of count one, which include 42(b), (c), (d), (h), (s), and (aa).
During argument, the court granted the plaintiff one week from October 10, 2017, to serve notice to amend subparagraphs 42(b), (c), (d), (h), (s) and (aa), five days for defendants to file a reply, and three days for the plaintiff to reply to the defendants’ response.
DISCUSSION
" [A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). " Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mark v. Neundorf, 147 Conn.App. 485, 489, 83 A.3d 685 (2014). " A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014).
" The first amendment to the constitution of the United States and article first, § 3, of the constitution of Connecticut prohibit the state’s involvement in the internal doctrinal matters of religious organizations." Thibodeau v. American Baptist Churches of Connecticut, 120 Conn.App. 666, 667, 994 A.2d 212, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 901, 3 A.3d 74 (2010). " [T]he first amendment has interpreted broadly to severely [circumscribe] the role that civil courts may play in resolving ... disputes concerning issues of religious doctrine and practice ... Under both the free exercise clause and the establishment clause, the first amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving disputed issues of religious doctrine and practice." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 671. " By contrast, exercise of governmental authority is permissible if it (1) has a secular purpose, (2) neither inhibits nor advances religion as its primary effect and (3) does not create excessive entanglement between church and state." Id., citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). " Under excessive entanglement analysis, civil tort claims requiring courts to review and interpret religious doctrine and practices are barred by the first amendment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thibodeau v. American Baptist Churches of Connecticut, supra, 671.
" [T]he Supreme Court consistently has held that civil courts are prohibited by the first amendment from adjudicating disputes turning on church policy and administration or on religious doctrine and practice ... [As a] general rule ... religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and ... a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 672-73.
" The constitution, however, does not immunize every church action from juridical review ... Courts have considered it constitutionally appropriate to resolve cases using neutral principles of law so long as they do not implicate or are not informed by religious doctrine or practice ... But the exception in cases where neutral principles of law may apply ought not swallow the first amendment rule: where conduct is prima facie protected by the first amendment, a party seeking secular court jurisdiction bears a burden to show that the controversy in issue is outside the constitutional bar." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 673-75.
" The central question presented is whether the disputes require the court to interpret and to apply religious doctrine and practices or whether the dispute is simply a controversy that involves church officials but to which neutral principles of secular law can be applied without need to inquire into ecclesiastical matters." Id., 675. The defendant in Thibodeau " provided a clearinghouse whereby congregations seeking ministers could obtain information about available ministers. Over time, the defendant became concerned about the plaintiff’s fitness for the ministry. It decided to ‘flag’ his profile and decided not to circulate it to congregations seeking ministers." Id., 668. The plaintiff filed a four-count complaint in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant " ‘blacklisted’ him based on, inter alia, his theological perceptions. Resolution of this claim would involve an impermissible inquiry into the defendant’s internal procedures and its judgment regarding the qualifications of clergy, as well as the plaintiff’s objective qualifications for employment opportunities through the defendant." (Emphasis added.) Id., 677-78.
" [An] ecclesiastical decision[, however, ] is not totally free from legislative restrictions ... State restriction is permitted when the religious activity pose[s] some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order ... For example, a church could not select its ministers on the basis of their demonstrated willingness to commit a crime, or by forcing the candidates to play a game of Russian roulette and hiring whoever survived." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 688.
" The common-law doctrine of negligence does not intrude upon the free exercise of religion, as it does not discriminate against [a] religious belief or regulate or prohibit conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons ... The court’s determination of an action against the defendants based upon their alleged negligent supervision of [a priest] would not prejudice or impose upon any of the religious tenets or practices of Catholicism. Rather, such a determination would involve an examination of the defendants’ possible role in allowing one of its employees to engage in conduct which they, as employers, as well as society in general, expressly prohibit. Since the Supreme Court has consistently failed to allow the Free Exercise Clause to relieve [an] individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs, the defendants [cannot] appropriately implicate the First Amendment as a defense to their alleged negligent conduct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Noll v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X04-CV-02-4034702-S (October 20, 2008, Shapiro, J.) (46 Conn.L.Rptr. 527, 531-32).
" In deciding whether the defendants were negligent in the supervision of their employee, the court would be able to apply neutral principles of tort law to determine whether the defendants failed to act when they knew or should have known of the priest’s engaging in the alleged tortious conduct. There is no indication or allegation that, by taking the kind of preventative action required by tort law, the institutional defendants would have violated any doctrine, practice or law of the Roman Catholic Church. As noted previously, in the absence of such a conflict, subjecting the institutional defendants to liability does not violate their right to the free exercise of their religion. There is no constitutional bar to the application of neutral principles of tort law to determine whether the defendants failed to act if they knew or should have known of Father Jean’s alleged tortious conduct." Hayes v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-02-0100267-S (March 5, 2004, Silbert, J.) (36 Conn.L.Rptr. 676, 678).
" [T]he Academy Florida Trial Lawyers makes a convincing case that the First Amendment does not protect the church when the acts of the clergy involve children and are criminal in nature ... [J]ust as the State may prevent a church from offering human sacrifices, it may protect its children against injuries caused by pedophiles by authorizing civil damages against a church that knowingly (including show know) creates a situation in which such injuries are likely to occur." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 45 Conn.Supp. 397, 402-03, 716 A.2d 967 (1998), quoting Doe v. Dorsey, 683 So.2d 614, 617 (Fla.App. 1996). " Since the [United States] Supreme Court has consistently failed to allow the Free Exercise Clause to relieve [an] individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs, the defendants [cannot] appropriately implicate the First Amendment as a defense to their alleged negligent conduct ... The Free Exercise Clause might well prohibit this court from interfering in the manner in which the Diocese supervised a priest’s performance of Mass, or confession, but it certainly cannot prohibit this court, from determining whether the Diocese should be liable for negligently allowing its employees to engage in criminal conduct." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 403.
Against the backdrop of these principles, the court has reviewed the challenged allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint. Paragraphs 42(b), (c), (d), (h), (s), and (aa) of count one sounding in negligence allege the following:
42. The injuries and damages sustained by the Plaintiff were the result of the negligence and carelessness of the Defendants Diocese, Reilly, and Academy, its agents, servants and/or employees in one or more of the following ways, in that they:
(b) failed to adequately evaluate the mental fitness of Brother Paul to serve as Administrator of a boarding school with its related responsibilities to students, including the Plaintiff; (c) failed to periodically evaluate the mental fitness of Brother Paul to continue to serve in his capacity as Executive Director and teacher; (d) failed to adequately monitor and supervise Brother Paul in his interaction with minor students, many of whom were especially vulnerable, in order to prevent injury to them; (h) failed to provide training and/or educational programs to Brother Paul to inform him of proper conduct toward minor students; (s) failed to police activities of the staff, and in particular Brother Paul, upon premises it owned and controlled, including failing to provide or enforce a prohibition on staff having minors in private rooms; (aa) throughout the period Brother Paul was a member and/or employee of the Defendants, the Defendants, acting either individually, in concert, or through their agents, servants and/or employees, failed to thoroughly evaluate Brother Paul, failed to investigate, investigated inadequately, or concealed the results of their investigation of him, failed to remove him from the Defendants Diocese and Academy, and allowed him to continue to engage in improper conduct with minors allowing him to molest children.
The defendants rely on Aspinwall v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X03-CV-15-6066535-S (January 17, 2017, Moll, J.), wherein Judge Moll determined that, within the context of child sexual abuse, evaluation of a priest’s " fitness" for priesthood sufficiently entangles the court in questions of faith. However, the plaintiff points to Noll v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 46 Conn.L.Rptr. 527, wherein Judge Shapiro determined that " an examination of the defendants’ possible role in allowing one of its employees to engage in conduct which they, as employers, as well as society in general, expressly prohibit, " would not violate the defendants’ first amendment rights. Id., 531-32. " [T]he bulk of the plaintiff’s claims of negligent and reckless institutional failure to appropriately deal with child sexual abuse will not inexorably entangle the court in a doctrinal dispute." Id., 532. The court in Noll went on to dismiss paragraphs of the complaint that " expressly refer to alleged religion-based obligations, with phrases such as ‘induced the Catholic faithful, ’ ‘moral and spiritual well being, ’ and ‘representatives of God.’ " Id. Similarly, in Givens v. St . Adalbert Church, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-12-6032459-S (July 25, 2013, Sheridan, J.) (56 Conn.L.Rptr. 585), the court dismissed paragraphs of the complaint that alleged the defendant was subject to the " canons, rules, regulations, and discipline of the Roman Catholic Church, " and " the plaintiff ... a practicing Catholic, has sustained spiritual damage." This language is absent from the allegations in the present case. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleges that he was placed at the Academy by DCF. The complaint is devoid of any claim that the plaintiff was a parishioner or associated with the Academy for religious purposes.
The court finds the reasoning in Noll v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, more persuasive than the holding in Aspinwall v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, in the context of this case. A review of the challenged portions of the amended complaint leads to the conclusion that the allegations do not entangle the court with religious doctrine. Unlike in Aspinwall v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, where the court determined that, within the context of abuse, evaluation of a priest’s fitness for priesthood sufficiently entangles the court in questions of faith, here, the plaintiff does not allege that Brother Paul was a priest or member of the clergy. Rather, the plaintiff alleges negligent hiring and supervision of Brother Paul in his role as a school administrator, executive director, and teacher. Even if the plaintiff had alleged that Brother Paul was a priest, unlike in Thibodeau v. American Baptist Churches of Connecticut, supra, 120 Conn.App. 677, the " theological perceptions" of Brother Paul are irrelevant for the purposes of his fitness for ministry. Instead, any determination of whether the defendants evaluated Brother Paul’s fitness for acting as a priest and teacher at the Academy center on his criminal conduct and/or propensity for the same. In Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F.Supp.2d 139, 143-49 (D.Conn. 2003), the court held that inquiry into allegations similar to the ones in the present case " can generally be conducted without any entanglement in the religious doctrines and practices of the church." Id., 146. " Plaintiff has broadly alleged negligent hiring and supervision ... As we construe her claims, they do not involve the entanglement of this Court with the church’s religious practices. However, we would caution the parties to carefully limit the scope of this claim to the secular matters of negligent hiring and supervision." Id. Therefore, because the plaintiff has broadly alleged a secular negligent hiring and supervision claim as to Brother Paul’s role as a school administrator, executive director, and teacher, the defendants’ motion to dismiss subparagraphs 42(b), (c), (d), (h), (s), and (aa) of count one is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.