Summary
In Dixon v. Green, 240 Miss. 204, 127 So.2d 662 (1961), this Court affirmed a refusal by the commission to reopen a compromise settlement of a claim where the schedules were not applicable and it was not possible to determine the exact extent of disability. That compromise was based on Sec. 9(i). The Court pretermitted the question of whether Sec. 21 would apply to a 9(i) compromise. [Emphasis supplied].
Summary of this case from Bailey Lumber Co. v. MasonOpinion
No. 41647.
March 13, 1961. ON SUGGESTION OF ERROR
1. Workmen's compensation — compromise and settlement — Commission's refusal to set aside order of approval correct.
Workmen's Compensation Commission's refusal to set aside its order of approval of compromise settlement of a claim was correct where Commission found it was not possible to determine exact extent of disability, claimant was aware of doubtful nature of his claim, Commission talked with claimant about effect of the settlement, he knowingly signed an application for the settlement, and there was no showing of fraud or unfair advantage by employer or its insurer. Sec. 6998-15, Code 1942.
2. Workmen's compensation — compromise and settlement — statute authorizing reopening of compensation case not applicable.
Section of the Workmen's Compensation Act authorizing reopening of a case for changed conditions or mistake did not, under the circumstances, apply to a proceeding to set aside Commission's approval of a compromise settlement of a claim. Secs. 6998-15, 6998-27, Code 1942.
Headnotes as approved by Ethridge, J.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Grenada County; HENRY L. RODGERS, Judge.
Leon E. Provine, Grenada, for appellant.
I. The Circuit Court erred in not reversing the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Commission on the weight of the evidence in the trial of the cause.
II. The Court erred in not finding as a matter of law that the Commission had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties.
III. The Court erred in finding that the Commission's order of 30th July 1959, being an order of the attorney-referee, was well taken and that the Commission had a right to settle a total disability case under a 9(i) agreement, drawn up by the attorney for the insurance company, and finding less than total disability even though the medical evidence showed total disability.
IV. The Court erred in finding that Section 6998-27 continuing jurisdiction of the Commission was not applicable in the instant case, said section specifically stating that the Commission's jurisdiction continued in event of any error, mistake, or determination of fact, and that the instant case has direct application of said section. Sec. 6998-27, Code 1942.
V. The Court erred in not reversing the orders of the Commission by not finding as a fact that the insurer had signed a B-15 agreeing to pay claimant during disability, recognizing a liability under their agreement, and then discontinuing such payments for over seven months while claimant was destitute and, as a matter of fact, coerced claimant into signing papers prepared by the insurer while claimant was totally disabled and under medical sedation for a subarachnoid brain hemorrhage. Secs. 6998-19(j), 6998-21, Code 1942.
VI. Court erred in not setting aside the order of the Commission dated 29th April 1958 and set the cause down for hearing on its merits.
Beach, Davidson Beach, Jackson, for appellees.
I. We find no decision of this Court construing Section 6998-15 with respect to the finality of a compromise settlement approved by the Commission. It is manifest, however, that said Section 6998-15, Code 1942, provides that compromise payments may be made where the prescribed schedules are not applicable, with the approval of the Commission, which must first determine that such compromise payment is in the best interest of the injured worker. Final authority in such questions is vested in the Commission. Therefore, when the Commission has exercised its discretion, has approved the proposed compromise payment and the consideration has been paid, the Commisison is divested of further jurisdiction. Johnson v. Atlas Processing Co. (La.), 58 So.2d 346; Paltsios's Case, 329 Mass. 526, 109 N.E.2d 163; Secs. 6998-15, 6998-27, Code 1942; Dunn, Mississippi Workmen's Compensation, Secs. 209, 211; 2 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law (1960 Cum. Supp.) p. 158.
ON SUGGESTION OF ERROR
Appellant argues that the Workmen's Compensation Commission was in error in refusing to set aside a compromise settlement of a workmen's compensation claim, to re-examine the extent of his disability, under Sec. 21, Miss. Code 1942, Rec., Sec. 6998-27, and award further compensation. We have carefully reconsidered this record, and conclude that our original judgment should stand, affirming the order of the Commission and judgment of the circuit court. Hence the suggestion of error is overruled, but the original opinion herein is withdrawn, and this one inserted in its place.
Appellant sustained an injury on May 29, 1957, while working for appellee Green, moving concrete culvert pipes. Apparently he suffered a subarachnoid hemorrhage, probably resulting from an arterial aneurysm. He was hospitalized, and the insurance carrier paid medical expenses and temporary total disability for fifteen weeks, to September 11, 1957. After negotiations between claimant and the insurance carrier, appellant and appellees filed with the Commission on April 21, 1958, a joint petition for approval by the Commission of a compromise settlement of his claim. The petition set up the facts, and alleged the claim was a questionable and doubtful one as to any causal connection between claimant's employment and his remaining disability. The parties agreed to settle the matter by payment of $1,000 to claimant in a lump sum. Attached to the petition was a "Settlement Agreement and Release", dated April 18, 1958, and signed by claimant. The petition asked the Commission to approve that agreement. Hon. John Craig, Chairman of the Commission, discussed the matter personally with Mr. and Mrs. Dixon around April 20. There was some correspondence concerning the proposal. Craig advised them fully of their rights and urged them to be certain that they intended to settle the matter in full. This was the Commission's practice before approving a settlement. Appellant wanted to go ahead with it, so on April 29, 1958, the Commission entered an order reciting the facts and approving the compromise settlement. Thereafter appellant was paid and accepted the $1,000 agreed upon, as approved by the Commission.
On January 21, 1959, claimant filed a petition with the Commission, which sought to set aside the Commission's order of April 29, 1958, and to reopen his claim for further compensation and redetermination of his disability. There was a hearing before the attorney-referee. He concluded that the compromise agreement and the Commission's order approving it were valid under Sec. 9(i) of the Act. Hence appellant's petition to reopen the case was dismissed, thereby sustaining appellees' motion to dismiss. The Commission and the circuit court affirmed that action.
The Commission's approval of the compromise settlement of appellant's claim was sufficiently based upon Sec. 9(i) of the Act, being Code Sec. 6998-15. It provides: "Rules of the commission shall govern compromise payments where the prescribed schedules are not applicable and which in its discretion may be made in cases where it is not possible to determine the exact extent of disability, as for example in certain injuries to the back or head. Commutation and lump sum settlement payments shall be governed by rules of the commission, and shall not be made except when determined to be in the best interest of the injured worker or his dependents, the commission having final authority in such questions."
(Hn 1) The prescribed schedules were not applicable here. The Commission found it was not possible to determine the exact extent of disability to claimant's back and head. The record reflects that appellant was well aware of the existence of a doubtful claim as to whether he still had a compensable disability, connected with the accident; or whether the employment injury had ended and there remained only a condition predating the accident. One of the members of the Commission talked with claimant about the effect of a settlement. He knowingly signed the application for a compromise settlement, and the agreement, with full cognizance of its import. The Commission reviewed in detail the petition for settlement, and approved it. Appellant failed to show any fraud by appellees or unfair advantage by them. He knew what he was doing. Hence the Commission was manifestly correct in refusing to set aside its order of approval and the compromise.
(Hn 2) For these reasons we do not reach the question of whether Sec. 21 of the Act, authorizing reopening of a compensation case for changed conditions or mistake, could apply under other and different circumstances. Code Sec. 6998-27. Certainly it could not apply here. See Dunn, Miss. Workmen's Compensation Law (1957), Sec. 211.
Suggestion of error overruled.
All Justices concur, except Rodgers, J., who took no part.