DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. 109,205.5 SQUARE FEET OF LAND

Full title: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Plaintiff, v. 109,205.5 SQUARE FEET OF LAND et. al…

Court: United States District Court, D. Columbia

Date published: Apr 21, 2005

Civil Action No.: 05-202 (RMU), Document No. 7 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2005)

Opinion

Civil Action No.: 05-202 (RMU), Document No. 7.

April 21, 2005

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND

RICARDO URBINA, District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on the plaintiff, the District of Columbia's (the "District") motion to remand to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia ("Superior Court") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447. Defendant CSX Corporation ("CSX") contends that this court has federal question jurisdiction over the instant case and thus the defendant properly removed it to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Specifically, CSX claims that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act ("ICCTA"), 49 U.S.C. § 10501, preempts the District's condemnation of the defendant's lands. Because the court concludes that federal preemption does not exist, the court does not have federal question jurisdiction over this case, and any federal concerns may be addressed in the Superior Court, it grants the plaintiff's motion to remand.

II. BACKGROUND

On January 6, 2005, the District filed in the Superior Court a condemnation action involving two parcels of land in the District that CSX owns. Pl.'s Mot. to Remand ("Pl.'s Mot.") at 1. The land encompasses one parcel of 109,204.5 square feet of land, more or less, situated between Franklin Street, N.E., and Rhode Island Ave., N.E., (Parcel C) and another parcel of 85,651 square feet of land, more or less, situated between Rhode Island Ave., N.E., and southerly line of R Street, N.E., (Parcel B). Def.'s Opp'n at 1. The purpose of the condemnation is to acquire the subject property for a pedestrian and bicycle trail. Pl.'s Mot. at 1. On January 27, 2005, the defendant filed a notice of removal to this court. Id. at 2 On that same day, the Superior Court issued an order removing the case to this court. Id. On February 25, 2005, the District filed a motion to remand back to the Superior Court. Pl.'s Mot. at 1. The court now turns to that motion.

III. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard for Remand

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and therefore the law presumes that "a cause lies outside of [the court's] limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938). According to the removal statute, a defendant may properly remove to federal court an action brought in a state court when original subject-matter jurisdiction exists in the form of diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Diversity jurisdiction exists when the action involves citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00 per plaintiff, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187 (1990).

Additionally, a defendant may properly remove to federal court an action brought in a state court when the federal court enjoys original subject matter jurisdiction, that is, a claim arising under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b); Hardin-Wright v. Dist. of Columbia Water and Sewer Auth., 350 F. Supp. 2d 102, 104 (D.D.C. 2005) (citations omitted). "If, however, state law creates the cause of action, the court must determine whether the adjudication of those state law claims requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law, because the mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction." Id. at 104-05 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (citing Merell Dow Pharm, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 US 804, 813 (1986); Franchise Tax. Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983)). "[F]ederal courts have fashioned a two-pronged test in order to determine if a state cause of action can provide the basis for federal removal jurisdiction. The removing party must show (1) that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on a question of federal law, and (2) that the question of federal law is substantial." Int'l Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers v. Ins. Co. of the W., 2005 WL 713608, at *4 (D.D.C. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see generally Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. 804.

Courts must strictly construe removal statutes. Williams v. Howard Univ., 984 F. Supp. 27, 29 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing Shamrock Oil Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 107-09 (1941)). The court must resolve any ambiguities concerning the propriety of removal in favor of remand. Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999); Nwachukwu v. Karl, 223 F. Supp. 2d 60, 66 (D.D.C. 2002). When the plaintiff makes a motion to remand, the defendant bears the burden of proving federal jurisdiction. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; Wilson v. Republic Iron Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921); Nat'l Org for Women v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 612 F. Supp. 100, 101 (D.D.C. 1985).

If a defect in removal procedures or lack of subject-matter jurisdiction becomes apparent at any point prior to final judgment, the removal court must remand the case to the state court from which the defendants originally removed the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). In the event that the federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, remand is mandatory. Republic of Venez. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 287 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Johnson-Brown v. 2200 M St. LLC, 257 F. Supp. 2d 175, 177-78 (D.D.C. 2003).

B. The Court Grants the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand 1. Legal Standard for Federal Preemption

The preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution and stands for the general proposition that courts implement Congress's intent for a federal law to trump, and therefore supersede the enforceability of, a state law. Fidelity Fed. Sav. Loan Assoc. v. De La Cuesta, 458 US 141, 152-153 (1982); see U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. Application of the preemption doctrine requires the court to examine congressional intent, whether it be express or implied. Fidelity Fed. Sav. Loan Assoc., 458 U.S. at 152-153. In general, to determine whether a federal statute or regulation preempts state law, the court must evaluate: (1) the congressional intent to occupy the entire field and whether the pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme leaves no room for state supplementation; (2) the level of dominance of the federal interest in preventing state intervention; and (3) the danger of conflict between state laws and the administration of a federal program. Commonwealth of Pa. v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05 (1956). "Accordingly, the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in the preemption analysis." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 331 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).

2. The Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act

"Congress and the courts long have recognized a need to regulate railroad operations at the federal level[,]" and Congress's authority to do so under the Commerce Clause is well established. City of Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Therefore, "[i]n enacting the ICCTA, Congress sought to deregulate and federalize many aspects of railway regulation that previously had been reserved for the states in an effort to revitalize the surface transportation industries." Cedarapids v. Chi., Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 265 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1011 (N.D. Iowa 2003). To ensure that deregulation and federalization of the rail industry would come about, the ICCTA grants exclusive jurisdiction of most rail regulation matters to the Surface Transportation Board ("STB"). Cedarapids, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1012; CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 944 F. Supp. 1573, 1583 (N.D. Ga. 1996). Consequently, the ICCTA provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided under this part with respect to the regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law." 49 U.S.C § 10501(b)(2). Some courts have interpreted the ICCTA as a broad statement of Congress's intent to preempt state regulatory authority over railroad operations. CSX Transp., Inc., 944 F. Supp. at 1581. "The most natural reading of section 10501(b)(2) is that federal remedies provided by the ICCTA are the only remedies available as to the regulation of rail transportation, and that the federal remedies are exclusive of state remedies except where the [ICCTA] has expressly provided otherwise." CSX Transp., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1581 (citations omitted); see also Wis. Cent. LTD. v. City of Marshfield, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1013 (W.D. Wis. 2000). Hence, by enacting the ICCTA, Congress ensured that states would not impose regulations that conflict with or undermine those set forth in the ICCTA. Cedarrapids, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1013.

3. The ICCTA Does not Preempt the Instant Eminent Domain Proceeding

The defendant argues that the ICCTA expressly preempts the District's power of condemnation as to land owned or used by a railroad company. Def.'s Opp'n at 7. The District argues that ICCTA does not necessarily preempt its eminent domain authority when dealing with railroads. Pl.'s Reply at 2. Courts have been split on the broadness of preemption under ICCTA; some have held it preempts all state efforts, City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1029-103; Wis. Cent. LTD, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1013, and others have held it applies only to the regulation of rail transportation. Iowa, Chi. E.R.R. v. Wash. County, 584 F.3d 557, 561 (8th Cir. 2004); Fla. E. Coast R.R. Co. v. City of West Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir 2001). Despite this split, the STB, which is the administrative body that governs railroad operations, has stated that "Federal preemption does not completely remove any ability of state or local authorities to take action that affects railroad property. To the contrary, state and local regulation is permissible where it does not interfere with interstate rail operations." Maumee W.R.R. Corp. and RMW Ventures, LLC — Petition for Declaratory Order, 2004 WL 395835, at *1 (Surface Transp. Bd. Mar. 2, 2004); see also S.D. v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 919, 931 (D.S.D. 2003); Fla. E. Coast R.R. Co., 266 F.3d at 1330-31.

In the instant case, the District is seeking an easement on the defendant's property for a bike and pedestrian trail. Pl.'s Mot. at 1. "[A]cquisition of an easement by eminent domain to permit a crossing of railroad track in connection with construction of a new public street would not implicate the Federal preemption of 49 U.S.C. 10501(b) unless it would prevent or unreasonably interfere with railroad operations." Maumee, 2004 WL 395835, at *1; see also Dakota, Minnesota, E.R.R. Corp. v. S.D., 236 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1009 (D.S.D. 2002). Accordingly, the court's inquiry is whether the District's intended use of the defendant's property would unreasonably interfere with railroad operations. "Courts have held that Federal preemption can shield railroad property from state eminent domain law, but these holdings have been in situations where the effect of the eminent domain law would have been to prevent or unreasonably interfere with railroad operations." Maumee, 2004 WL 395835, at *2. Here, the District intends to use the easement as a bicycle and pedestrian trail. The defendant contends that a trail would interfere with railroad operations because the trail would impede its access to the signal boxes and prevent railroad maintenance. Def.'s Opp'n at 9, Ex. 2 (Hurley Aff. ¶¶ 8, 10). The District argues that the defendant can access its signal equipment from 8th Street, N.E., and can maintain its tracks with every public right of way intersection in Parcel B. Pl.'s Reply, Attach. 1 (Holben Aff. ¶ 6). Because the defendant still has vehicular access to their signal equipment and has general accessibility for the purpose of railroad maintenance, the court concludes that the easement will not impede railroad operations.

This brings the court to its next inquiry: whether the District's intended use poses an undue safety risk. Maumee, 2004 WL 395835, at *2. "[R]outine, non-conflicting uses, such as non-exclusive easements for at-grade road crossings . . . are not preempted so long as they would not impede rail operations or pose undue safety risks." Id. The defendant argues that when active railroad tracks are in close proximity to pedestrian and bicycle trails, their policy is to have its property line a minimum of 50 feet from the centerline of the track. Def.'s Opp'n at 9; Hurley Aff. ¶ 8. The defendant moreover contends that the easement would reduce this distance to 25 feet and create a safety risk without the appropriate setback distance, fencing, and other safety precautions. Def's Opp'n at 9; Hurley Aff. ¶ 9. The District argues that only a parking lot for the trail will be within 25 feet of the active rail and that the trail itself will maintain the 50 feet setback distance. Holden Aff. ¶ 3. In addition, the District intends to provide security fencing between any trail facility and active rail. Id. at ¶ 5. While a safety risk is always present whenever an active railroad track is involved, the court agrees with the District that its maintenance of the 50 foot setback distance from the active track along with building fencing to prevent access to the active rail prevents this undue safety risk. Therefore, because the use of the defendant's property would not interfere with railroad operations and the District's implementation of proper safety precautions would prevent an undue safety risk, this type of a crossing case is among those generally resolved in the state courts. Maumee, 2004 WL 395835, at *2. Accordingly, the court grants the plaintiff's motion to remand the case at hand to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

4. The Younger Abstention Doctrine Does not Apply

The court now addresses the final shot from the plaintiff's sling: the District's contention that this court should abstain from hearing this case pursuant to the Younger Abstention Doctrine. Pl.'s Mot. at 2-11. From the outset, it is incumbent on the court to note that "[t]he doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it." County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959). Despite abstention's narrow exception, Younger v. Harris and its progeny adhere to the policies of comity and a proper respect for state functions and "espouse a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances." Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assoc., 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982); JMM Corp. v. Dist. of Columbia, 378 F.3d 1117, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Thus, the question whether a federal district court should abstain is threefold: "first, . . . [is there] an ongoing state judicial proceeding; second, do the proceedings implicate important state interests; and third, is there an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges." Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432; JMM. 378 F.3d. 1117.

The District argues that because it filed its claim in the Superior Court there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding. Pl.'s Mot. at 7. Additionally, the District contends that the eminent domain proceedings are a matter of important state interests and thus it satisfies the second prong of the Younger Doctrine. Id. Finally, the District argues that the Superior Court provides the defendant with an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional concerns. Id. The defendant counters that once it removed the case from the Superior Court to this court, the state judicial proceedings necessarily ceased and thus the District fails to meet the first prong of the Younger Doctrine. Def.'s Opp'n at 4-5.

Here, while the Superior Court does provide litigants with an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges, Capitol Hill Hosp. v. Dist. of Columbia, 769 F. Supp. 16, 19 (D.D.C. 1991), and eminent domain presents an important state interest, La. Power Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1959), there is no on-going state proceeding. The defendant removed the pending action from the Superior Court to this court; therefore, the state proceedings ceased upon removal. Accordingly, the court concludes that the Younger Doctrine does not apply to the case at hand.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the court grants the plaintiff's motion to remand. An order directing the parties in a manner consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued this 21st day of April 2005.