Opinion
No. 99-CV-1131 (LEK).
January 9, 2003
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Background
This motion for final payment of legal fees comes before the Court following Plaintiffs' litigation of their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claim. After three trials, defendants City of Schenectady and Ronald A. Pedersen were found liable to plaintiff Rebecca DiSorbo. Following an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, DiSorbo was ultimately awarded $325,000.00 in damages. While the case was before the Court of Appeals, Plaintiffs had filed a motion for interim legal fees. Following that Court's decision, Plaintiffs have now moved for final payment of legal fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in the amounts set forth in their September 10, 2003 and August 2, 2002 motions. They seek a total of $313,808.00 in fees for 2183.2 hours of work and $29,435.69 in costs.
Defendant City of Schenectady ("Schenectady") opposes Plaintiffs' motion on the grounds that Plaintiffs' fee application fails to (1) sufficiently detail the services performed by Plaintiffs' attorneys for which compensation is sought; and (2) reflect that a significant amount of time for which compensation is sought was devoted to certain of Plaintiffs' claims that were ultimately unsuccessful. Schenectady also challenges Plaintiffs' request for expert witness fees and seeks a reduction by fifty percent of Plaintiffs' application for travel expense fees. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion is granted in the amount of $313,183.00 in attorneys fees and $28,330.69 in costs.
II. Discussion
(a) Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to § 1988
In determining whether a civil rights plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees, courts must determine (1) whether the plaintiff is the prevailing party and (2) whether the fees requested are reasonable. See Pino v. Locasio, 101 F.3d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1996). In the present action, Schenectady does not challenge that Rebecca DiSorbo is the prevailing party. As stated above, however, Schenectady does challenge the reasonableness of the requested fees.
"The calculation of reasonable attorneys fees is a factual issue whose resolution is committed to the discretion of the district court," Cruz v. Local Union No. 3 of the Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted), as "the district judge is in the best position to weigh the respective input of counsel, considering [his] superior understanding of the litigation." In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 1987).
"The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). This "lodestar" should be based on prevailing market rates and current rates, and the Court "should include the number of hours claimed by plaintiffs' attorneys that are supported by time records, that are not excessive or duplicative, and that do not reflect work done only in connection with unrelated claims on which plaintiffs did not succeed." LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 764 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court should use an hourly rate that is "in line with [those] rates prevailing in the community for similar services of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Cruz, 34 F.3d at 1159 (quotingBlum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n. 11 (1984)). The relevant community to which the Court should look is the district in which the case was brought.
In the Northern District of New York, the current prevailing hourly rates generally applied are: $175.00 for civil rights attorneys with significant experience and numerous years of practice; $125.00 for associates with four or more years of experience; $100.00 for newly admitted attorneys; and $65.00 for paralegals. People ex rel. Vacco v. Rac Holding, Inc., 135 F.Supp.2d 359, 363. (N.D.N.Y. 2001). These rates were recognized for the first time in TM Park Ave. Associates v. Pataki, 44 F.Supp.2d 158, 167 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) ( vacated on other grounds by 214 F.3d 344 (2d Cir. 2000)). The prevailing rates for work done prior to March 25, 1999 were $150.00 for partners, $100.00 for associates, and $50.00 for paralegals. Id. at 166.
(b) Sufficiency of Detail in Plaintiffs' Application
Schenectady contends that Plaintiffs' fee application lacks the detailed specificity required by law for awarding legal fees. The Court disagrees. Citing Hensley for the proposition that a district court may, in its discretion, reduce any granted award of attorneys fees accordingly where the documentation of hours is inadequate, Schenectady points to particular entries within the exhibits provided by Plaintiffs' attorneys as illustrative of Plaintiffs' failure to provide the necessary detail. However, in examining the entirety of Plaintiffs' materials, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' attorneys have adequately documented both the number of hours spent on the case and the nature of the work performed during each of those hours.
The Second Circuit requires that any attorney who applies for court-ordered compensation in this Circuit should "specify, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done." New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1147 (2d Cir. 1983). Here, Plaintiffs' attorneys have met all of these criteria to the Court's satisfaction. Plaintiffs' attorneys have all submitted affidavits and exhibits that break down their time spent on the case into tenths of an hour, and the hours are sorted by attorney name and date. In addition, the affidavits divide the hours expended and expenses incurred during the case into appropriate categories (e.g. "Investigation and Discovery," "Pre-trial Depositions," "Pre-trial Motions," etc.). The entries contained within these submissions sufficiently indicate the nature of the work performed.
Even if the Court were to agree with Schenectady that the entries pointed out in Schenectady's memorandum lacked sufficient detail, "Second Circuit decisions generally reduce fee awards only when there are numerous entries . . . [that are too vague],"Broome v. Biondi, 1997 WL 691427, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), and the Court will neither deny attorneys fees nor make an across-the-board reduction for lack of specificity when "[t]he time records overall . . . afford sufficient opportunities to evaluate the reasonableness of time expended on each task." Id. In this case, any entries that might be considered vague are few in number and certainly do not detract from the Court's ability to evaluate the reasonableness of time expended by Plaintiffs' attorneys on each task. The Court finds that Plaintiffs' entries meet the Second Circuit's requirements and that Plaintiffs' application is sufficiently detailed.
(c) Degree of Plaintiffs' Success
Schenectady's second challenge to Plaintiffs' fee application rests on the ground that Plaintiffs' attorneys fees should be reduced due to the limited success that Plaintiffs achieved. Specifically, Schenectady contends that the fees should be reduced because Plaintiffs' counsels' affidavits (1) fail to differentiate between the work done on behalf of Jessica DiSorbo's unsuccessful claims and appeals and the work done on behalf of Rebecca DiSorbo's successful claims and appeals and (2) fail to differentiate between the work done on behalf of Rebecca DiSorbo's successful claims and appealed claims of excessive force, battery, and abuse of process and the work done on behalf of Rebecca DiSorbo's unsuccessful claims and appeals.
As stated above, the district court has broad discretion in determining the reasonableness of the attorneys fees requested. The Supreme Court has listed twelve factors that district courts should generally consider in making this determination. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429-30. Schenectady's challenge focuses on the eighth factor — the amount involved and the results obtained. As the Hensley Court noted, "[t]his factor is particularly crucial where a plaintiff is deemed `prevailing' even though he succeeded on only some of his claims for relief."Id. at 434. Schenectady has not challenged Plaintiffs' fee application on the basis of the other eleven factors, but the Court notes that, in any event, consideration of these other factors weighs significantly in Plaintiffs' favor. Plaintiffs' attorneys litigated this fact-intensive case for more than three years on a contingency fee basis, preventing the attorneys involved from billing on matters that were certain to generate fees. In addition, the case was litigated against police officers, charging those officers with misconduct, and, as Plaintiffs point out in their memorandum, such cases are understandably undesirable. It is also the Court's opinion that Plaintiffs' attorneys served as excellent advocates on behalf of their clients and that their expertise was critical to Plaintiffs' ultimate recovery. Finally, the Court is satisfied that the fee award sought by Plaintiffs here is comparable to other fee awards in similar cases.
These factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
With respect to the results obtained by Plaintiffs' attorneys, it is clear that Plaintiffs were only partially successful, as all of Jessica DiSorbo's claims were dismissed following the first trial and were unsuccessfully appealed. Likewise, Rebecca DiSorbo was unsuccessful to the extent that she failed in her claims of false arrest against defendant Pedersen and excessive force and false arrest against defendant Kenneth Hill, as well as in her New York State battery claim. Schenectady contends that Plaintiffs' time entries fail to differentiate between Plaintiffs' successful and unsuccessful claims and appeals, and that this lack of specificity renders it impossible for the Court to determine which functions were performed for which plaintiff or for which claim. On these grounds, Schenectady asks that Plaintiffs' motion be dismissed.
The Court takes its direction in evaluating Schenectady's argument from Hensley, which dealt primarily with the issue of calculating the reasonableness of fees given less than complete success. As the Supreme Court explained, when a plaintiff has succeeded on only some of his claims for relief, two questions must be addressed: "First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award?" Hensley, at 434. The Court then distinguished cases in which "counsel's work on one claim will be unrelated to his work on another claim" from cases in which "the plaintiff's claims for relief will involve a common core of facts or will be based on related legal theories."Id. at 435. In the latter category of cases, "[m]uch of counsel's time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis," and, rather than viewing such cases as a series of discrete claims, "the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation."Id.
In this action, Plaintiffs achieved a degree of success commensurate with the hours expended on the litigation by Plaintiffs' attorneys. While Jessica DiSorbo's claims were dismissed following the first of the three trials, and while Rebecca DiSorbo was unsuccessful on some of her claims, the Court finds that this litigation falls into the latter category of cases described above. These claims were all grounded in a common core of facts, and were based on related legal theories, such that it would have been difficult for Plaintiffs' attorneys to divide the hours expended on the litigation on a claim-by-claim basis.
In this litigation, all claims arose from the same events, namely the confrontations between Plaintiffs and the defendant officers at the Union Inn Bar and, subsequently, at the police station. Thus, nearly every claim involved the same events and the same witnesses as did every other claim, and the successful claims shared a common core of facts with the unsuccessful claims. Similarly, both Plaintiffs brought the same claims in the lawsuit. As a result, any legal research done by Plaintiffs' attorneys would have benefitted both clients, and the research performed would not be "divisible" by client with respect to billing. The claims litigated in this action, then, and the work required by Plaintiffs' attorneys with respect to each of those claims, were almost entirely interrelated with one another, and the Court believes that this case exemplifies exactly the type of lawsuit discussed by the Hensley Court as one that "cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims." Furthermore, the efforts of Plaintiffs' attorneys recovered a substantial award of $325,000 for their clients.
Accounting for all of the above considerations, the Court finds that the "lodestar" figure of $313,808 (minus $625, as discussed below), or the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate, is not an excessive amount given the results obtained by Plaintiffs' attorneys. The number of hours represented by Plaintiffs' attorneys is justified by the attorneys' performance and the results achieved. That Plaintiffs' attorneys were thorough and well prepared was evident to this Court throughout the litigation, and the Court believes that the amount requested in Plaintiffs' attorneys fees application is reasonable given the degree of success they obtained.
(d) Costs
Schenectady's final challenge to Plaintiffs' application regards Plaintiffs' request for reimbursement of expert witness fees and travel expenses. Following the Supreme Court's 1991 holding that "§ 1988 conveys no authority to shift expert fees,"West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102 (1991), it is now well settled that expert witness fees are not compensable as costs under § 1988. See Wilder v. Bernstein, 975 F.Supp. 276, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying plaintiffs reimbursement for expert fees based on Casey's proscription of such fee shifting). See also Swans v. City of Lansing, 65 F.Supp.2d 625, 648 (W.D.Mich. 1998) (plaintiff's motion for expert witness fees pursuant to § 1988 was "not well-received in light of United States Supreme Court precedent."); Baird v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 830 F.Supp. 1183, 1188 (S.D.Ind. 1993) ("Under the teachings ofCasey, plaintiffs . . . are not entitled to expert fees under § 1988."). The Court will therefore reduce Plaintiffs' award of costs by $1,105.00, the amount Plaintiffs seek to recover for "Expert witness fees paid."
With respect to Schenectady's challenge of Plaintiffs' request for travel expenses, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' request for travel expenses should be granted in full. Schenectady is correct that "courts in this circuit customarily reimburse attorneys for travel time at fifty percent of their hourly rates." Broome, at *4 (citing Jennette v. City of New York, 800 F.Supp. 1165, 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). See also Williams v. New York City Housing Authority, 975 F.Supp. 317, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). However, the expenses challenged here by Schenectady are not "travel time" reimbursement expenses, but rather they are the literal expenses of travel, such as airfare and hotel expenses. These expenses are properly awarded to Plaintiffs in this case. The Court will, however, deduct $625 from the lodestar amount awarded to Plaintiffs, representative of fifty percent of the amount billed by Plaintiffs' attorney Adrienne Kerwin for her time spent traveling to and from Alabama in January of 2000. See Exhibit "A" attached to the Affidavit of Adrienne Kerwin.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Plaintiffs' motion for final payment of legal fees and costs is GRANTED AS MODIFIED and that Plaintiffs are awarded attorney fees and costs in the amount of $341,513.69; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this order on all parties by regular mail.
IT IS SO ORDERED.