Summary
holding "a different result on a subsequent application for disability is not material to the previous finding" despite determination of disability "as of . . . the day after the ALJ's decision"
Summary of this case from Atkinson v. AstrueOpinion
5:07CV00028 HLJ.
March 26, 2008
ORDER
Plaintiff has filed a motion to remand. (Docket #15) According to Plaintiff, she filed a subsequent application after the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the instant case filed his opinion denying her benefits. That application was granted; Plaintiff was found disabled as of September 22, 2006, the day after the ALJ's decision in the case before the Court.
Plaintiff asks that this case be remanded to consider her disability from her alleged onset date through the date of the ALJ's denial. But that period of time is the period of time that was considered by the ALJ; that fact has not changed.
Plaintiff argues that the result on the second application and on the first are inconsistent. The Court does not know how the two applications were different, other than the time period under consideration. It is not the Court's function on appeal to decide if Plaintiff was disabled. The Court's function on review is to determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and free of legal error. Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Generally, a different result on a subsequent application for disability is not material to the previous finding. See Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff's motion to remand is hereby denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.